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Rntroduction 
he Space Shuttle took shape and won support, and criticism, as part 
of NASA's search for a post-Apollo future. As with the Amy and 
Navy in World War 11, NASA had grown rapidly during the 1960s. 
Similarly, just as those military services saw a sharp falloff in funding in the 
wake of victory, the success of the piloted Moon landings brought insistent 
demands that NASA should shrink considerably. In facing those demands, 
and in overcoming them to a degree, NASA established itself as a permanent 
player in Washington. 
In civics books, we learn that the three branches of government include 
the White House, Congress, and the Supreme Court. In making policy and in 
carrying it out, however, the judiciary rarely plays a significant role. One may 
speak of a tripartite government with a different set of participants: the White 
House, Congress, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Though 
the OMB is part of the Executive Branch and responds to the wishes of the 
President, its officials have considerable leeway to shape policy in their own 
right, by cutting budgets. In seeking its post-Apollo future, NASA repeatedly 
had to accept such cuts, as its senior officials struggled to win support within 
the White House. 
During 1969, with Nixon newly elected and the first astronauts setting 
foot on the Moon, NASA Administrator Thomas Paine led a push for a Euture 
in space that promised to be expansive. He aimed at nothing less than a 
piloted expedition to Mars, propelled by nuclear rocket engines that were 
already in development. En route to Mars, he expected to build space stations 
and large space bases. Almost as an afterthought, he expected to build a space 
shuttle as well, to provide low-cost flight to these orbiting facilities. 
Soon after Neil Arrnstrong made his one small step in the lunar Sea of 
Tranquillity, Paine received a cold bath in the Sea of Reality. Nixon's budget 
Mayo, chopped a billion dollars from Paine's request. This 
brought an end to NASA's hopes for a space base and for flight to Mars. It 
appeared possible, however, to proceed with the space station and the shuttle, 
as a joint project. The shuttle drew particular interest within the Air Force, 
which saw it as a means to accomplish low-cost launches of reconnaissance 
satellites and other military spacecraft. 
ix 
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Congress, however, was deeply skeptical toward the proposed shuttldsta- 
tion, as both the House and Senate came close to killing it in 1970. NASA 
responded to this near-death experience by placing the station on the shelf and 
bringing the Shuttle to the forefront. Its officials needed political support that 
could win over doubters in Congress, and they found this support within the 
Department of Defense. 
The Air Force now found itself in a most unusual position. Its generals had 
worked through the 1960s to pursue programs that could put military astro- 
nauts in space. These programs had faltered, with the main ones, the 
Dyna-Soar and the Manned Orbiting Laboratory, being canceled in 1963 and 
1969 respectively. Yet here was NASA offering the Pentagon a piloted Space 
Shuttle, and promising to design it to meet Air Force needs. Indeed, the Air 
Force would receive the Shuttle on a silver platter, for NASA alone would fund 
its development and constmction. It is a measure of NASA’s desperation that 
it accepted the Shuttle project on those terms. The ploy, however, worked. The 
Air Force gave its political support to the Shuttle, and NASA went on to quell 
the opposition on Capitol Hill. 
The OMB was a tougher opponent. NASA tried to win it over by com- 
missioning cost-benefit studies that sought to support the Shuttle on economic 
grounds. These studies, however, merely provided more ammunition for the 
OMB’s critics. In mid- 197 1, these critics forced NASA to abandon plans for a 
shuttle with two fully reusable liquid-fueled stages, and to set out on a search 
for a shuttle design that would cost half as much to develop. Then, when the 
resulting design exercises promised success in meeting this goal, the OMB 
responded by arguing that this success showed that NASA could do still more 
to cut costs. Budget officials demanded a design that would be smaller and less 
costly, even though such a shuttle would have significantly less capability than 
the Air Force wanted. 
By shrinking the Shuttle, however, NASA won support where it counted. 
Caspar Weinberger, the OMB’s deputy director, gave his endorsement late in 
197 1. Nixon also decided that the nation should have the Shuttle. On the eve of 
decision, the key player proved to be OMB Director George Shultz. He decided 
that since the Shuttle was to serve the entire nation, it should have the full capa- 
bility for which NASA hoped and the Air Force demanded. Shultz’s decision 
reinforced Nixon’s, putting an end to the OMB’s continuing demands to down- 
size the design. The consequence was the Space Shuttle as we know it today. 
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C H A  T R O N E  
Space Sitations and 
Winged  R o c k e t s  
efore anyone could speak seriously of a space shuttle, there had 
to be widespread awareness that such a craft would be useful 
and perhaps even worth building. A shuttle would necessarily 
find its role within an ambitious space program. While science 
fiction writers had been prophesying such wonders since the days of Jules 
Verne, it was another matter to present such predictions in ways that smacked 
of realism. After World War 11, however, the time became ripe. Everyone 
knew of the dramatic progress in aviation, which had advanced from biplanes 
to jet planes in less than a quarter-century. Everyone also recalled the sudden 
and stunning advent of the atomic bomb. Rocketry had brought further sur- 
prises as, late in the war, the Germans bombarded London with long-range 
V-2 missiles. Then, in 1952, a group of specialists brought space flight clearly 
into public view. 
The Collier's Series 
One of these specialists, the German expatriate Willy Ley, had worked with 
some of the builders of the V-2 personally and had described his experiences, 
and their hopes, in his book Rockets, Missiles, and Space Travel.' The first 
version, titled Rockets, appeared in May 1944, just months before the first 
1. Citation in bibliography. 
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firings of the V-2 as a weapon. Hence, this book proved to be very timely. 
His publisher, Viking Press, issued new printings repeatedly, while Ley 
revised it every few years, expanding both the text and the title to keep up 
with fast-breaking developments.2 
One day in the spring of 195 1, Ley had lunch with Robert Coles, chairman 
of the Hayden Planetarium in Manhattan. He remarked that interest in astro- 
nautics was burgeoning in Europe. An international conference, held in Paris 
the previous October, had attracted over a thousand people. None had come 
from the U.S., however, and this suggested to Ley that Americans should orga- 
nize a similar congress. Coles replied, “Go ahead, the planetarium is yours.” 
Ley proceeded to set up a symposium that took place on Columbus Day. 
Admission was by invitation only. Some invitations, however, went to mem- 
bers of the press. Among the attendees were a few staffers from Collier’s, a 
magazine with a readership of ten million. Two weeks later, the managing 
editor, Gordon Manning, read a brief news item about an upcoming Air Force 
conference, in San Antonio, on medical aspects of space flight. He sent an 
associate editor, Cornelius Ryan, to cover this meeting and to see if it could 
be turned into a story.3 
While no space enthusiast, Ryan was a meticulous reporter, as he would 
show in such books as The Longest Day and A Bridge Too Far. At the meet- 
ing, he fell in with Wernher von Braun, who had been the technical director 
of the V-2 project. Von Braun, a consummate salesman, had swayed even 
Hitler.4 Over cocktails, dinner, and still more cocktails, Von Braun proceeded 
to deliver his pitch. It focused on a space station with an onboard crew living 
and working in space. Von Braun declared that it could be up and operating 
in orbit by 1967. It would have the shape of a ring, 250 feet in diameter, and 
would rotate to provide centrifugal force that could substitute for gravity in 
weightless space. The onboard staff of 80 people would include astronomers 
operating a major telescope. Meteorologists, looking earthward, would study 
cloud patterns and predict the  eath her.^ 
To serve the needs of the Cold War, von Braun emphasized the use a 
space station could have for military reconnaissance. He also declared that it 
2 Expanded versions appeared in 1945, 1948, and 1952 
3 Ley, Rockers, pp 330-331, AAS History Senes, vol 15, pp 235-242 
4 Domberger, V-2, pp 103- 1 1 1 
5 AAS History Senes, vol 15, pp 235-242. 
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could operate as a high-flying bomber, dropping nuclear weapons with great 
accuracy. To build it, he called for a fleet of immense piloted cargo rockets 
(space shuttles, though the term had not yet entered use) each weighing 7,000 
tons, 500 times the weight of the V-2. Yet the whole program-rockets, sta- 
tion and all-would cost only $4 billion, twice the budget of the wartime 
Manhattan Project that had built the atomic bomb.6 
With its completion, the space station could serve as an assembly point 
for a far-reaching program of exploration. An initial mission would send a 
crew on a looping flight around the Moon, to photograph its unseen far side. 
Later, perhaps by 1977, a fleet of three rockets would carry as many as 50 
people to the Moon's Bay of Dew for a six-week period of wide-ranging 
exploration using mobile  vehicle^.^ Eventually, perhaps a century in the 
future, an even bolder expedition would carry astronauts to Mars.' 
By the end of that evening, von Braun had converted Ryan, who now 
believed that piloted space flight was not only possible but imminent. 
Returning to New York, Ryan persuaded Manning that this topic merited an 
extensive series of articles that eventually would span eight issues of the mag- 
azine.g Manning then invited von Braun, together with several other 
specialists, to Manhattan for a series of interviews and discussions. These spe- 
cialists included Willy Ley; the astronomer Fred Whipple of Harvard, a moon 
and Mars specialist; and Heinz Haber, an Air Force expert in the nascent field 
of space medicine.'O 
In preparing the articles, Collier's placed heavy emphasis on getting the 
best possible color illustrations. Artists included Chesley Bonestell, who had 
founded the genre of space art by presenting imagined views of planets such 
as Saturn, as seen closeup from such nearby satellites as its large moon Titan. 
Von Braun's engineering drawings and sketches of his rockets and spaceships 
were used by Bonestell and the other artists to create working drawings for 
Von Braun's review. They would execute the finished paintings only after 
receiving Von Braun's corrections and comments.'' 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
Zbid.; 'time, December 8, 1952, pp. 67,71; Collier's, March 22, 1952, pp. 27-28. 
Collier's, October 18, 1952, pp. 51-59; October 25, 1952, pp. 38-48. 
Zbid., April 30, 1954, pp. 22-29. 
Zbid., March 22, October 18 and October 25, 1952; February 28, March 7, March 14, and June 27, 1953; 
April 30, 1954. Reprinted in part in NASA SP-4407, vol. I, pp. 176-200. 
CollierS, March 22, 1952, p. 23. 
AAS History Series, vol. 15, p. 237; vol. 17, pp. 35-39. 
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Collier‘s, March 
spumed a surge of 
space flight. 
(Courtesy of Ron 
22, 1952, 
anterest in 
,. 
MiUer) 
The first set of articles appeared in March 1952, with the cover illustra- 
tion of a space shuttle at the moment of staging, high above the Pacific. “Man 
Will Conquer Space Soon,” blared the cover. “Top Scientists Tell How in 15 
Startling Pages.” Inside, an editorial noted “the inevitability of man’s con- 
quest of space” and presented “an urgent warning that the U.S. must 
immediately embark on a long-range development program to secure for the 
West ‘space superiority.’ ”12 
The series appeared while Willy Ley was bringing out new and updated 
editions of his own book. It followed closely The Exploration of Space by 
Arthur C. Clarke, published in 1951 and offered by the Book-of-the-Month 
Club.13 The Collier’s articles, however, set the pace. Late in 1952, Time maga- 
zine ran its own cover story on von Braun’s ideas.14 In Hollywood, producer 
12. Collier’s, March 22, 1953, p. 23 
13. Citation In bibliography. 
14. Time, December 8, 1952. 
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Cargo rocket of the Collier’s series, 
with winged upper stage. (Art by 
Rolf Klep; courtesy of Ron Miller) 
George Pal was working already with Bonestell, and had brought out such sci- 
ence fiction movies as Destination Moon (1950) and When Worlds Collide 
(1951). In 1953, they drew on von Braun’s work and filmed The Conquest of 
Space, in color. Presenting the space station and Mars expedition, the film pro- 
posed that the Martian climate and atmosphere would permit seeds to sprout 
in that planet’s red ~ 0 i l . l ~  
Walt Disney also got into the act, phoning Ley from his office in Burbank, 
California. He was building Disneyland, his theme park in nearby Anaheim, 
and expected to advertise it by showing a weekly TV program of that name 
over the ABC television network. With von Braun’s help, Disney went on to 
produce an hour-long feature, Man in Space. It ran in October 1954, with sub- 
sequent reruns, and emphasized the piloted lunar mission. Audience-rating 
organizations estimated that 42 million people had watched the program.I6 
15. Miller and Durant, Worlds Beyond, pp. 100-102. 
16. Ley, Rockets, p. 331. 
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In its 1952 article, Time referred to von Braun’s cargo rockets as “shut- 
tles” and “shuttle rockets,” and described the reusable third stage as “a winged 
vehicle rather like an airplane.” His payload weight of 72,000 pounds proved 
to be very close to the planned capacity of 65,000 pounds for NASA‘s space 
sh~tt1e.I~ He expected to fuel his rockets with the propellants nitric acid and 
hydrazine, which have less energy than the liquid hydrogen in use during the 
1960s. Hence, his rockets would have to be very large. While his loaded 
weight of 7,000 tons would compare with the 2,900 tons of America’s biggest 
rocket, the Saturn V,Is his program cost of $4 billion was wildly optimistic. 
Still, the influence of the CoZZier’s series echoed powerfully throughout 
subsequent decades. It was this eight-part series that would define nothing 
less than NASA’s eventual agenda for piloted space flight. Cargo rockets such 
as the Saturn V and the space shuttle, astronaut Moon landings, a space sta- 
tion, the eventual flight of people to Mars-all these concepts would 
dominate NASA’s projects and plans. It was with good reason that, in the 
original Collier’s series, the space station and cargo rocket stood at the fore- 
front. By 1952, the concept of a space station had been in the literature for 
nearly 30 years, while large winged rockets were being developed as well. 
Background to the Space Station 
The concept of a space station took root during the 1920s, in an earlier era of 
technical change that focused on engines. As recently as 1885, the only 
important prime mover had been the reciprocating steam engine. The advent 
of the steam turbine yielded dramatic increases in the speed and power of both 
warships and ocean liners. Intemal-combustion engines, powered by gasoline, 
led to automobiles, trucks, airships, and airplanes. Submarines powered by 
diesel engines showed their effectiveness during World War I. l9 
After that war, two original thinkers envisioned that another new engine, 
the liquid-fuel rocket, would permit aviation to advance beyond the Earth’s 
atmosphere and allow the exploration and use of outer space. These inventors 
were Robert Goddard, a physicist at Clark University in Worcester, 
Massachusetts, and Hermann Oberth, a teacher of mathematics in a gymnasium 
17. Time, December 8, 1952, pp. 67,68. 
18. NASA SP-4012, vol. 111, p. 27. 
19. Scienf$cAmencan, May 1972, pp. 102-111; April 1985, pp. 132-139. 
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in a German-speaking community in Romania?’ Goddard experimented much, 
wrote little, and was known primarily for his substantial number of patents.** 
Oberth contented himself with mathematical studies and writings. His 1923 
book, Die Rakete zu den Planetenraumen (The Rocket into Interplanetary 
Space), laid much of the foundation for the field of astronautics. 
Both Goddard and Oberth were well aware of the ordinary fireworks 
rocket (a pasteboard tube filled with blackpowder propellant). They realized 
that modern technology could improve on this centuries-old design in two 
critical respects. First, a steel combustion chamber and nozzle in a rocket 
engine could perform much better than pasteboard. Second, the use of pro- 
pellants such as gasoline and liquid oxygen would produce far more energy 
than blackpowder. Oberth produced two conceptual designs: the Model B, an 
instrument-carrying rocket for upper-atmosphere research, and the Model E, 
a spaceship.22 
Having demonstrated to his satisfaction that space flight indeed was 
achievable, Oberth then considered its useful purposes. While he was not 
imaginative enough to foresee the advent of automated spacecraft (still well 
in the future), the recent war had shown that, using life support systems, sub- 
marines could support sizable crews underwater for hours at a time. 
Accordingly, he envisioned that similar crews, with oxygen provided through 
similar means, would live and carry out a variety of tasks in a space station as 
it orbited the Earth. 
Without describing the station in any detail, he wrote that it could develop 
out of a plans for a large orbiting rocket with a mass of “at least 400,000 kg”: 
But if we should let a rocket of this size travel around the earth, it would con- 
stitute a sort of miniature moon. It would then no longer need to be designed 
or equipped for descent and landing. Trajic between this satellite and earth 
could be carried out with smaller vehicles and these large rockets (let us call 
them observation stations) could be built to further dimensions for their par- 
ticular purpose. If ill effects result from experiencing weightlessness over 
long periods of time (which I doubt), two such rockets could be connected 
with a cable and caused to rotate about each othel: 
20. Ley, Rockets, pp. 107, 116. 
21. Lehman, High Man, pp. 360-363. 
22. Ley, Rockets, pp. 108-1 12; NASA TT-F-9227, p. 98. 
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The station could serve as an astronomical observatory: 
In space, telescopes of any size could be used, for the stars would not 
flicker .... Suficient for an objective glass would be a large, lightly shaded, 
concave mirror made of sheet metal. lfthis were mounted by means of three 
metal rods at a distance of several kilometers from the rocket, we would have 
a telescope which, for most purposes, would be one hundred times superior 
to the best instruments on earth. 
The station could also carry out Earth observations, while serving as a 
communications relay: 
With their sharp instruments they could recognize every detail on the earth 
and could give Eight signals to earth through the use of appropriate mirrors. 
They would enable telegraphic connections with places to which neither 
cables nor electrical waves can reach .... Their value to militaqy operations 
would be obvious, be it that they are controlled by one of the belligerents or 
be it that high fees could be charged for the reports they could render: The 
station could observe every iceberg and could warn shipping, either directly 
or indirectly. The disaster of the Titanic of 1912, for example, could have 
been prevented in this way. 
Oberth also considered the building of immense orbiting mirrors, with 
diameters as large as 1,000 kilometers: 
For example, routes to Spitzbergen or to rhe northern Siberian ports could be 
kept free of ice. I f  the mirror had a diameter of only 100 km, it could make 
broad areas in the northern regions of the earth inhabitable through difised 
light, and in our latitude it could prevent the fea$ul spring freezes and pro- 
tect fruit crops from damage by night frosts in both spring and winter 
He recommended sodium as a lightweight construction material. While it 
reacts strongly with oxygen, sodium would remain inert in airless space. He 
also described how the observation station also could serve as a fuel station: 
... ifthe hydrogen and oxygen are shielded from fhe sun’s rays, they could be 
stored here for as long as desired in a solid state. A rocket which is filled here 
and launched from the observation station has no air resistance to over- 
come. ... I f  we couple a large sphere of sodium sheet which is produced and 
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filled with fie1 on location with a small, stoutly built rocket which pushes its 
b e l  supply ahead of it and is continually supplied by it, then we have a very 
powe@l and long-range vehicle which is easily capable of making the trip 
to other bodies of the universe.23 
Although Oberth was shy and retiring by nature, the impact of his ideas, 
during subsequent decades, would rival that of von Braun’s a generation later. 
Die Rukete spurred the founding of rocket-research groups in Germany, the 
U.S., and the Soviet Union. As early as 1898, Russia’s Konstantin 
Tsiolkovsky, a provincial math teacher like Oberth, had developed ideas sim- 
ilar to those of Oberth’s. Officials of the new Bolshevik government then 
dusted off Tsiolkovsky papers, showing that he had been ahead of the 
Germans. As his writings won new attention, the Soviet Union emerged as 
another center of interest in 
Fritz Lang, a leading German film producer, then became interested. More 
than a filmmaker, Lang was a leader in his country’s art and culture. Later, 
Willy Ley noted that at one of his premieres, “The audience comprised liter- 
ally everyone of importance in the realm of arts and letters, with a heavy 
sprinkling of high government  official^."^^ In 1926, Lang released the classic 
film Metropolis, with a robot in the leading role. Two years later, he set out to 
do the same for space flight with Frau im Mond (The Girl in the Moon). 
Drawing heavily on Oberth’s writings, Lang’s wife, actress Thea von 
Harbou, wrote the script for Frau im Mond. Fritz Lang hired Oberth as a tech- 
nical consultant. Oberth then convinced Lang to underwrite the building of a 
real rocket. After all, it would be great publicity for the movie were such a 
rocket to fly on the day of the premiere. The project attracted a number of 
skilled workers who went on to build Germany’s first liquid-fuel rockets. 
Among them, a youthful Wernher von Braun went on to develop the V-2 with 
support from the German army?6 
Even during the 1920s’ Oberth’s ideas drew enough attention to encour- 
age other theorists and designers to pursue similar thoughts and to write their 
own books. Herman PotoCnik, an engineer and former captain in the Austrian 
23. NASA TT F-9227, pp. 92-97. 
24. Ley, Rockets, pp. 100-104. 
25. Ibid., p. 124. 
26. lbrd, pp. 124-130; Neufeld, Rocket and Reich, pp. 11-23. 
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-.--..-.----.- Institute of Technology) 
army, wrote under the pen name of Hermann Noordung. In 1929, he pub- 
lished The Problem of Space Travel, a book that addressed the issue of space 
station design. It was to be his last publication, however, for later that same 
year, he died of tuberculosis at the age of 36.27 
PotoEnik introduced the classic rotating wheel shape, proposing a diame- 
ter of 100 feet with an airlock at its hub. The sun would provide electric power, 
27. NASA SP-4026, pp. xv-xvi 
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though not with solar cells; these, too, lay beyond the imagination of that gen- 
eration. Instead, a large parabolic mirror would focus sunlight onto boiler pipes 
in a type of steam engine. For more power, a trough of mirrors would run 
around the station’s periphery concentrating solar energy on another system of 
pipes. Like a flower, the station would face the sun?’ 
Except for being two and a half times larger, von Braun’s Collier’s space 
station closely resembled that of PotoCnik, and it is tempting to view von 
Braun as the latter’s apt pupil. He certainly had the opportunity to read 
Potocnik’s book (though published initially in its author’s native language of 
Slovenian, it appeared quickly in German tran~lation).~’ Moreover, von 
Braun’s concept included a circumferential trough of solar mirrors for power. 
This, however, came not from PotoEnik but rather from a suggestion of Fred 
Whipple (who had not read PotoEnik’s book), and thus represented an inde- 
pendent in~ention.~’ The influence of Potocnik on von Braun may have been 
only indirect. 
The historian J.D. Hunley, who has prepared an English translation of 
PotoEnik’s book, describes its influence on von Braun as “probable but spec- 
ulative.” Nevertheless, he states unequivocally that “PotoCnik’s book was 
widely known even to people who may have seen only photographs of sec- 
tions from the book in tran~lation.”~~ His concept of a large rotating wheel was 
sufficiently simple to permit von Braun and others to carry it in their heads 
for decades, developing this concept with fresh details when using it as the 
point of reference for an original design. 
In the popular mind, if not for aerospace professionals, the Collier’s 
series introduced the shape of a space station in definitive form. It carried over 
to Disney’s Man in Space, and to George Pal’s Conquest of Space. Fifteen 
years later, when producer Stanley Kubrick filmed Arthur C. Clarke’s 2001: 
A Space Odyssey, he too used the rotating-wheel shape, enlarging it anew to 
a diameter of a thousand feet.32 
28. Ibid., pp. 101-1 13. 
29. Ibid., pp. ix, xii. 
30. Ley, Rockets, pp. 312-313. 
31. NASA SP-4026, pp. xxii-xxiii. 
32. Clarke, 2001, photo facing p. 112. 
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Winged Rockets: The Work of Eugen Sanger 
While space stations came quickly to the forefront in public attention, it was 
another matter to build them, even in versions much smaller than von Braun’s 
250-foot wheel. Between 1960 and 1980 the concept flourished only briefly, 
in the short-lived Slsylab program. The second major element of the Collier’s 
scenario, the winged rocket, enjoyed considerably better prospects. At ftrst 
merely topics for calculation and speculation, the development of long-range 
winged rockets during World War 11 was the departure point for a number of 
serious postwar projects. 
In the 1930s, work on winged rockets foreshadowed the development of 
a high-speed airplane able to land on a runway for repeated flights. The first 
important treatment came from Eugen Siinger, a specialist in aeronautics and 
propulsion who received a doctorate at the Technische Ho~hschule~~  in Vienna 
and stayed on to pursue research on rocket engines. In 1933, he published 
Raketenflugtechnik (Rocket Flight Engineering). The first text in this field, it 
included a discussion of rocket-powered aircraft performance and a set of 
drawings. Sanger proposed achieving velocities as high as Mach 10, along 
with altitudes of up to 70 ki10mete1-s.~~ 
While the turbojet engine was unknown at that time, it was this engine, 
rather than the rocket, that would offer the true path to routine high perfor- 
mance. Because a turbojet uses air from the atmosphere, a jet plane needs to 
carry fuel only, while its wings reduce the thrust and fuel consumption. 
Hence, it can maintain longer flight times. By contrast, a rocket must carry 
oxygen as well as fuel, and thus, while capable of high speeds, it lacks 
endurance. After World War 11, rocket airplanes as experimental aircraft went 
on to reach speeds and altitudes far exceeding those of jets. Jet planes, how- 
ever, took over the military and later the commercial realms. 
During World War 11, Sanger made a further contribution, showing how 
the addition of wings could greatly extend a rocket’s range. Initially, 2 winged 
rocket would fly to modest range, along an arcing trajectory like that of an 
artillery shell. Upon reentering the atmosphere, however, the lift generated by 
33 A technical institute that doe5 not qualify as a university but that offers advanced academic studies, pxtic- 
ufarly in engrneenng 
34 AAS History Senes, vol 7, Part I, pp 195, 203-206, vol 10, pp 228-230, Ley, Rockets, pp 408410 
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The A-4b, a winged V-2 of 
2 945. (Smitksonian I; 
Photo NO. 76-7772) 
Wtil : d o n  
the rocket’s wings would carry it upward, causing it to skip off the atmosphere 
like a flat stone skipping over water. Sanger calculated that with a launch 
speed considerably less than orbital velocity, such a craft could circle the 
globe and return to its launch site.35 After WorId War 11, this concept drew 
high-level attention in Moscow, where, for a time, Stalin sought to use it as a 
basis for a serious weapon project.36 
35. Ley, Rockets, pp. 428-434. 
36. Zaloga, Targef, pp. 121-124 
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In haste and desperation, winged rockets entered the realm of hardware late 
in the war, as an offshoot of the V-2 program. The standard V-2 had a range 
of 270 kilometers. Following the Normandy invasion in 1944, as the Allies 
surged into France and the Nazi position collapsed, a group of rocket engi- 
neers led by Ludwig Roth sought to stretch this range to 500 kilometers by 
adding swept wings to allow the missile to execute a supersonic glide. 
The venture was ill-starred from the outset. When winds blew on the wings 
during liftoff, the marginal guidance system could not prevent the vehicle from 
rolling and going out of control. In this fashion, the first winged V-2 crashed 
within seconds of its December 1944 launch. A month later, a second attempt 
was launched successfully and had transitioned to gliding flight at Mach 4. 
Then a wing broke off, causing the missile to break up high in the air.37 
Nevertheless, this abortive effort provided an early point of departure for 
America’s first serious long-range missile effort. In the Army Air Forces 
(AAF), the Air Technical Service Command (ATSC; renamed Air Materiel 
Command in March 1946) began by defining four categories of missiles: air- 
to-air, air-to-surface, surface-to-air, and surface-to-surface. The last of these 
included the V-2 and its potential 
The program began with a set of military characteristics, outlined in 
August 1945, that defined requirements for missiles in these categories. AAF 
Headquarters published these requirements as a classified document. In 
November 1946, ATSC invited 17 contractors, most of them aircraft manu- 
facturers, to submit proposals for design studies of specific weapons. One of 
these firms was North American Aviation (NAA) in Los A n g e l e ~ . ~ ~  
NAA had been a mainstay in wartime aircraft production. At the end of 
World War 11, amid sweeping contract cancellations, the company dropped 
from 100,000 to 6,500 employees in about two months.40 The few remain- 
ing contracts were largely in the area of jet-powered bombers and fighters. 
To NAA’s president, James “Dutch” Kindelberger, these bombers repre- 
31 Neufeld, Rocket and Retch, pp. 248-251,281 
38 Neufeld, Bailistic Missiles, p 26 
39 Fahrney, History, p 1291, Neal, Navaho, pp 1-2 
40 A A S  History Senes, vol 20, pp. 121-132 
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Test of a small rocket engine in a parking lot at North American Aviation. (Rocketdyne) 
sented the way into the future. He decided to bring in the best scientist he 
could find and have him build a new research lab, staffed with experts in 
such fields as jet propulsion, rockets, gyros, electronics, and automatic con- 
trol. The lab’s purview, which would go well beyond the AAF study, was to 
work toward bringing in new business by extending the reach of the firm’s 
technical  qualification^.^^ 
An executive recruiter, working in Washington, D.C., recommended 
William Bollay to head this lab. Bollay, who held a Ph.D. in aeronautical 
engineering from Caltech, had been a branch chief in the Navy’s Bureau of 
Aeronautics, with responsibility for the development of turbojet engines. He 
came to NAA by November 1946, in time to deal with the AAF request for 
proposals. Working with the company’s chief engineer, Raymond Rice, 
Bollay decided to pursue the winged V-2, which the Germans had designated 
as the A-9. During World War 11, the Germans had regarded this missile as the 
next step beyond the standard V-2, hoping that its wings would offer a simple 
way to increase its range. The V-2’s overriding priority had prevented serious 
41. Author interview, J. Leland Atwood, b s  Angeles, July 18, 1988 
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work on its winged version. Late in 1945, however, the NAA proposal offered 
to “essentially add wings to the V-2 and design a missile fundamentally the 
same as the A-9.”42 
A letter contract, issued to the firm in April 1946, called for the study and 
design of a supersonic guided missile designated MX-770, with a range of 175 
to 500 miles.43 Meanwhile, rocket research was under way in an NAA company 
parking lot, with parked cars only a few yards away. A boxlike steel frame held 
a rocket motor; a wooden shack housed instruments. The steel blade of a bull- 
dozer’s scraper was used as a shield to protect test engineers in the event of an 
explosion.44 A surplus liquid-fueled engine from Aerojet General, with a 1,000 
pounds of thrust, served as the first test motor. The rocket researchers also built 
and tested home-brewed engines, initially with 50 to 300 pounds of thr~st.4~ 
Some of these engines were so small that they seemed to whistle rather than 
roar. In the words of J. Leland Atwood, who became company president in 
1948, “We had rockets whistling day and night for a couple of years.”46 
In June 1946, the first step toward a coordinated plan came in the form of 
a new company proposal. In the realm of large rocket-engine development, 
Bollay and his associates proposed a two-part program: 
Phase I: Rejirbishment and testing of a complete V-2 propulsion system, to 
be provided as government-furnished equipment. 
Phase II: Redesign of this engine to American engineering standards and 
methods of manufacture, along with construction and testing. 
In the spring of 1947, the company added a further step: 
Phase I l l :  Design, construction and testing of a new engine, drawing on V-2 
design but incorporating a number of  improvement^.^' 
Bollay and his colleagues also launched an extensive program of consul- 
tation with Wernher von Braun and his wartime veterans. These included 
42 Ibrd , author interview, Jeanne Boilay, Santa Barbara, California, January 24, 1989, Report AL-1347 (North 
Amencan), pp 1-4, Neufeld, Rocket and Reich, p 249 
43 Report AL-1347 (North Amencan), pp 5-6 
44 Threshold, Summer 1993, pp 40-47 
45 Report AL-1347 (North Amencan), p 37 
46 Author interview, J Leland Atwood, Los Angeles, July 18, 1988 
47 Report AL-1347 (North Amencan), pp 9-10,34 
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Walther Riedel, Hans Huter, Rudi Beichel, and Konrad Dannenberg. In addi- 
tion, Dieter Huzel, a close associate of von Braun, went on to join NAA as a 
full-time employee.48 
Bollay wanted to test-fire V-2 engines. Because their thrust of 56,000 
pounds was far too great for the company’s parking lot test center, Bollay 
needed a major set of test facilities. Atwood was ready to help. “We scoured 
the country,” Atwood recalls. “It wasn’t so densely settled then-and we 
located this land.”49 It was in the Santa Susana Mountains, at the western end 
of the San Fernando Valley. The landscape-stark, sere, and full of rounded 
reddish boulders-offered spectacular views. In March 1947, NAA leased 
the land and built a rocket test center on it as part of a buildup of facilities 
costing upwards of $1 million in company money and $1.5 million from the 
Air Force.50 
In 1946, two government-furnished V-2 engines arrived at the site. 
Detailed designing of the Phase I1 engine began in June 1947; the end of 
September brought the first release of drawings and of the fxst fabricated 
parts. Early in 1949, the first such engine was completed. Two others followed 
shortly thereafter.51 
Still very much a V-2 engine, it had plenty of room for improvement. 
Lieutenant Colonel Edward Hall, who was funding the work, declared that “it 
wasn’t really a very good engine. It didn’t have a proper injector, and that 
wasn’t all. When we took it apart, we decided that was no way to By 
fixing the deficiencies during Phase In, NAA expected to lay a solid founda- 
tion for future rocket engine development. 
A particular point of contention involved this engine’s arrangements for 
injecting propellants into its combustion chamber. Early in the German rocket 
program, Walter Riedel, von Braun’s chief engine designer, had built a rocket 
motor with 3,300 pounds of thrust with a cup-shaped injector at the top of the 
thrust chamber. For the V-2, a new chief of engine design, Walter Thiel, 
grouped 18 such cups to yield its 56,000 pounds. Unfortunately, this arrange- 
ment did not lend itself to a simple design wherein a single liquid-oxygen line 
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
Threshold, Summer 1991, pp. 52-63, Huzel, Peenemunde, pp. 226-228. 
Author interview, J. Leland Atwood, Los Angeles, July 18, 1988. 
Report AL- 1347 (North American), pp. 23-26; Neal, Navaho, p. 29. 
Report AL-1347 (North American), pp. 36-37, Fahmey, History, p. 1292; AAS History Series, vol. 20, pp. 
Author interview, Edward Hall, Los Angeles, January 25, 1989. 
133- 144. 
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could supply all the cups. Instead, his “18-pot engine” required a separate 
oxygen line for each individual cup.53 
Thiel had pursued a simpler approach by constructing an injector plate, 
resembling a showerhead, pierced with numerous holes to permit the rapid 
inflow and mixing of the rocket propellants. By the end of World War 11, 
Thiel’s associates had tested a version of the V-2 engine successfully that 
incorporated this feature, though it never reached produ~tion.~~ Bollay’s 
rocket researchers, still working within the company parking lot, were upping 
their engines’ thrust to 3000 pounds, and were using them to test various types 
of injector plates.55 The best injector designs would be incorporated into the 
Phase 111 engine, bringing a welcome simplification and introducing an 
important feature that could carry over to larger engines with greater thrust. 
In September 1947, preliminary design of Phase 111 began, aiming at the 
thrust of the V-2 engine but with a weight reduction of 15 percent.56 
Bollay had initially expected to design the 500-mile missile as a V-2 with 
swept wings and large control surfaces near the tail, closely resembling the A- 
9. Work in a supersonic wind tunnel built by Bollay’s staff showed that this 
design would encounter severe stability problems at high speed. Thus, by early 
1948, a new configuration emerged. With small forward-mounted wings 
(known as canards) that could readily controI such instability, the new design 
moved the large wings well aft, replacing the V-2’s horizontal fins. In January 
1948, four promising configurations were tested in the Ordnance Aerophysics 
Laboratory wind tunnel in Dainge&ield, Texas. By March, a workable prelim- 
inary design of the best of these four configurations was largely in hand.57 
When it won independence from the Army, the U.S. Air Force received 
authority over programs for missiles with a range of 1,000 miles or more. 
Shorter-range missiles remained the exclusive domain of the Army. 
Accordingly, at a conference in February 1948, Air Force officials instructed 
NAA to stretch the range of their missile to 1000 miles? 
The 500-mile missile had featured a boost-glide trajectory. It used rocket 
power to arc high above the atmosphere and then its range was extended with 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
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a supersonic glide. This approach was not well suited when the range was 
doubled. At the Air Force developmental center of Wright Field, near 
Dayton, Ohio, Colonel M. S .  Roth proposed to increase the missile range 
anew by adding  ramjet^.'^ Unlike the turbojet engines of the day, the 
ramjet-which worked by ramming air into the engine at high speed-could 
59. Letter, Colonel M. S. Roth to Power Plant Lab, 1 1  February 1948 (cited in Fahrney, Hisrory, p. 1294). 
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Navaho concept of 1948. (U.S. Air Force) 
fly supersonically. A turbojet, however, could take off from a standing start 
whereas a ramjet needed a rocket boost to reach the speed at which this air- 
ramming effect would come into play. 
A Navy effort, Project Bumblebee, had been under way in this area since 
World War I1 and NAA had done several relevant aerodynamic studies. In 
addition, at Wright Field, the Power Plant Laboratory included a Nonrotating 
Engine Branch that was funding the development of ramjets as well as rocket 
motors. Its director, Weldon Worth, dealt specifically with ramjets; Lieut. Col. 
Hall, who dealt with rockets, served as his deputy.60 
Though designed for boost-glide flight, the new missile configuration 
readily accommodated ramjets and their fuel tanks for supersonic cruise. The 
original boost-glide missile thus evolved into a cruise missile when a modifi- 
cation of the design added two ramjet engines, mounting one at the tip of each 
of two vertical fins. These engines and their fuel added weight, which neces- 
sitated an increase in the planned thrust of the Phase III rocket motor. 
Originally it had been planned to match the 56,000 pound thrust of the V-2. 
In March 1948, however, the thrust of this design went up to 75,000 pounds. 
The missile was named the Navaho, reflecting a penchant at NAA for names 
beginning with ‘‘NA.’’61 
60. Report AL-1347 (North American), p. 6; .kt Propulsion, vol. 25 (1955), pp. 604-614; author interview, 
Edward Hall, Los Angeles, August 29, 1996. 
61. Report AL-1347 (North American), pp. 39,42-43. 
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By late November of 1949, the first version of this engine was ready for 
testing at the new Santa Susana facility. Because it lacked turbopumps, pro- 
pellants were pressure-fed from heavy-walled tanks. Thus, this version of the 
engine was much simpler than its later operational type, which would rely on 
turbopumps to force propellants into the engine. Proceeding cautiously, the 
rocket crew began with an engine-start test at 10 percent of maximum pro- 
pellant flow for 11 seconds. It was successful and led to somewhat longer 
starting tests in December. Then, as the engineers grew bolder, they hiked up 
the thrust. In March 1950, this simplified engine first topped its rated level of 
75,000 pounds-for four and a half seconds. During May and June, the full- 
thrust runs went well, exceeding a minute in duration. 
Meanwhile, a separate developmental effort was building the turbo- 
pumps. Late in March 1950, the first complete engine, turbopumps included, 
was assembled. In August, this engine fired successfully for a full minute- 
at 12.3 percent of rated thrust. Late in October, the first full-thrust firing 
reached 70,000 pounds-for less than five seconds. In seven subsequent tests 
during 1950, however, only one, in mid-November, topped its rated thrust 
level. This was due to problems with rough combustion during the buildup 
to full thrust.62 
The pressure-fed tests exhibited surges in combustion-chamber pressure 
(known as “hard starts”) that were powerful enough to blow up an engine. 
Walther Riedel, one of the German veterans, played an important role in intro- 
ducing design modifications that brought this problem under control. The 
problem of rough combustion was new, however, and went beyond the 
German experience. It stemmed from combustion instability in the engine’s 
single large thrust chamber. Ironically, the V-2’s 18-pot motor had avoided 
this difficulty. Acting as preliminary burners, its numerous injector cups were 
too small to permit such in~tabilities.~~ 
Following the successful full-thrust test of November 1950, it was not 
until March 195 1 that problems of unstable combustion came under control.64 
However, this marked another milestone. For the first time, the Americans had 
encountered and solved an important problem that the Germans had not expe- 
rienced. While combustion instabilities would recur repeatedly during 
62. Ibid, pp. 75-81. 
63. Threshold, Summer 1991, pp. 52-63. 
64. hid . ,  p. 53; Report AL-1347 (North American), p. 81 
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subsequent engine programs, the work of 1950 and 195 1 introduced NAA to 
methods for solving this problem. 
By then, the design and mission of the Navaho had changed dramatically. 
The August 1949 detonation of a Soviet atomic bomb, the fall of China to 
communism, and the outbreak of the Korean War in mid-1950 combined to 
signal to the nation that the rivalry with the Soviet Union was serious and that 
Soviet technical capability was significant. The designers at North American, 
working with their Air Force counterparts, accordingly sought to increase the 
range of the Navaho to as much as 5,500 nautical miles, and thereby give it 
intercontinental capability. 
At the Pentagon in August 1950, conferences among Air Force officials 
brought a redefinition of the program that set this intercontinental range of 
5,500 miles as a long-term god. A letter from Major General Donald L. Putt, 
director of research and development within the Air Materiel Command, 
became the directive instructing NAA to pursue this ~bjec t ive .~~ An interim 
version, Navaho 11, with range of 2,500 nautical miles, seemed technically 
feasible. The full-range version, Navaho 111, represented a long-term project 
that would go forward as a parallel effort.66 
‘The 1,000-mile Navaho of 1948, with its Phase I11 engine, had amounted 
to a high-speed piIotless airplane fitted with both rocket and ramjet propul- 
sion. This design, however, had taken approaches based on winged rockets to 
their limit. The new Navaho designs separated the rocket engines from the 
ramjets, assigned each to a separate vehicle, and turned Navaho into a two- 
stage missile. The first stage or booster, powered by liquid-fuel rockets, 
acdelerated the missile to Mach 3 and 58,000 feet. The ramjet-powered 
second stage rode this booster during initial ascent-similar to the way in 
which the Space Shuttle rides its external tank today-and then cruised to its 
target at Mach 2.75 (about 1,800 m ~ h . ) . ~ ~  
Lacking the thrust to boost the Navaho, the 75,000-pound rocket motor 
stood briefly on the brink of abandonment. Its life, however, was only begin- 
ning. This engine was handed over to von Braun, who was at Redstone Arsenal 
65. 
66. 
67. 
22 
Letter, Maj Gen D L Putt to Commanding General, Air Matenel Command, 21 August 1950 (cited in 
Fahrney, Hlsrory, p 1297) 
Report AL-1347 (North Amencan), p 88, Fahmey, Hlsrory, pp 1296-1297; Neal, Navaho, pp 12-14 
“Standard Missile Charactenstics XSM-64 Navaho” U S Air Force, November 1,1956, Ax Force Museum, 
Wnght-Patterson Am, Ohio 
Space Stations and Winged Rockets 
in Huntsville, Alabama, directing development of the Army's Redstone mis-  
sile. With a range of 200 miles, this missile needed an engine. In March 195 1, 
the Army awarded a contract to NAA for this rocket motor. Weighing less than 
V-2 engine, left, and its successor deoeloped for Navaho. (Rocketdyne) 
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half as much as the V-2’s 18-pot engine (1,475 pounds versus 2,484), this 
motor delivered 34 percent more thrust than that of the V-2.6’ 
For Navaho 11, this basic engine would be replaced by a new one with 
120,000 pounds of thrust. A twin-engine installation, totaling 240,000 
pounds, provided the initial boost. For Navaho 111, NAA upgraded the engine 
to 135,000 pounds of thrust and designed a three-engine cluster for that mis- 
sile’s b0oster.6~ 
In 1954 and 1955, the Air Force and Army made a major push into long- 
range missiles-but these were not Navahos. Instead, they were the Air 
Force’s Atlas, Titan, and Thor, along with the Army’s Jupiter. When these 
new programs needed engines, however, it was again NAA that produced the 
rocket motors that would do the job. The Navaho’s 135,000 pounds of thrust 
was upgraded to 139,000 and then again to 150,000 pounds. In addition to 
this, a parallel effort at Aerojet General developed very similar engines for 
the Titan.70 
“We often talked about this basic rocket as a strong workhorse, a rugged 
engine,” says Paul Castenholz, a test engineer who worked at Santa Susana. 
“I think a lot of these programs evolved because we had these engines. We 
anticipated how people would use them; we weren’t surprised when it hap- 
pened. We’d hear a name like Atlas with increasing frequency, but when it 
became real, the main result was that we had to build more engines and test 
them more ~tringently.”~~ 
The Navaho of 1948, designed as a winged rocket with ramjets, stood two 
steps removed from the missiles that later would go on to deployment and 
operational status. First, the versions of 1950 and after were designed and 
built as high-speed aircraft with a separate rocket booster. 
versions were replaced by the Atlas and other missiles o 
legacy lived on. Bollay’s research center, 
In 1955, this labor 
68 Threshold, Summer 1991, p. 63. 
69. Neal, Navaho, pp. 30-31; AAS History Series, vol. 20, pp. 133-144. 
70. AAS History Series, vol. 13. pp. 19-35; vol. 20, pp. 133-144. 
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became the nation’s premier builder of rocket engines. Autonetics emerged as 
a major center for guidance and control. The Missile Division, later renamed 
Space and Information Systems, built the Apollo spacecraft as well as the 
second stage of the Saturn V Moon 
The Navaho also left a legacy in its people. Sam Hoffman, who brought 
the 75,000-pound engine to success, presided over Rocketdyne as it built the 
main engines for the Saturn V. Paul Castenholz headed development of the J- 
2, the hydrogen-fueled engine that powered Saturn V’s upper stages. John R. 
Moore, an expert in guidance, became president of Autonetics. Dale Myers, 
who served as Navaho project manager, went to NASA as Associate 
Administrator for Manned Space Flight.73 
Navaho’s engines, including those built in the parallel effort at Aerojet 
General, represented a third legacy. Using such engines, Atlas, Thor, and 
Titan were all successful as launch vehicles. Upper stages were added to Thor 
which evolved into the widely-used Delta. Additional upgrades raised the 
thrust of its engine to 205,000 pounds. A cluster of eight such engines, pro- 
ducing up to 1.6 million pounds of thrust, powered the Saturn I and Saturn 
I-B boosters, which flew repeatedly in both the Apollo and Skylab pro- 
g r a m ~ . ~ ~  Between 1946 and 1950, the winged rockets of the Navaho program 
played a pioneering role, planting seeds that would flourish for decades in 
aerospace technology. 
The X-15: An Airplane for Hypersonic Research 
During the 1940s and 50s, the nation’s main centers for aeronautical research 
operated within a small federal agency, the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics (NACA; it became the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, NASA, in 1958). After World War 11, NACA and the Air 
Force became increasingly active in supersonic flight. Rocket-powered air- 
craft such as the Bell X-1 and the Douglas Skyrocket D-558 set the pace. The 
X-1 broke the sound barrier in 1947; the Skyrocket approached Mach 2 only 
72. 
73. 
74. 
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four years later. Also, between 1949 and 1951, NAA designed a new fighter, 
the F-100, planning it to be the first jet plane to go supersonic in level flight.75 
Supersonic aviation brought difficult problems in aerodynamics, propul- 
sion, aircraft design, and stability and control in flight. Still, at least for flight 
speeds of Mach 2 and somewhat higher, it did not involve the important issue 
of aerodynamic overheating. Though fitted with rocket engines, the cited air- 
craft were built of aluminum, which cannot withstand high temperatures. At 
speeds beyond Mach 4 lay the realm of hypersonic flight, where problems of 
heating would dominate. 
Nevertheless, by the early 1950s, interest in such flight speeds was 
increasing. This was due in part to the growing attention given to prospects 
for an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a rocket able to carry a 
nuclear weapon to Moscow. In December 1950, the Rand Corp., an influen- 
tial Air Force think tank, reported that such missiles now stood within reach 
of technology. The Air Force responded by giving a study contract to the firm 
of Convair in San Diego, where, a few years earlier, the designer Karel 
Bossart had nurtured thoughts of such missiles. Bossart’s new design, devel- 
oped during 1951, called for the use of the Navaho’s 120,000-pound-thrust 
rocket engine. The design was thoroughly unwieldy; it would stand 160 feet 
tall and weigh 670,000 pounds. Nevertheless, it represented a milestone. For 
the first time, the Air Force had an ICBM design concept that it could pursue 
using rocket engines that were already being de~e loped .~~  
Among the extraordinarily difficult technical issues faced by the ICBM, 
the problem of reentry was paramount. Because an ICBM’s warhead would 
reenter the atmosphere at Mach 20 or more, there was excellent reason to 
believe that it would burn up like a meteor. As early as 1951, however, the 
NACA aerodynamicist H. Julian Allen offered a solution. Conventional think- 
ing held that hypersonic flight would require the ultimate in slender 
needle-nose shapes. Allen broke with this approach, showing mathematically 
that the best design would introduce a nose cone as blunt or flat-faced as pos- 
sible. Such a shape would set up patterns of aifflow that would carry most of 
the heat of reentry away from the nose cone, rather than delivering this heat 
to its outer surface.77 
75 Ley, Rocketc., pp 423-425, Gunston, Fighter\. pp 170-171 
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There was further interest in hypersonics at Bell Aircraft Corp. in 
Buffalo. Here Walter Dornberger, who had directed Germany’s wartime 
rocket development, was proposing a concept similar to Eugen Sanger’s 
skip-gliding rocket plane. The design of the rocket (known as the Bomi- 
Bomber Missile) required a two-stage vehicle with each stage winged, 
piloted, and rocket-powered. Dornberger argued that Bomi would have the 
advantage of being able to fly multiple missions like any piloted aircraft, 
and it could be recalled once in flight. By contrast, an ICBM could fly only 
once and would be committed irrevocably to its mission once in flight.78 
Bell Aircraft, very active in supersonic flight research, had built the 
X-1, which was the first through the sound barrier. Also, Bell Aircraft 
was building the X-1A that would approach Mach 2.5 and the X-2 that 
would top Mach 3.79 Robert Woods, co-founder of the company and a 
member of NACA’s influential Committee on Aerodynamics, had been a 
leader in the design of these aircraft. He also took a strong interest in 
Dornberger’s ideas. 
In October 1951, at a meeting of the Committee on Aerodynamics, 
Woods called for NACA to develop a new research airplane resembling the 
V-2, to “obtain data at extreme altitudes and speeds, and to explore the prob- 
lems of reentry into the atmosphere.” In January 1952, Woods wrote a letter 
to the committee, urging NACA to pursue a piloted research airplane capa- 
ble of reaching beyond Mach 5. He accompanied this letter with 
Dornberger’s description of Bomi. That June, at Woods’s urging, the com- 
mittee passed a resolution proposing that NACA increase its program in 
research aircraft to examine “problems of unmanned and manned flight in 
the upper stratosphere at altitudes between 12 and 50 miles.”*’ 
NACA already had a few people who were active in hypersonics, notably 
the experimentalists Alfred Eggers and John Becker, who had already built 
hypersonic wind tunnels.*’ At NACA’s Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 
Floyd Thompson, the lab’s associate director, responded to the resolution by 
setting up a three-man study group chaired by Clinton Brown, a colleague of 
Becker. In Becker’s words, “Very few others at LangIey in 1952 had any 
78 Spaceflight, vol 22 ( 1  980). pp 270-272 
79 Miller, X-Planes, pp 25-26, 37,4142 
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knowledge of hypersonics. Thus, the Brown group filled an important educa- 
tional function badly needed at the time.”p2 
According to Thompson, he was looking for fresh unbiased ideas and the 
three study-group members had shown originality in their work. Their report, 
in June 1953, went so far as to propose commercial hypersonic flight, sug- 
gesting that airliners of the future might evolve from boost-glide concepts 
such as those of Dornberger. At the more practical level, however, the group 
warmly endorsed building a hypersonic research aircraft. NACA-Langley 
already had a Pilotless Aircraft Research Division (PARD), which was using 
small solid-fuel rockets to conduct supersonic experiments. Brown’s group 
now recommended that PARD reach for higher speeds, perhaps by launching 
rockets that could cross the Atlantic and be recovered in the Sahara Desert.83 
PARD, a NACA in-house effort, went forward rapidly. In November 
1953, it launched a research rocket that carried a test nose cone to Mach 5.0. 
The following October, a four-stage rocket reached Mach 10.4.84 To proceed 
with a piloted research airplane, NACA’s limited budget needed support from 
the Air Force. Here too there was cross-fertilization. Robert Gilruth, head of 
PARD and an assistant director of NACA-Langley, was also a member of the 
Airci-aft Panel of the Air Force’s Scientific Advisory Board. At a meeting in 
October 1953, this panel stated that “the time was ripe” for such a research 
airplane, and recommended that its feasibility “should be looked into.”85 
The next step came at a two-day meeting in Washington of NACA’s 
Research Airplane Projects Panel. Its chairman, Hartley SoulC, had directed 
NACA’s participation in research aircraft programs since the earliest days of 
the X-1 project in 1946. The panel considered specifically a proposal from 
Langley, endorsed by Brown’s group, to modify the X-2 for flight to Mach 
4.5. They rejected this concept, asserting that the X-2 was too small for hyper- 
sonic work. The panel members concluded instead that “provision of an 
entirely new research airplane is desirable.”86 
NACA’s studies of such an airplane would have to start anew. In March 
1954, John Becker set up a new group that took on the task of defining a 
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design. Time was of the essence; everyone was aware that the X-2 project, 
underway since 1945, had yet to make its first powered flight.87 Becker stip- 
ulated that “a period of only about three years be allowed for design and 
construction.’’ Hence NACA would move into the unknown frontiers of 
hypersonics using technology that was already largely in hand.” 
Two technical problems stood out: overheating and instability. Because 
the plane would fly in the atmosphere at extreme speeds, it was essential that 
it be kept from tumbling out of control. As on any other airplace, tail surfaces 
were to provide this stability. Investigations had shown that these would have 
to be excessively large. A Langley aerodynamicist, Charles McLellan, came 
to the rescue. While conventional practice called for thin tail surfaces that 
resembled miniature wings, McLellan now argued that they should take the 
form of a wedge. His calculations,showed that at hypersonic speeds, wedge- 
shaped vertical fins and horizontal stabilizers should be much more effective 
than conventional thin shapes. Tests in Becker’s hypersonic wind tunnel ver- 
ified this approach.89 
The problem of overheating was more difficult. At the outset, Becker’s 
designers considered that, during reentry, the airplane should point its nose in 
the direction of flight. This proved unacceptable because the plane’s stream- 
lined shape would cause it to enter the dense lower atmosphere at excessive 
speed. This would subject the aircraft to disastrous overheating and to aero- 
dynamic forces that would cause it to break up. These problems, however, 
appeared far more manageable if the plane were to enter with its nose high, 
presenting its flat undersurface to the air. It then would lose speed in the upper 
atmosphere, easing both the overheating and the aerodynamic loads. In 
Becker’s words, “It became obvious to us that what we were seeing here was 
a new manifestation of H. J. Allen’s ‘blunt body’ principle. As we increased 
the angle of attack, our configuration in effect became more ‘blunt.”’90 While 
Allen had developed his principle for missile nose cones, it now proved 
equally useful when applied to hypersonic airplanes. 
Even so, the plane would encounter far more heat and higher tempera- 
tures than any aircraft to date had received in flight. New approaches in the 
87. Astronautics &Aeronautics, February 1964, p. 53. 
88. Hallion, ed., Hypersonic, p. 1 .  
89. Astronautics &Aeronautics, February 1964, pp. 54,56 
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structural design of these aircraft were imperative. Fortunately, Dornberger’s 
group at Bell Aircraft had already taken the lead in the study of “hot struc- 
tures.” These used temperature-resistant materials such as stainless steel. 
Wings might be covered with numerous small and very hot metal panels 
resembling shingles that would radiate the heat away from the aircraft, While 
overheating would be particularly severe along the leading edges of the 
wings, these could be water-cooled. Insulation could protect an internal struc- 
ture that would stand up to the stresses and forces of flight; active cooling 
could protect a pilot’s cockpit and instrument compartment. Becker described 
these approaches as “the first hypersonic aircraft hot structures concepts to be 
developed in realistic meaningful detail.”” 
His designers proceeded to study a hot structure built of Inconel X, a 
chrome-nickel alloy from International Nickel. This alloy had already demon- 
strated its potential, when, during the previous November, it was used for the 
nose cone in PARD’S rocket flight to Mach 5.92 The hot structure would be of 
the “heat sink” type, relying on the high thermal conductivity of this metal to 
absorb heat from the hottest areas and spread it through much of the aircraft. 
As an initial exercise, they considered a basic design in which the Inconel 
X structure would have to withstand only conventional aerodynamic forces 
and loads, neglecting any extra requirements imposed by absorption of heat. 
A separate analysis then considered the heat-sink requirements, with the 
understanding that these might greatly increase the thickness and hence the 
weight of major portions of the hot structure. When they carried out the exer- 
cise, the designers received a welcome surprise. They discovered that the 
weights and thicknesses of a heat-absorbing structure were nearly the same as 
for a simple aerodynamic structure.93 Hence, a hypersonic research airplane, 
designed Iargely from aerodynamic considerations, could provide heat-sink 
thermal protection as a bonus. The conclusion was clear: piloted hypersonic 
flight was achievable. 
The feasibility study of Becker’s group was intended to show that this air- 
plane indeed could be built in the near future. In July 1954, Becker presented 
the report at a meeting in Washington of representatives from NACA, the Air 
Force’s Scientific Advisory Board, and the Navy. (The Navy, actively involved 
91. Ibid., p. 384. 
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with research aircraft, had built the Douglas Skyrocket.) Participants at the 
meeting endorsed the idea of a joint development program that would build 
and fly the new aircraft by drawing on the powerful support of the Pentagon.94 
Important decisions came during October 1954, as NACA and Air Force 
panels weighed in with their support. At the request of General Nathan 
Twining, the Air Force Chief of Staff, the Aircraft Panel of the Scientific 
Advisory Board presented its views on the next 10 years of aviation. The 
panel’s report paid close attention to hypersonic flight: 
In the aerodynamic field, it seems to us pretty clear that over the next ten 
years the most important and vital subject for research and development is 
thejeld of hypersonicflows .... This is one of the fields in which an ingenious 
and clever application of the existing laws of mechanics is probably not ade- 
quate. It  is one in which much of the necessary physical knowledge still 
remains unknown at present and must be developed before we arrive at a true 
understanding and competence.. .. 
[A] research vehicle which we now feel is ready for a program is one 
involving manned aircraft to reach something of the order of Mach 5 and alti- 
tudes of the order of 200,000 to 500,000 feet. This is very analogous to the 
research aircraft program which was initiated ten years ago as a joint ven- 
ture of the Air Force, the Navy, and NACA. It is our belief that a similar 
cooperative arrangement would be desirable and appropriate 
In addition to this, NACA’s Committee on Aerodynamics met in execu- 
tive session to make a formal recommendation concerning the new airplane. 
The committee included representatives from the Air Force and Navy, from 
industry, and from uni~ersities.~~ Its member from Lockheed, Clarence 
“Kelly” Johnson, vigorously opposed building this plane, arguing that expe- 
rience with earlier experimental aircraft had been “generally unsatisfactory.” 
New fighter designs were advancing so rapidly as to actually outpace the per- 
formance of research aircraft. To Johnson, their high-performance flights had 
served mainly to prove the bravery of the test pilots. While Johnson pressed 
his views strongly, he was in a minority of one. The other committee mem- 
94 AAS History Series, v01. 13, p 299 
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bers passed a resolution endorsing “immediate initiation of a project to design 
and construct a research airplane capable of achieving speeds of the order of 
Mach number 7 and altitudes of several hundred thousand feet.”97 
With this resolution, Hugh Dryden, the head of NACA, could approach 
his Air Force and Navy counterparts to discuss the initiation of procurement. 
Detailed technical specifications were necessary and would come, by the end 
of 1954, from a new three-member committee, with Hartley Soul6 as the 
NACA representative. The three members used Becker’s study as a guide in 
deriving the specifications, which called for an aircraft capable of attaining 
250,000 feet and a speed of 6600 feet per second while withstanding reentry 
temperatures of 1200 degrees Fahrenheit.” 
In addition to this, as NACA and the military services reached an agree- 
ment on procurement procedures, a formal Memorandum of Understanding 
came from the office of Trevor Gardner, Special Assistant for Research and 
Development to the Secretary of the Air Force. This document stated that 
NACA would provide technical direction, that the Air Force would adminis- 
ter design and construction, and that the Air Force and Navy would provide 
the funding. It concluded, “Accomplishment of this project is a matter of 
national urgency.’999 
Now the project was ready to proceed. Under standard Air Force prac- 
tices, officials at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base would seek proposals from 
potential contractors. Early in 1955, the aircraft also received a name: the X- 
15. Competition between proposals brought the award of a contract for the 
airframe to NAA. The rocket engine was contracted to Reaction Motors, 
Inc.Ioo The NAA design went into such detail that it even specified the heat- 
resistant seals and lubricants that would be used. Nevertheless, in many 
important respects it was consistent with the major features of the original 
feasibility study by Becker’s group. The design included wedge-shaped tail 
surfaces and a heat-sink structure of Inconel X.”’ 
The X-15 was to become the fastest and highest flying airplane until the 
space shuttle flew into orbit in 1981. In August 1963, the X-15 set an altitude 
record of 354,200 feet (67 miles), with NASA’s Joseph Walker in the cockpit. 
97. Ibid., pp. 12-14, 
98. Ibid., p. 14; A A S  History Series, VOI. 8, p. 299. 
99 Hallion, ed , Hypersonic, p 1-6. 
100 Ibid., pp. I-iv, 11-15. 
101. Astronautics &Aeronautics, February 1964, p. 54. 
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X-15.  (NASA)(E-5251) 
Four years later, the Air Force's Captain William Knight flew it to a record 
speed of 4,520 miles per hour, or Mach 6.72.'02 In addition to setting new 
records, the X-15 accomplished a host of other achievements. 
A true instrument of hypersonic research, in 199 flights it spent nearly 
nine hours above Mach 3, nearly six hours above Mach 4, and 82 minutes 
above Mach 5. Although the NACA and the Air Force had hypersonic wind 
tunnels, the X- 15 represented the first application of aerodynamic theory and 
wind tunnel data to an actual hypersonic aircraft. The X-15 thus enhanced the 
usefulness of these wind tunnels, by providing a base of data with which to 
validate (and in some instances to correct) their results. This made it possible 
to rely more closely on results from those tunnels during subsequent pro- 
grams, including that of the Space Shuttle. 
The X-15 used movable control surfaces that substituted for ailerons. It 
also introduced reaction controls: small rocket thrusters, mounted to the air- 
102. Hallion, ed., Hypersonic, pp. I-v, I-viii. 
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craft, that controlled its attitude when beyond the atmosphere. As it flew to 
the fringes of space and returned, the X-15 repeatedly transitioned from aero- 
dynamic controls to reaction controls and back again. Twenty years later, the 
Space Shuttle would do the same. 
In another important prelude to the shuttle, the X-15 repeatedly flew a tra- 
jectory that significantly resembled flight to orbit and return. The X-15 
ascended into space under rocket power, flew in weightlessness, then re- 
entered the atmosphere at hypersonic speeds. With its nose high to reduce 
overheating and aerodynamic stress, the X-15 used thermal protection to 
guard the craft against the heat of reentry. After reentry, the X-15 then main- 
tained a stable attitude throughout its deceleration, transitioned to gliding 
flight, and landed at a preselected location. The shuttle would do all these 
things, albeit at higher speeds. 
The X-15 used a rocket engine of 57,000 pounds of thrust that was throt- 
tleable, reusable, and “man-rated”-safe enough for use in a piloted aircraft. 
The same description would apply to the more powerful Space Shuttle Main 
Engine. 
The demands of the project pushed the development of practical hyper- 
sonic technology in a number of areas. Hot structures required industrial 
shops in which Inconel X could be welded, machined, and heat-treated. The 
pilot required a pressure suit for use in a vacuum. The X-15 required new 
instruments and data systems including the “Q-ball,” which determined the 
true direction of aifflow at the nose. Cooled by nitrogen, the “Q-ball” oper- 
ated at temperatures of up to 3,500 degrees Fahrenheit and advised the pilot 
of the angle of attack suitable for a safe reentry.’” 
Like the Navaho, the X- 15 also spurred the rise of people and institutions 
that were to make their mark in subsequent years. At NACA-Langley, the X- 
15 combined with the rocket flights of PARD to put an important focus on 
hypersonics and hypervelocity flight. Leaders in this work included such vet- 
erans as Robert Gilruth, Maxime Faget, and GharIes D ~ n l a n . ’ ~ ~  A few years 
later, these researchers parlayed their expertise into leadership in the new field 
of piloted space missions. In addition to this, part of NACA-Langley split off 
to establish the new Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston as NASA’s princi- 
103 Ibid., pp. 157-159; AAS History Series, vol. 8, p. 306; Miller, X-Planes, p. 110 
104. NASA SP-4308; see index references. 
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pal base for piloted space flight. Gilruth headed that center during the Apollo 
years, while Faget, who had participated in Becker’s 1954 X-15 feasibility 
study, became a leading designer of piloted spacecraft. ‘05 
The X-15 program brought others to the forefront as well. At NAA the 
vice president of the program, Harrison “Stormy” Storms, became president 
of that company’s Space Division in 1960. While Gilmth was running the 
Manned Spacecraft Center, Storms had full responsibility for his division’s 
elements of Apollo: the piloted spacecraft and the second stage of the Saturn 
V Moon rocket.Io6 In addition to this, Neil Armstrong, the first man to set foot 
on the Moon, was axong the test pilots of the X-15.’” 
L i f ~ n g  Bodies: Wingless 
Although the X-15 emerged as a winged rocket par excellence, an alternate 
viewpoint held that future rocket craft of this type could have many of the 
advantages of wings without actually having any of these structures. Such 
craft would take shape as “lifting bodies,” wingless and bathtub-shaped craft 
that were able to generate lift with the fuselage. This would allow them to 
glide to a landing. At the same time, such craft would dispense with the 
weight of wings, and with their need for thermal protection. 
How can a bathtub generate lift, and fly? Lift is force that is generated 
when the aerodynamic pressure is greater below an aircraft than above it. 
Wings achieve this through careful attention to their shape; a properly-shxped 
aircraft body can do this as well. The difference is that wings produce little 
drag, whereas lifting bodies produce a great deal of drag. Hence the lifting 
body approach is unsuitable for such uses as commercial aviation, where 
designers of airliners seek the lowest possible drag. Space flight, however, is 
another matter. 
The lifting body concept can be traced back to the work of H. Julian Allen 
and Alfred Eggers, at NACA’s Ames Aeronautical Laboratory near San 
Francisco. Allen developed the blunt-body concept for a missile’s nose cone, 
shaping it with help from Eggers. They then considered that a reentering 
body, while remaining blunt to reduce the heat load, might have a form that 
105. NASA SP-4307; see index references 
106. Resume of Harrison A. Storms 
107 Miller, X-Planes, p. 108 
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would give lift, thus allowing it to maneuver at hypersonic speeds. The 1957 
M- 1 featured a blunt-nose cone with a flattened top. While it had some capac- 
ity for hypersonic maneuverability, it could not glide subsonically or land 
horizontally. It was hoped that a new shape, the M-2, would do these things 
as well. Fitted with two large vertical fins for stability, it was a basic config- 
uration suitable for further research.lo8 
Beginning in 1959, a separate line of development took shape within the 
Flight Dynamics Laboratory of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. The pro- 
gram that developed sought to advance beyond the X-15 by building small 
hypersonic gliders, which would study the performance of advanced hot 
structures at speeds of up to 13,000 miles per hour, three-fourths of orbital 
velocity. This program was called ASSET-Aerothermodynamidelastic 
Structural Systems Environmental Tests. lo9 
The program went forward rapidly by remaining small. The project's 
manager, Charles Cosenza, directed it with a staff of four engineers plus a sec- 
retary, with 17 other engineers at Wright-Patterson providing s~pport ."~ In
April 1961, the Air Force awarded a contract to McDonnell Aircraft Corp. for 
development of the ASSET vehicle. McDonnell was already building the 
smali piloted capsules of Project Mercury; the ASSET vehicle was also small, 
with a length of less than six feet. Not a true lifting body, it sported two tiny 
and highly-swept delta wings. Its bottom, which would receive the most heat, 
was a flat triangle. For thermal protection, this triangle was covered with 
panels of columbium and molybdenum. These would radiate away the heat, 
while withstanding temperatures up to 3,000 degrees Fahrenheit. The nose 
was made of zirconium oxide that would deal with temperatures of up to 
4,000 degrees.' 
Beginning in September 1963 and continuing for a year and a half, five 
of the six ASSET launches were successful. They used Thor and nor-Delta 
launch vehicles, the latter being a two-stage rocket that could reach higher 
velocities. The boosters lofted their ASSETS to altitudes of about 200,000 
feet. The spacecraft then would commence long hypersonic glides with 
ranges as great as 2,300 nautical miles. Onboard instruments transmitted data 
108. Hallion, ed., Hypersonic, pp. 529,535, 864-866 
109. Ibd,  pp. 449-450,505, 
110. Zbid., p. 459. 
I I 1. Ibid., pp. 451,452,464-469. 
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Aerodynamic Control 
Surface Experiment 
- Panel Flutter Experiment 
ASSET’S use of metallic shingle-like panels as thermal protection permitted use of indivudual 
panels for specific experiments. (U.S. Air Force) 
~ 
on temperature and heat flow. The craft were equipped to float following 
splashdown; one of them actually did this, permitting direct study of an 
advanced hot structure that had survived baptism by fire.Il2 
The success of ASSET led to the development of Project PRIME- 
Precision Recovery Including Maneuvering Entry. Beginning in late 1964, the 
contract for this Air Force project went to the Martin Co., where interest in 
lifting bodies had flourished for several years. Unlike ASSET, PRME fea- 
tured true lifting bodies, teardrop-shaped and fitted with fins. PRIME was 
slated to ride the Atlas, which was more powerful than the Thor-Delta and 
could reach near-orbital speeds.Il3 
Whereas ASSET had executed simple hypersonic glides, PRIME carried 
out the more complex maneuver of achieving crossrange, namely, flying far 
to the left or right of its flight path. Indeed, to demonstrate such reentry 
112 I b i d , p p  504-519 
1 13 Hallton, Parh, pp 30-3 1 
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The homebuilt M2-Fl lifting body, left> and the Northrop M2-F2. (NASA)(E-14339) 
maneuvering was its reason for being. PRIME did not attempt to produce data 
on heating, for ASSET had covered this point nicely, nor did it break new 
ground in its construction. Slightly larger than ASSET, it used a conventional 
approach for missile nose cones that featured an aluminum structure covered 
with a thermally-protective “ablative” layer that would carry away heat by 
vaporizing in a controlled fashion during reentry. The ablative material also 
served as insulation to protect the underlying aluminum. 
With its peak speed topping 17,000 mph, PRIME could bridge the 
Pacific, flying from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California to Kwajalein, 
not far from New Guinea. In April 1967, during its best performance, PRIME 
achieved a crossrange of 710 miles, puting it within five miles of its target. A 
waiting recovery plane snatched PRIME in mid-air as it descended by para- 
chute.‘14 
ASSET and PRIME demonstrated the value of lifting bodies at the hyper- 
sonic end of the flight path: gliding, maneuvering, surviving reentry using 
114 Hallion, ed , Hypersonic, pp V-11, V-IV, 702-703 
38 
Space Stations and Winged Rockets 
Martin Marietta’s X-24A, built for subsonic flight, duplicated the shape of PRlME, which 
flew at near-orbital welocity. (NASA)(E-l8769) 
advanced hot structures. Both types of craft, however, used parachutes for 
final descent, making no attempt to land like conventional aircraft. If lifting 
bodies were to truly have merit, they would have to glide successfully not 
only at hypersonic speeds but at the slow speed of an aircraft on a final 
approach to a runway. Under the control of a pilot, lifting bodies would have 
to maintain stable flightall the way to a horizontal touchdown. 
These requirements led to a second round of lifting-body projects focus- 
ing on approach and landing. These projects went forward with ASSET and 
PRIME at the same time. R. Dale Reed, the initiator of this second round of 
projects, was a sailplane enthusiast, a builder of radio-controlled model air- 
planes, and a NASA engineer at Edwards Air Force Base. He had followed 
with interest the work at NASA-Ames on the M-2 lifting-body shape, and he 
resolved to build it as a piloted glider. He drew support from the local com- 
munity of aircraft homebuilders. Designated as the M2-FI, the aircraft was 
built of plywood over a tubular steel frame. Completed in early 1963, the air- 
craft was 20 feet long and 13 feet across. 
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The M2-FI needed a vehicle that could tow it along the ground to help get 
it into the air for initial tests. The M2-F1, however, produced a lot of drag and 
needed a tow car with more power than NASA’s usual vans and trucks. Reed 
and his friends bought a stripped-down Pontiac with a big engine and a four- 
barrel carburetor that could reach speeds of 110 mph. The car was turned over 
to a funny car shop in Long Beach for modification. Like any other flight-line 
vehicle it was sprayed yellow and “National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration” was added on its side. Initial piloted tow tests showed rea- 
sonable success, allowing the project to use a C-47, called the Gooney Bird, 
for true aerial tests. During these tests, the Gooney Bird towed the M2-Fl 
above 10,000 feet, then set it loose to glide to an Edwards AFB lake bed. 
Beginning in August 1963, the test pilot Milt Thompson did this repeatedly. 
Through these tests, Reed, working on a shoestring budget, showed that the M- 
2 shape, optimized for hypersonic reentry, could glide down to a safe landing. 
During much of this effort, Reed had support from the NASA director 
at Edwards, Paul Bikle. As early as April 1963, he alerted NASA 
Headquarters that “the lifting-body concept looks even better to us as we get 
more into it.” The success of the M2-Fl spurred interest in the Air Force as 
well, as some of its officials, along with their NASA counterparts, set out to 
pursue piloted lifting-body programs that would call for more than plywood 
and funny cars. l5 
NASA contracted with the firm of Northrop to build two such aircraft, the 
M2-F2 and HL-IO. The M2-F2 amounted to an M2-F1 built to NASA stan- 
dards; the HL-10 drew on an alternate lifting-body design by Eugene Love of 
NASA-Langley. This meant that both NAS A-Langley and NASA- Ames 
would each have a project. In addition to this, Northrop had a penchant for 
oddly-shaped aircraft. During the 1940s, the company had built flying wings 
that essentially were aircraft without a fuselage or tail. With these lifting 
bodies, Northrop would build craft now that were entirely fuselage and lacked 
wings. The Air Force project, the X-24A, went to Martin Co., which built it 
as a piloted counterpart of PRIME, maintaining the same shape.*I6 
All three flew initially as gliders, with a B-52 rather than a C-47 as the 
mother ship. The B-52 could reach 45,000 feet and 500 mph, four times the 
115. NASA SP-4303, pp. 148-152. 
116. Hallion, Path, pp. 29,31-32. 
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altitude and speed of the old Gooney Bird.'17 It had routinely carried the X- 
15 aloft, acting as a booster for that rocket plane; now it would do the same 
for the lifting bodies. Their shapes differed, and as with the M2-F1, a major 
goal was to show that they could maintain stable flight while gliding, land 
safely, and exhibit acceptable pilot handling qualities.' '* 
These goals were not always met. Under the best of circumstances, a lift- 
ing body flew like a brick at low speed. Lowering the landing gear made the 
problem worse by adding drag. In May 1967, the test pilot Bruce Peterson, 
flying the M2-F2, failed to get his gear down in time. The aircraft hit the lake 
bed at more than 250 mph, rolled over six times, and then came to rest on its 
back, minus its cockpit canopy, main landing gear, and right vertical fin. 
Peterson, who might have died in the crash, got away with a skull fracture, a 
mangled face, and the loss of an eye. While surgeons reconstructed his face 
and returned him to active duty, the M2-F2 needed surgery of its own. In addi- 
tion to an extensive reconstruction back at the factory, Northrop engineers 
added a third vertical fin that improved its handling qualities and made it safer 
to fly. Similarly, while the rival HL-10 had its own problems of stability, it 
flew and landed well after receiving  modification^."^ 
These aircraft were mounted with small rocket engines that allowed accel- 
eration to supersonic speeds. This made it possible to test stability and 
handling qualities when flying close to the speed of sound. The HL-10 set 
records for lifting bodies by making safe approaches and landings from speeds 
up to Mach 1.86 and altitudes of 90,000 feet.'2o The Air Force continued this 
work through 1975, having the Martin Co. rebuild the X-24A with a long 
pointed nose, a design well-suited for supersonic flight. The resulting craft, the 
X-24B, looked like a wingless fighter-plane fuselage. It also flew we11.12' 
In contrast to the Navaho and X-15 efforts, work with lifting bodies did 
not create major new institutions or lead existing ones in important new direc- 
tions. This work, however, did extend that of the X-15 with the hot-structure 
flights of ASSET and the maneuvering reentries of PRIME. The piloted lift- 
ing bodies then demonstrated that, with the appropriate arrangements of fins, 
117. Miller, X-Planes, p. 153. 
118. Ibid., p. 151; NASA SP-4303, p. 153. 
119. NASA SP-4303, pp. 159, 161-162; Spacejlighf, vol. 21, (1979), pp. 487-489. 
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The X-24B, a lifting body capable of supersonic flight. (NASA)(E-25283) 
they could remain stable and well-controlled when decelerating through the 
sound barrier afid gliding to a landing. They thus broadened the range of 
acceptable hypersonic shapes. 
Sol id -~~ope l la~ t  Rockets: ~ ~ e x p e ~ s i v e  Boosters 
The X-15 and lifting-body programs demonstrated many elements of a 
reusable launch vehicle in such critical areas as propulsion, flight dynamics, 
structures, thermal protection, configurations, instruments, and aircraft stabil- 
ity and control. However, the reason for reusability would be to save money, 
and an airplane-like orbiter would need a low-cost booster as a &st stage. 
During the 1950s and I960s, the Navy, Air Force, and NASA laid groundwork 
for such boosters by sponsoring pathbreaking work with solid propellants. 
The path to such propellants can be traced back to a struggling firm called 
Thiokol Chemical Cop. Its initial stock-in-trade was a liquid polysulfide 
polymer that took its name (Thiokol) from the Creek for “sulfur glue” and 
could be cured into a solvent-resistant synthetic rubber. During World War 11, 
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it found limited use in sealing aircraft fuel tanks-a market that disappeared 
after 1945. Indeed, business was so slow that even small orders would draw 
the attention of the company president, Joseph Crosby. 
When Crosby learned that California Institute of Technology (CIT) was 
buying five- and ten-gallon lots in a steady stream, he flew to California to 
investigate the reason behind the purchases. He found a group of rocket 
researchers, loosely affiliated with CIT, working at a place they called the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory. They were mixing Crosby ’s polymer with an oxidizer 
and adding powdered aluminum for extra energy. They were using this new 
propellant in ways that would make it possible to build solid-fuel rockets of 
particularly large size. 
Crosby soon realized that he too could get into the rocket business, with 
help from the Army. While Army officials could spare only $250,000 per year 
to help him get started, to Crosby this was big money. In 1950, Army 
Ordnance gave him a contract to build a rocket with 5,000 pounds of propel- 
lant. A year and a half later it was ready, with a sign on the side, “The Thing.” 
Fourteen feet long, it burned for over forty seconds and delivered a thrust of 
17,000 p 0 ~ n d s . l ~ ~  
The best solid propellants of the day were of the “double base” type, 
derived from the explosives nitroglycerine and nitrocellulose. Some versions 
could be cast in large sizes. These propellants, however, burned in a sudden 
rush, and could not deliver the strong, steady push needed for a rocket booster. 
The new Thiokol-based fuel emerged as the first of a type that performed well 
and burned at a reasonable rate. These fuels drew on polymer chemistry to 
form as thick mixtures resembling ketchup. Poured into a casing, they then 
polymerized into resilient rubbery solids.’% 
The Navy also took an interest in solid propellants, initially for use in anti- 
aircraft missiles. In 1954, a contractor in suburban Virginia, Atlantic Research, 
set out to achieve further performance improvements. Two company scientists, 
Keith Rumbel and Charles Henderson, focused their attention on the use of 
powdered aluminum. Other researchers had shown that propellants gave the 
122 Forfune, June 1958, p. 109 
123 Ibid., p 190, Thiokol’s Aerospace Facts, July-September 1973, p 10; Saturday Evening Post, October 1, 
1960,p 87 
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Military uses of solid propellants. Left, Minuteman ICBM. Right, three gener- 
ations of the Navy's Polaris submarine-launched missile, with a range of up to 
2,500 nautical miles. Human figure indicates scale. (Art by Dan Gauthier) 
best performance with an aluminum mix of five percent; higher levels caused a 
falloff. Undiscouraged, Rumbel and Henderson decided to try mixing in really 
large amounts. The exhaust velocity, which determines the performance of a 
rocket, took a sharp leap upward. By early 1956, they confinned this discovery 
with test firings. Their exhaust velocities, 7,400 feet per second and greater, 
compared well with those of liquid fuels such as kerosene and liquid oxygen.125 
By then the Navy was preparing to proceed with Polaris, a program that 
sought to send strategic missiles to sea aboard submarines. Initial design con- 
cepts were unpleasantly large; a submarine would be able to carry only four 
such missiles, and the submarine itself would be excessive in size. The break- 
through in propellants coincided with an important advance that markedly 
reduced the weight of thermonuclear weapons. Lighter warheads meant 
smaller missiles. These developments combined to yield a solid-fueled 
Polaris missile that was very compact. Sixteen of them would fit into a con- 
ventional-sized submarine.'Z6 
125. Baar and Howard, Polaris!, pp. 3 1-32. 
126. Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, vol. 15 (1978). pp. 265-278. 
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The new propellants, and the lightweight warheads, also drew interest 
within the Air Force, though its needs contrasted sharply with those of the 
Navy. Skippers could take time in firing undersea missiles, for a submarine 
could hide in the depths until it was ready for launch. Admirals, however, 
preferred solid fuels over liquids because they presented less of a fire hazard. 
While the Air Force was prepared to use liquid propellants in its ICBMs, 
these would take time to fuel and prepare for launch-and during that time 
they would lie open to enemy attack. With solid propellants, a missile could 
be fueled in advance and ready for instant launch. Moreover, such a missile 
would be robust enough to fire from an underground chamber. Prior to 
launch, that chamber would protect the missile against anything short of a 
direct nuclear hit. 
Lieutenant Colonel Edward Hall, who had midwifed the birth of the 
Navaho during the 1940s, now played a leading role in this newest project. He 
was the propulsion officer on the staff of Major General Bernard Schriever 
who was responsible for the development of the Atlas, Titan, and Thor. Hall 
developed a passionate conviction that an Air Force counterpart of Polaris 
would offer considerable advantage in facing the Soviet ICBM capability. At 
the outset of the new project, he addressed the problem of constructing very 
large solid-fuel charges, called grains. He could not draw on the grains of the 
Polaris for that missile had grains of limited size. 
Hall gave contracts to all of the several solid-fuel companies that were in 
business at that time. Thiokol’s Crosby, who had lost the Polaris contract to 
Aerojet General, now saw a chance to recoup. He bought a large tract of land 
near Brigham City, Utah, a remote area where the shattering roar of rockets 
would have plenty of room to die away. In November 1957, his researchers 
successfully fired a solid-fuel unit with 25,000 pounds of propellant, the 
largest to date. 
Meanwhile, Hall had taken charge of a working group that developed a 
preliminary design for a three-stage solid-fuel ICBM. Low cost was to be its 
strong suit, for Hall hoped to deploy it in very large numbers. Early in 1958, 
with the test results from Thiokol in hand, Hall and Schriever went to the 
Pentagon and pitched the concept to senior officials, including the Secretary 
of Defense. But while that missile, named the Minuteman, might be launched 
on a minute’s notice, it would take most of 1958 to win high-level approval 
for a fast pace of development. 
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Barely two years later, in early 1961, the Minuteman was ready for its 
first flight from Cape Canaveral. It scored a brilliant success as all three stages 
fired and the missile flew to full range. The Air Force proceeded to raise the 
Minuteman to the status of a crash program. The first missiles were opera- 
tional in October 1962, in time for the Cuban Missile Crisis. Because its low 
cost made it the first strategic weapon capable of true mass production, the 
Air Force went on to deploy 1,000 of the Minuteman 
The Air Force and NASA also prepared to build solid-fuel boosters of 
truly enormous size for use with launch vehicles. In contrast to liquid rockets 
that were sensitive and delicate, the big solids featured casings that a ship- 
yard-specifically, the Sun Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, near 
Philadelphia-would manufacture successfully. 
The Minuteman's first stage had a 60-inch diameter. In August 1961, 
United Technology Corp. fired a 96-inch solid rocket that developed 250,000 
pounds of thrust. The following year saw the first 120-inch tests-twice the 
diameter of the Minuteman-that reached 700,000 pounds of thrust. The 
next milestone was reached when the diameter was increased to 156 inches, 
the largest size compatible with rail transport. During 1964, both Thiokol 
and Lockheed Propulsion Co. fired test units that topped the million-pound- 
thrust mark. 
Large rocket stages can be moved by barges over water as well as by land. 
Aerojet was building versions with 260-inch diameters. It took some doing just 
to ignite such a behemoth. The answer called for a solid rocket that itself devel- 
oped a quarter-million pounds of thrust, producing an eighty-foot flame that 
would ignite the inner surface of the big one all at once. This igniter rocket 
needed its own igniter, a solid motor that weighed a hundred pounds and gener- 
ated 4,500 pounds of thrust. The 260-inch motor was kept in a test pit with its 
nozzle pointing upward. In February 1966, a night firing near Miami shot flame 
and smoke a mile and a half into the air that was seen nearly a 100 miles away. 
In June 1967, another firing set a new record with 5.7 million pounds of thrust.'28 
At NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, a 1965 study projected that 
production costs for a 260-inch motor would run to $1.50 per pound of 
127. Emme, ed., History, pp. 155-159; Neufeld, Ballistic Missiles, pp. 227-230, 237, 239; Fortune, June 1958, 
128. Quest, Spring 1993, p 2 6  Astmnautics, December 1961, p 125; November 1962, p. 81, Astronautics ana 
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Titan r ICBM; xtan rr ICBM; ?itan IIr 
launch vehicle. Human figure indicates scale. 
(Art by Dan Gauthier) 
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weight, or roughly a dollar per pound of thrust. This contrasted sharply with 
the liquid-fueled Saturn V, which, with 7.5 million pounds of thrust versus 6 
million for the big solid, was in the same class. Even without its Apollo moon- 
ship, however, the Saturn V cost $185 million to purchase, over thirty times 
more than the 260-inch motor. By 1966, NASA officials were looking ahead 
already to sizes as large as 600 inches, noting that “there is no fundamental 
reason to expect that motors 50 feet in diameter could not be made.”’29 
Meanwhile, the Air Force not only was testing big solids but it was 
preparing to use them operationally as part of the Titan program which, in a 
decade, had evolved from building ICBMs to assembling a launch vehicle of 
great power. At the outset, Titan I was a two-stage ICBM project that ran in 
parallel with Atlas and used similar engines in the first stage. While it was 
deployed as a weapon, it was never used to launch a spacecraft or ~ate1lite.I~’ 
The subsequent Titan 11 represented a major upgrade as the engine con- 
tractor, Aerojet General, developed new engines that markedly increased the 
thrust in both stages. It too reached deployment, carrying a heavy thermonu- 
clear warhead with a yield of nine megatons. By lightening this load 
somewhat, the Titan I1 was able to thrust a payload into orbit repeatedly. In 
particular, during 1965 and 1966, the Titan I1 carried 10 piloted Gemini 
spacecraft, each with two astronauts. Their weight ran above 8,300 p0~nds.l~’ 
The Air Force’s Titan 111-A added, to the Titan 11, a third stage (the 
“transtage”) which enhanced its ability to carry large payloads. It never served 
as an ICBM, but worked as a launch vehicle from the start. In particular, it 
served as the core for the Titan 111-C, which flanked that core with a pair of 
120-inch solid boosters. The rocket that resulted had more than a casual 
resemblance to the eventual Space Shuttle, which would use two somewhat 
larger solid boosters in similar fashion. After Iifting the Titan 111-C with 2.36 
million pounds of thrust, its boosters then fell away after burnout, leaving the 
core to ignite its first stage, high in the air. 
The Titan 111-C had a rated payload of 23,000 pounds. NASA replaced the 
transtage with the more capable Centaur upper stage, which used liquid 
hydrogen as a high-energy fuel. This version, the Titan 111-E Centaur. 
129. Astronautics &Aeronautics. January 1966, p. 33; NASA budget data, February 1970. 
130. Emme, ed., History, pp. 145, 147. 
131. NASA SP-4012, vol. II, pp. 83-85; Quest, Winter 1994, p. 42; Thompson, ed., Space Lag, vol. 27 (1991 
p. 87. 
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increased the payload to 33,000 pounds. Martin Marietta, the Titan I11 con- 
tractor, also proposed to delete the third stage while increasing the thrust of 
both the solid boosters and the core. This version, the Titan 111-M, was never 
built, but it would have lifted a payload of 38,000 pounds.13* 
Hence during the 1960s, the X-15, ASSET, PRIME, lifting body and 
solid-booster efforts all combined to provide a strong basis for the Space 
Shuttle program. Such a program might build an orbiter in the shape of a lift- 
ing body with a hot structure for thermal protection. Piloted and crewed, it 
could maneuver during atmosphere entry, ride through the heat of reentry 
with its nose up, then transition to gliding flight and fly to a landing, perhaps 
at Edwards Air Force Base. Moreover, long before those early projects had 
reached completion (and even before some of them were underway), the Air 
Force set out to build a mini-shuttle that would ride a Titan 111-C to orbit and 
then return. This project was called Dyna-Soar arid, later, the X-20. 
During the mid-l950s, with the Bomi studies of Bell Aircraft in the back- 
ground and the X-15 as an ongoing program, a number of people eagerly 
carried out further studies that sought to define the next project beyond the 
132. NASA SP-4012, vol. 111, pp. 38-42; Quest, Fall 1995, p. 18; AAS History Series, vol. 13, pp. 19-35 
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X-15. The ideas studied included Hywards (a piloted hypersonic boost-glide 
research aircraft), the Rob0 (Robot Bomber), and two reconnaissance vehi- 
cles, the System 118-P and the Brass Bell. With so many cooks in the kitchen, 
the Air Force needed a coordinated program in order to produce something as 
specific as the X-15. Its officials were in the process of defining this program 
when, in October and November 1957, the Soviet Union launched the world’s 
first satellites. Very quickly, hypersonic flight became one of the means by 
which the US.  might turn back the challenge from Moscow. 
Having read the work of Sanger, hypersonic specialists knew of his ideas 
for skipping entry as a way to extend the range of a suborbital aircraft. The 
Air Force described this maneuver as “dynamic soaring.” The craft that would 
do this acquired the name Dyna-Soar. By early 1958, this idea was being stud- 
ied seriously by a number of aeronautical contractors with the clear 
understanding that the Air Force intended to request proposals and build a 
flying prototype. In June 1958, the Air Force narrowed the competition to two 
contenders: Boeing and a joint Bell Aircraft and Martin Co. team.’33 
By then, Dyna-Soar was caught up in the first round of a controversy as to 
whether this craft should be the prototype of a bomber. While the powerful Air 
Research and Development Command (ARDC) firmly believed that Dyna-Soar 
should be the prototype of a piloted military spaceplane, it found it difficult to 
point to specific military missions that such a craft could carry out. For nuclear 
weapons delivery, the Air Force was already building the Atlas, Titan, and Thor. 
For strategic reconnaissance, the Central Intelligence Agency had launched, in 
1958, a program that aimed to build automated camera-carrying satellites and 
put the first ones into orbit in as little as one year.’34 
Air Force Headquarters, however, with support from the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, refused to consider weapon-system objectives unless 
ARDC could define suitable military missions. Early in 1959, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles wrote that his approval was only “for a 
research and development project and did not constitute recognition of Dyna- 
Soar as a weapon system.” 
In April, the Defense Director of Research and Engineering, Herbert 
York, made a clear statement of the program’s objectives. Its primary goal 
133 AAS History Series, vol. 17, pp. 255-259. 
134. (bid., p. 260; Ruffner, ed., Corona, pp. 3-14. 
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would involve hypersonic flight up 
would fall short of orbital velocity. 
able, and capable of landing 
ARDC, stating that it could 
provided that such tests did not detract from the primary goal. ARDC officials 
hastened to affirm that there would be no conflict. They promptly issued 
ermine the mili- 
ogram went forward as its man- 
Dyna-Soar would fly suborbital missions only. Over the next year and a half, 
however, the choice of booster changed to the Titan 11 and then the powerful 
Titan III-C. A new plan, approved in December 1961, dropped suborbital flights 
and called nt of orbital flight, with the Titan III booster.” 
This plan called initially for single-orbit missions that would not require 
the craft to carry an onboard retro-rocket for descent from orbit. Instead the 
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Mockup of Dyna-Sour displayed in 1962. (Boeing) (P-30793) 
The piloted Dyna-Soar spacecraft also emerged with highly-swept delta 
wings and two upturned fins at the wingtips. With a length of 35 feet, it lacked 
an onboard rocket engine and provided room for a single pilot only. Like 
ASSET, it relied on advanced hot structures, with a heat shield of columbium, 
well insulated, atop a main structure built from a nickel alloy that had been 
developed for use in jet engines.'37 In September 1962, a full-scale mockup 
was the hit of the show at an Air Force Association convention in Las Vegas. 
In addition to this, the Air Force named six test pilots who would fly Dyna- 
Soar as its  astronaut^.'^^ 
137. Ibid., pp. 217-219 
138. Ibid., p. 269. 
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The question of military missions raised its head again when in mid-1961 
the new Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara, directed the Air Force to jus- 
tify Dyna-Soar on military grounds. Air Force officials discussed orbital 
reconnaissance, rescue, inspection of Soviet spacecraft, orbital bombardment, 
and use of the craft as a ferry vehicle. While McNamara found these reasons 
unconvincing, he nevertheless remained willing to let the program proceed as 
a research effort, dropping all consideration of a possible use of the craft as a 
weapon system. In an October 1961 memo to President Kennedy, McNamara 
proposed to “re-orient the program to solve the difficult technical problem 
involved in boosting a body of high lift into orbit, sustaining man in it and 
recovering the vehicle at a designated place.”*39 
This reorientation gave the project another two years of life. With its new 
role as an experimental craft, it was designated by Air Force Headquarters as 
the X-20. In this new role, however, the program could not rely on a military 
justification; it would have to stand on its value as research. By 1963, this 
value was increasingly in question. ASSET, with its unpiloted craft, was 
promising to demonstrate hypersonic gliding entry and hot-structure technol- 
ogy at far lower cost. In the realm of piloted flight, NASA now was charging 
ahead with its Gemini program. Air Force officials were expecting to partici- 
pate in this program as well. 
These officials still believed that their service in time would build piloted 
spacecraft for military purposes. In March 1963, McNamara ordered a study 
that would seek to determine whether Gemini or the X-20 could better serve 
the role of a testbed for military missions. The results of the study gave no 
clear reason to prefer the latter. 
In October, Air Force officials, briefing the President’s Scientific 
Advisory Committee, encountered skepticism in this quarter as well. Two 
weeks later, McNamara and other senior officials received their own briefing. 
McNamara asked what the Air Force intended to do with the X-20 after using 
it to demonstrate maneuvering reentry. He insisted he could not justify con- 
tinuing the project if it was a dead-end program with no ultimate purpose. 
He canceled the program in December, stating that the purpose of the pro- 
gram had been to demonstrate maneuvering reentry and precision landing. 
The X-20 was not to serve as a cargo rocket, could not carry substantial pay- 
139. Spaceflight, vol. 21 (1979), pp. 436-438. 
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loads, and could not stay in orbit for long-duration missions. He could not jus- 
tify continuing with the program because it was costly and would serve “a 
very narrow obje~tive.’’’~~ 
At that moment, the program, well past the stage of paper studies, called 
for the production of 10 X-20 vehicles. Boeing had completed nearly 42 per- 
cent of the necessary tasks. While NcNamara’s decision drew hot criticism, he 
had support where it counted; the X-20 did not. Eugene Zuckert, the Air Force 
Secretary, continued to endorse the program to the end, but the project had 
little additional support among the Pentagon’s civilian secretaries. In the Air 
Force, the Space Systems Division (SSD) was to conduct pilot training and 
carry out the flights. Support for the X-20, however, was lukewarm both at the 
SSD and at Aerospace Corp., its source of technical advice. General Bernard 
Schriever, commander of the ARDC,I4l was also lukewarm. So was his deputy 
commander for aerospace systems, Lieutenant General Howell Estes.14* 
This was the life and death of the Dyna-Soar. From its demise one can 
draw several conclusions. By 1963, the program’s technical feasibility was no 
longer in question; it was just a matter of putting the pieces together. Although 
aerospace vehicles were continuing to evolve at a rapid pace, no technical 
imperative existed that could call the X-20 into existence. The program 
needed a mission, a justification sufficiently compelling to win political sup- 
port from high-level officials. Dyna-Soar demonstrated that even though the 
means were in hand to pursue the development of a vehicle resembling the 
Space Shuttle, such a project would stand or fall on its merits. To be built, it 
would require a reason capable of attracting and winning endorsement from 
presidential appointees and other leaders at the highest levels. 
140. AAS History Series, vol. 17, pp. 271-275. 
141. Redesignated Air Force Systems Command in 1961. 
142 Ibid., p, 275; Hallion, ed., Hypersonic, p II-xvii. 
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Technology Bypasses the Space Station 
During the 1950s, as Walt Disney and Collier’s presented the space station and 
shuttle concept to the American public, the rapid pace of technical development 
was making it obsolete before it could ever be built. The concept had taken 
form in an era when radio was the only well-developed electronic technology. 
It was easy, therefore, to imagine that space flight would demand large orbiting 
crews to conduct satellite communications, weather observation, and military 
reconnaissance. Like a base in Antarctica, the space station would support these 
crews with comfortable accommodations inside a centralized facility. 
This point of view appeared not only in the writings of Wernher von 
Braun, but in the work of his fellow visionary Arthur C. Clarke. In 1945, 
Clarke proposed building communications satellites in geosynchronous orbit, 
at an altitude of 22,300 miles. They would circle the Earth every 24 hours, to 
remain fixed in position in the sky: 
Using material ferried up by rockets, it would be possible to construct a 
“space-station” in such an orbit. The station could be provided with living 
quarters, laboratories and everything needed for the comfort of its crew, 
who would be relieved and provisioned by a regular rocket service .... Since 
the gravitational stresses involved in the structure are negligible, only the 
very lightest materials will be necessary and the station could be as large 
as required. 
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Let us now suppose that such a station were built in this orbit. It could 
be provided with receiving and transmitting equipment ... and could act as a 
repeater to relay transmissions between any two points on the hemisphere 
beneath, using any frequency which will penetrate the ionosphere. ‘ 
Even then, in 1945, rocket researchers were broadening the use of radio 
by introducing telemetry: the automated transmission of instrument readings. 
Telemetry developed in the technology of weather balloons, which could 
carry meteorological instruments to high altitudes. By transmitting the instru- 
ment readings, telemetry eliminated the need to physically recover the 
instruments following a long flight. In addition to this, weather balloons (and 
rockets) required equipment of minimal weight. During World War 11, teleme- 
try was used actively during test flights of the V-2. After that war, when von 
Braun brought his V-2s to the U.S. and carried out a program of instrumented 
flights in New Mexico, telemetry again played an important role.’ 
In space flight, telemetry made it possible to envision automated space- 
craft. As part of the Collier’s series, von Braun offered a proposal for such a 
craft in 1953. It was to carry rhesus monkeys, along with a TV camera for 
observation of clouds and weather patterns. Collier’s called it a “baby space 
station,” describing it as the “first step in the conquest of space.” Chesley 
Bonestell, in his lyric style, portrayed it in a closeup view, soaring high over 
New York City. 
This spacecraft, however, would serve as a prelude to the full-size space 
station; in no way would it represent a substitute. In von Braun’s words, “We 
scientists can have the baby rocket within five to seven years if we begin work 
now. Five years later, we could have the manned space station.” Though the 
automated spacecraft could carry a TV camera, “most of the weather research 
must await construction of a man-carrying space  tati ion."^ 
Two other technical developments allowed automated satellites to come 
into their own. The first was the development of electronic circuits that had 
long life. This drew on work at Bell Telephone Laboratories, where the first 
transistors took form. Bell Labs also introduced the solar cell, a thin wafer of 
silicon that could transform sunlight directly into electric current. In addition 
I .  Pierce, Beginnings, pp.  38-39. 
2. Ley, Rockets, pp.  263-265. 
3. Collier’s, June 27, 1953, pp. 33-40. 
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to this, while Arthur Clarke wrote of communications satellites, it was another 
of Bell Labs’ specialists, John Pierce, who developed the invention that 
allowed these spacecraft to emerge as working technology. This was the trav- 
eling-wave tube, an electronic amplifier that could work with a broad range 
of freq~encies.~ 
In his 1945 paper, Clarke was more able to envision frequent space supply 
flights in high orbits than to foresee electronic circuitry that would operate rou- 
tinely and reliably for years, without maintenance. Crews in their orbiting 
stations would spend a great deal of time replacing vacuum tubes. The situa- 
tion was not much different in 1953, when von Braun proposed his “baby 
space station.” He envisioned a time in orbit of only 60 days, which was about 
as much as he could expect given the limits of circuitry at that time. As early 
4. Bernstein, Three Degrees, pp. 75-75, 91-95, 102-105; Pierce, Beginnings, pp. 1-9, New Yorker, September 
21, 1963, pp. 60-66. 
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as 1958, however, the Vanguard 1 satellite demonstrated the prospect of long 
life. Though it lacked instruments and carried only a radio transmitter, it was 
powered by solar cells and was able to transmit for over six years.5 
Another important development brought the advent of spacecraft that 
could operate autonomously and return from orbit. This project, known as the 
Corona program, was run by the Central Intelligence Agency, with Lockheed 
as the contractor. Their spacecraft, called Discoverer, was able to stabilize 
while in orbit and point a lens at the Earth below. It also operated an auto- 
mated camera, winding the exposed film into a protected cassette. At an 
appropriate moment, the spacecraft then released a reentry capsule that fired 
a retro-rocket. The capsule deployed a parachute to land within a specified 
target area. Air Force cargo planes were then often able to snatch the capsule 
in mid-air.6 
It took over a dozen satellite launches before the CIA got this complex 
system to work successfully. While the first launch, Discoverer 1, flew in 
February 1959, it was not until Discoverer 13 and 14, in August 1960 that the 
program achieved success.’ Its significance then was undeniable. The analyst 
Jeffrey Richelson described space reconnaissance as “one of the most signif- 
icant military technological developments of this century and perhaps in all 
history. Indeed, its impact on postwar international affairs is probably second 
only to that of the atomic bomb. The photo-reconnaissance satellite, by damp- 
ening fears of what weapons the other superpower had available and whether 
military action was imminent, has played an enormous role in stabilizing the 
superpower relationship.”* 
These developments-telemetry, long-life electronics, onboard auton- 
omy-completely changed the prospects for space flight. No longer would it 
be necessary to build von Braun’s 7000-ton cargo rockets or to support large 
crews in orbiting stations. Instead, the nation would proceed by developing 
launch vehicles from the ICBMs and similar missiles that the military was 
building for defense purposes. Satellites would take shape as instrumented 
craft of modest size and weight. In turn, the space station ceased to hold the 
attention of visionaries such as von Braun, who went on to influence policy. 
5 Emme ed Histon, p 138, Thompson, ed , Space Log. vol 27 (1991). p 50 
6 Ruffner, ed , Corona, pp 3-39 
7 Ibid , pp 16-24 
8 Richelwn, Secret Eves, p 265 
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Cutaway view of the Corona satellite reconnaissance system. (Central Intelligence Agency) 
Rather than emerging as a matter of urgency for the near future, the space sta- 
tion became something that might be built in the distant future. 
In May 1961, President Kennedy committed NASA and the nation to a 
major effort in piloted space flight that had nothing to do with a space station. 
The goal, instead, was to land astronauts on the Moon. In doing this, NASA 
completely bypassed the classic approach of first building a space station and 
then using it as a base or staging area for the lunar mission. Instead, as a single 
Saturn V rocket carried a complete moonship with a crew of three, NASA 
went for the Moon in one fell swoop,. 
The concept of an orbiting station, however, did not go away. If it now 
offered no obvious path for use in space applications, the space station still 
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promised considerable value as a science center, supporting astronomy and 
studies of the Earth. Kennedy’s effort aimed at a Moon landing; it was easy 
to imagine a permanent base on the Moon. A space station, in Earth orbit, 
could demonstrate and test many critical technologies. As an essential prelude 
to an eventual mission to Mars, it also could test the ability of astronauts to 
remain healthy when living for long periods in zero gravity. 
The architecture of such stations also changed. The concept of a big rotat- 
ing wheel fell by the wayside, in favor of designs that could fit atop a rocket 
as a single payload. The Saturn V could carry close to 300,000 pounds to 
orbit,9 a capacity that spurred far-reaching thoughts. After 1965, attempts by 
NASA officials to use this capacity led to the development of a space station 
called Skylab. 
Apollo Applicatio~s: Prelude to a Space Station 
The ubiquitous von Braun played a key role in initiating this new effort, not 
because he succeeded in convincing senior NASA officials of the merits of a 
space station, but rather because he knew that his staff would soon need new 
work. During the 1960s, he was director of NASA’s Marshall Space Flight 
Center, where large launch vehicles were a specialty. As he stated in 1962, 
“we can still carry an idea for a space vehicle.. . from the concept through the 
entire development cycle of design, development, fabrication, and testing.” 
His domain included the Michoud Assembly Facility near New Orleans, 
where complete Saturn V first stages were assembled. It also included the 
nearby Mississippi Test Facility, where these five-engine stages could operate 
as complete units on a test stand.‘O 
The development of the Saturn V set the pace for the entire Apollo pro- 
gram. This Moon rocket, however, would have to reach an advanced state of 
reliability before it could be used to carry astronauts. The Marshall staff also 
was responsible for development of the smaller Saturn I-B that could put a 
piloted Apollo spacecraft through its paces in Earth orbit. Because both rock- 
ets would have to largely complete their development before Apollo could hit 
its stride, von Braun knew that his center would pass its peak of activity and 
9. NASA SP-4012, VOI. III, p. 27. 
10. NASA SP-4208, p. 4; NASA SP-4206; see index references 
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would shrink in size at a relatively early date. He would face large layoffs 
even while other NASA centers would still be actively preparing for the first 
mission to the Moon.” 
At NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C., George E. Mueller (pro- 
nounced “Miller”), Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, 
understood von Braun’s situation for he had helped to create it. Mueller had 
been vice president of the fm of Space Technology Laboratories in Los 
Angeles, a division of TRW and a prime source of technical support for the 
Air Force’s principal missile programs. Mueller had been deeply involved in 
the Minuteman ICBM effort, and had pushed successfully for “all-up testing,” 
during which that missile fixed all three stages and flew to its full range on its 
first flight. 
11. NASA SP-4208, p. 5 
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Coming to NASA in 1963, he quickly became convinced that he could do 
the same with the Saturn V. von Braun had used a cautious step-by-step 
approach in developing the earlier Saturn I, flight-testing only the first stage 
before committing to flights of the complete two-stage launch vehicle. Mueller 
decided that similar caution in flight testing of Saturn V’s three stages would 
push the first lunar landing into the next decade. He won von Braun’s consent to 
allow Saturn V to fly ‘‘all-up” on its first flight by firing all three of its stages.12 
This quickened the pace of development on the Apollo program, making 
it likely that the Saturn V would become available at a relatively early date. It 
also hastened the day when von Braun’s center would largely complete its 
work and face layoffs. Mueller’s decision, however, also made it likely that 
surplus Saturn-class rockets would become available for purposes other than 
direct support of Moon landings. 
In August 1965, MuCller set up a new Saturn-Apollo Applications 
Program Office. The Saturn I-B emerged as an early focus for attention. This 
powerful rocket conducted only a limited program of developmental flights 
for Apollo before giving way to the much larger Saturn V. The Saturn I-B’s 
second stage, the S-IVB, had a liquid-hydrogen propellant tank with a volume 
of nearly 10,000 cubic feet. There was interest in turning the S-IVB into an 
orbiting workshop. Mueller later stated that this would match the volume of 
“a small ranch house. The kind I can afford to buy.” 
By early 1967, the program called for an initial mission featuring two 
launches. The first would carry an Apollo spacecraft with its crew of three; the 
second would launch the workshop, mounted to an airlock and docking 
adapter. The S-IVB, modified for use in orbit, was to sprout large solar panels 
along with two floors within the 21-foot wide hydrogen tank. These floors 
would provide living quarters and work areas. The flight crew would ren- 
dezvous with the workshop and dock with the adapter. Inside the spent fuel 
tank, these astronauts would find an empty, bare-walled space that would 
require four days of fitting-out to turn into habitable living quarters. The crew 
would then stay in space for 28 days conducting biomedical tests as their prin- 
cipal activity. A subsequent mission to the workshop would bring a fresh crew 
to live in space for 56 days.13 
12. Ibid., pp. 6-7; NASA SP-4012, vol. 11, pp. 54-58 
13. NASA SP-4208, pp. 20-21,2627, 53-55. 
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In addition to Mueller's powerful Office of Manned Space Flight, a sep- 
arate NASA program center, the Office of Space Science a d Applications 
(OSSA), made its own contribution to the new post-Apollo effort. Within the 
field of space science, OSSA supported solar astronomy, using spacecraft to 
observe the Sun at ultraviolet and x-ray wavelengths that do not penetrate the 
atmosphere. In 1962 and 1965, two Orbiting Solar Observatory spacecraft 
returned a great deal of useful data and sparked interest in an advanced auto- 
mated solar observatory. Such plans fit the cyclic activity of the Sun itself, 
which, every 11 years, rises to a peak in the number of sunspots, radiation 
levels, and magnetic activity. The next such peak was to occur in 1969, leav- 
ing ample time for development of the new spacecraft. 
OSSA'S plans fit the solar cycle much better than the budget cycle. OSSA 
had little clout, and the demands of Apollo were all-consuming; pressed by its 
budgetary needs, scientific satellites tended to fall by the wayside. The head 
of OSSA, Homer Newell, was undismayed. Though his advanced automated 
observatory failed to win support and had to be canceled, Newell saw that he 
could seek an even more ambitious solar observatory by hitching his wagon 
to the star of piloted space flight. Working with Mueller, Newell developed a 
concept for an Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM), as a second important com- 
ponent of Apollo Applications. 
This ATM took shape as a substantial spacecraft in its own right. 
Requiring its own Saturn I-B to carry it aloft, it also called for its own set of 
solar panels that would unfold to form a large cross. The program plan called 
for it to rendezvous with the orbiting workshop early in the 56-day second 
mission. The astronauts would move it into position and install it as part of 
the complete space laboratory. With a dozen instruments, the ATM would test 
the ability of astronauts to conduct useful scientific research by operating 
sophisticated equipment in orbit.14 
These missions were to herald a major program. Released in March 1966, 
NASA's initial schedule envisioned 26 launches of the Saturn I-B and 19 of 
the Saturn V. Flight hardware would include three S-IVB stages intended for 
on-orbit habitation, four ATMs, and three more capable space stations that 
would ride atop the Saturn V. The Bureau of the Budget (BOB), an arm of the 
White House, was not encouraging. Bureau officials were concerned that 
? 
14. Ibid., pp. 36-37, 69-71. 
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Apollo Applications might wastefully duplicate an Air Force program, the 
Manned Orbiting Laboratory. In addition to this, with Apollo reaching the 
peak of its funding, those officials were in no mood to allow NASA to launch 
another costly program. 
Initial discussions focused on the budget request for FY 1967 that 
President Lyndon B. Johnson would present to Congress early in 1966. 
Mueller hoped at first for $450 million, with over $1 billion in FY 1968. 
Bureau of the Budget officials preferred to start by offering $100 million, 
though they were willing to listen to arguments for $250 million. This part of 
NASA's budget included Apollo. To keep it on schedule, Mueller had to put 
Apollo Applications under a particularly severe squeeze with only $42 mil- 
lion (less than a tenth of his initial budget mark) for FY 1967.15 
The FY 1968 budget brought more of the same. Initial discussions 
between NASA and the BOB chopped the request from $626 million to $454 
15. [bid., pp. 42-43; NASA SP-4011, p. 71. 
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million, a sum that at least would get the program off to a good start. In his 
budget message to Congress, Johnson endorsed this figure with an argument 
that would be heard again in subsequent years: “We have no alternative unless 
we wish to abandon the manned space capability we have created.” Though 
Johnson and the BOB were now on board, Congress, which cut the authoriza- 
tion to $347 million, was not. Not even the appropriation-more bad news at 
$300 million-was safe, as the NASA Administrator, James E. Webb, trans- 
ferred part of it to other activities. Apollo Applications was left with only 
$253 million, the lowest level Mueller could accept.16 
It nevertheless was enough, barely, to get the program under way and turn 
it into something more than a design exercise. As serious engineering activity 
got under way, however, designers came to realize that they were pursuing an 
approach marked with pitfalls. The approach continued to call for a “wet 
workshop,” a propulsive stage that would then serve as living and working 
quarters while in orbit. After reaching orbit, however, astronauts would have 
to convert the empty fuel tank into these quarters and install a good deal of 
equipment. As studies proceeded, it became increasingly doubtful that all this 
could be done. 
The alternative would be to build the space station as a “dry workshop” 
with no provision for use as a rocket stage. Unable to propel itself into orbit, 
the dry workshop would need the heavy lifting power of a Saturn V. That 
rocket’s payload capacity would make it possible to incorporate the ATM 
from the outset, rather than having to bring it up on a separate flight. The 
complete, well-integrated space station could undergo tests and verification 
on the ground. 
While studies of a dry workshop were being conducted at the same time 
as those of the wet version, they were never endorsed by NASA Administrator 
James Webb. The sticking point was the need for a Saturn V. The historians 
Charles Benson and David Compton note that “it had taken all of Webb’s 
power of persuasion to convince Congress and the BOB that Apollo required 
at least 15 Saturn V launch vehicles, and he would tolerate no suggestion that 
any could be used for something else.”17 When Webb resigned from NASA in 
October 1968, he took his objections with him. In addition to this, in 
16. NASA SP-4208, pp. 53, 86-87. 
17. Ibid., pp. 105-109. 
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December 1968, Apollo 8 carried three astronauts on a successful flight that 
orbited the Moon and returned safely. This was only the third flight of a 
Saturn V, making it highly plausible that it would indeed be possible to spare 
one of those behemoths for Apollo Applications.” 
With the mounting technical problems of the wet workshop approach, 
Mueller became convinced that it simply was not practical. Hence, only a dry 
workshop could save the program. The new NASA Administrator Thomas 
Paine became convinced in 1969 that it was necessary to make the switch. His 
decision was subject only to the success of Apollo 1 1, the planned first lunar- 
landing mission. He signed the project-change document on July 18, while 
Apollo 11 was en route to the Moon. Four days later, with the landing accom- 
plished and the astronauts homeward bound, the Apollo Applications program 
manager, William Schneider, sent telexes to the NASA centers that directed 
them to proceed with the dry workshop. 
Program cutbacks, however, had taken their toll. Apollo Applications, ini- 
tially conceived as a long-running extension of Apollo, was down to a single 
workshop supported by three astronaut crews flying the Saturn I-B. There was 
hope for a second workshop that would carry different equipment. The pro- 
gram needed a new name; a committee considered close to a hundred 
possibilities, inchding “Socrates” and “LSD.” The winning name, “Sky lab,” 
came from Lieutenant Colonel Donald Steelman, an Air Force officer on duty 
with NASA. The new name, which replaced Apollo Applications, was for- 
mally adopted in February 1970.19 
Space Station Concepts of the 1960s 
There was only a single Skylab orbiting workshop in existence. Though 
NASA had built a second model, there were no funds to launch this space- 
craft, and it wound up on display at the National Air and Space Museum.20 To 
this day, Skylab remains the closest thing to a true space station that NASA 
has ever built and operated. Nevertheless, it represented no more than a small 
step toward that goal. 
18 NASA SP-4012, vol. 11, p. 61. 
20. [bid., p. 353. 
19. N A S A S P - 4 2 0 8 , ~ ~ .  107-110, 112, 114-115. 
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Skylab grew out of Apollo Applications, which merely sought to make 
good use of Apollo launch vehicles and equipment. Though the Skylab space- 
craft strongly modified the standard S-IVB rocket stage, its design was 
heavily constrained. The 22-foot diameter of Skylab followed from the diam- 
eter of the S-IVB, even though the Saturn V could accommodate payloads of 
up to 33 feet across. Similarly, although Skylab included the ATM as part of 
its package, its total weight, 165,000 pounds, fell well short of the lifting 
power of the Saturn V. These restrictions arose because the dry workshop, 
which used the Saturn V, developed out of the wet workshop, which was to 
have used the much smaller Saturn I-B.21 
In addition, Skylab was not permanently inhabited. It supported three 
crews in orbit, during 1973 and 1974, who stayed respectively for 28, 59 and 
84 days. Though the last such mission continues to hold the record for dura- 
tion in U.S.-built spacecraft, Soviet and Russian cosmonauts have stayed in 
orbit for up to 437 days in the Mir station. Following the return of the third 
Skylab crew, in February 1974, NASA made no further attempt to use this 
valuable facility. Skylab's orbit, left to decay, caused it to burn up in the 
atmosphere in July 1979.22 
In spite of its limitations and its shrinking budgets, Apollo Applications 
was important. Not just a paper study, it was a true and funded program, with 
a project office at NASA Headquarters that stood alongside similar offices for 
Gemini and A p ~ l l o . ~ ~  It thus gave considerable hope to those in both NASA 
and the industry who were carrying out studies for the next space station. 
During the 1960s, a number of studies sought to define such a station. 
NASA's Langley Research Center took an early interest in such studies, set- 
ting up a space station office within its Applied Mechanics and Physics 
Division. Early work, from 1959 to 1962, focused anew on the rotating-wheel 
configuration. At the outset, the Langley designers considered a range of shapes 
that could rotate to provide artificial gravity. Like PotoEnik and von Braun 
before them, they decided the wheel was best. With a radius of 75 feet, it would 
rotate at four revolutions per minute, producing two-fims of normal gravity. 
Langley then contracted with North American Aviation (NAA) to carry 
out further studies. A prime question was how to fit so large a structure into 
2 1 Ibid., pp. 107-108; Thompson, ed., Space h g ,  vol. 27 (1991), p. 137. 
22. Thompson, Space Log, vol. 27 (1991), pp. 137, 138, 141; vol. 31 (1995). p. 68. 
23. NASA SP-4208, pp 200-21. 
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the cargo volume of a Saturn V. NAA changed the wheel to a hexagon com- 
posed of six long cylinders joined at their ends. These would fold into a 
package 103 feet long by 33 feet in diameter. Once in orbit, mechanical screw 
jacks would unfold the hinged parts. The complete space station would 
include a hub with a docking facility for Apollo spacecraft. With telescoping 
spokes joining the hub to the hexagon, the station’s volume of 45,000 cubic 
feet would accommodate up to 36 crew members.24 
In size between Potocnik’s concept of 1928 and von Braun’s of 1952, 
NASA’s concept represented a brilliant attempt to bring the rotating wheel 
into an era in which major tasks, including piloted flight to the Moon, would 
be canied out in space. Even so, it was behind the times. The project’s empha- 
sis on artificial gravity was better suited to an earlier age when large crews 
were expected to live in comfort. At the same time, by 1960, tasks that were 
to be conducted by astronauts were ready for automated electronics. In addi- 
tion to this, by 1963 it was clear that studies of human physiology during 
extended durations in weightlessness would represent an important rationale 
for a space station. Subsequent concepts reflected these changes. 
24. Ibid., pp. 9-10,AAS History Series, voI. 14, pp. 80-83 
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Cutaway view of MORL. (Douglas Aircraft) 
Langley’s next round of studies, called the Manned Orbiting Research 
Laboratory (MORL), rejected the rotating wheel once and for all. Late in 1963, 
Douglas Aircraft won this study contract. In many ways, MORL illustrated 
what Apollo Applications might have accomplished if it had been given high 
priority and ample funding. 
Rather than seeking to support large crews in the comfort of artificial 
gravity, MORL emphasized small crews that would live in weightlessness in 
versatile, compact stations. The basic station was to fly atop a Saturn I-B and 
hence had that rocket’s diameter of 22 feet. Weighing 30,000 pounds at 
launch, MORL would enclose 9,000 cubic feet of internal volume, with a 
crew of six. Each astronaut would serve a six-month tour of duty. A modified 
Apollo spacecraft, riding its own Saturn I-B, would carry supplies along with 
new three crew members to the space station. 
Specialized equipment would enhance the usefulness of MORL. It would 
carry astronomical telescopes, A crew-tended radar would support large-scale 
topographical mapping. Douglas Aircraft also proposed to install a nine-lens 
camera system for observation of the Earth’s surface and weather at a variety 
of wavelengths. With astronauts tending a lab full of plants, animals and 
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bacteria, additional modules would research new fields such as life sciences. 
The addition of other such modules would allow the basic station to expand 
to house nine astronauts rather than the original six. Selected crew members 
would remain in orbit for as long as a year. 
Use of the Saturn V would enable the MOIU to fly in orbits as high as 
23,000 miles while continuing to receive resupply. The MOIU would be able 
to fly to lunar orbit to map the Moon’s surface. It would be able to land on the 
Moon and to serve as a base. Serving as a test bed for systems intended for 
use in a piloted mission to Mars, MORL also might evolve into an important 
element of a spacecraft built to cany out such a mission.25 
At the Manned Spacecraft Center (renamed the Johnson Space Center in 
1973) in Houston, other investigators agreed that a space station could repre- 
sent an intermediate step toward a mission to Mars. That center had its own 
space station group that had contracted with the Space Division of the Boeing 
Co. to conduct the pertinent study. Completed in 1967, that study envisioned 
a Mars spaceship that also could serve as an Earth-orbiting station. 
The Mars ship would take the form of a two-deck module, 22 feet in 
diameter, with room for both crew members and equipment. For use as a 
space station, the vehicle would add a second module, together with a central 
section, midway along the station, that could accommodate the docking of 
two Apollo spacecraft. With a weight of 248,000 pounds, this complete sta- 
tion would ride a Saturn V to orbit. It would support a crew of eight, with 
these astronauts flying on the Saturn I-B, in Apollo craft modified to carry 
four rather than the usual three people. Two such launches would provide the 
initial staff. Subsequent flights every 90 days would bring fresh crew mem- 
bers as well as new supplies. The station would remain continuously occupied 
for two years. 
Without resupply or revisit en route, the Mars mission would also last two 
years. Mission designers would chop the space station in two, retrieving the 
basic two-deck module and staffing it with a crew of four. After being placed 
in orbit by a single Saturn V launch, additional Saturn V flights would carry 
fully-fueled S-IVB stages to boost the Mars ship toward its destination. While 
it would fly past and not land on that planet or even orbit it, the mission would 
drop off planet probes, landers, and an orbiter during this flyby. During the 
25. Astronautics &Aeronautics, March 1967, pp. 34-46; NASA SP-4308, pp. 293-300. 
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Boeing space station concept of 1967. (Boeing) 
close approach to that planet, the flight to Mars would culminate in an 1 1 -day 
period of intense crew activity followed by the long voyage home.26 
Not everyone agreed that a space station should serve as a way station for 
flight to Mars. An alternate viewpoint stressed the usefulness of such stations 
for science alone. This view found support at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight 
Center. A 1966 study there noted that a proper science station could not be all 
things to all people. It was argued that different sciences would impose char- 
acteristic demands that would be mutually incompatible. 
Astronomy in space, for example, would require gamma-ray, x-ray, opti- 
cal, and radio telescopes. These would have to point in fixed directions during 
their observations, maintaining stability to within 0.00 1 degrees. A due-east 
launch from Cape Canaveral could put them in orbit, with an inclination to the 
equator of 28 degrees. By contrast, observation of the Earth’s surface and 
weather would ideally require a polar orbit that demands more energy at 
launch. An Earth-observing station would have to turn slowly to point con- 
tinually downward, rather than stare at a fixed position in space. It could work 
26. Report D2-114012-1 (Boeing). 
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with a stability of 0.05 degrees. Biomedical experiments, including long- 
duration studies of the human response to weightlessness, would be even less 
demanding. Able to work in any orbit, they would dispense with the costly 
control systems necessary for pointing and stabilization. 
The Marshall study thus called for two stations, each with a crew of nine 
and a lifetime of five years for the station. They would fly to orbit atop the 
Saturn V. One station, supporting astronomy, would fly due east from the 
Cape. The second station, supporting meteorology and Earth observations, 
would not use the hard-to-reach polar orbit, but would achieve an intermedi- 
ate inclination of 55 degrees. This inclination would still permit coverage of 
the world’s major land masses. Biologists and life-science specialists, not 
requiring a specific orbit, could build a specialized module that could fly as 
part of either station.27 
It is important to note that these studies lacked the support of a NASA 
Headquarters program office similar to that of Apollo Applications after 1965. 
These studies, however, did have the attention of center directors. In 1963, the 
original MORL Studies Office reported directly to Floyd Thompson, the direc- 
tor of NASA-Langley.28 Similarly, it was no secret that Wernher von Braun, 
director of NASA-Marshall, had a strong and ongoing interest in space stations. 
With no one at Headquarters who was ready to take those studies and push for 
their fulfillment, the space station represented only a possible new direction for 
NASA. In no way was there a commitment to pursue that direction. 
In addition, these studies reflected the characteristic point of view that 
space stations could offer intrinsic advantages. In 1968, Robert Gilruth, direc- 
tor of the Manned Spacecraft Center, defined such a station as “a site in space 
developed to support men, experimental equipment, and operations perma- 
nently and to take advantage of the favorable economies of size, 
centralization, and permanency-in terms of power, volume, instruments, 
communications, data reduction, and 10gistics.”~~ This amounted to an asser- 
tion that those “favorable economies” actually existed, a point from which 
both Congress and the Budget Bureau soon would differ. 
Likewise, it was not easy to assume that space stations would win support 
on their merits for use in science. The concepts of the day anticipated the rou- 
27. AAS History Series, vol. 14, pp. 83-86. 
28. NASA SP-4308, p. 294. 
29. Astronautics &Aeronautics, November 1968. p. 54. 
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tine use of the Saturn I-B with the Apollo spacecraft for resupply and crew 
rotation. The Apollo 7 mission, which had flown atop the Saturn I-B in 1968, 
cost $145 million. Two years later, a single flight of a Saturn V with its moon- 
ship would cost up to $375 million. By contrast, in FY 1970, the National 
Science Foundation, which sponsors a broad range of basic research in a large 
number of fields, received a budget of $440 million.30 Indeed, it would take a 
true believer to assert that a Saturn V, even with an Apollo mission, could offer 
the scientific return of a year's worth of grants from the NSF to the nation's 
universities and research centers. 
This point was not lost on the advanced-planning designers who were 
nurturing their space stations. They saw that the expensive Saturn V might not 
remain the only way to launch a large station; a reusable launch vehicle might 
cut costs while offering even greater lifting power. In addition to this, it might 
prove feasible to dispense with the Saturn I-B, replacing it with a low-cost 
launcher of intermediate size. A number of specialists pursued these hopes 
during the 1960s, as they allowed their imaginations to run free. In pursuing 
their designs, they laid a considerable amount of groundwork for the serious 
studies for a practical space shuttle that followed. 
Early Studies of Low-Cost Reusable Space Flight 
No one could deny that space flight was expensive. Launch vehicles flew only 
once. There was no way to reuse them; they launched their payloads and then 
splashed into the ocean. A Saturn I-B came to $45 million, excluding its Apollo 
spacecraft and flight operations; a Saturn V cost $1 85 million. For these rock- 
ets to carry three astronauts cost as much as $60 million per per~on.~' 
Advocates of reusable launch vehicles said that using throwaway Saturns 
was tantamount to flying a planeload of passengers across the Atlantic and 
having that airliner fly only once. It is a measure of the truly enormous cost 
of space flight that this comparison was off by three orders of magnitude. The 
Boeing 727, a popular jet of the 1960s, had a sticker price of $4.2 million. It 
carried 131 passengers. Had each such plane made only a single flight, the 
cost of a ticket would have been some $30,000.32 The corresponding price for 
30. NASA budget data, February 1970; Science, 5 February 1971, p. 460. 
3 1 NASA budget data, February 1970. 
32. Serhng, Legend, p. 186; Pedigree, p. 58. 
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a ticket on a Saturn V was 2,000 times greater. A more appropriate if less 
exact simile came from Newsweek in 1961 .33 It compared the space race to 
the potlatch ceremony of the Kwakiutl t ibe of the Pacific Northwest, whose 
members vie to throw the most valuable objects into a fire. Clearly, the nation 
was unlikely to persist in this celestial potlatch unless it had the most com- 
pelling of reasons. 
An initial step toward reusability came at NASA-Marshall during 1961 
and 1962, where engineers sought to learn whether a high-performance rocket 
engine could survive a dunking in seawater. They worked with the H-1, a 
standard engine from Rocketdyne that went on to power the Saturn I-B. 
Following immersion, investigators dismantled the engine, checked its parts 
for corrosion, reassembled it, and ran it successfully on a test stand. Thus, it 
was proven that this powerful engine, rated at 187,000 pounds of thrust, could 
withstand a bath in seawater and return to service.34 
The next question was whether a Saturn-class first stage could be recov- 
ered for reuse. There was considerable interest in using a flexible and 
deployable wing invented by Francis Rogallo of NAS A-Langley. The 
“Rogallo wing” later found its niche as a type of hang glider, allowing enthu- 
siasts to fly from clifftops and soar on uprising air like birds. Advocates hoped 
to use it as a directional parachute, permitting a large booster to descend by 
gliding to a designated recovery point. 
Studies showed that this approach would not work with existing first 
stages such as the Saturn I-B. Because they had not been designed for recov- 
ery, they lacked the storage room for the furled Rogallo wing.35 Thus, it would 
not be possible to introduce reuse by the simple approach of mounting a 
deployable wing to a Saturn booster. Studies funded by NASA-Marshall, 
under the name “50- to 100-Ton Payload Reusable Orbital Carrier,” showed, 
however, that NASA might achieve better results by installing fixed wings on 
the Saturn V’s first stage. 
The new first stage would use that booster’s standard engines, adding 
landing gear, a pilot compartment, insulation to protect against the heat of 
atmosphere reentry, and large wings, sharply swept, with big vertical fins at 
the tips. These modifications would add 300,000 pounds of weight. The 
33. Newsweek, January 2, 1961, p. 42. 
34. Akridge, Space Shuttle, pp. 8-9; NASA SP-4012, vol. 11, p. 56. 
35. Akridge, Space Shuttle, p. 9; Astmnautics &Aeronautics, August 1968, pp. 50-54. 
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second stage, however, would retain its full lifting power. Thus, the payload 
would be decreased by only 20 percent. 
Smaller winged rockets also drew interest, as analyses showed that even 
with parachutes, recovery of any craft at sea would be both costly and clumsy. 
Leonard Tinnan, a manager at North American Aviation (NAA), wrote that “in 
comparing parachute or other so-called ‘simple’ means of booster recovery 
with the ‘sophisticated’ fixed-wing approach, for example, it becomes rather 
easy to demonstrate that the former is economically superior-if the time and 
costs associated with the mid-ocean retrieval and refurbishment of booster 
stages, and the impact of corresponding extension of turnaround time, are 
omitted or minimized. In the final analysis, however, all such factors must be 
fully ~onsidered.”~~ 
A review of design concepts of the early 1960s shows that engineers were 
of two minds on approaches to reuse. The prospect of aircraft-type operation 
tantalized a number of these people, with the X-15 offering inspiration by 
flying routinely in flight test. Designers expected that their reusable launch 
vehicles would fly often. For this they would need wings and runways because 
recovery at sea would hamper frequent flight schedules. Other investigators 
wanted reusable launchers that would carry far more payload than a Saturn V. 
Far too large for wings, such leviathans would have to come down in the ocean. 
Perhaps the largest of these reusable launchers was the Nexus. The work 
of a group at General Dynamics led by Krafft Ehricke, the Nexus was to rep- 
resent the next leap beyond the Saturn V, carrying up to eight times more 
payload. Fully fueled, it would weigh 24,000 tons, as much as an ocean-going 
freighter. It would carry a 1,000 tons to orbit, allowing it to launch a space- 
ship bound for Mars. This behemoth would have a diameter of 202 feet with 
its height approaching that of the Washington Monument. It would fly as a 
single-stage launch vehicle. Fully recoverable, it would touch down in the 
ocean following a return from orbit. Parachutes would slow its descent. Retro- 
rockets, firing during the last seconds, would assure a gentle landing.37 
Others hoped to develop new types of engines. The years since World War 
II had brought enormous advances in turbojets, rockets, and ramjets. By 1960, 
all three offered tested paths to high-speed flight. With such further develop- 
36. Astronautics, January 1963, pp. 50-56. 
31. Astrorzautics & Aeronautics, January 1964, pp. 18-26. 
75 
THE SPACE SHUTTLE DECISION 
Touchdown Rockets 
and Reaction Structure 
Flaps Extended 
LH, Tank 
Flaps Extended 
Sectionallzed LO 
Torus Tani 
400 ft. 
I 
115ft. 
Atlas 
Control Engines OJH, Truncated Plug Engine 
(150 1, MR=5 1) 
NEXUS heavy-lift booster concept. Atlas ICBM at lower left indicates scale. (Krafft Ehricke) 
76 
NASA’s Uncertain Future 
ments in the offing, advocates of advanced propulsion saw their prospects in 
two novel concepts: LACE (Liquid Air Cycle Engine), an airbreathing rocket; 
and the scramjet, a hypersonic jet engine. 
LACE sought to overcome the requirement that a rocket must carry its 
oxygen as a heavy quantity of liquid in an onboard tank. Instead, this con- 
cept sought to allow a rocket to get its oxygen from air in the atmosphere. 
Because rocket engines operate at very high pressure, no air compressor 
could compress the ambient air so as to allow it to flow into a thrust cham- 
ber. If the air could be liquefied, however, it would form liquid air, which 
could be pumped easily to high pressure. LACE sought to do this by passing 
the incoming air through a heat exchanger that used supercold liquid hydro- 
gen, chilling the air into liquid form. The engine then would use the 
hydrogen and liquefied air as  propellant^.^^ 
This approach drew strong interest at Marquardt Co., a Los Angeles 
propulsion-research firm. In tests at Saugus, California, in 1960 and 1961, 
Marquardt engineers successfully demonstrated a LACE design that used heat 
exchangers built by Garrett AiResearch. A film of those tests, shown at a con- 
ference of the Institute of the Aeronautical Sciences in March 1961, shows 
liquid air coming down in a torrent, as seen through a porthole. Marquardt 
went on to operate test engines with thrusts of up to 275 pounds. During these 
tests, LACE performed twice as well as conventional hydrogen-fueled rockets. 
There were further innovations as well. Four-fifths of air is nitrogen, 
which does not burn. The presence of this nitrogen reduced the performance 
of LACE by cooling the exhaust and demanding extra liquid hydrogen to 
accomplish liquefaction. Oxygen, however, liquefies at 90 degrees Kelvin 
while nitrogen liquefies at the lower temperature of 77 degrees Kelvin. Thus, 
by carefully controlling the heat-exchange process, oxygen in the air could be 
liquefied preferentially. This represented a topic for further research. In 1967, 
at General Dynamics, a test of this concept demonstrated 90 percent effec- 
tiveness in excluding the nitrogen.39 
While LACE represented a new direction in rocket research, the scramjet 
represented advances in the design of the ramjet. Ramjet engines showed their 
power during the 1950s when the Lockheed X-7, an unpiloted missile, 
38. Heppenheimer, Hypersonic, pp. 15- 16. 
39. Zbid., p. 16; Aviufzon Week, May 8, 1961, p 119. Film courtesy of William Escher, Kaiser Marquardt, Van 
Nuys, California. 
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reached Mach 4.31 or 2,881 miles per hour setting a record for the flight of 
airbreathing engines?* This was close to the speed limit of a ramjet. Air in 
such a ramjet, flowing initially at supersonic speeds, had to slow to subsonic 
velocity in order to burn the fuel. When it slowed, an engine became hot and 
lost power. 
For a ramjet to reach speeds well beyond Mach 4, this internal airflow 
would have to remain supersonic. This would keep the engine cool and pre- 
vent it from overheating. This also imposed the difficult problem of injecting, 
mixing, and burning fuel in such a supersonic airflow. Nevertheless, a number 
of people hoped to build such an engine, which they called a  cramj jet.^' 
Scramjet advocates included Alexander Kartveli, the vice president for 
research and development at Republic Aviation, and Antonio Ferri, a profes- 
sor at Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute. During World War 11, Ferri had been 
one of Europe’s leading aerodynamicists and had directed Italy’s premier 
research facility, a supersonic wind tunnel. Kartveli was one of America’s 
leading airplane designers, crafting such fighter aircraft as the F-84 and the F- 
105. During the 1950s, his focus was on another proposed fighter, the 
XF-103. It was to use a ramjet to reach speeds of Mach 3.7 (2,450 mph) and 
altitudes of 75,000 feet:’ 
Ferri, who worked as a consultant on this project, formed a close friend- 
ship with Kartveli. They complemented each other professionally, Kartveli 
studying issues of aircraft design, Ferri emphasizing the details of difficult 
problems in aerodynamics and propulsion. As they worked together on the 
XF-103 they each stimulated the other to think bolder thoughts. Among the 
boldest put forth first by Ferri, and then supported by Kartveli with more 
detailed studies, was the idea that scramjet-powered aircraft would have no 
natural limits to speed or performance. They could fly to orbit, reaching 
speeds of Mach 25.43 
In the Air Force, concepts such as LACE and scramjets drew support from 
Weldon Worth, technical director at the Aero Propulsion Lab of Wright- 
Patterson Air Force Base. Beginning in about 1960, Worth built up a program 
of basic research called Aerospaceplane. Not aiming at actually building an 
40. Miller, X-Planes, p. 72. 
41. Heppenheimer, Hypersonic, pp. 12-14. 
42. Ibid., pp. 10-12, Gunston, Fighfers. pp. 184, 193-195 
43. Republic Aviation News, September 9, 1960, pp. 1, 5. 
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airplane that would fly to orbit, the program pursued design studies and 
propulsion research that might lead to such aircraft in the distant future. The 
propulsion efforts were often very basic. When, in November 1964, Ferri suc- 
ceeded in getting a scramjet to deliver thrust, it was impressive enough to 
merit an Air Force news release. Ferri went on to set a goal of 644 pounds of 
thrust for his test engine; he managed 5 17 pounds, 80 percent of his goal.@ 
Aerospaceplane was too hot to keep under wraps. A steady stream of 
leaks brought continuing coverage in the trade magazine Aviation Week.45 At 
the Los Angeles Times, the aerospace editor Marvin Miles developed his own 
connections, which led to banner headlines: “Lockheed Working on Plane 
Able to Go Into Orbit Alone”; “Huge Booster Not Needed by Air Force Space 
Plane.”46 The Air Force’s Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) was not amused. 
As early as December 1960, it w m e d  that “too much emphasis may be 
placed on the more glamorous aspects of the Aerospaceplane resulting in 
neglect of what appear to be more conventional problems.” 
By 1963, with hype outrunning achievement, the SAB had had enough. 
In October, it declared that “today’s state-of-the-art is inadequate to support 
any real hardware development, and the cost of any such undertaking will be 
extremely large .... [Tlhe so-called Aerospaceplane program has had such an 
erratic history, has involved so many clearly infeasible factors, and has been 
subjected to so much ridicule that from now on this name should be dropped. 
It is also recommended that the Air Force increase the vigilance that no new 
program achieves such a difficult position.”47 Soon after, the Aerospaceplane 
died as a forrnal program. The scramjet, however, continued to live as NASA- 
Langley pursued an experimental program, the Hypersonic Research Engine, 
that continued well into the 1970s.& 
Amid the gigantism of the Nexus and the far-out futurism of 
Aerospaceplane, there were those who were content to envision winged craft 
powered by conventional rocket engines. Here, too, the exuberance of the day 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
Heppenheimer, Hypersonic, pp. 14-17; Hallion, ed., Hypersonic, pp. 948-952; news release, USAF 
Aeronautical Systems Division, November 12, 1964 Scramjet test data from Louis Nucci, General 
Applied Science Laboratories, Inc., Ronkonkoma, New York. 
Aviamn Week October 31, 1960, p 26; December 26, 1960, pp. 22-23; June 19, 1961, pp. 54-62; 
November 6, 1961, pp. 59-61; April 23, 1962, pp. 26-27. See also Mzssiles and Rockets, May 22, 1961, p. 
14 
Los Angeles Times: November 3, 1960, p. 3A; January 15,1961, front page. 
Hallion, ed., Hypersonic, p. 951 
Ibid., pp. 747-842; Heppenheimer, Hypersoizic, pp. I 7-20. 
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sometimes found expression in concepts of heroic size, such as the Astroplane 
of Aerojet-General. This concept included wings that would carry liquid 
hydrogen, much as the wings of airliners carry jet fuel. The Astroplane would 
have a wingspan of 423 feet and a length of 260 feet, excluding its payload. 
Carrying up to 220 tons of cargo, it would weigh 5,000 tons at liftoff, and 
would rise into the air with twice the thrust of a Saturn V.49 
There were several design exercises, however, that projected modest size 
and near-term technology. One such concept, the Astro from Douglas 
Aircraft, was a two-stage fully-reusable launch vehicle with a payload of 
37,150 pounds. Both stages of the Astro were designed as lifting bodies and 
would burn hydrogen and oxygen, using rocket engines that were already 
under development. The project engineers saw no problem with reuse of such 
rockets, noting that one of their engines, the Pratt & Whitney RL-IO, had 
already “been operated more than 9,000 seconds with more than 50 restarts.” 
Nevertheless, these engineers also shared the enthusiasm of the times. 
Written in 1963, their paper on the Astro anticipated that this vehicle could be 
operational “in the 1968-70 period.” Each flight would cost $1.5 million. In 
readying the second stage for a reflight, turnaround time “would range 
between 2.5 and 5 days, based on a two-shift operation.” The Astro would fly 
240 times per year.s0 
The era’s exuberance was understandable; it had taken less than 35 years 
to advance from Lindbergh in Paris to astronauts in orbit. It was expected that 
this pace would continue. Amid the plethora of new possibilities, however, 
promising ideas sometimes were lost in the shuffle. This happened to Martin 
Marietta’s Astrorocket concept of 1964. In the light of subsequent events, the 
concept seems to have offered a glimpse of the future, not only because the 
design was highly futuristic but because it clearly foreshadowed a class of 
design concepts that later stood in the forefront between 1969 and 1971. 
With a planned liftoff weight of 1,250 tons, Astrorocket was to be inter- 
mediate in size between the Saturn I-B and the Saturn V. It was a two-stage 
fully-reusable design, with both stages having delta wings and flat undersides. 
These undersides fitted together at liftoff, belly to belly. The designers of 
Astrorocket were no clairvoyants; rather, they drew on the background of 
49. Astronautics & Aeronautics, January 1964, pp. 35-41 
50. Ibid., pp. 42-51. 
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Martin Marietta’s Astrorocket concept. (Art by Dennis Jenkins) 
Dyna-Soar and studies at NASA-Ames of winged reentry  vehicle^.^' The 
design studies of 1969-1971 followed the same approach, featuring two-stage 
fully-reusable configurations and a strong preference for delta wings. 
Unfortunately, Astrorocket was at least five years ahead of its time. It 
failed to win support from NASA, the Air Force, and even its own manage- 
ment of Martin Marietta. That firm would continue to pursue studies of 
reusable launch vehicles, but these would not be Astrorockets. 
“Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought content,” 
said China’s Chairman Mao in 1956.52 Studies of future space transportation 
were certainly blossoming. The field, however, needed vigorous pruning to 
define the most promising approaches. Wielding their garden shears, a 
number of investigators began to address some key questions. 
Was it worth waiting for the scramjet? While its performance far sur- 
passed that of even the best rockets, its development would take time and its 
prospects were not certain. Even accepting that the next generation of launch 
vehicles would continue to use rockets, there was the question of whether 
51. Hallion, ed., Hypersonic, pp. 952-954. 
52. Oxford, p. 328. 
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such craft should take off horizontally, like an airplane. A booster, heavy with 
propellant, would need large, massive wings to do this. The vehicle, however, 
might ride a rocket-powered sled that would accelerate to several hundred 
miles per hour, at no cost to the booster in onboard fuel. 
In 1962, NASA-Marshall set out to address such issues through design 
studies. The first step was to set standards for the design of launch-vehicle 
concepts. Each concept had to carry ten passengers or ten tons of cargo. 
Aircraft-type approaches were paramount, with Marshall stating that contrac- 
tor designs “should be compatible with a philosophy used in the development 
of supersonic commercial jet aircraft and should offer a potential commercial 
application in the late 1970s’ such as operating the vehicle over global dis- 
tances for surface-to-surface transport of cargo and personnel.’’ 
This study, called “Reusable Ten Ton Orbital Carrier Vehicle,” awarded 
contracts of $428,000 to Lockheed and of $342,000 to NAA. From June 1962 
to December 1963, designers looked at two-stage fully-reusable configura- 
tions that put fixed wings on both stages, and carried through separate designs 
for both vertical and horizontal launch. They also considered concepts that 
drew on the Air Force’s Aerospaceplane, with advanced airbreathing engines 
to provide propulsion in the first stage. 
Subsequent studies investigated additional alternatives and pursued 
design issues in greater depth. In 1965, General Dynamics defined a concept 
for a reusable second stage that had the shape of a lifting body; both that firm 
and Lockheed conducted studies of first stages that could carry such a second 
stage. First-stage concepts continued to cover both vertical and horizontal 
launch. When using airbreathing engines, design choices ranged from con- 
ventional turbojet engines to scramjets. At General Dynamics the possibilities 
included LACE, for which that company had an active experimental program. 
These studies concluded that, without exception, rocket engines were 
preferable to airbreathers for first-stage propulsion. A leader in these efforts, 
Max Akridge of NASA-Marshall wrote that “the economic advantage for the 
rocket engine was always about the same as the developmental cost of the air- 
breathing engine.” Similarly, vertical takeoff proved to offer an advantage 
over horizontal launch because the cost of developing a rocket sled was not 
offset by lower weight and cost in the flight vehicle. 
These studies defined the preferred approach of NASA-Marshall’s Future 
Projects Office which called for a two-stage fully-reusable launch vehicle, 
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Three classes of adwanced launch vehicles studied in 1966. 
Left, Class I: a piloted spacecraft resembling Dyna-Sour, 
launched by a Saturn I-B. Center, C h s  11: a two-stage fully- 
reusable space shuttle with rocket propulsion in both stages. 
Right, C h s  111: space shuttle with airbreathing engines in the first stage. (U.S. Air Force) 
with both stages having fixed wings and rocket propulsion. The work also 
established the technical feasibility of such vehicles. NASA's Manned 
Spacecraft Center also adopted this approach, and NASA as a whole pro- 
ceeded to hold to such designs until 1971.53 
A dissenting word came from the Air Force, where people were in no 
hurry to define a single class of concepts. At Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 
the Flight Dynamics Laboratory emerged as a center for such studies. The 
FDL, conducting two design exercises during 1965, drew the interest of the 
Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board, a joint NASA- Air Force 
committee. In August 1965, this board set up a subpanel that spent the next 
year reviewing technology and design concepts for reusable launch vehicles. 
The subpanel issued its report in September 1966. 
Rather than focus on a single type of craft, the subpanel took the view that 
advancing technology would permit increasingly capable designs to emerge 
53. Akridge, Space Shuttle, pp. 5, 16-19; Aviation Week, March 26, 1962, pp. 20-21; Report LR 18790 
(Lockheed); Report GD/C-DCB-65-018 (General Dynamics); Nau, Compuriso?i. 
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in the relatively near future. By 1974, the nation might have a vehicle, called 
Class I, in which a small reusable spacecraft would ride atop an expendable 
booster. The Saturn I-B could serve as this booster; Martin Marietta’s pro- 
posed Titan 111-M was another possibility, as was a new booster derived from 
the 260-inch solid rocket motor that was then being tested. Essentially, the 
spacecraft would be tantamount to an updated version of the Dyna-Soar. In 
turn, two-stage fully-reusable configurations (counted as Class II), such as 
those of NASA-Marshall, could be available by 1978. By 198 1, the prospects 
could broaden to include Class 111, featuring horizontal takeoff and a first 
stage powered by scramjets. 
Like others in the field, the authors of this report were optimistic. 
NASA’s eventual Space Shuttle would fall into Class I, with two solid boost- 
ers, an expendable propellant tank, and a reusable orbiter. However, it would 
not fly until 1981, the year in which this subpanel expected to see an opera- 
tional scramjet. Nevertheless, the work of this subpanel was significant for 
three reasons. 
It brought reusability into the realm of ongoing collaborations between 
NASA and the Air Force. It was a reminder that development of a new Dyna- 
Soar was a quick route to reusability. In addition to this, in the words of the 
report’s summary, “It is important to note that no single, most desirable vehi- 
cle concept could be identified by the Subpanel for satisfying future DoD and 
NASA objectives.” The Air Force would not follow the lead of NASA- 
Marshall by focusing attention on a single design approach; the hundred 
flowers would continue to bloom.54 
ders Emerge: Max Hunter and George Mueller 
While many were talking about airline-type space operations, few had the 
professional background that would allow them to do much about it. Most 
managers and senior designers had entered the realm of space flight by way 
of the Pentagon’s missile program of the 1950s. Few of them had working 
knowledge of the standard methodology for determining the operating costs 
of commercial airliners, as published initially in 1940 and subsequently 
adopted by the Air Transport Association. 
54. Hallion, ed., Hypersonic, pp. 964-978; Ames, chairman, Report. 
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At Lockheed Missiles and Space Company (LMSC), Max Hunter was 
one of the few people in the industry with an intimate knowledge of both air- 
line economics and of launch-vehicle design. Earlier in his career, working at 
Douglas Aircraft, he had spent two and a half years dealing with the perfor- 
mance of transport aircraft. In those days, Douglas ruled the skies with its 
DC-6 and DC-7 airliners. For some time, Hunter was in charge of all calcula- 
tions on their performance and economics. He then joined the Thor missile 
project and served as chief design engineer. Rebuilt with upper stages, the 
Thor became the Delta launch vehicle and emerged as NASA’s most widely 
used booster. 
This background allowed Hunter to approach the problem of low-cost 
space transportation from a fresh perspective. Existing studies left him dis- 
satisfied; he writes that “by the end of 1963 the state of recoverable rockets 
was terrible.” He disliked two-stage fully-reusable concepts which to him 
meant building two vehicles to do the work of one, with the smaller of the 
two-the second stage-being the one that counted. He also felt that the tech- 
nology of scramjets or single-stage-to-orbit concepts lay far in the future. By 
March 1964, however, he had the germ of a new idea: the stage-and-a-half 
configuration. 
This new idea was to consist of a reusable core fitted with large expend- 
able tanks that would hold most of the propellant. The core would carry 
everything that was costly and important: payload, crew, engines, electronics, 
onboard systems. With a heat shield on its underside, it would achieve com- 
plete reuse. The tankage would consist of simple and inexpensive aluminum 
shells that would carry liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen. They would fall 
away during the ascent to orbit, leaving the core to continue with the mission. 
Hunter went to work at Lockheed in the fall of 1965. On his first day, he 
was asked if there was anything he thought should be done that was not being 
done already. He responded with an internal company memo on orbital trans- 
portation, which drew the attention of a number of senior managers. These 
included Eugene Root, the president of LMSC, who provided the internal 
company support that allowed Hunter to begin to pursue his ideas. He pro- 
ceeded to take his gospel to meetings of professional societies, and won 
funding from the Air Force. He particularly emphasized that the economic 
model of the Air Transport Association, though developed for airliners, could 
apply as well to rocket transports. 
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Paradoxically, two-stage fully-reusable vehicles promised launch costs as 
low as one-third of Hunter’s approach-but only when flying up to a hundred 
times per year. Because it had a far lower development cost for 10 or fewer 
flights per year, the stage-and-a-half had a decided advantage. In Hunter’s 
words, “its development can consequently be justified at an earlier point in 
time with a smaller number of mi~sions.”~~ 
While Hunter gave an airline industry view of airplane-type space opera- 
tions, NASA’s George Mueller, head of the Office of Manned Space Flight, 
was promoting such concepts as well. His domain included all of Apollo; he 
also was a strong proponent of space stations, and he was pushing vigorously 
for a strong Apollo Applications program. Looking to the future, he under- 
stood that low-cost space flight would be essential for viable space stations. 
As a first step, in December 1967, he invited a number of NASA and 
industry specialists to a one-day symposium, held in January at NASA 
Headquarters. Because much of the data from industry was proprietary, 
Muefler limited attendance to representatives of government agencies. Even 
so, some 80 people, most of them from NASA and the Air Force, attended the 
conference. The symposium proceedings give a clear view of the topic at the 
end of 1967, when the field was alive with ideas but when no single design 
approach had come to the forefront. In addition to this, those proceedings pre- 
sented design solutions that, four years later, would show up in the final Space 
Shuttle configuration. 
Martin Marietta was the most conservative, pitching its Titan 111-M along 
with a small reusable spacecraft, similar to the Dyna-Soar, that would carry six 
people. This was the quintessential Class I design (featuring an expendable 
booster) that NASA and the Air Force had identified in their 1966 joint study. 
The Titan Et-M was to rely on twin 120-inch solid boosters, slightly smaller than 
the solid rockets that, 13 years later, would boost the operational Space Shuttle. 
Those rockets were not built as single units, but rather as a stack of seg- 
ments, like short lengths of pipeline that are bolted together at their flanges. 
Manufacturers such as Thiokol filled each segment with the solid propellant, 
then sent them off by highway or railroad. Such segmented rockets were 
much easier to transport than the unsegmented type; the segments could be 
stacked and joined at the launch site, using putty to fill the gaps. 
55. Hunter, Origins. Reprinted in part in Earth/Space News, November 1976, pp. 5-7 
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i 
I 
Lockjleed’s Star Clipper: three-wiew drawing of h e  orbiter, with the complete vehicle, including 
proDellant tanks, in upper right. (Lockheed; Dan Cuuthier) 
The standard Titan 111-C used five-segment solid rockets, each 85 feet 
long with a thrust of 1,180,000 pounds. For the Titan 111-M, these rockets 
were to grow to seven segments, each 112 feet in length with a thrust of 
1,508,000 pounds. The first stage was also to grow in length, to hold more 
propellant, while receiving liquid-fueled engines with 1 1 percent more thrust. 
The combination would carry 38,000 pounds to orbit from Cape Canaveral, 
or 32,000 pounds from Vandenberg Air Force Base.56 
Lockheed presented Max Hunter’s configuration. Called Star Clipper, it 
€eatured a core vehicle in the form of a lifting body, triangular in shape. The 
expendable propellant tanks would be 156 inches in diameter (the limit for 
highway or rail transport) and would join at the front, running along the 
sides of the core. The vehicle’s avionics would include an automated on- 
56. !&ridge, Space Shuttle, p. 35; Schnyer and Voss, Review, pp. 15-16.40-47; Quest, Fall 1995, pp. 18-19; 
Astronautics, August 1961, pp. 22-25, 50-56. 
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board checkout system, similar to those on airliners. Lockheed managers 
claimed that the Star Clipper could lift off within one hour after arrival at 
the launch pad.57 
McDonnell Aircraft, recently merged to form McDonnelI Douglas, had 
built the piloted Mercury and Gemini spacecraft, and had been studying new 
launch-vehicle concepts for six years. Like Lockheed, it had adopted the 
stage-and-a-half approach, again with a reusable core flanked by expendable 
propellant tanks. Known as Tip Tank, this concept would carry 12 astronauts, 
sitting side by side like passengers in first class. The core again had the shape 
of a lifting body, but McDonnell went one better than Lockheed by proposing 
to add small wings that would fold within the fuselage and snap out for use in 
landing. These wings then would help the craft to handle better during the 
landing approach, when conventional lifting bodies tended to dive toward a 
runway at speeds of several hundred miles per 
The Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas concepts counted as only par- 
tially reusable, because their external tanks would not be recovered. During 
197 1, this became the configuration NASA would adopt; the shuttle orbiter 
would take shape as a core vehicle of the type Hunter had recommended. Its 
propellants would go into a big expendable tank, with two large solids flank- 
ing this tank in the fashion of the Titan 111-M. Hence as early as 1967, the 
basic elements of the eventual shuttle not only were well known but had influ- 
ential advocates among NASA’s contractors. 
At that early date, however, there was no reason to pick this approach over 
others that also had their advocates. The two-stage fully-reusable concept 
continued to shine, and General Dynamics, with Air Force support, had been 
studying a version called the Triamese. It would feature a standard vehicle 
fitted with rocket engines and a pilot compartment. Like the core of 
McDonnell Douglas’ Tip Tank, it was tantamount to a lifting body with 
deployable wings. Three such vehicles, identical in shape, would fit together 
to make a complete launch system. The middle vehicle would carry the pay- 
load and would serve as the core; the other two would serve as tankage, 
carrying most of the propellant. This standardization represented an attempt 
to save money during development, for then it would not be necessary to 
57. Schnyer and Voss, Review, pp. 17-22. 
58. Ibid., pp. 35-39. 
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McDonnell Douglas' 
X p  Tank: top and sde 
views of the orbiter, 
showing foldout wings, 
and complete vehicle 
with propellant tanks. 
(Dennis Jenkins; 
NASA) 
develop a reusable first stage with a design of its own. In the Triamese 
approach, all three vehicles would reenter and return to a runway.s9 
General Dynamics did not present this concept at Mueller's symposium, 
but instead discussed five alternatives, ranging from the Titan 111-M to a two- 
stage fully-reusable configuration. The company showed, again, that the 
former had a low development cost but a high cost per flight; the latter had 
the highest development cost but the lowest per-flight cost. Though these con- 
clusions were not new, they too pointed a path to the future. 
59. Reports GDC-DCB-67-031, GDC-DCB-68-017 (both from General Dynamics). 
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Triamese concept of General Dynamics. (NASA) 
These conclusions addressed the issue of designing a reusable launch 
vehicle to meet economic criteria. If the criterion was to achieve the lowest 
possible cost per flight, thus attaining true airline-like operation, then one 
would go with the two-stage fully-reusable, even though this approach carried 
high development cost. If the most important goal was to achieve minimum 
development cost, then one would choose the Titan 111-M. Stage-and-a-half 
configurations appeared intermediate, both in development and in launch 
costs. In sum, one could choose a level of reusability so as to balance between 
these two types of cost. As its space shuttle concepts matured, NASA would 
spend much of 197 1 seeking this balance. 
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The General Dynamics presentation offered more. Within the industry, it 
was widely appreciated that piloted aircraft cost much less to develop than 
missiles or expendable launch vehicles. The reason was that missiles 
demanded extensive and costly ground tests to assure that they would fly 
properly, with no pilot at the controls. By contrast, the development of aircraft 
took full advantage of their reusability. Test pilots could start with simple 
exercises in taxiing and takeoff, then reach toward higher speeds and greater 
levels of performance, in step-by-step programs. At each step, the aircraft 
would come back, where engineers could study it carefully and correct defi- 
ciencies. Such flight testing was far less costly than ground tests. 
General Dynamics then drew on recent experience with the X- 15 and the 
Atlas ICBM, arguing that piloted craft could maintain this advantage even as 
rocket-powered vehicles of extreme performance. The X- 15 and Atlas had 
both gone through development in the late 1950s; their empty weights were 
similar, and both mounted rocket engines that came to their respective con- 
tractors as government-furnished equipment. Although the X- 15 was more 
complex than Atlas, it had less than half the development cost because it too 
followed the step-by-step approach to flight test, with its test pilots often 
taking action to save the vehicle from disaster. Indeed, the X-15 would likely 
have been destroyed on as many as a third of its flights had there been no pilot 
aboard.60 Test pilots thus served as inexpensive substitutes for the automated 
systems that might have been required to take their place. 
The reusable concepts of the day, and those that followed during 1968 and 
1969, were often referred to as Integral Launch and Reentry Vehicles. The Air 
Force, in particular, used that designation in its own work.61 Mueller adopted 
a different term, calling such vehicles space shuttles. The term had appeared 
now and then through the years. For example, Philip Bono of Douglas 
Aircraft had offered a concept called the ROMBUS (Reusable Orbital 
Module, Booster, and Utility Shuttle). Dating to 1963, it resembled the 
immense Nexus, and its mission was similar. Walter Dornberger, who had 
proposed to build Bomi during the 1950s, lately had been writing of a “recov- 
erable and reusable space transporter, or shuttle.” He described it as “an 
economical space plane capable of putting a fresh egg, every morning, on the 
60. Schnyer and Voss, Review, pp. 28-34; Asfrunautics, January 1963, p. 53. 
61. Jenkins, Space Shuttle, p. 56; Hallion, ed., Hypersonic, p. 995. 
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table of every crew member of a space station circling the globe.”62 Mueller 
now made the term his own, fully aware that the space shuttle was to shuttle 
to and from such a station. 
In August 1968, in London, he received an award from the British 
Interplanetary Society and gave a prepared address in which he pledged his 
troth to the shuttle as NASA’s next goal: 
I believe that the exploitation of space is limited in concept and extent by the 
very high cost of putting payload into orbit, and the inaccessibility of objects 
after they have been launched. Therefore, I would forecast that the next major 
thrust in space will be the development of an economical launch vehicle for 
shuttling between Earth and the installations, such as the orbiting space sta- 
tions which will soon be operating in space .... 
These space stations will be used as laboratories in orbit and will provide 
the facilities to study and understand the nature of space. They will provide 
observatories to view the sun, the planets and the stars beyond the atmospheric 
veil of earth. Stations in orbit will provide bases for continuous observation of 
the earth and its atmosphere on an operational basis-for meteorological and 
oceanographic uses, for earth resource data gathering and evaluation, for 
communications and broadcasting and ground trafic control .... 
One of the applications of these stations that has intrigued planners for 
many years has been their use as fie1 and supply bases, and as transfer points 
enroute to high or distant orbits, to lunar distance, or toward the planets .... 
Essential to the continuous operation of the space station will be the 
capability to resupply expendables as well as to change andor augment crews 
and laboratory equipment .... Our studies show that using today’s hardware, 
the resupply cost for a year equals the original cost of the space station .... 
Therefore, there is a real requirement for an eficient earth-to-orbit 
transportation system-un economical space shuttle .... The shuttle ideally 
would be able to operate in a mode similar to that of large commercial air 
transports and be compatible with the environment of major airports .... The 
cockpit of the space shuttle would be similar to that of the large interconti- 
nental jet aircraft, containing all instrumentation essential to complete 
on-board checkout .... Interestingly enough, the basic design described above 
62. Astronautics & Aeronautics, January 1964, pp. 28-34; November 1965, pp. 88-94. 
93 
THE SPACE SHUTTLE DECISION 
for an economical space shuttle from earth to orbit could also be applied to 
terrestrial point-to-point transport .... 
Barron Hilton, whose hotels ring the earth, has suggested that a Hilton 
resort hotel in low earth orbit would offer unique attractions. Looking at the 
earth porn space, seeing sunrise and sunset every 90 minutes, floating in the 
zero g of weightlessness, are all unearthly experiences. More seriously, lack 
of gravity lightens the load on the heart and certain other organs, so that the 
Orbiting Resort might also be a health spa .... 
The Space Shuttle is another step toward our destiny, another hand-hold 
on our future. We will go where we choose-on our earth-throughout our 
solar system and through our galaq-eventually to live on other worlds of 
our universe. Man will never be satisfied with less than that.63 
This was not your usual speech by a government official. Napoleon may 
have spoken often of “destiny,” but even within NASA, an agency not known 
as a home for shrinking violets, such talk was slightly out of the ordinary at 
least. It helped that Mueller was talking to his fellow enthusiasts and was 
speaking in London, where his presentation was not likely to receive hostile 
fire from the Washington Post. Mueller’s hopes, however, contrasted sharply 
with recent experience, wherein NASA had tried and failed to define an ambi- 
tious Apollo Applications effort as a major post-Apollo program. The 
agency’s budget was on a sharp downhill slide, and NASA was nowhere near 
the bottom. Indeed, it had not begun to see the bottom. 
NASA and the Post-Apollo Future 
Before federal bureaucrats such as Mueller could grapple with human destiny, 
they first had to face the more prosaic question of what NASA would do after 
landing astronauts on the Moon. The first significant interest in this issue 
came in January 1964, when President Johnson, in office for barely two 
months, sent a letter to NASA Administrator James Webb. 
The background to this letter involved a program of the Atomic Energy 
Commission called NERVA (Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Application) 
that was developing a nuclear-powered rocket engine. While NASA did not 
63. Mueller, Address, August 10, 1968. 
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need it for Apollo, such an engine might prove useful indeed in any follow- 
on program of piloted flight to Mars. The program had strong support from 
Senator Clinton Anderson (D-New Mexico), chairman of the Senate space 
committee; it also had the support of Webb. Its opponents, however, included 
President Kennedy’s science advisor, Jerome Weisner. Weisner convinced 
Johnson to ask NASA to identify the future missions that would require 
NERVA’s power. 
Johnson took up this and other issues in his letter to Webb. Could NASA 
list possible space objectives beyond those already approved? What support- 
ing research and development would these new goals require? How much of 
NASA’s current work, particularly in the development of launch vehicles such 
as the Saturn V, could support such future programs? 
An old hand at Washington politics, Webb smelled a rat. He later 
described this as “part of a power play rather than a desire for proposals. It 
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was an effort to put us on the defensive and to make us commit ourselves to 
certain missions which they could then attack.” Accordingly, Webb did not 
reply immediately, but set up a committee that proceeded to take its sweet 
time in preparing a response. Meanwhile he mollified Johnson with interim 
replies, listing possible future missions but declining to choose among them.64 
Events that summer showed that Webb was wise to be cautious. As far 
back as 1962, the Future Projects Office at NASA-Marshall had contracted 
with several major aerospace firms for initial studies of piloted planetary mis- 
sions, including landing on Mars. These studies continued during subsequent 
years. Then, in mid-1964, the new presidential science advisor, Donald 
Hornig, asked Webb to present an estimate of the cost of a piloted Mars land- 
ing that might follow Apollo. 
The initial estimate, internal to NASA, was $32 billion. An internal 
review added $5 billion for program contingencies and forwarded the total of 
$37 billion to Webb. He accepted some further additions that hiked the cost to 
$50 billion, and gave this figure to Hornig. Hornig doubled it to $100 billion, 
on his own initiative, and gave this new estimate to a Congressional commit- 
tee. The next day, newspapers quoted one congressman as stating that the 
piloted Mars mission would cost $200 billion, amounting to 40 years of 
NASA’s budgets at the 1965 rate of $5 billion per year. In the words of an 
observer, “In only one week, a well developed estimate of $37 billion was 
multiplied into a $200 billion program.”65 
A year after receiving his initial request, Webb finally gave a full reply to 
Johnson’s letter in a report written in February 1965. It amounted to a verbose 
exercise in saying little that was new or significant and saying it at consider- 
able length, while offering no targets for skeptics. The report reviewed recent 
and current NASA activities in detail, and included three single-page lists of 
future possibilities. These lists resembled pages from a book index, lacking 
any trace of description, estimated cost, schedule, or priority. In an outstand- 
ing display of political adroitness, the report called for “a continued balanced 
program” that would “not impose unreasonably large demands upon the 
Nation’s resources.” No one could oppose such recommendations; they were 
on a par with supporting motherhood and apple pie. 
64. NASA SP-4102, p. 243; Logsdon, Apollo, Chapter 1, pp. 27-28. 
65. AAS History Series, vol. 17, pp. 421-429. 
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Webb’s report drew questions within the Senate space committee, which 
complained that “alternatives are presented, but no criteria are given as to 
how a selection would be made.” That was just as Webb intended; he was not 
about to take the initiative in offering a plan that critics could attack. He 
would have been quite willing to have the President take the lead, as Kennedy 
had done in supporting Apollo in 1961. Johnson, however, also preferred to 
keep his options open. In March 1965, he told his advisor Jack Valenti that he 
did not intend to make a new Kennedy-style commitment in space: “I think I 
would have more leeway and running room by saying nothing, which I would 
prefer.”@ 
The historian Arthur Levine notes that two years later, Webb explained to 
him just why he had finessed Johnson’s initial request: 
First, the announcement by NASA in the mid-1960s of a long-term goal 
would make the agency vulnerable. It would provide ammunition to critics, 
who would be able to shoot down the proposed program as being too expen- 
sive or impractical, thereby raising the possibility that long-range technology 
developments tied to the announced goal would be cut out. This in turn would 
cripple the agency’s ability to support the Apollo and other advanced mis- 
sions that depended on a strong base of advancing technology. 
Second, should NASA announce a long-term post-Apollo goal, critics 
would claim that the lunar landing was simply an interim goal, subordinate 
to the new effort. For example, if NASA announced that the post-Apollo goal 
should be a manned Mars landing, the Apollo program for a moon landing 
would be relegated to a secondary position. This would raise the possibility 
of cutting support for Apollo, thus jeopardizing the program or stretching it 
out. In the event of subsequent change in national opinion on the worth of the 
long-range goal, both the lunar landing and the more distant goal might 
never be realized. 
Third, the major effort required for planning, proposing, and defending 
a new long-range goal would tie up the energies of top NASA leadership and 
key scientists and engineers, diverting them from concentrating on making 
Apollo a success.67 
66. NASA SP-4102, p. 243; Jack Valenh to Lyndon Johnson, March 30, 1965 (Lyndon Johnson Presidenhal 
67. Levine, Furure, pp. 1 18- f 19 
Library, Austin, Texas); Smith, chairman, Summary. Reprinted in NASA SP-4407, vol. I, pp. 473-490. 
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The last point addressed the fact that there was no consensus, even within 
NASA itself, as to NASA’s next goal. George Mueller, head of the Office of 
Manned Space Flight, had his eye on a piloted mission to Mars. The two most 
powerful center directors, von Braun at NASA-Marshall and Robert Gilruth 
of the Manned Spacecraft Center, preferred a different objective: a space sta- 
tion. Mueller also liked space stations and was well aware of their usefulness 
as preparations for Mars. von Braun and Gilruth, however, saw space stations 
as major elements of a program that, diverging sharply from one that would 
aim at Mars, would focus on activities in Earth orbit. 
Nevertheless, during 1965 and 1966, the beginnings of a post-Apollo 
future began to take shape. Not surprisingly, its major features were in line 
with the initiatives that Webb had suggested in his report to Johnson. Apollo 
Applications emerged, strongly backed by Mueller. For Mars, attention 
focused on an ambitious automated mission called Voyager that would orbit 
that planet and then send craft to land on its surface, looking with instruments 
for signs of life. Plans for Voyager flourished for a time. While initial designs 
called for use of the Saturn I-B, in October 1965 its officials decided instead 
to try for the much larger Saturn V.68 
In addition to this, even though Webb was unwilling to carry through a 
serious plan for NASA’s future, the President’s Science Advisory Committee 
(PSAC) proved willing to do it for him. This blue-ribbon panel was poten- 
tially a source of clout; it operated within the Executive Office of the 
President, and received support from another White House group, the Office 
of Science and Technology. In February 1967, the PSAC issued a major 
report, The Space Program in the Post-Apollo Period. John Newbauer, editor 
of the trade journal Astronautics & Aeronautics, wrote that it “should prove 
the pivot for policy discussions for some time to come.” He described it as 
“the most cohesive and solid appraisal of space-program goals since the 
Space Act itself,” which led to the founding of NASA in 1958.69 
The PSAC report did not endorse anything so specific as piloted flight to 
Mars. Nevertheless, it proposed an organizing theme: “a program directed ulti- 
mately at the exploration of the planets by man.” The report defined this as “a 
68. NASA SP-4102, p. 147; Logsdon,Apollo, Chapter I ,  pp. 17-18 
69. Astronautics & Aeronautics, March 1967, p. 20. 
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balanced program based on the expectation of eventual manned planetw 
exploration.” The program would pursue several intermediate goals including 
continued lunar missions by astronauts; long-duration piloted flights, at first 
through Apollo Applications and later in a true space station; and “a strongly 
upgraded program of early unmanned exploration of the nearby planets.” 
The PSAC was certainly not in NASA’s pocket; its report pulled no 
punches. It criticized the Apollo Applications wet workshop: “some doubts 
arise about man’s ability to carry out extensive construction efforts in space. 
The requirement that man actually construct his laboratories in space in these 
initial applications may constitute a serious impediment to their develop- 
ment,” A true space station might represent “a more effective use of funds.” 
The panel endorsed building a single wet workshop, if only as an initial step: 
“The launch vehicle and spacecraft ,for this experiment are already on order, 
and the opportunity for 28- and 56-day flights in 1968 should be taken.” 
In other areas, the report was more favorable: “In the period after the ini- 
tial two Apollo lunar landings we recommend that a sustained program of 
lunar exploration ... continue manned expeditions at the rate of between one 
and two per year.” The PSAC recommended “that the Saturn V vehicle con- 
tinue to be produced,” and that “the post-Apollo Saturn V production rate be 
fixed at 4 systems per year.” 
On Voyager: “We recommend an expanded commitment to the Voyager 
planetary lander program, pointing toward a soft landing of a Surveyor-type 
module on Mars in 1973.” As a prelude to Apollo, a program called Surveyor 
was seeking to conduct soft landings of automated spacecraft on the Moon, 
and had scored its first success the previous June. 
On a space station: 
We recommend that programs of studies and advanced developments be ini- 
tiated promptly with the objective of a launch in the mid 1970’s of the first 
module of a space station for very prolonged biological studies of man, ani- 
mals, and other organisms in earth orbit. Such a station should be designed 
with consideration of its possible role in support of earth orbital astronomy. 
On future launch vehicles: 
75rze payload capabilities of the [Saturn I-B] are not signiJicantly superior to 
those of the Titan III-M, while the launch costs of the [Saturn I-B] are about 
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double those of the Titan III-M. ... Because of the continuing requirements for 
manned and man-attended systems we visualize that an important problem will 
be posed for a long time by the cost associated with taking men to and from 
orbit. ... For the longer range, studies should be made of more economical fer- 
rying systems, presumably involving partial or total recovery and reuse.” 
The report did not give NASA everything it might have wanted, even in 
dealing with projects that were achievable in the short-term. It endorsed only 
a modest Apollo Applications effort, as noted. It ignored NERVA, though that 
program was proceeding smartly with its nuclear engine and offered a promis- 
ing source of propulsion for a piloted mission to Mars. The PSAC also 
recommended delaying a commitment to a true space station until 1971 or 
1972, although its advocates hoped for such a decision as early as 1968.7’ Yet 
by endorsing construction of this station “in the mid- 1970’s,” and by openly 
embracing Mars as a long-term goal, the PSAC endorsed a program that went 
well beyond what NASA in fact would be able to pursue. 
While Mars was in the ascendancy at the PSAC, NASA’s hopes were 
about to prove star-crossed. The agency had been charging ahead with Apollo; 
in January 1967 it had a Saturn I-B on a pad at Cape Canaveral that was being 
readied to launch a mission into orbit. Late that month, the astronauts Gus 
Grissom, Ed White, and Roger Chaffee were conducting a pre-launch exer- 
cise atop that rocket, within their spacecraft. A fire broke out; the men could 
not escape, and they perished before help could reach them.72 
In the aftermath of this fire, plans for the future went on hold while NASA 
struggled to win success with Apollo. There also was bad news elsewhere in 
Washington and in the nation. In January, the President had presented the fed- 
eral budget for Fiscal Year 1968, anticipating a deficit of $8 billion. The 
Vietnam War, however, was escalating rapidly. By August, when the estimate 
was close to $30 billion, Johnson asked Congress to approve a 10 percent 
income-tax surcharge to keep it from rising further. 
The summer of 1967 also brought major riots. Looters in Newark plun- 
dered stores on a massive scale; snipers fired from rooftops, and fires blazed 
high. The city’s 1,400 police officers could not control the situation. Speaking 
70. Ibid., pp. 20-22, Long, chairman, Space Program. 
7 I .  Logsdon, Apollo, p 1-32, 
72. Zbid., Chapter 1, pp. 37-38; Chaikin, Man, pp. 11 -26. 
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of “a city in open rebellion,” New Jersey’s governor called in the National 
Guard. At the peak, almost half of the city was in the hands of the rioters. The 
upheavals raged for five days; 27 people lost their lives. 
Detroit blew a week later; the next 11 days saw 1,600 fire alarms. Three 
miles of Grand River Avenue, a major thoroughfare, burned to the ground. 
Some sections of downtown resembled the burned-out German cities of 
World War 11. Forty-three people died; over 7,000 were arrested; 5,000 were 
left homeless.73 
“Conditions have greatly changed since I submitted my January budget,” 
the President admitted. “Because the times have placed more urgent 
demands upon our resources, we must now moderate our efforts in certain 
space projects.” In the House, an appropriations subcommittee reopened 
hearings on the NASA budget, and proceeded to make deep cuts in virtually 
every program except Apollo. 
With cities burning, taxes rising, and the Vietnam War escalating, NASA 
proceeded to shoot itself in the foot. In a stunning display of tactlessness, the 
Manned Spacecraft Center invited 28 companies to bid on a study of piloted 
flyby missions to Mars and Venus, beginning in 1975. When this announce- 
ment created an uproar, MSC withdrew its request. It was too late. In 
Congress, the view took hold that the automated Voyager project should be 
canceled because it was the first step toward a needless extravagance: a 
piloted mission to Mars. 
The final cut in NASA’s budget came to $5 11 million, a reduction of 10 
percent. Voyager was canceled, being eliminated in conference with the 
Senate. Apollo Applications, budgeted at $454 million in the January presi- 
dential request, ended with $253 million. The conferees spared Apollo, voting 
funds to allow this program to recover in the wake of the fire at Cape 
Canaveral. The cuts, however, hit hard at future programs.74 
Voyager did not remain dead for long. Within days of its formal cancel- 
lation, NASA officials began discussing a follow-on concept that was 
approved by the president in the budget for IT 1969. The new project had the 
name Viking, and its mission remained the same: to orbit Mars with auto- 
mated spacecraft, place landers gently on the surface, and look for signs of 
73. Lagsdan, Apollo, p. 1-46; Manchester, Glory, pp. 1079-1081. 
74. Logsdon, Apollo, Chapter 1, pp. 46-47; NASA SP-4102, p. 148. 
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life. Viking, however, would not ride a Saturn V, it would use the Titan III- 
Centaur. While this was certainly a splendid launch vehicle, it had less than 
one-eighth the lifting power of its much larger cousin.75 
That summer’s near-debacle confirmed Webb’s belief that even a modest 
post- Apollo planning effort could backfire badly. With Apollo continuing to 
reign supreme in a time of cutbacks, Webb took to raiding the Apollo 
Applications budget by reprogramming some of its funds. In June 1968, he 
told his center directors that this program was nothing more than “a surge tank 
for Apollo.” In this fashion, he took from the future to meet the needs of the 
present. Above all else, Apollo had to succeed.76 
That program’s peak funding had come in FY 1965. That year also saw 
NASA’s appropriation peak at $5.25 billion. After this, the budget slid down- 
ward; the appropriation for FY 1969, which began the previous July, was 
$3.953 billion, a drop of 25 percent. NASA’s in-house employment stayed 
close to the FY 1965 level of 33,000 positions. The contractors, however, 
were having a hard time of it; their personnel had fallen by half, from 377,000 
to 186,000.77 Unless NASA could take hold of something new and major, it 
was likely to shrink to insignificance. 
Mueller had hoped that Apollo Applications could come to the forefront 
as this new program. Already in 1968, it was clear that this would not happen. 
The agency had spent several years trying to pursue such a route to the future, 
without success. More was involved here than budget cuts per se. Congress 
and the Administration had imposed those cuts because NASA had failed to 
make a persuasive case for its plans. Nor was NASA able to propose anything 
as compelling as Apollo. 
Apollo, above all, had the beauty of simplicity. Everyone knew of science- 
fiction visions of astronauts on the Moon. The program’s goal was succinct: 
to carry out the lunar landing during the decade of the 1960s, and to bring 
its explorers back safely. As von Braun stated in 1964, “Everybody knows 
what the Moon is, everybody knows what this decade is, and evcrybody 
can tell a live astronaut who returned from the Moon from one who 
didn’ t.”78 
75 
76. NASA SP-4208, pp. 86-87, 104; NASA SP-4102, p 254. 
NASA SP-4012, V O ~ .  III, pp 27,40-41,213-219. 
77. NASA budget data, February 1970. 
78. US. News & World Report, June 1, 1964, p. 54. 
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Apollo Applications lacked this compelling character. In the end, it was a 
program with no compelling central focus. It offered only modest initiatives: 
solar astronomy, flights with durations of weeks, medical studies, and oppor- 
tunities to use Saturn-class rockets that otherwise might go to waste. The 
historian John Logsdon writes that, according to program critics, these initia- 
tives “were designed to fit the specific features of the Apollo and Saturn 
hardware. The missions suggested were not necessarily those deserving high- 
est priority, and modified Apollo/Saturn equipment was not necessarily the 
most effective way of carrying out those missions.”79 Here was enough to sup- 
port a single orbital workshop, but not enough to compete with something as 
historic as putting the first man on the Moon. 
An opportunity, however, did exist to plan once again with boldness. The 
PSAC report had danced around this, proposing nothing more than “the 
expectation of eventual manned planetary exploration.” That was not NASA’s 
style; the agency had established itself by literally reaching for the Moon, not 
by resting content with an expectation that astronauts would get there some- 
day. The new goal was there for anyone who would dare to pursue it, to seize 
it. One could see it in the night sky, glowing redly; one could name this goal 
with a single word: Mars. During 1969, NASA would seek seriously to estab- 
lish a piloted expedition to this planet as the basis for the agency’s future. 
79. Logsdon, Apollo, p. 1-26. 
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C H A P T  T R E E  
M a r s  and O t h e r  Dream Worlds 
A key component of early Space Shuttle plans was its linkage to a possible 
mission to Mars as the next major NASA undertaking. During 1967 and 1968, 
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) reached key milestones in propulsion 
on the road to Mars. In tests in Nevada, the AEC conducted successful 
demonstrations of nuclear reactors built for use in rocket propulsion and 
showed that its contractors were ready to develop a flight-rated engine suit- 
able for piloted missions to that planet.’ 
Nuclear Rocket Engines 
The AEC’s nuclear-rocket program could trace its beginnings to December 
1953, when the nuclear scientist Robert Bussard published an article on this 
topic in the classified Journal of Reactor Science and Technology. His 
paper stirred interest, and led to the initiation of an experimental effort 
called Project Rover at Los Alamos, New Mexico. Initial work aimed at 
building a succession of rocket reactors named Kiwi after the flightless bird 
of New Zealand. 
The basic approach followed Bussard’s proposal, calling for a compact 
reactor built of graphite, which withstands high temperatures and actually 
gains strength when heated. Hydrogen, flowing through channels in this reac- 
tor core, would receive heat from the reactor and reach temperatures of 
1. NASA SP-4012, VOI. 11, pp. 487-488. 
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several thousand degrees. This gas would then expand and flow through a 
nozzle, to produce thrust. 
Such a rocket appeared highly promising because it offered the greatest 
possible exhaust velocity and hence the best performance. It would do this by 
taking advantage of hydrogen’s low molecular weight: two, in appropriate 
units, compared with 18 for water vapor and 44 for carbon dioxide. Molecules 
of low weight fly faster, and hence yield a higher exhaust velocity; for this 
purpose, hydrogen is best.2 
The first version of Kiwi was heavy and produced only 70 megawatts 
(MW) of power, a modest amount. When it ran for five minutes in mid-1959, 
however, it suggested strongly that nuclear propulsion indeed was worth pur- 
suing. Some NASA officials had already been following this work, now they 
joined with their AEC counterparts to set up a joint program oftice. Los 
Alamos managers laid plans for advanced Kiwi reactors that would aim at 
1,OOO megawatts. In addition to this, the joint office set a follow-on goal of 
developing a flight-rated engine called NERVA (Nuclear Engine for Rocket 
Vehicle Application). In June 1961, NASA and the AEC chose Aerojet 
General as the prime contractor for development of the complete nuclear 
engine, with Westinghouse, an experienced builder of reactors, as the princi- 
pal ~ubcontractor.~ 
In November 1962, during a test of a new and promising Kiwi, disaster 
struck. The analyst James Dewar writes that “paralleling the rapid increase in 
power was a rapid increase in the frequency of flashes of light from the 
nozzle. On reaching 500 MW, the flashes were so spectacular and so frequent 
that the test was terminated and shut-down procedures begun. Quick disas- 
sembly confirmed that the flashes of light were reactor parts being ejected 
from the nozzle. Further disassembly and analysis revealed that over 90 per- 
cent of the reactor parts had been broken, mostly at the core’s hot end.” 
Harold Finger, head of the joint office, decided that there would be no fur- 
ther hot tests until the cause of the failure was found and carefully fixed. The 
failure was found to have been caused by vibrations produced by gas flowing 
through the core, which cracked the uranium fuel elements. It took over a year 
and a half of new designs to restore confidence in the project. In the end, 
2. Astronautics, December 1962, pp. 32-35, Astronautics & Aeronautics, May 1968, pp. 44,45; Halliday and 
3. Astromtzcs &Aeronautics, June 1965, p. 42; NASA SP-4012, vol. 11, pp. 478-480.484-485, 
Resnick, Physics, pp. 5 16-5 19. 
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vibration-free reactor cores proved to be attainable. In August 1964, another 
Kiwi ran for eight minutes at 900 MW, with complete success. The engineers 
then restarted it and successfully ran it again at full power. This series of tests 
NERVA nuclear rocket under test. (Smithsonian Institution Photo No. 75-13750) 
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demonstrated an effective exhaust velocity of 24,450 ft/sec, far more than any 
chemically-fueled rocket could achieve! 
Other work improved the non-nuclear parts of the rocket. The AEC test 
facility included a liquid-hydrogen pump that served well during the ground 
tests, but was unsuitable for flight. During 1965, however, workers assembled 
a complete nuclear engine that included a hydrogen 
a flight-type turbopump. Tests of this engine b 
reached full power in March 1966. This was the fir 
rocket with major components representative of a flight-rated engine. 
Subsequent work returned anew to reactor development, emphasizing 
long-duration tests as well as high power. In December 1967, an experimen- 
tal version of NERVA carried through a 60-minute endurance run at rated 
temperature and full power, 3,630 degrees Fahrenheit and 1 , 100 M W .  In addi- 
tion to this, Los~Alamos was developing a new class of reactors called 
Phoebus, rated at 5,000 MW. A June 1968 test ran for over 30 minutes, with 
12 minutes at or above 4,000 Mw. 
By then plans were in hand for a true flight engine, with 1,560 MW of 
power and temperatures of 4,040" E It would produce a thrust of 75,000 
pourids with an exhaust velocity of 26,500 ft/sec, nearly twice that of the 
best hydrogen-oxygen rocket then available. This version of NERVA would 
not take off from the ground, but would serve in upper stages. The plans 
called for developing this engine through a Preliminary Flight Rating Test, 
a pre-flight qualification. It would be ready for actual space missions soon 
after 1975.5 
The rapid pace o 
of plans in Washington. With NASA having no approved post- 
it was quite possible 
tested NERVA, ready for flight, only to find that 
it. NASA's prospects did not improve durin 
new attempt to plan i 
This new planning e 
Webb named Homer Newe 
of Space Science an 
4. AAS History Series vol. 
5. AsbWnaUfiCS 
4-35.42-46. 
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Administrator in October 1967, giving him agency-wide responsibility. He 
hoped to prepare proposals that could influence the FY 1970 budget request 
that would go to the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) late in September. He pro- 
ceeded to set up 12 working groups, drawing on a broad range of NASA 
specialists. A Planning Coordination Group (PCG) would direct the working 
groups’ activities; a Planning Steering Group then would choose alternatives 
and pass recommendations to the Administrator. 
This effort accomplished little. The head of the PCG noted “a definite 
failure to pull together among the key program offices, science and manned 
space flight.”6 Newell himself admitted that the results 
were not up to the standards of boldness and imagination expected at the 
beginning of the cycle, or worthy of our first decade in space. It is probable 
that the agency had become so conditioned to retreat over the past two years 
that an intellectual conservatism pervaded the planning .... The total effort in 
terms of forward motion was pedestrian, even timid.’ 
Willis Shapley, NASA’s Associate Deputy Administrator, spoke of 
“Homer Newell’s monumentally bureaucratic planning process. The 
number of new ideas that were injected-well, I think the Space Shuttle was 
really the only one that I can remember.” For instance, 
all the planetary missions sounded about the same. Somebody might have 
thought of some other instrument here and there, but in terms of forward 
NASA planning, everybody was just projecting exactly what the next step in 
his own little segment was.8 
Moreover, even as NASA was pouring old wine into new bottles, the 
Budget Bureau was turning up its nose at the proffered vintage. NASA’s plans 
emphasized long-duration piloted flights, but a BOB staff paper responded 
with skepticism: 
It is dificult to conceive of any use short of a manned planetary expedition 
that would require men to operate in orbit for more than 30 days. Most 
6 Logsdon, Apollo, Chapter 2, pp. 7-10; NASA SP-4102, pp 256-257. 
7. Memo, Homer Newell to George Low, February 9, 1970. 
8. John Mauer interview, Wilhs Shapley, October 26, 1984, pp. 8-9. 
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scientiJic endeavors that require the collection of data by means of space 
flight can be accomplished by unmanned systems at considerably less 
expense than the manned flight systems. 
More broadly, this staff paper saw little reason to continue with post- 
Apollo piloted space flight, other than competition with the Soviet Union: 
Reasons for proceeding other than competition include enhancing the 
natwnal prestige, advancing the general technology, or simply faith 
that manned spaceflight will ultimately return benefits to mankind in 
ways now unknown and unforeseen. None of these secondary argu- 
ments can be quantified and most are dificult to support. 
The case for continuation of a manned spaceflight effort after Apollo is 
one of continuing to advance our capability to operate in space on a larger 
scale, for longer duration, for ultimate purposes that are unclear,’ 
The NASA appropriation for FY 1970 came in at $3.697 billion. This was 
very close to the Administration’s request to Congress. Nevertheless, it repre- 
sented another step on that agency’s downward road.I0 
“Do not go gentle into that good night,” wrote the poet Dylan Thomas, in 
writing of elderly people facing death. “Rage, rage against the dying of the 
light.” NASA’s light was not yet dying, not with the piloted Moon landings 
immediately ahead. But under new leadership, this agency was ready to rage 
with vigor against the slow demise that seemed to be marked out as its fate. 
w  administrator^ Thomas Paine 
During 1966 and 1967, Webb worked with Robert Seamans as his deputy. As 
Administrator, Webb dealt with NASA’s external environment, including 
Congress, the White House, and the Budget Bureau. Seamans had held high- 
level NASA positions since 1960. As Deputy Administrator, he served as the 
agency’s general manager; all line and staff offices reported to him. He left 
NASA early in 1968 to take a professorship at Massachusetts Institute of 
9. Budget Bureau, ‘‘Nat~onal Aeronautics and Space Administration-Highlights Summary,” October 30, 
1968. Reprinted in NASA SP-4407, Volume I, pp. 495-499. 
10. NASA SP-4102, p 188. 
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Thi ma Paine. (NASA) 
Technology. His replacement, Thomas Paine, took over his post and became 
the new Deputy Administrator. * 
The son of a naval commodore, Paine served in World War I1 as a radar 
and engineering officer aboard the submarine USS Pompon. The experience 
stayed with him; decades later, trapped in a boring meeting, he would fill the 
time by drawing a sketch of his submarine under way on the surface and ready 
for action. After receiving a Ph.D. in physical metallurgy at Stanford 
University in 1949, he joined the General Electric (GE) Research Laboratory 
in Schenectady, New York. In this company, he rose to manager of engineer- 
ing applications. In 1963, he returned to the west coast and became head of 
TEMPO, a GE think tank in Santa Barbara, California. From this position, he 
went on to become Webb’s deputy at NASA in January 1968.12 
Like a good Navy man, he hit the ground running. Though still recover- 
ing from the Apollo fire during that year, NASA was pushing forward in 
1 1 .  Ibid., pp. 309, 310; Logsdon, Apollo, p. 1-14. 
12. Biographical data, Thomas 0. Paine papers, Library of Congress. These papers include an example of a 
submarine sketch. 
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expectation of meeting President Kennedy’s goal of a piloted lunar landing by 
the end of 1969. The Apollo spacecraft, well along in development, would 
soon be ready to carry its crew of three. The Saturn V, in flight test, soon 
would be ready as well. However, a vital element of Apollo, the lunar module, 
was encountering delays. This spacecraft, with room for two astronauts, was 
to carry out the actual landing on the Moon. 
The Saturn V was to carry a complete moonship, comprised of both an 
Apollo spacecraft and a lunar module, with the latter being flight-tested in 
both Earth and lunar orbits before it could qualify for the demanding task of 
a lunar landing. Its delay in development, however, raised the prospect that a 
Saturn V might be ready for launch, with only the Apollo spacecraft qualified 
for flight as its payload. 
At the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, George Low, head of the 
Apollo Spacecraft Program Office, was ready to accept this. He recom- 
mended that the mission leave the lunar module on the ground, but send the 
Apollo spacecraft into lunar orbit, allowing its crew to circle the Moon repeat- 
edly before breaking out of that orbit to return to Earth. 
In August 1968, Webb and Mueller-both out of the country attending a 
United Nations conference in Vienna-left Paine in Washington to mind the 
store. Sam Phillips, the Apollo program director, told him of Low’s proposal. 
Paine, who found the concept exciting, gave it his full support. He then tried 
to sell it to Webb, as both he and Phillips talked to their Administrator via 
overseas telephone. 
Webb was shocked at the audacity of the idea, and yelled, “Are you out of 
your mind?“ They had not even flown a piloted Apollo spacecraft in Earth 
orbit. In addition to this, Webb viewed the lunar module as a lifeboat that could 
save the crew of a lunar mission if their Apollo spacecraft were to become dis- 
abled.13 Any piloted lunar mission would be dangerous; to fly without a lunar 
module would make it more so. In turn, the deaths of additional astronauts, in 
the wake of the Apollo fire, would shake NASA to its foundations. 
Nevertheless, Webb did not say no; he left the door open. When Paine then 
strengthened his argument by sending Webb a long cable, Webb grudgingly 
agreed to consider this proposal, at least for purposes of planning. Events now 
played into Paine’s hands. In September, the Soviet Union carried out an 
13. This happened during the Apollo 13 mission, in April 1970 
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important lunar mission, Zond 5. This spacecraft looped around the Moon, 
returned to Earth, reentered the atmosphere, came down in the Indian Ocean, 
and was recovered. Two turtles were aboard, and they came back safely. An 
impressed Webb described this flight as “the most important demonstration of 
total space capacity up to now by any nation.” 
Zond 5 raised the stakes. All along the goal of Apollo had been to beat 
Moscow to the Moon; yet by sending a cosmonaut in place of the turtles, the 
Soviets could still win the race with another Zond mission. While Zond would 
only loop around and not land on the Moon, if cosmonauts were to do this, 
they would become the first pilots to fly to the Moon. Subsequent Apollo 
landings then would appear merely as following in Soviet footsteps. 
During that same September, Webb announced that he would step down 
as NASA Administrator. He had held that post since 1961; he now would turn 
it over to Paine, who would serve as Acting Administrator until the next pres- 
ident, due to be elected in November, could name a new head of NASA. 
Webb’s resignation took effect early in October and left Paine free to make 
decisions as opposed to more recommendations. 
In that same month, the Apollo 7 mission successfully flew with three 
astronauts in Earth orbit, as they tested their spacecraft during an 1 1-day mis-  
sion. This exorcised the ghosts of the Apollo fire, and led within weeks to the 
commitment Paine had sought. Having flown successfully in Earth orbit, the 
Apollo spacecraft, sans lunar module, indeed would fly to the Moon on the 
next mission. The flight that resulted, Apollo 8, carried the astronauts Frank 
Borman, James Lovell, and William Anders. On Christmas Eve 1968, much of 
the world listened as a radio circuit carried their voices, live from lunar orbit: 
Anders: In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the 
earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the 
deep.. .. 
Lovell: And God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night. And 
the evening and the morning were the$rst day.... 
Borman: And God said, “Let the waters under the heavens be gathered 
together in one place, and let the dry land appead’ And it was  SO....'^ 
14. NASA SP-4205, pp. 256-260; Logsdon, Apullo, Chapter 2, pp. 10-14; Levine, Future, pp. 101-102; Chaikin, 
Man, pp 56-59; Heppenheimer, Countdown, pp. 237-239,243-244, NASA SP-4102, pp. 257-258,311. 
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The year 1968 had been one of war and upheaval, as public bitterness 
over Vietnam drove the powerful Lyndon Johnson from the presidency. 
Nevertheless, Time picked the crew of Apollo 8 as its Men of the Year, and 
assessed the significance of their mission: 
What the rebels and dissenters ask will not be found on the moon: social jus- 
tice, peace, an end to hypocrisy-in short, Utopia. But to the extent that the 
rebels really want a particular kind of tomorrow-rather than simply a curse 
on, and an escape from, today-the moon fZight of Apollo 8 shows how that 
Utopian tomorrow could come about. For this is what Westernized man can 
do. He will not turn into a passive, contemplative being; he will not drop out 
and turn 0% he will not seek stability and inner peace in the quest for nir- 
vana. Western man is Faust, and if he knows anything at all, he knows how 
to challenge nature, how to dare against dangerous odds and euen against 
reason. He knows how to reach for the moon. 
That is Western man, and with these qualities he will succeed or fail.I5 
Apollo 8 reflected Paine’s leadership and initiative, which he had dis- 
played even while Webb still headed NASA. That mission also reflected a 
characteristic boldness, a willingness to reach for new horizons; this too was 
part of Paine’s approach. He would display such boldness time and again 
during his tenure, as he pushed his colleagues to think more daring thoughts. 
In several respects, however, Paine’s position was weaker than that of 
Webb. Webb had served the Truman Administration as director of the Budget 
Bureau from 1946 to 1949, and as Under Secretary of State from 1949 to 
1952. Though Republicans held the White House during the subsequent eight 
years, Webb’s background made him a charter member of the Democrats’ 
shadow government, ready to receive an important sub-cabinet post when 
they regained the presidency in 1960. 
Paine had no such background. He held no record of government service, 
or even of involvement in the space program as a technical manager. In the 
words of the historian John Logsdon, “’he was as new to the ways of 
Washington as James Webb had been a master of them.” Paine had obtained 
15. Erne, January 3, 1969, p. 17 
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his initial selection as Deputy Administrator because he had offered himself 
for appointment to a high-level Washington position, nature unspecified. The 
head of the Civil Service Commission found Paine’s name in a list of execu- 
tives who had expressed interest in receiving such posts, and passed it on. 
With the new president, Richard Nixon, free to name his own NASA 
Administrator, Paine submitted a pro forma resignation upon Nixon’s inau- 
guration in January 1969. Nixon’s staff offered the post to candidates that 
included General Bernard Schriever, who had built the Air Force’s big m i s -  
siles; Simon Ramo, a co-founder of TRW who had provided Schriever with 
vital technical support; and Patrick Haggerty, head of Texas Instruments. 
When all declined, Nixon decided to stick with Paine. Continuing as Acting 
Administrator, Paine received Senate confirmation as Administrator, without 
qualification, in March 1969.16 
There was less to this than met the eye, for in no way did Nixon intend to 
endorse Paine’s bold approach to space flight. “He was not committed to 
space,” recalls Hans Mark, director of NASA’s Ames Research Center and 
later an Air Force Secretary. “Nixon had no real interest in it. He didn’t want 
to be the president that would kill our space program, but he had no personal 
interest in it at all.” 
Mark assesses Paine as “a rank failure” because he was 
a Democrat in a Republican administration. Just to give you an idea of why 
I think Nixon didn’t give a damn about the space program, he didn’t go out 
and look for a strong Administratox What better way to have a pliant NASA 
than to have a Democrat sitting there exposed to his people? When Paine was 
confirmed as Administrator under Nixon, my reaction was, “Oh, my God- 
nobody is going to pay any attention to us.” 
Willis Shapley recalls that Paine initially 
had expected to be fired because he was a liberal Democrat. And Nixon 
delayed in replacing the Administrator of NASA for a long time. Suddenly, 
they realized that with the Apollo program coming up and a reasonable 
chance that it might have failed spectacularly, they wanted to distance them- 
16. NASA SP-4102, p. 309; Logsdon, ApoZlo, pp, 1-14, 11-12,111-2. 
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selves from the Apollo program. That led to, by pretty straightfornard politi- 
cal logic, “All right, this was Kennedy’s program: it’s going to be Kennedy’s 
failure, and here’s a liberal Democrat, Tom Paine. All right, he can be the fall 
guy. Also, we can’t3nd anybody else for the job.” So that’s how Tom Paine 
became Administrator of NASA, 
Space Shuttle Studies Continue 
Amid drama near the Moon and change in Washington, NASA plugged 
ahead, as space shuttle studies continued to receive their modest share of 
attention. As early as October 1966, a meeting in Houston brought together 
officials from NASA Headquarters, NASA-Marshall, and the Manned 
Spacecraft Center. They began to plan a joint study of Space Shuttles to pro- 
vide logistics for a space station. A month earlier, a joint Air Force-NASA 
study had concluded that “no single, most desirable vehicle concept could be 
identified ... for satisfying future DoD and NASA objectives.”18 The partici- 
pants in the Houston meeting hoped to create a united front within NASA. 
Noting the substantial number of studies already available, Daniel Schnyer, 
representing the Office of Manned Space Flight, declared that “we have a vast 
store of knowledge to draw on, and should now be able to get together and 
decide on an agency concept for the entire logistic system.” 
This meeting was sufficiently noteworthy for Max Akridge, a representa- 
tive from NASA-Marshall, to describe it as “the beginning of the space shuttle 
as SUC~.’’’~ Little came of it; as George Mueller learned when he hosted his 
symposium in January 1968, various groups and designers were still pursuing 
their individual approaches. Still, NASA Marshall would now work in tandem 
with the Manned Spacecraft Center. This joint approach was in the forefront 
when, in October 1968, managers from these two centers launched a new 
round of space shuttle studies. 
Why could NASA not order up a definitive treatment of some particular 
concept, such as Lockheed’s Star-Clipper, and be done with it? NASA needed 
such studies because there was no way to get such a definitive treatment, at 
17. John Mauer interview, Willis Shapley, October 26, 1984, p. 7; interview, Hans Mark, Austin, Texas, 
18. Ames, chairman, Report, p. 1 .  
19. Akridge, Space Shuttle, pp. 25-26. 
October 16, 1991,pp. 9-10. 
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least not with the modest sums available to underwrite individual studies. Like 
professors reviewing a graduate student’s dissertation, senior managers could 
always read the report of a particular study and raise new questions, new topics 
for further examination. Similarly, like grad students who look for jobs 
wherein they can continue their dissertation research, engineers and managers 
were eager to carry forward with new design exercises and further analyses. 
They would continue to do this as long as funding remained available. 
George Mueller was the man behind the new activity. In the wake of the 
1968 election, his hopes were high. In mid-December, just prior to the launch 
of ApoIlo 8, he talked with Wernher von Braun and chided him: “You’d been 
telling me that my space shuttle was in the future and you needed an interim 
system,” such as the Titan 111-M. Mueller predicted that the new president 
would want to go “all out,” adding that “this may be the big program for 
Nixon.” Von Braun replied, “If Nixon wants to spend $3 billion, who am I to 
say no?”20 
Initial activity revolved around a formal Request for Proposal, issued 
October 30. It represented an invitation for interested companies to describe the 
studies they hoped to conduct. Responses were due by the end of November. In 
the parlance of the day, the spacecraft under consideration were described anew 
as Integrated Launch and Reentry Vehicles, with the new studies representing 
a continuation of work funded by the Air Force under that designation. 
The study contracts, signed at the end of January 1969, called for all 
designs to follow a common set of ground rules. The Statement of Work defined 
the basic mission as the resupply of a space station, in an orbit with 55-degree 
inclination. Each vehicle was to carry 12 people, as passengers and crew, or a 
payload of 25,000 pounds. Contractors were also to present variations of their 
basic designs, to accommodate payloads ranging from 5,000 to 50,000 pounds. 
Payload bays were to provide cargo volume of at least 3,000 cubic feet; when 
returning from orbit, these vehicles were to cany at least 2,500 pounds. 
Designers were to seek to achieve aircraft-like checkout and ease of mainte- 
nance, including readiness for rapid launch in as little as 24 hours. 
North American Aviation (NAA), which now had the name of North 
American Rockwell after having merged with the firm of Rockwell 
International, took a contract. It was to study new low-cost expendable 
20. Ibid., pp. 47-48. 
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boosters with reusable upper stages. Having ruled out existing expendables 
such as the Saturn I-B or Titan 111-C, NASA welcomed new concepts. 
Lockheed was told to concentrate its effort on new studies of stage-and- 
a-half configurations such as the Star-Clipper. The new topics would include 
use of solid- or liquid-fueled booster stages that would ignite at liftoff. (Here 
was another glimpse of the future; the final Shuttle configuration, three years 
later, would use such solid boosters.) In addition to this, Lockheed was to 
develop its own versions of the Triamese concept for comparison with those 
of General Dynamics (GD). 
GD focused on two-stage fully-reusable approaches, excluding stage- 
and-a-half designs. GD’s configurations therefore demanded a “flyback first 
stage,” capable of returning to the launch site, and this fm’s  engineers were 
to consider unpiloted concepts. The Triamese approach was to remain an 
important though not predominant focus of effort. At the same time, NASA 
officials raised a new question: Is there a way to design a flyback first stage 
that could develop into a Triamese vehicle? 
McDonnell Douglas, home of the Tip Tank stage-and-a-half concept, was 
to study it anew. Like Lockheed, this firm was to look at the use of booster 
stages; in addition to this, its investigators would study fully-reusable con- 
cepts. These became central to this company’s efforts as the study progressed 
during 1969. 
At first glance, these contracts promised more of the same. One could see 
a few new faces in the crowd. Martin Marietta failed to win a study contract 
while North American Rockwell, builder of the Apollo spacecraft and the 
second stage of the Saturn V, won instead. The promised concepts, however, 
amounted to new variations on old themes. No one was offering anything so 
original as Max Hunter’s stage-and-a-half approach, and each of the four 
studies had only $300,000 in funding?’ 
In the light of subsequent events, one notes particularly the strong empha- 
sis on space station logistics. The study requirements placed little weight on 
contractor concepts that would specialize in carrying automated spacecraft as 
payloads. Yet there was a reason for this focus on space station logistics: Tom 
Paine wanted such a station, and was pushing hard in Washington to win 
approval to build it. 
21. Ibid., pp. 46-53,55-51. 
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Space Shuttle Policy: Opening Gambits 
George Mueller believed strongly in convening advisory boards, and in spon- 
soring studies of future programs. One of his ongoing panels, the Science and 
Technology Advisory Committee (STAC), sought to bring top-level scientists 
into consultation with his Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF). Many sci- 
entists were strongly skeptical of the OMSF and its works; they regarded 
Apollo as a costly extravagance, and argued instead for less costly automated 
spacecraft. STAC scientists, who at least were not vocal in their opposition, 
gave OMSF access to high-quality scientific advice. It also offered a counter 
to criticism from the scientific community. The chairman of STAC, Charles 
Townes, was a physicist who had shared a Nobel Prize for work leading to the 
invention of the laser.22 
In December 1968, a month after the election, Townes agreed to chair an 
advisory group that would make recommendations to the new administration 
on space policy. The group’s members included Robert Seamans, who had 
been NASA’s Deputy Administrator. Other members, including Townes, had 
served on the President’s Science Advisory Committee panel that had pre- 
pared the 1967 report, The Space Program in the Post-Apollo Period. 
Townes’s group included at least one true believer: Francis Clauser, vice- 
chancellor of the University of California at Santa Cmz, who was about to 
take over as chairman of the college of engineering at Calte~h.’~ In a letter 
appended to the final report, Clauser urged Nixon to 
chart a bold program ... 1 think our rate of development can be considerably 
more rapid than presented in the task force report. For example, I believe we 
can place men on Mars before 1980. At the same time we can develop eco- 
nomical space transportation which will permit extensive exploration of the 
moon. 
On the whole, however, the new report was considerably more cautious in 
tone than the PSAC review of 1967. On NASA’s future, Townes’ panelists 
agreed that “we do not recommend a commitment now to a large space sta- 
22. Logsdon, Apollo. p. 1-16. 
23. Ibid., p. 1-23. Long, chairman, Space Program, p. v; Asrronautzcr &Aeronautics, May 1969, p. 35; 
Townes, chamnan, Report, letter attached. Reprinted 1n NASA SP-4407, vol. I, p. 5 12. 
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tion, extensive development of ‘low-cost boosters,’ or a manned planetary 
expedition.” The panel called for “a new look ... at the balance between the 
manned and unmanned segments of the NASA space program.” Asserting in 
effect that the existing program was badly out of balance, the report proposed 
redress: “an active and successful manned program for several years while at 
the same time steadily decreasing the level of funding for manned space flight 
to perhaps $1.25 billion by fiscal 1972.” 
On a space station: 
We are against any present commitment to the construction of a large 
space station .... The “manraed space station” concept, proposed as a pro- 
gram for the late 1970s, is on much more doubtjiul ground. It is much too 
ambitious to be consistent with the present clear needs for continued explo- 
ration of man’s usefulness in space. On the other hand, it is not obviously an 
efective way of continuing to demonstrate for prestige purposes our manned 
space capabili ty.... It therefore seems premature to make any firm program 
decisions regarding the proposed manned space station. 
On a space shuttle: 
The unit costs of boosting payloads into space can be substantially 
reduced, but this requires an increased number offlights, or such an increase 
coupled with an expensive development program. We do not recommend ini- 
tiation of such a development, 
On piloted flight to Mars: 
The great majority of the task force is not in favor of a commitment at 
present to a manned planetary lander or orbitex ... It would be undesirable 
to define at this time a new goal that is both very ambitious in scope and 
highly restrictive in schedule, for example a manned landing on Mars 
before 1985, even though such a goal might be achievable. Such a commit- 
ment, adopted now, might inhibit our ability to establish a proper balance 
between the manned space program and the scient@ and applications pro- 
grams. 24 
24. Townes, chairman, Report. In NASA SP-4407, vol. I, pp. 499-512. 
120 
Mars and Other Dream Worlds 
This report, released in January 1969 prior to the inauguration, was not to 
Paine’s liking. In a written critique, he noted 
its repeated opposition to the word “commitment.” We must not commit, the 
report says, to a space station, to low-cost space transportation, to manned 
planetary exploration. I can understand this reluctance to make commit- 
ments, but I cannot sympathize with or accept it. I understand that the word 
“commitment ’’ means to many scientists the type of commitment we made to 
Apollo, but I do not agree with those who regret or deplore that commitment. 
They see only its disadvantages .... 
We have been frustrated too long by a negativism that says hold back, be 
cautious, take no risks, do less than you are capable of doing. I submit that no 
perceptive student of the history of social progress doubts that we will estab- 
lish a large laboratory in earth orbit, that we will provide a practical system 
for the frequent transfer of men and supplies to and from such a laboratory, 
that we will continue to send men to the Moon, and that eventually we will 
send men to the planets. If this is true, now is the time to say so. Now is the 
time for the President of the United States to say, “This country will establish 
a scientific laboratory in earth orbit. This country will develop a practical 
space transportation system. This country will send men to the planets.”25 
By then, Richard Nixon was in the White House and was dealing with the 
federal budget. Preparing a budget for a particuIar fiscal year (FY) took time; 
though elected in 1968 and inaugurated in 1969, the first budget that would 
be truly Nixon’s own would cover FY 1971. At the moment he was dealing 
with the budget for FY 1970 that would begin in mid-1969. Like other new 
presidents, Nixon, seeking to contrast his own financial prudence with the 
spendthrift ways of his predecessor, ordered his department heads to look for 
ways to make cuts. 
The new Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Robert Mayo, wrote a gov- 
ernment-wide letter to those heads of agencies on January 23, asking them to 
review their portions of President Johnson’s FY 1970 budget and to propose 
areas where spending might be reduced. Paine took this as an invitation to 
press instead for an increase. A month later, Paine replied to Mayo with a 
25. Letter, Paine to DuBridge, May 6, 1969. 
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Robert Mayo, right, with Nixon and Treasury Secretary, D a d  M. Kennedy. 
(National Archives) 
seven-page letter, single spaced. Its crux required little more than a single 
line: “In our judgment the NASA FY 1970 budget is deficient by $198 mil- 
lion from the amount required.”z6 
Mayo slapped this down in a hurry. It took him only a few days to reply 
with a letter to Paine: “I am not prepared at this time to recommend to the 
President approval of your requested budget increase.” He also wrote to 
Nixon: “Our fwst look at the agency recommendations ... shows many more 
increases than decreases. In total these requests, if granted, would make pre- 
carious if not impossible the attainment of the surplus forecast by the previous 
Administration.” He advised the President to “make no statements endorsing 
future space objectives” pending extensive further review, which would 
include “the total budget context.”” 
Mayo’s staff went on to request a $90 million cut in the NASA budget, 
where Paine had sought a $198 million increase. While Paine succeeded in 
winning some relief, the final BOB cut still came to $45 million. Part of a $5.5 
26. Logsdon, Apollo, Chapter 3, pp. 2-3; letter, Paine to Mayo, February 24, 1969. 
27. Memo, Mayo to Nixon, March 3, 1969; letter, Mayo to Paine, March 3, 1969. Quoted in Logsdon, Apollo, 
p. 111-7. 
122 
Mars and Other Dream Worlds 
billion cut in an overall federal budget of $200 billion for FT 1970, this rep- 
resented no more than NASA’s fair share. This, however, was no way to build 
a post-Apollo future.28 
Nevertheless, the Nixon administration was preparing to chart its own 
course toward that future, with Paine having a hand in the planning. In 
December 1968, during the transition between administrations, Nixon had 
selected A. Lee DuBridge, the president of Caltech, to be his new science 
advisor. At Caltech, DuBridge’s purview had included the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory, the nation’s principal center for automated exploration of the 
Moon and planets operated by this university under contract to NASA. Like 
many of his fellow scientists, however, DuBridge was skeptical of the value 
of piloted space flight. He favored paying greater attention to automated mis- 
sions, and he knew them well.29 
The Townes panel had cast its net broadly, offering recommendations that 
dealt with international cooperation in space, issues of NASA’s internal orga- 
nization and of its relations with the Defense Department, and even matters 
that could require new legislation in Congress.30 The economist Arthur 
Burns, a Nixon advisor, proposed that DuBridge should direct a new study 
that would further address these issues. On February 4, Nixon responded 
with a memo to DuBridge: 
There is general agreement that our space eflorts should continue, although 
there are notable diflerences of opinion in regard to spec@ projects and the 
amount of annual funding. 
The report from Arthur Burns’ group ...p roposes the establishment of an 
interagency committee which would include you, the Administrator of NASA, 
and a senior oficial from the Department of Defense. The primary function 
of this committee would be to f imish recommendations to me on the scope 
and direction of our Post Apollo Space Pr~gram.~’ 
As the president’s science advisor, DuBridge served as director of the 
Office of Science and Technology (OST), one of a myriad of special-purpose 
28. Logsdon, Apollo, p. 111-10. 
29. Ibid., p. II-23, NASA SP-4102, p. 15. 
30. Townes, charman, Report, pp. 22-28. Reprinted in NASA SP-4407, vol. I, pp. 509-51 1 .  
3 I .  Memo, Nixon to DuBridge, February 4, 1969. 
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bureaus within the Executive Branch. OST staff members proceeded to draft 
a directive which represented an attempt to give DuBridge the leadership of 
this review of space policy. No NASA officials took part in drafting this direc- 
tive, for in the words of one OST staffer, Russell Drew, “there was a concern 
that we would be called upon to rubber-stamp a NASA document, which we 
did not want to do.”32 
Learning of this ploy, Paine protested strongly. He disliked the idea that 
DuBridge and the OST might present him with plans sanctioned by Nixon 
that he then would have to execute; as he later put it, “YOU never want one 
bunch of guys to do the planning and another bunch to carry it out.” 
Nevertheless, Paine’s position was quite weak at that moment. He was no 
more than Acting Administrator, and because he had sent in his resignation, 
he was merely serving from day to day at Nixon’s pleasure, pending appoint- 
ment of a replacement. 
But Paine, a Democrat in a Republican administration, was not about to 
play the patsy. As he later recalled, 
I was the person directly reporting to the President, responsible for the space 
program even though I was only the acting rather than the full Administrator: 
I nevertheless took the view that I was acting for the new Administrator who- 
ever he might be, and that it was very important that I not give away any of 
the authority and responsibili ty... to an advisory staff function [the OST] even 
though that staff function might reside in the White House .... 
I took the very early and the very strong view. ..that this must recite the 
fact that NASA would be responsible for setting up the NASA portion of this, 
that the Air Force and the DoD would be responsible for the military portion 
of the space program; and that we then review it with other responsible 
people ... to make it reflect a broad Administration-wide consensus. 
Paine won his argument, in what he called “a rather typical Washington 
power struggle.”33 
If not the OST and Lee DuBridge, who would direct this interagency study? 
The answer lay in the original Space Act of 1958 that had created a policymak- 
32. Logsdon, Ap0110, p. IV-4. 
33. Interview, Thomas Paine, September 3, 1970, pp. 5-6. 
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ing body, the National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC). Its members 
included representatives from all federal agencies with an important interest in 
space: NASA, the DoD, the AEC and the State Department, the latter because 
the space program required overseas tracking stations and featured cooperation 
with scientists of other nations. Though by law the Vice President chaired this 
body, it had never done much. The recent Townes panel described it as “not very 
effective,” noting that Nixon might ask Congress to abolish it. 
The ineffectiveness of the NASC matched that of its new chairman, Vice 
President Spiro Agnew. He was in a position familiar to new vice presidents, 
for he had little to do and was looking for ways to make himself useful. In 
Paine’s words, “at that time, he hadn’t figured out what his role was going to 
be in the administration.” He willingly agreed to chair the new interagency 
review, which would go forward within a committee called the Space Task 
Group (STG>.34 
On February 13, Nixon issued a new memo confirming this arrangement. 
DuBridge was to join the STG and provide its staff. Paine would also be a 
member. Nixon initially designated Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird as a 
third member. Laird, however, chose instead to appoint a representative: 
Robert Seamans, lately the number two man in NASA and now recalled from 
MIT to become the new Air Force Secretary. 
The group held an initial meeting on March 7, with Agnew in the chair. 
This meeting served to organize the group’s activities. Nixon had directed the 
STG “to prepare for me a coordinated program and budget proposal”; hence 
it was appropriate to invite Robert Mayo, director of the Budget Bureau, to sit 
with the group as an observer. The STG issued similar invitations to two 
others: Glenn Seaborg, chairman of the AEC, and U. Alexis Johnson, 
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs.35 
Already Paine was wooing Agnew vigorously, for Agnew had no back- 
ground in space-he had been governor of Maryland-and proved amenable 
to Paine’s bold planning. The Apollo 9 mission flew during that month, atop 
a Saturn V, which carried a lunar module into E& orbit along with three 
astronauts in an Apollo spacecraft. This represented the first test flight of a 
34. Ibrd., p 7; NASA SP-4102, p. 15; Townes, chairman, Report, pp. 7, 27. Reprinted In NASA SP-4407, vol. 
35. Logsdon, Apollo, Chapter 4, pp. 5-7; memo, Nixon to Agnew et al., February 13, 1969 Reprinted in 
I, pp. 502,511. 
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complete moonship. Paine invited Agnew to come to Cape Canaveral on the 
day of the launch, as an honored guest. While DuBridge and Seamans were 
there, it was Agnew who received special treatment. He was given a tour of 
the moonport, with astronauts as his escorts. These included Frank Borman, 
who had commanded Apollo 
The STG held a second meeting two weeks later. Seamans, seeing “con- 
siderable military interest and potential use” for a shuttle, won agreement that 
a joint NASA/DoD pane1 would study it anew. Paine called for “a new banner 
to be hoisted,” as daring as Apollo, around which the nation might rally. 
Agnew pursued this thought: Where was the Apollo of the 1970s? Could it be 
that the United States should undertake a human expedition to Mars? The 
issue flickered only momentarily for it was too early for such plans to catch 
fire. Agnew and Paine, however, would return to this topic anew in subsequent 
months.37 
The Townes study, the setting-up of the STG, and Paine’s attempt to boost 
his budget all took place between December 1968 and the following March. 
For Paine, the record was mixed. He sat and watched while Townes’ panelists 
proposed to do little in space that was new. He had lost in his opening 
encounter with Mayo. He had succeeded, however, in shaping the STG to his 
liking and had reason to think he would have Agnew as an ally, with Seamans 
as another highly knowledgeable participant. 
The second STG meeting was the last such full-dress meeting until 
August. During the intervening months, participants would call on planning 
groups to develop specific proposals. Paine was already doing this, for while 
he might have little clout at the Budget Bureau, on his own turf he was king. 
He wanted a space station and a great deal more, and was already working 
with colleagues to determine the designs. 
S ~ ~ c e  S t a ~ Q n  
There was little fundamentally new in the realm of space shuttle design; the 
same was true of space stations. The studies of the 1960s had emphasized 
concepts such as the Manned Orbiting Research Laboratory of Douglas 
36 Thompson, ed., Space Log, vol. 27 (1991), p 107; “Visit by the Vice President, Kennedy Space Center,” 
March 3, 1969 Thomas Pane papers, Library of Congress. 
37 Logsdon, Apollo, Chapter 4, pp. 8, 9. 
126 
Mars and Other Dream Worlds 
Aircraft, carrying crews of six to nine people and using the Saturn I-B for 
logistics. This approach had continued to win attention, with a recent version 
including a component called the Manned Orbiting Module. The name had 
been chosen with care, for as one NASA official put it, “What congressman 
would dare vote against anything called MOM?’38 
Paine wanted more. He not only wanted new and more detailed studies; he 
wanted new thinking, and he was not shy about giving pep talks. Thus, in a letter 
to the director of NASA’s Lewis Research Center in mid-January, he noted 
the need to outline bold objectives for the Space Station program. Modest 
goals, which tax neither our own creativity nor the potential advances of 
our industrial technology, are not worthy successors to those of Apollo .... 
Please review this draft work statement thoroughly, and submit a revised 
document which proposes a substantially stronger and bolder U S .  Space 
Station Program.39 
A month later, addressing a symposium on space stations at NASA 
Langley, Paine stated openly that the inspiration for his agenda came from the 
Collier’s series of the early 1950s: 
Seventeen years ago a group of forward-looking scientists and engineers pro- 
posed that the United States undertake the construction of a large space 
station over a ten-year period at a cost of $4 billion .... The space station, a 
250-foot-diameter ring with artijicial gravity and solar powel; was to be put 
into a 1,075-mile altitude high-inclination orbit .... 
The scientists who worked with Collier’s Magazine on this proposal 
included Dr. Wernher von Braun, Dr. Fred L. Whipple, Dr. Joseph Kaplan, DI: 
Heinz Haber and MK Willy Ley.... Their timetable for space exploration 
included an orbiting space station by 1967 and a possible j r s t  lunar landing 
by 1977. Five years before Sputnik the scientists warned: “What you will read 
here is not sciencejction. It is serious fact. Moreovel; it is an urgent warning 
that the U.S. must immediately embark on a long-range development program 
to secure for the West ‘space superiority.’ If we do not, somebody else will. 
That somebody else very probably would be the Soviet Union.’’ ... 
38. Aviation Week October 21, 1968, pp. 25, 26. 
39. Letter, Paine lo Silverstein, January 14, 1969. 
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As we meet here today the United States stands at the end of theJirst 
decade in space looking forward to the second. ... But we are still looking for- 
ward to the establishment of that projected major research laboratory in the 
sky, the permanent U S .  space station accessed by a low-cost space shuttle.40 
Yet though Paine was sounding a clarion call, in a vital respect he was 
blowing an uncertain trumpet, for his center directors lacked clear direction 
as to what they were to produce. They were quite ready to boldly go where no 
one had gone before, but their engineers needed more than 2001: A Space 
Odyssey when drawing up their specifications. In particular, they needed a 
well-drawn Statement of Work to direct the new space station studies. Paine, 
addressing this issue as well, had recently convened a meeting of those direc- 
tors for this purpose. 
The draft Statement of‘Work of that moment was the seventh in a series, 
and everyone agreed it left much to be desired. Abe Silverstein of NASA- 
Lewis, who had received Paine’s letter of mid-January, cited three criteria in 
evaluating the draft: “Would contractors receiving this in the mail know what 
to do? Could we evaluate their responses? Could the project be completed to 
meet our specs within time and money?” 
He added that “the number-seven draft document fails to meet these cri- 
teria and cannot be edited to meet these criteria. NASA is asking-in mushy 
language-for something we should know ourselves before going out.” He 
then gave a list of “things we need to do more homework on”: size, weight, 
orbits, programs and experiments, power, logistic support, and communica- 
tions. “We need to define all these factors for the contractors,” he concluded. 
“In essence, tell them clearly what NASA wants. We need a document that 
defines the basics.” 
With even the basics left undefined, Robert Gilruth of the Manned 
Spacecraft Center was willing to fill in the blanks in a very expansive spirit: 
This work statement doesn’t set NASA’s sights high enough for the future. We 
should now be looking at a step more comparable in challenge to that of 
Apollo after Mercury. The space station size should be modular and based on 
our Saturn V lift capability into 200-mile orbit. Three launches would give us 
40. Paine, speech, February 11, 1969. 
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one million pounds in orbit, including spent stages. That is the number we 
should be planning for the core size. 
Gilruth predicted a need for “nuclear power of several hundred kilowatts. The 
design should also emphasize the utility of the space base as a way-station to 
the moon and Mars.” 
Wernher von Braun, representing NASA Marshall, proposed a specific 
approach: 
Tell the contractors what we want in the long run, what we foresee as the ulti- 
mate, the long-range, the dream-station program. Then NASA should define 
a 1975 station as a core facility in orbit from which the ultimate “space 
campus” or “space base” can grow in an eficient orderly evolution through 
1985. We should start in 1975 to launch the basic core of the space station or 
space base that we want to be operating in 1980, providing planned orderly 
growth capability.“ 
This meeting took place late in January. Over the next several weeks 
Charles Mathews, George Mueller’s deputy at the OMSF in Washington, 
developed new guidelines that now called for two space stations: an initial 
concept for the short term and a blue-sky version as a follow-on project. 
However, the latter would show a close relation to the former, for the initial 
space station would serve as a module or building block. By launching sev- 
eral of them and linking them together in orbit, NASA could assemble a true 
space base, with accommodation for as many as a hundred people. 
This brought a highly compelling concept for a space station program 
that could extend through the 1970s and beyond. The basic space station 
would not resemble MORL, with its crew of six. Instead, it was to provide 
room for as many as 12 people. It would have a diameter of 33 feet, com- 
pared to the 22 feet of MORL, and would fly on the Saturn V. NASA would 
resupply this station using the Saturn I-B or the Titan 111-M, with the chosen 
launch vehicle carrying a modified Gemini spacecraft called Big G.  The 
standard Gemini had carried two people; Big G would retain that spacecraft 
as a cockpit or flight deck, while adding a passenger section with 7 to 10 
additional seats. 
41. Paine, notes, January 27, 1969. 
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This station would be in orbit as early as 1975. Modules of similar size, 
brought up on their own Saturn V vehicles, would then build it into the find 
space base, with enough people to fill an office building. After 1975, a space 
shuttle would become available, and would replace Big G along with its 
expendable 
Here indeed was the boldness Paine wanted. Part of what made this sce- 
nario exciting was that, in its essence, it called for no more than a modest 
extension of concepts with which everyone was familiar. The new station 
would represent something of a stretch when compared with MORL,, but its 
design would rest solidly on the foundation of earlier studies, and it would 
use the Saturn V. Its logistics vehicle was old hat; the Big G concept had been 
around since 1967. The space base would grow from the basic station in a 
natural way, with a space shuttle-another well-known concept-comple- 
menting it strongly. 
With these plans evolving rapidly, Paine received a request from the 
White House dated February 17, in which Nixon solicited his views on issues 
of policy in space and aeronautics. Paine responded by pouring out his heart 
in a nine-page letter, again single-spaced. He wanted his space station, natu- 
rally, and he not only wanted a presidential commitment; he wanted it quickly. 
This letter represented an attempt to bypass the deliberations of the Space 
Task Group, even though Paine was one of its members. It also bypassed the 
normal budget process. 
While that was awkward, Paine and Nixon were both aware that the STG 
would require the entire spring and summer to carry through with its work, 
and Paine wrote that the matter was too urgent to wait. He brashly played the 
Soviet card, warning that Moscow was “pushing toward a dominant position 
in large-scale long-duration space station operations in Earth orbit .... Their 
moving clearly ahead of the US. in this field would have a continuing impact 
on the rest of the world.” The Soviets might make their move as early as that 
summer. This would “take the edge off your announcement of a similar U.S. 
objective in the fdl.’’43 
Paine knew his man. Nixon had lost the presidency to Kennedy by a 
whisker-thin margin in 1960 partly because Kennedy had warned that the 
42. Aviation Week June 19,1967, pp. 20-21; February 24, 1969, pp. 16-17; Report H321 (McDonnell 
43. Memo, Paine to Nixon, February 26, 1969. Repnnted in NASA S P W ,  YO]. I, pp. 513-519. 
Douglas); bgsdon, Apollo, chapter 3, pp. 23-24. 
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Russians were ahead of us in the space race. Nixon, however, refused to bite. 
He replied to Paine with a courteous note that put the space station issue firmly 
in the hands of the STG. The PSAC also declined to support NASA, as Lewis 
Branscomb, chairman of its panel on space science and technology, wrote that 
if one does not accept the argument that potential Soviet competition in this 
area compels establishment of the space station at the earliest date, there 
does not seem to be a compelling operational requirement for a specijic 
target date.44 
The work of Mathews and his colleagues now gave a firm basis for a suit- 
able Statement of Work that could guide the new round of space station 
studies. On April 19, this document went out to prospective contractors. There 
would be two study contracts of $2.9 million each, one managed by NASA 
Marshall and the other by the Manned Spacecraft Center, with NASA 
Headquarters providing coordination. The studies were to put more than half 
their efforts into defining the basic station with its crew of 12. These studies 
were also to address issues involving logistic systems, along with concept def- 
inition of the eventual space base.45 
Space Shuttles Receive New Attention 
Money talks, and the initial funding of the 1969 Space Shuttle studies showed 
that these held lower priority than those of the space station. While the station 
studies came to,$5.8 million, there was only $1.2 million at first for shuttle 
work. This would be divided among four contractors who were to pursue their 
studies for no more than six months.46 
Shuttles would now win new attention, for these studies would feed into 
the work of the STG. George Mueller then set up a program office almost 
overnight. To direct it, he picked LeRoy E. Day, an Apollo manager who was 
two levels down from him on the organization chart. It was April; the Apollo 
10 mission was only weeks away, and Day was deeply immersed in prepara- 
tion for a key pre-launch review. 
44. Memo, Nixon to Paine, March 7, 1969; Logsdon, Apollo, p. III-8. 
45. Logsdon, Apollo, chapter 3, pp. 24-26. 
46. Aviarion Week, February 10, 1969, p. 17. 
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Day went into Mueller’s office, expecting to discuss this upcoming flight, 
and saw him covering a blackboard with notes on the Space Shuttle. Day knew 
that this would not concern him; it was completely foreign to him in any case, 
so he waited politely for Mueller to finish. The following discussion ensued: 
Mueller: I want you to really get going on the space shuttle. We’ve got a 
whole series of things to be done. We have to complete reports in about 
sixty days here, and then we have to negotiate with the DOD. 
Day: George, what does all this have to do with me? 
Mueller: Well, this is what I want you to do. 
Day: But you haven’t said anything about me leaving my job in Apollo. You 
know we ?-e just getting ready for the flight readiness review on Apollo 10. 
Mueller: I understand all that, but I want you to work on the shuttle. I need 
somebody to really head up this s t u .  and I want you to do it. 
Day: Well, gee, I guess-let me go back and kind of timeline how I can get 
disengaged and come back with some dates to you, and then we’ll talk 
about it, and maybe-I guess I can get out in a couple of weeks, right after 
this flight readiness review. 
Mueller: No. You don’t understand. I want you over here now to begin work 
on the shuttle. 
Day: What does “now” mean? 
Mueller: Tomorrow morning. 
It was past four in the afternoon, and Day felt that he was completely 
over his head. He felt even more intimidated when Mueller said that they 
were to write a proposal for the President’s Space Task Group, which would 
go on to the White House. Mueller assured him that he would not be alone: 
“You’ll have practically a blank check. You’ll be able to get people-who- 
ever you need.”47 
Paine was also taking action, in concert with the new Air Force Secretary, 
Robert Seamans. Their staffs had discussed the formal Terms of Reference for 
a new joint study of space transportation. Less than three years earlier, a sim- 
ilar joint study had found no design concept that could satisfy the needs of 
both NASA and the Pentagon. The STG, however, had called for this new 
47. John Mauer interview, LeRoy Day, October 17, 1983, pp. 1-3. 
132 
Mars and Other Dream Worlds 
study, and Paine and Seamans agreed that it would go forward in two parts. 
At first the DoD and NASA would work separately, each defining the Space 
Shuttle concepts that would suit its own needs. The two agencies then would 
work together, seeking to meld their approaches, and would “recommend a 
preferred concept.” A joint committee would manage both phases of the 
effort, with the co-chairmen being Mueller and Grant Hansen, Assistant 
Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development. The study was to 
be brief; by mid-June, a joint report was to be ready for the STG.48 
Early in May, Mueller hosted a meeting of the NASA Space Shuttle study 
contractors and presented them with some new rules. The mission of this 
shuttle had emphasized space station logistics, with a modest payload capacity 
of 25,000 pounds to orbit, 3,000 cubic feet, 2,500 pounds returned from orbit. 
This rationale now was broadening to include the launching of spacecraft, 
many of which would require upper stages to reach high orbits. Mueller told 
the attendees that “the principal carload capacity that we would have would 
probably be liquid hydrogen. So that dictates a fairly low density volume.” 
The new rules called for a payload of 50,000 pounds carried both up and 
down, a volume of 10,000 cubic feet. The payload bay could be 15 or even 22 
feet in diameter, the latter accommodating craft that would fit atop an S-IVB. 
This doubling of the payload weight would bring a doubIing in the shuttle’s 
takeoff weight. This would suit the Air Force, which had a strong interest in 
large payloads and had built the Titan 111-C to launch them. 
Mueller had been a professor of electrical engineering during part of the 
1950s. Drawing on this background, he proceeded to lay out a new concept 
for the use of computers to achieve rapid onboard checkout, and to present 
flight crews with the information they would use during a mission. This con- 
cept would make it possible for a small ground crew to carry out the preflight 
checks, achieving true aircraft-like simplicity. 
Mueller called for designers to equip individual shuttle components, such 
as rocket engines, with sensors that would monitor their condition. Each com- 
ponent would cany a black box that would keep track of measured 
parameters. At any moment, some parameters would stand within acceptable 
limits, while others would lie outside such limits. Still other parameters would 
48. Am-, chairman, Report, p. 1; Logsdon, Apollo, p. IV-9; ‘Terns of Reference for Joint NASA/DOD Study 
of Space Transportation Systems,” April 1 1 ,  1969. Reprinted in NASA SP-4407, vol. 11, pp. 364-365. 
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be within bounds at that moment, but would be drifting toward unfavorable 
values. In response to a query from the computer, each black box could 
answer in turn: “I am well,” with all parameters within limits. A particular box 
might answer, “I am sick,” with one or more parameters outside the safe zone. 
Similarly, a box might respond, “I am about to get sick,” with a parameter 
drifting toward danger. Further queries from the computer then could identify 
the bad parameters and permit cures. 
Mueller also wanted the onboard computer to take the initiative in pre- 
senting data to the flight crew. While the data would be available on 
flight-deck instruments, a pilot might easily miss something because there 
would be many such instrument displays. Mueller preferred to “have the com- 
puter sweeping the cabin and looking at the end points of the gauges, and 
when one is going off from where it ought to be it can flash and show you 
what the reading is and what it ought to be and tell you what is wrong.” With 
the computer running a display, “it provides you with the information you 
need when you need it, but it does not spread that information out over so 
many instrument~.”~~ 
On May 19, two weeks after this meeting, LeRoy Day’s task group sub- 
mitted an initial report. It represented a milestone in presenting the Space 
Shuttle concept as one that might win serious support, for it broadened the 
rationale while narrowing the range of acceptable design approaches. 
Since the early 1960s, shuttle advocates had been bedeviled by a multi- 
plicity of reusable launch vehicle concepts, all of which could claim the name 
of a shuttle. In their day these had included boosters powered by scramjets or 
by LACE, horizontal-takeoff vehicles employing a rocket sled, and behemoths 
such as the Nexus that matched the weight of an ocean liner. These had fallen 
by the wayside, but the range of concepts had remained uncomfortably broad: 
expendable boosters with reusable upper stages, stage-and-a-half partially- 
reusable configurations such as Lockheed’s Star-Clipper, two-stage 
fully-reusables such as General Dynamics’s Triamese. This was somewhat like 
having the Air Force propose to build a new military airplane, without speci- 
fying whether it would be a fighter, bomber, or transport. 
The May 19 report now rejected the use of an expendable booster. To 
meet Mueller’s new requirements, such a launch vehicle would have to be 
49. Muelier, Briefing, May 5 ,  1969 
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larger than a Saturn V. It might use a big solid-propellant first stage or rely on 
low-cost liquid-fueled engines, making it cheaper to buy and fly. This vehi- 
cle, however, would splash into the Atlantic every time one of them 
flew-something that NASA was not about to do. After all, the goal from the 
start had been to move well beyond the Saturn V, not to develop it anew in a 
less costly version. In the words of the. report, “Fully reusable or near fully 
reusable systems offer the maximum potential for an economic and versatile 
space shuttle system.” 
The report also broadened the rationale. To NASA, though not to the Air 
Force, a shuttle had pimarily held the promise of low-cost logistic support for 
a space station. That made it a speculation nested within a speculation, for the 
station existed only at the level of designs and dreams. The report now added 
several attractive types of missions ,that reflected current practice or that built 
on current activities in plausible ways. This broadened rationale also made it 
more likely that NASA could come up with a configuration that would win 
Air Force support, thus further widening its usefulness. 
A shuttle might not only place satellites in orbit; it could service them. 
Standard practice amounted to shooting and hoping, as ground crews 
launched their rockets and trusted their spacecraft to work. A shuttle crew, 
however, could check out a satellite after carrying it to orbit, ensuring that it 
was functioning properly. If a costly spacecraft failed in orbit, a shuttle might 
fly up to fix it. A shuttle might also carry it to a repair facility within a space 
station, or return it to Earth for rebuilding. 
This reusable launch vehicle could also be large enough to carry the 
highly capable Centaur upper stage and powerful enough to carry communi- 
cations satellites or planetary spacecraft of considerable size. This would 
lower the cost of such launches, by taking advantage of the shuttle’s reusabil- 
ity, without compromising the demands of spacecraft designers by limiting 
this service to payloads of only modest weight. 
A shuttle could also serve as an interim space station, by carrying an 
instrumented and crew-tended module within its payload bay. Such a mission 
might fly for up to thirty days. It could be far less costly than Skylab, while 
offering duration, internal volume, and onboard power considerably beyond 
that of Apollo. 
Here was a new form of boldness: not a warmed-over version of the 
Collier’s agenda, but a well-grounded concept of a completely new approach 
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to the space activities that were already under way or approved. The report con- 
tinued to list the prime shuttle mission as “space stationhase logistics support.” 
But its breadth of rationale for the first time raised the possibility that a shuttle 
program might take on a life of its own, serving the nation even in the complete 
absence of a station. On these terms, the shuttle could indeed go 
ace ro re s 
Within the STG, Paine represented NASA, Seamans represented the DoD, and 
DuBridge spoke for the scientific community. Though these leaders and their 
constituencies held distinctly different views on the future of space flight, the 
STG would have to reach a consensus if it was to speak with one voice. Much 
of the work of the STG took place outside its infrequent formal meetings, as 
these members commissioned studies that would define their positions. 
NASA already had a well-established planning procedure in place; 
Homer E. Newell, the Associate Administrator, had set it up the previous year 
to develop program options that the Administrator could present to the BOB. 
This procedure featured a dozen working groups that drew broadly on spe- 
cialists serving the entire range of NASA activities, with one committee 
providing coordination and a second committee-the Planning Steering 
Group-choosing the options that would reach Paine’s desk. Newell took on 
the task of using this machinery to prepare the planning document that Paine 
would take to the STG. 
Though he now held NASA-wide responsibility, Newell had headed the 
Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA) that dealt with automated 
spacecraft. OSSA had operated in the shadow of the far more powerful Office 
of Manned Space Flight, and Mueller, its director, was not about to defer to 
Newell when it came to planning. Mueller had a planning group of his own at 
Bellcomm, a branch of AT&T with close ties to Bell Labs. This group had fur- 
nished NASA with planning analyses during the Apollo program; it too would 
readily serve the needs of the STG.” 
Newell and Mueller initiated their planning exercises in December 1968, 
with the work of the Townes panel under way. Though the STG still lay two 
50. Day, manager, Summav Report, May 19, 1969. 
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I36 
Mars and Other Dream Worlds 
months in the future, Newell hoped to influence the N 197 1 budget that would 
become the subject of serious negotiation during 1969. During that same 
December, Mueller convened another of his planning groups, the Science and 
Technology Advisory Committee (STAC). In the course of that month, Mueller 
told von Braun that Nixon would go all-out and pick the Space Shuttle as his 
big program. STAC reviewed the prospects for piloted space flight and showed 
similar ebullience, calling for “extensive exploration and initial colonization of 
the Moon,” along with planetary missions that would include “a manned expe- 
dition to the surface of Mars.” STAC also strongly endorsed the Shuttle, giving 
it highest priority and calling it “the keystone to future development and large- 
scale practical application of the space pr~gram.”~’ 
Armed with this study, Mueller approached Bellcomm. With two pages of 
handwritten notes, he joined a Bellcomm staffer on a flight to Cape Canaveral 
late in March. The two men discussed the outline of what Mueller wanted. It 
amounted to an extension of the space station approach that was taking shape, 
wherein a single module would serve as a building block for later construc- 
tion of a space base. Similarly, a minimum number of major new systems 
were to serve as many roles as possible.53 
Spurred on by Paine’s desire for boldness, Newell’s planners proceeded 
to develop a scenario calling for a fast-paced effort that would emphasize 
space stations. The program called for an initial station in 1975, with a crew 
of 12, followed quickly by additional stations in polar orbit and in geosyn- 
chronous orbit, the latter at an altitude of 22,300 miles. A space shuttle would 
enter service during 1977. At the same time, other stations would be operat- 
ing in lunar orbit and on the Moon’s surface, while NASA would begin to 
build an Earth-orbiting space base for a crew of 50, 
Newell did not ignore thoughts of piloted flight to Mars. His working 
groups included a task force on planetary exploration. During April he told 
its chairman, Donald Hearth, to write a position paper on “a mid-’70s deci- 
sion leading to a manned Mars landing in the mid-1980s.’’ Hearth’s target 
date of 1986 gained influence as it made its way upward through the plan- 
ning process. In July, a draft report for the STG, which reflected Newell’s 
work, proposed “that the United States begin preparing for a manned expe- 
52. NASA SP-196, pp. iii, 5, 12; Logsdon, Apollo, chapter 4, pp. 16-17, IS, 26 
53. Logsdon, Apollo, Chapter 4, pp. 27-28. 
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dition to Mars at an early date.” In turn, such a goal could provide a focus for 
decisions on future programs.54 
Though Mueller also was interested in Mars, he disliked the overall 
approach of Newell’s planning. In sowing the Earth-Moon system thickly with 
space stations, Newell was repeating the basic theme of the ambitious Apollo 
Applications wish list of a few years earlier. Mueller knew from sad experience 
that this would not work. He had tried it, and all it had produced was Skylab. 
54. Ibid., pp. 19-20.23-24,48. 
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Newell’s approach smacked of building space stations for their own sake, as if 
NASA was the Bureau of Reclamation with its penchant for dams and water 
projects. The stations also failed to point a clear path toward Mars. 
Mueller, working with the planners at Bellcomm, was devising both an 
integrated program and an integrated set of projects that could carry it out. 
This plan resembled LeRoy Day’s for the shuttle. Day’s plan held a space 
base as a long-term goal but asserted that the shuttle would pay its way in the 
nearer future by launching and servicing payloads. Similarly, while Mueller 
and Bellcomm aimed specifically at Mars, they expected to get there by using 
rockets and spacecraft that would serve a broad range of activities between 
the Earth and the Moon. The key was breadth of application. A version of the 
plan presented to STAC that July stated that “the program of developments 
and flight activities that comprise the integrated space program will expand 
this nation’s capacity for space flight as far as foreseeable development in 
technology will permit.” 
In addition to the Space Shuttle and a space station module, the plan 
called for three new program elements: 
Space Tug: This would serve as a general-purpose vehicle that would be 
based in space, returning to Earth only at rare intervals, if at all. It would draw 
on the ability of the shuttle to carry propellants in substantial quantities. The 
tug would operate as a “utility propulsion module capable of transporting 
men, spacecraft and equipment throughout cislunar space.” It also would pro- 
vide a ferry from a lunar-orbiting space station to the Moon’s surface. 
Astronaut-Tended Spacecraft: These would include large automated 
telescopes in orbit as well as automated applications satellites. They would 
be designed to take advantage of the shuttle’s capacity for revisit and on- 
orbit maintenance, including the installation of upgraded instruments by the 
flight crews. 
Nuclear Shuttle: This reusable rocket would rely on the NERVA nuclear 
engine. It would operate between low Earth orbit, lunar orbit, and geosyn- 
chronous orbit, with its exceptionally high performance enabling it to carry 
heavy payloads and to do considerable amounts of work with limited stores 
of liquid-hydrogen propellant. In turn, the nuclear shuttle would receive this 
propellant from the Space Shuttle. 
The Space Shuttle, space tug, and nuclear shuttle together would consti- 
tute a complete reusable space transportation system, with the tug and nuclear 
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Space base as envisioned in the late 1960s. (North American Rockwell) 
shuttle both based in space. In turn, this system would serve an array of pro- 
grams that would focus on applications of a space station module. Variants of 
this module would operate as components of a large space base, as stations in 
lunar orbit and on the Moon’s surface, and as a geosynchronous station. 
What of Mars? A piloted mission could use this same equipment, with 
the nuclear shuttle providing propulsion for a spaceship that would draw 
again on the basic space station module. Mueller, like Newell, looked toward 
such a mission in 1986, defining it also as an ultimate goal. Unlike Newell, 
however, he expected to get to Mars with equipment that could find plenty 
of uses closer to home. Just as Day’s space shuttle might earn its keep even 
in the absence of a space station, Mueller’s integrated plan would serve the 
nation even if NASA never received permission to send astronauts to the 
Red Planet.55 
55. [bid., pp. 25-26.27, 30-32,48-49. 
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Mueller’s integrated plan came along a little too late to serve as the basis 
for a July draft of NASA’s report to the STG, setting forth the agency’s pro- 
posals. That draft drew principally on Newell’s work, adding a discussion of 
Mueller’s plan as nothing more than an appendix. Within a week, however, 
the appendix became the core of the report. The reason for this, as one might 
expect, was Tom Paine. 
Newell’s Planning Steering Group (PSG) had briefed Paine on its activi- 
ties at the end of May. A dissatisfied Paine saw the report as tantamount to 
stapling together the contributions of its task groups, for the PSG at that 
moment had nothing so succinct as a clear emphasis on space stations. Paine 
was not pleased “with the level of imagination and the level of innovation and 
the level of forward thrust”; he described the recommendations as “good, 
workmanlike, but stodgy and unimaginative.” 
But he reacted quite differently when he received a briefing from 
Mueller. Mueller’s plan proved easy to sell; he recalls that he had to “spend 
more time making sure my facts were right than convincing Tom.” At a June 
24 planning review meeting, Paine personally directed Newell to accept 
Mueller’s plan and to use as much of it as possible in preparing NASA’s 
report to the STG. By then there was not much difference between the two 
plans; both featured space stations galore along with lunar stations and a 
trip to Mars. Mueller, however, had the more convincing scenario as to how 
it might happen, for he made Mars appear to grow out of ongoing future 
activity in a natural way. By contrast, Newell made Mars appear more ad 
Yet while Mueller’s plan offered exciting theater, it flew in the face of the 
demand by the Townes panel for redress of the imbalance between the piloted 
and automated elements of NASA’s program. These corresponded respec- 
tively to OMSF and OSSA. With Newell having come out of OSSA to direct 
his NAS A-wide planning activity, there had been at least a chance that NASA 
might respond to Townes’ call. When Mueller, head of OMSF, took over the 
planning with a set of proposals that grew out of his ties to Bellcomm and 
STAC, it was clear that Paine would go to the STG with an agenda that would 
be virtually all OMSF. Paine then would learn that there were plenty of 
people, in both the Air Force and in the scientific community, who opposed a 
56. Ibid., pp. 22-25,32-33; interview, Thomas Paine, September 3, 1970, p. 3. 
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single-minded emphasis on piloted flight, and who certainly were in no hurry 
to get to Mars. 
Robert Seamans was a fellow member of the STG, co-equal with Paine 
in standing. His report carried a summary that rejected virtually all of 
Mueller’s work. He willingly endorsed and even emphasized the value of a 
space shuttle: 
I recommend that we embark on a program to study by experimental means 
including orbital tests the possibility of a Space Transportation System that 
would permit the cost per pound in orbit to be reduced by a substantial factor 
(10 or more). 
But he rejected building even one space station, let alone several: 
Even though the development of a large manned space station appears to be 
a logical step leading tofurther use and understanding of the space environ- 
ment, I do not believe we should commit ourselves to the development of such 
a space station at this time. 
He had similar hard words about flight to Mars: “I don’t believe we should 
commit this Nation to a manned planetary mission, at least until the feasibil- 
ity and need are more firmly e~tablished.”~~ 
Lee DuBridge, the third member of the STG, developed his own view 
as well. As chairman of the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), 
he commissioned a report from the PSAC’s Space Science and Technology 
Panel. He also issued invitations to other institutions to present their own 
positions. The respondees included the American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics (AIAA), the nation’s principal professional society in this field. 
The AIAA might readily have done the expected by acting as a standard 
Washington lobby, pleasing its corporate members by asking for the Moon. It 
did no such thing; it issued a report that was remarkable for its moderation. 
Flight to Mars? “This program is the next major step after unmanned explo- 
ration of the planets. While it is technically possible to commit to development 
of vehicles for this program at this time, it would not be reasonable to do so.” 
57. Letter, Seamans to Agnew, August 4, 1969. Reprinted in NASA SP-4407, vol. I, pp. 519-522. 
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Space stations? “Again, there has been a constant flow of studies for 10 
years of small and large space stations, most of which assumed that man was 
to find an abundance of tasks to perform continually in space.” The AIAA 
declined to endorse any such proposals, opting instead for additional activity 
within Apollo Applications. Its report noted that such missions “will provide 
a means of retaining a manned orbital capability until flight experience pro- 
duces desirable specifications for new orbital-station hardware.” 
However, concerning space shuttles, the AIAA had a different view: 
We encourage early steps be taken to commit to Jight demonstration a par- 
tially reusable low-cost space-transportation system which could start initial 
operations in the 1974-76 period. ... For example, most versions of low-cost 
space-transportation systems can effectively compete with present expend- 
able boosters in delivering medium to large unmanned payloads to orbit .... 
We consider that commitment to an entirely new space station is less urgent 
than commitment to a new logistics system [emphasis in original].58 
One of a number of papers that reached the PSAC, the AIAA report’s 
moderate tone gave it weight. The PSAC also gave attention to Russell 
Drew, a staffer at the Office of Science and Technology. Drew became con- 
vinced that the Shuttle was the key element in the long-range program. In 
May, the PSAC’s Space Science and Technology Panel met with the full 
PSAC at Cape Canaveral, with the Space Shuttle as a prime topic of dis- 
cussion. Drew wrote a background paper that emphasized its use in 
launching automated spacecraft. Significantly, he downplayed its uses in 
supporting a space station. 
The PSAC report made recommendations that closely resembled those of 
Seamans. Seamans had proposed an expansion of Apollo Applications; the 
PSAC did so as well, asserting that such a program could provide much of the 
data on long-duration human space flight “for which a more ambitious space 
station has been proposed.” PSAC rejected such a station, and proposed 
merely to “keep open the option of manned planetary exploration in the 
1980’s, but without immediate commitment to this goal.” 
The PSAC, however, had kind words for the Space Shuttle: 
58. Astronautics & Aemnautics, July 1969, pp .  39-46. 
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Study, with a view to early development, a reusable space transportation 
system with an early goal of replacing all existing launch vehicles ... with a 
system permitting satellite recovery and orbital assembly and ultimately rud- 
ical reduction in unit cost of space tran~portation.~~ 
It is worth noting that PSAC, AIAA, NASA, and the Air Force all 
endorsed a shuttle. NASA had developed this concept for use in space station 
logistics, but the other three institutions rejected such a station out of hand. 
Nevertheless, they liked the Shuttle because it seemed to promise lower cost 
and greater effectiveness in supporting automated spacecraft. This unanimity 
gave critical political support to NASA during 1970 and afterward. 
In their overall views, however, the members of the STG were badly split. 
There was good agreement between the views of Seamans and of DuBridge, 
but Paine seemed out in theblue sky. This raised the possibility that DuBridge 
and Seamans might collaborate on a majority report, leaving Paine to tack on 
his views as an appendix, as Francis Clauser had done with his letter to the 
Townes panel. The STG, however, had a fourth member: its chairman, Spiro 
Agnew, who had been developing his own views as well. 
Agnew Leads a Push Towurd Mars 
Like many other children of immigrants, Agnew had advanced in the world 
largely through his own talent and effort. On the eve of World War II, he had 
been a claims adjuster for the Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Company in 
Baltimore. After returning from service in the Tenth Armored Division, he 
became a manager at Schreiber Food Stores. He acquired a law degree and 
launched his political career by winning the presidency of his local PTA. He 
rose in politics through the next 20 years, and ran for governor of Maryland in 
1966. It was a time of racial upheaval, and his Democratic opponent courted the 
votes of white people with thinly-disguised racial appeals. Agnew built a repu- 
tation as a moderate, won support among black voters, and took the election. 
He maintained his role as a political moderate, becoming a leading sup- 
porter of Nelson Rockefeller, governor of New York, who competed with 
Nixon for the 1968 COP presidential nomination. Nixon picked him as his 
59. Logsdon, Apollo, chapter 4, pp. 33-38; DuBridge, chairman, Post-Apollo. 
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running mate largely because he had not been around long enough to draw 
opposition from any of the party’s factions. Agnew himself admitted that his 
name was “not a household word.” 
He became better known during the campaign due in part to his personal 
coarseness. He called Poles “Polacks,” referred to a Japanese news reporter as 
“the fat Jap,” and declared that Hubert Humphrey, the Democratic presiden- 
tial nominee, was “soft on communism.” Campaigning in Detroit- certainly 
a place where discretion was advisable-he remarked that “if you’ve seen one 
city slum, you’ve seen them all.” As his reputation spread, protesters began to 
greet him with signs such as one that read “Apologize Spiro, It Will Save 
Time Later.”60 
This insensitivity was part of a larger artlessness, for in dealing with the 
space program he quickly showed that despite having no background in this 
area, he would rush in where leaders such as Robert Seamans and Lee 
DuBridge would fear to tread. At Cape Canaveral, six weeks after the inau- 
guration, he stated at a luncheon that he was “all-out for space.” Less than 
three weeks later, at a meeting of the STG, he suggested that Mars could be 
an Apollo-like goal for the 1970s. He then raised the prospect of Mars repeat- 
edly in subsequent discussions. 
In mid-May, the STG met with members of the House and Senate who 
served on the congressional space committees. In the words of an observer 
from the Budget Bureau, “a promotional motive ... ran virtually unchecked” at 
the meeting. Agnew declared that the nation could “prove its greatness” with 
the space program. He added that he “might be all alone,” but he “favored a 
great achievement represented by planetary travel as a way of invigorating the 
American public.” 
Early in July, at a meeting with space planners from outside the govern- 
ment, he stated that “a manned spaceflight to Mars” could be the “overture to 
a new era of civilization.” He compared this mission to the early voyages of 
exploration: “Would we want to answer through eternity for turning back a 
Columbus or a Magellan? Would we be denying the people of the world the 
enlightenment and evolution which accompany every great age of dis~overy?~ 
Thus far he had restricted his comments to audiences at STG meetings. 
On July 16, however, as he joined thousands of people at Cape Canaveral for 
60. Manchester, Glory; White, 1968; see index references. 
145 
THE SPACE SHUTTLE DECISION 
the liftoff of Apollo 11, he went public. He stated in an interview that he had 
the “individual feeling that we should articulate a simple, ambitious, opti- 
mistic goal of a manned flight to Mars by the end of this century.”61 This 
statement brought quick reaction within NASA, as Paine directed his planners 
to come up with a “very strong, very far-out, but down-to-earth presentation” 
that would “substantially shake up the STG.” Specifically, these planners 
were to prepare a proposal for a Mars mission at a date well before 1986, a 
date that Mueller and Newell had previously endorsed in their planning. 
Mueller’s planners at Bellcomm, who had already devised a concept for 
a Mars mission based on Mueller’s integrated plan, briefed Paine on their sce- 
nario on July 19. Characteristically, Paine wanted more, and decided to 
“wheel up NASA‘s big gun”: Wernher von Braun. He told von Braun to pre- 
pare a presentation for the STG on the feasibility of a Mars mission that 
would resemble Bellcomni’s, but that would fly at the earliest possible date. 
Such studies had been a specialty of the house at NASA Marshall, which 
von Braun headed. In his words, “it was an effort of a very few weeks to put a 
very consistent and good and plausible story together as to how we would use 
these new elements to go to Mars.” Paine’s directive suited him personally as 
well, for as he said a year later, 
I have been a space man ever since I was a child, and I think I would be 
betraying my profession $1 were to tell you that we should not send men to 
Mars. I think we should and we will, and I am all for the finest and the most 
energetic space program we can imagine.62 
What brought this sudden focus on Mars? Paine would describe it as a 
matter of timing: 
Had we done this in thefirst meeting of the Space Task Group, we would 
really have shot our wad too early. Had we waited until too late, the darn 
thing would have been cast in concrete and we wouldn ’t have had the oppor- 
tunity. I felt that this was the right time. Everyone had listened to various 
proposals. We had listened to everybody; the time had come for us to come 
61. Logsdon, Apollo, chapter 4, pp. 12-13,39-40. 
62. Ibid., pp. 40-43.48-50; interview, Thomas Paine, September 3, 1970, pp. 9-10; John Logsdon interview, 
Wernher von Braun, pp. 11, 13. 
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out with a powerful forward look of our own and say, “We really haven’t seen 
the proposal that we can carry to the President for the fiture NASA program, 
but we now feel that we have a spec@ one to lay before 
Timing was important in other ways as well, for the early months of the 
Nixon administration coincided with the brilliant successes of Apollo 8 and 
Apollo 11. Less than a month after Apollo 8 had carried the first astronauts to 
orbit the Moon, Nixon had spoken of them in his inaugural address: 
Only a few short weeks ago, we shared the glory of man’s$rst sight of the 
world as God sees it, as a single sphere repecting light in the darkness. 
As the Apollo astronautspew over the moon’s gray su$ace on Christmas 
Eve, they spoke to us of the beauty of earth-and in that voice so clear across 
the lunar distance, we heard them invoke God’s blessing on its goodness. 
In that moment, their view from the moon moved poet Archibald 
MacLeish to write: “To see the earth as it truly is, small and blue and beau- 
tifil in that eternal silence where itpoats, is to see ourselves as riders on the 
earth togethel; brothers on that bright loveliness in the eternal color-broth- 
ers who know now that they are truly brothers.”@ 
Amid the glow of that triumph, Paine had tried to win a budget increase 
and to gain Nixon’s support for a space station. Now in July, the Apollo 11 
lunar landing encouraged even more far-reaching thoughts. In addition to this, 
the success of Apollo 11 had the highly practical consequence of freeing up 
the first Saturn V for other duty, as Paine committed one of them to launch the 
Skylab dry workshop.65 Such broadened use of the Saturn V would be a key- 
stone of an effort that would aim at Mars. 
The members of the STG-Paine, DuBridge, Seamans, and Agnew-had 
not held a full-dress meeting since March 1969, for their staffs had been busy 
preparing proposals and working papers. On August 4, however, two weeks 
after the Moon landing, these principals met anew. Paine declared that 
“Apollo 11 started a movement that will never end, a new outward movement 
in which man will go to the planets, first to explore, and then to occupy and 
63. Interview, Thomas Paine, September 3, 1970, p. 1 1 .  
64. Nixon, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1969. 
65. NASA SP-4208, pp. 109-1 10. 
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utilize them.” He then turned the meeting over to von Braun, who proceeded 
to describe a “typical manned Mars mission.” 
Carrying 12 astronauts, it would leave Earth orbit in two spaceships on 
November 12, 1981. It would arrive in Mars orbit on August 9, 1982 and 
would spend 80 days in this orbit, with six crew members descending to the 
Martian surface and spending up to two months exploring it. The expedition 
would leave Mars late in October and would swing past Venus four months 
later. It would arrive back in Earth orbit on August 14, 1983, ending a flight 
of 640 days. 
Yet despite its boldness, this mission would rely mostly on the equipment 
of Mueller’s integrated plan. Nuclear rockets, essential for propulsion, would 
duplicate Mueller’s nuclear shuttle used for flights between Earth orbit and 
lunar orbit. The Mars ships would be variants of a standard space station 
module. The only major new item would be a Mars Excursion Vehicle, to 
carry crews from orbit to the surface of that planet.66 
This proposal left the STG split right down the middle: Agnew and 
Paine supporting a strong push toward Mars, DuBridge and Seamans rec- 
ommending much less. There was a fifth man at that meeting: Robert Mayo, 
director of the Budget Bureau. Though he was an observer rather than a full 
member of the STG, his views would carry weight. His staff had been con- 
sidering proposals as well. They emphasized the need not for a single 
program, but for alternative programs with budgets at different levels. Mayo 
now found an ally in Seamans, who had been highly skeptical of Paine’s 
ambitious plans. 
DuBridge did not emphasize his own point of view, but tried to encour- 
age a compromise. None was within reach; indeed, while the STG had hoped 
to recommend a single program to the White House, there was no chance it 
could agree on one. The disagreements ran deep; Seamans later said he was 
“sort of like a skunk at a garden party” for opposing Paine, while Agnew told 
Mayo that he was “nothing but a cheapskate.” Nevertheless, the group could 
follow Mayo’s recommendation, which was in line with a standard 
Washington practice. Rather than continue to seek the elusive single set of 
recommendations, the STG decided to prepare three program options, which 
the staffer Russell Drew described: 
66. Logsdon, Apollo, chapier 4, pp. 51-52 
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I .  ‘%Austere”: Level fclnding at $4 billion per year; with no commitment to 
Mars but with an option for such a mission retained. 
2. “Intermediate ”: Funding increasing over the next Jive years to $5-6 bil- 
lion per year; with a commitment to Mars. This commitment would carry 
no Jixed date, but the mission would probably Jly in the mid- to late-1980s. 
3. ”Vigorous or all-out”: Funding increasing to $7 billion per year in the 
mid-1970s and possibly to $8-10 billion in the latter half of the decade, 
with a commitment to an early Mars mission.61 
This was a major victory for Paine. This three-option package again 
reflected standard practice, with the one in the middle as the one for the 
President to choose. The other two choices then would appear as too much 
and too little. The STG’s “intermediate” program specifically envisioned a 
commitment to Mars, with all that would entail: a space shuttle, space station, 
space tug, and nuclear shuttle. The only questions would involve the pace, 
schedule, and budget. 
Paine, quickly following up this victory with another, won the assignment 
of preparing the details of the three options. This played to a long-established 
art whereby the officials chosen to write a White House report can often shape 
it to suit their preferences. Rather than provide three different programs, 
Paine’s staffers proceeded to develop three different schedules for the same 
plan. That plan took Mueller’s integrated scenario as its point of departure, 
with all three aiming at a piloted Mars mission sometime during the 1980s. 
Plan A offered the “maximum progress technically feasible.” NASA 
described it as “comparable to the 1961 Apollo decision to go to the Moon.” 
Closely resembling the plan that Paine and von Braun had presented to the 
STG on August 4, it called for a mission to Mars in 1981. Plan B, offering 
“maximum returns from an economical program,” was the one Paine hoped to 
have approved; it differed from Plan A largely in slipping the Mars mission to 
“1983 or 1986.” Plan C offered “minimum investment consistent with contin- 
uing technological advance.” It also retained the full Mueller program, 
delaying the Mars mission only to 1986 or 1989. The three alternatives fea- 
tured dates as follows: 
67. Ibrd., pp. 55-60; John Logsdon interview, Robert Seamans, Washington, September 2, 1970, p. 13 
149 
THE SPACE SHUTTLE DECISION 
Space Transportation 
Space shuttle 
Space tug 
Nuclear shuttle 
Piloted Space Flight 
Space station, crew of 12 
Space base, crew of 50 
Space base, crew of 100 
Lunar orbiting station 
Lunar surface base 
First expeditions to Mars 
Plan C Plan A Plan B 
I975 1976 1977 
1976 1978 1981 
1978 1978 1981 
1975 1976 1977 
1980 1980 1984 
1985 I985 1990 
1976 1978 1981 
1978 1980 1983 
1981 1983 1986 
These plans were ready in mid-August. NASA then added a fourth 
option, Plan D; it excluded developments related specifically to the Mars 
expedition. In other respects it was identical to Plan C .  Plan D, the least ambi- 
tious, called for simultaneous development of a space station and a space 
shuttle, with both becoming operational in 1977.6* 
Significantly, amid the deliberations of the STG, the members with the 
most experience-Seamans and DuBridge-favored the most modest initia- 
tives. Paine, the man for Mars, had held his posts within NASA for barely a 
year and a half. Agnew, most enthusiastic of all, had never dealt with space at 
any serious level; he hardly knew a rocket from a sprocket. Both Agnew and 
Paine were living in a dream world. 
The nation had changed since 1961. The circumstances that had led to 
Apollo no longer applied. America now faced new issues and new concerns, 
and to such a degree as to make even the Moon landing appear merely as an 
irrelevant distraction. In no way would Nixon endorse a mission to Mars. 
Indeed, within this new climate, even Plan D would prove to be out of reach. 
68. Logsdon, Apollo, chapter 4, pp. 60-63; NeweII, chairman, ArnericuS Next Decades, pp. 59-60. 
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Winter of Discontent 
On an afternoon in July 1969, while the Apollo 11 mission stood poised for a 
flight to the Moon, Tom Paine found himself confronted by a group of civil 
rights demonstrators. Their leader was Reverend Ralph Abernathy, president 
of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Abernathy had succeeded 
Martin Luther King in that post, following the death of King a year earlier. 
Abernathy now came to Cape Canaveral on the eve of NASA’s triumph. 
A light mist of rain fell intermittently, as thunder rumbled in the dis- 
tance. Paine stood coatless under a cloudy sky, accompanied only by NASA’s 
press officer, as Abernathy approached with his party, marching slowly and 
singing “We Shall Overcome.” Several mules were in the lead, as symbols of 
rural poverty. Abernathy then gave a short speech. He deplored the condition 
of the nation’s poor, declaring that one-fifth of the nation lacked adequate 
food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. In the face of such suffering, he 
asserted that space flight represented an inhuman priority. He urged that its 
funds be spent to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, tend the sick, and house 
the homeless. 
Paine replied that “if we could solve the problems of poverty by not 
pushing the button to launch men to the Moon tomorrow, then we would not 
push that button.” He added that NASA’s technical advances were “child’s 
play” compared to “the tremendously difficult human problems’’ that con- 
cerned the SCLC. He offered the hope that NASA indeed might contribute 
to addressing these problems, and then asked Abernathy, a minister, to pray 
for the safety of the astronauts. Abernathy answered with emotion that he 
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would certainly do this, and they ended this impromptu meeting by shaking 
hands all around.’ 
Their brief conversation brought no lasting consequence. Yet it was heavy 
with history, for Paine and Abernathy stood as representatives of two deep 
themes that had marked the nation’s experience before America even existed. 
Paine was the technologist, heir to a record of splendid accomplishment. 
His forebears had built ships, constructed transcontinental railroads, dug the 
Panama Canal, captured water to allow cities to grow in the arid West, flung 
power and telephone lines from coast to coast. They had built highways and 
factories, had put the nation on wheels, had mastered the art of flight. At that 
very moment, others were winning achievement in the realm of computers. 
There was, however, another and far more somber side to America’s 
history, for the nation had been conceived in the original sin of slavery. 
Abraham Lincoln had proposed that “every drop of blood drawn with the 
lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword”; yet the stain ran so deep 
that not even the Civil War could expunge it. Like Lincoln, Martin Luther 
King had grappled with this sin, had sought the moral authority to sway a 
deeply divided people; and like Lincoln, he had paid with his life, with his 
goal only partly won. 
The Sixties 
“The legacy of Apollo has spoiled the people at NASA,” Wernher von Braun 
remarked in the wake of the Moon landing. “They believe that we are entitled 
to this kind of a thing forever, which I gravely doubt. I believe that there may 
be too many people in NASA who at the moment are waiting for a miracle, 
just waiting for another man on a white horse to come and offer us another 
planet, like President Kennedy.”2 
In 1969, NASA still lived in the shadow of Kennedy, both in its immedi- 
ate concern with Apollo and in its institutional hopes. Apollo had taken form 
as an initiative in foreign policy. It could hardly have been otherwise 
Kennedy was very much a cold warrior, who had devoted his inaugura 
address entirely to foreign affairs. There was a reason for this overriding con 
1. Paine, Memo for Record, July 17, 1969. 
2. John Logsdon interview, Wernher von Braun, Washington, pp. 18-19. 
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cern: Kennedy, like his party, carried a heavy burden. The party governed 
under its own shadow, for they had held both Congress and the White House 
when China fell to communism in 1949. 
It is difficult to overstate the dismay with which America faced the com- 
munist threat of the postwar years. It was almost as if to say that our victory 
in the war was meaningless, that we had defeated Japan and Germany only to 
face the far greater power of Stalin and Chairman Mao. Less than a year after 
Mao proclaimed the People’s Republic of China, the U.S. was at war in 
Korea, a war that President Truman would find himself neither able to win nor 
to end. In turn, this war drove him from office. At home, fear of communism 
encouraged the excesses of Senator Joseph McCarthy and his allies, who 
recklessly smeared the reputations of good and decent people because of their 
political beliefs and activities, real or alleged. 
It was the proud boast of Eisenhower’s Republicans that while Truman 
had lost not only China but Eastern Europe, they had held the line. They had 
ended the Korean War, and had preserved peace amid subsequent dangers in 
a perilous world. Kennedy’s main challenge was to continue to hold this line, 
to deny Moscow and Beijing any further victories. Under the shadow of 
China, however, he would not proceed with the calm confidence that had 
marked Eisenhower and his policies. Living in that shadow, Kennedy’s 
Democrats would find themselves driven to become more anti-communist 
than the Republicans. In conducting foreign policy, they worked amid gnaw- 
ing concern that they might prove to be weak, and would compensate by 
becoming overly bold.3 
The most important consequence was the war in Vietnam. When the 
French faced defeat in their struggle against Ho Chi Minh in 1954, Ike had 
had his chance to intervene massively in that country. Declining to do this, he 
had left the French to their fate. But Vietnam was adjacent to China, in the one 
area of the world where further communist advance was both most likely and 
most unacceptable. Kennedy and his advisors accepted the domino theory, 
which viewed South Vietnam as a linchpin: if it fell, the whole of Southeast 
Asia would soon go as well. In 1961, General Lyman Lemnitzer, chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned that if Saigon were to fall, “we would lose 
3. Heppenheimer, Countdown, pp. 177-1 88 treats the background to Kennedy’s commitment to Apollo. See 
also Logsdon, Decision. 
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Asia all the way to Singapore.” Kennedy, accepting this view, made it a basis 
for p01icy.~ 
Waging total cold war, Kennedy believed that it was essential to deny 
Moscow propaganda victories as well as military ones. A prime topic for pro- 
paganda was space flight, and in no way would Kennedy concede that the 
Soviets might concentrate resources into this area while failing their citizens 
in a host of ways that were far more important. The issue was one of national 
prestige, what in earlier times had been known as national honor: if the world 
viewed space as important and saw that the Soviets were ahead, then America 
would have to meet this challenge and take the lead. Time and again, during 
the campaign of 1960, Kennedy spoke of other nations and emphasized that 
leadership in space was essential if America was not to forfeit their support: 
The people of the world respect achievement. For most of the twentieth cen- 
tury they admired American science and American education, which was 
second to none. But now they are not at all certain about which way the future 
lies. The first vehicle in outer space was called Sputnik, not Vanguard. The 
first country to place its national emblem on the moon was the Soviet Union, 
not the United States. 
I f  the Soviet Union was first in outer space, that is the most serious 
defeat the United States has suffered in many, many years. Because we failed 
to recognize the impact that being first in outer space would have, the impres- 
sion began to move around the world that the Soviet Union was on the march, 
that it had definite goals, that it knew how to accomplish them, that it was 
moving and we were standing still. That is what we have to overcome, that 
psychological feeling in the world that the United States has reached matu- 
riq, that maybe our high noon has passed and that now we are going into the 
long, slow aftern~on.~ 
Ike had refused to be drawn into war in Vietnam, leaving that commit- 
ment to Kennedy. At a cabinet meeting in December 1960, Ike had also 
declined a commitment to the Moon, turning down a specific plan that closely 
resembled the eventual Apollo.6 When Kennedy accepted that challenge, only 
4. Fall, Hell, pp. 293-313; Manchester, Glory, pp. 915-923. 
5. McDougall, Heavens, pp. 221-222. 
6. Logsdon, Decision, pp. 34-35. 
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five months later, the Moon held a threefold significance. It represented a 
simple and dramatic goal that everyone could understand. It appeared reach- 
able during that decade, and would not impose a prolonged effort that might 
lose public interest. In addition to this, the Moon was demanding enough to 
call for an entirely new array of launch vehicles and spacecraft, requiring far 
more power than the Soviet rockets of the day could provide. The Soviet lead 
in rocketry would not help them; like the Americans, they would have to start 
afresh. Kennedy believed, correctly, that in the resulting competition the U.S. 
would prove more capable in coming up with the enormous sums of money 
that would be necessary to reach the Moon. 
As the decade of the 1960s progressed, the cold war lost its sense of 
imminent threat. In 1961, Nikita Khrushchev had provoked a crisis in 
Germany, and had built the Berlin Wall. By 1968, however, the Democrats 
could say that they too had held the line. By then nearly 20 years had elapsed 
since the fall of China had given communism its last major territoria1 advance. 
The Soviets had been stymied in Europe; America and its NATO allies had 
protected West Berlin, even though that city was entirely surrounded by com- 
munist territory. Though Fidel Castro ruled Cuba, he had failed to spread his 
revolution elsewhere in the Caribbean or in Latin America. In addition to this, 
communism had received a severe setback in Southeast Asia in 1965, for 
General Suharto of Indonesia broke an attempted communist takeover and 
went on to crush his country’s communist party.7 
In 1968, the nation was at war in Vietnam. During February, amid the new 
year celebrations known as Tet, that country’s communist forces launched a 
massive and widespread series of attacks. Battles raged in Saigon, where they 
penetrated the grounds of the American embassy. They captured the city of 
Hue, an ancient capital, and held it for several weeks. They laid siege to a 
Marine base, Khe Sanh, pounding it with mortars and artillery. Dozens of 
cities came under assault. 
As a military engagement, this Tet Offensive failed. Powerful counterat- 
tacks routed the communists, retaking Hue, while the Marines held Khe Sanh. 
As a political exercise, however, the offensive succeeded brilliantly. It drove 
home the fact that North Vietnam was in the war to stay and would not be 
defeated by any means short of additional massive escalation. In 1961, 
7. Heppenheimer, Countdown, pp. 196-197; Johnson, Modem, pp. 479-480 
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Kennedy had declared that America would “pay any price, bear any burden” 
to prevail. By 1968, it was clear that the nation would do nothing of the sort, 
at least not in Vietnam. In the wake of that offensive, the question facing 
America was not how to win, but how to withdraw. In turn, this reflected the 
waning of foreign affairs as a paramount concern, for withdrawal clearly 
meant that the nation would leave the battlefield on terms short of victory.8 
While foreign affairs lost their life-and-death character, the public turned 
to domestic concerns with considerable passion. Now these issues that had 
languished since the late 1930s, amid wars and military preparations, would 
have their day. Foremost among them was race. 
We remember the 1960s for the civil rights revolution. Its roots, however, 
went back an additional decade, and embraced all three branches of the fed- 
eral government. In 1954, the Supreme Court showed that it would rule 
unanimously in upholding the rights of black America, as Chief Justice Earl 
Warren led his associate justices in handing down the landmark ruling, Brown 
v. Board of Education, that struck down the segregation of schools. Three 
years later, President Eisenhower showed that he would enforce a desegrega- 
tion order using federal troops, as he sent elements of the lOlst Airborne 
Division to quell a dangerous mob in Little Rock, Arkansas. Also in 1957, 
Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson rallied two-thirds of his fellow sen- 
ators to break a filibuster and enact a civil rights bill. Though the bill was 
weak, its significance was great; it was the first such measure enacted since 
Reconstru~tion.~ 
In the lives of most black and white people, however, nothing had 
changed. Though the Supreme Court ruling represented binding precedent as 
case law, it lacked the force of a federal statute. Federal civil rights law 
remained so weak that the Justice Department lacked the legal standing to ini- 
tiate lawsuits aimed at achieving desegregation. The civil rights movement 
had an episodic character; when Eke sent troops to Little Rock, for instance, 
that city’s crisis ended as quickly as if the Seventh Cavalry had come riding 
to the rescue in a John Wayne movie. Similarly, when Kennedy sent a federal 
force against armed white rioters at the University of Mississippi in 1962, this 
news story blazed up and died in a matter of days. Such events made it easy 
8. Time, February 9, 1968, pp. 15-16, 22-33; Newsweek, February 12, 1968, pp. 23-33; Manchester, Glory, 
9. Manchester, Glory, pp. 734-737,799-809; Branch, Parting, pp. 220-222. 
pp. 1124-1126; Wlute, 1968, pp. 3-5, 10-13; Tuchman, Folly, pp. 348-352. 
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to believe that all was well, that federal marshals would preserve order, and 
that America could continue without fundamental change. 
Then in April 1963, Martin Luther King took his movement to 
Birmingham, Alabama, which he described as “the largest segregated city in 
the United States.” Opposing him was the city’s powerful police commis- 
sioner, Eugene “Bull” Connor, an ardent racist. King launched a succession of 
protest marches and demonstrations that grew in size as the month progressed; 
Connor struck back by arresting and jailing the demonstrators. King himself 
became a prisoner; still the protests continued to grow. By early May, Connor 
had literally run out of jail cells, and when the demonstrations continued, he 
lashed at them with police dogs and with fire hoses forceful enough to peel 
bark from a tree. 
Television networks had been covering Birmingham as an ongoing news 
story, and now they showed their power. When viewers saw nonviolent protest- 
ers under attack by vicious dogs and equally vicious police, the nation shuddered 
in dismay. This marked a breakthrough in the cause of civil rights, for that move- 
ment now held America’s full attention, and would not let it go. A month later, 
Kennedy himself addressed the nation, calling for a sweeping law that would 
protect the rights of black citizens. Kennedy took this stand before the election 
of 1964 and not after, for he expected to win a second term. In turn, his reelec- 
tion was to vindicate his leadership on this most controversial of issues.” 
The historian Bruce Catton writes that during the Civil War, newly-freed 
blacks “were men coming up out of Egypt, trailing the shreds of a long night 
from their shoulders.” For many of their descendants, the passage of a century 
had brought little change. Thus in 1964, a black woman named Fannie Lou 
Hamer told of her attempt to register to vote as a resident of Mississippi: 
I was carried to the county jail. I was placed in a cell. After I was placed in 
the cell I began to hear sounds of licks and screams. I could hear the sounds 
of licks and horrible screams, and I could hear somebody say, “Can you say, 
‘Yes sic’nigger? Can you say ‘Yessir’?” 
They beat he< I don’t know how long, and after awhile she began topray 
and asked God to have mercy on these people. 
And it wasn’t too long before three white men came to my cell. 
10. Manchester, Glory, pp. 943-952, 976-978; White, 1964, pp. 199-215. 
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I was carried out of the cell into another cell where they had two Negro 
prisoners. The State Highway Patrolman ordered the first Negro to t a k  the 
blackjack. 
The JLirst Negro prisoner ordered me, by orders from the State Highway 
Patrolman, for me to lay down on a bunk bed on my face, and 1 laid on my face. 
The first Negro began to beat, and I was beat until he was exhausted. The 
State Highway Patrolman ordered the second Negro to take the blackjack. 
The second Negro began to beat and I began to work my feet. I began to 
scream, and one white man got up and began to beat me on the head and tell 
me to "hush." 
All this is on account we want to registeq to becomejrst-class citizens." 
Yet if federal legislation could extirpate such evils, the nation now would 
certainly make the attempt. The Civil Rights Act, which became law in mid- 
1964, proved to be only the beginning. A year later, Congress complemented 
it with a far-reaching Voting Rights Act. In turn, these laws were part of a 
surge of domestic legislation that was virtually unparalleled. Trust in govern- 
ment was at a peak, and President Johnson, supported by powerful majorities 
within a willing House and Senate, would make the most of this. 
Aid to education topped his list of priorities; over 40 bills dealt with this 
topic. Congress enacted a law establishing Medicare, which complemented 
Social Security in addressing the needs of retirees. Johnson had declared war 
on poverty; Congress responded with a law that set up a new Office of 
Economic Opportunity, with the rural poor of Appalachia as a particular con- 
cern. Other bills established a National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities 
and a Cabinet-level Department of Housing and Urban Development. Still 
others fought heart disease, stroke, and cancer. A new immigration law opened 
the door to newcomers &om Asia, heralding a change in the centuries-old pre- 
dominance of immigration from Europe. To pay for it all, Johnson won a major 
tax cut that would stimulate economic gr~wth . '~  
Johnson was not about to promote these new programs at the expense of 
existing ones; hence NASA and Apollo would receive their due. As the nation 
turned its attention toward these domestic concerns, however, it became 
11. Catton, Stillness, p. 259; While, 1964, pp. 332-333. 
12. Manchester, Glory, pp. 1041-IO44, White, 1964, pp. 470-476. 
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increasingly clear that Apollo represented a response to a Soviet challenge 
that was about to run its course. Apollo was a creation of its time, and by 
decade’s end that time had come and gone. Events soon demonstrated that 
Apollo was a program that the nation would neither renew nor long continue. 
In turn, these events weighed heavily upon Paine’s pursuit of Mars. They took 
the form of budget cuts, imposed within the BOB. 
rs: The Advance 
At Gettysburg in 1863, General George Pickett led a charge that reached the top 
of Cemetery Ridge, only to be driven back by superior strength. NASA’s pur- 
suit of Mars would show a similar character, with the contested ground being 
the budget allocation for FY 1971. NASA accounted for some two percent of 
the federal budget. While this was f& below the allocations of the Pentagon or 
Health, Education, and Welfare, it was enough to justify the continuing atten- 
tion of small groups of staffers within both the White House and the BOB. 
Peter Flanigan, Assistant to the President, served as the White House link to 
NASA. He reported directly to Nixon and was one of the more powerful of the 
presidential assistants. Flanigan had been a Wall Street investment banker; his 
father had been chairman of Manufacturers Hanover Trust. Following Nixon’s 
election, Flanigan had drawn on his broad social and professional acquaintances 
and had recruited some 300 appointees for high-level administration positions. 
His White House responsibilities were correspondingly broad, and he relied on 
five staff assistants. These included Clay Whitehead, a graduate of MIT, who 
dealt with the space program as part of his day-to-day concerns. Whitehead had 
worked on Apollo at the Rand Corp. and helped to plug gaps in Flanigan’s expe- 
rience, for Flanigan had no prior background in space. 
Within the BOB, the director Robert Mayo and his deputy, James 
Schlesinger, were the only political appointees; the rest of the Bureau con- 
sisted of permanent Civil Service staff. Schlesinger was also a Rand Corp. 
alumnus; he worked closely with Whitehead during 1969 in reviewing the 
NASA budget. This budget fell within the purview of BOB’S Economics, 
Science, and Technology Programs Division, where a small professional 
group specialized in the pertinent is~ues.’~ 
13. Logsdon, Apollo, chapter 5, pp. 14-15; National Journal, February 28, 1970, pp. 422-425 
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The Space Task Group (STG) was to submit its report to Nixon in 
September 1969, in time for its recommendations to influence the FY 1971 
budget that Nixon would send to Capitol Hill the following February. 
However, initial exchanges concerning this budget were under way as early as 
April 1969, barely two months after the inauguration. On April 4, Mayo sent 
a letter to Paine that asked: “Should the U.S. undertake the development of a 
long duration manned orbital space station in the FY 1971-73 period?’ 
Attached to this letter was a full page of questions. Paine had recently tried to 
bypass the budget process by seeking Nixon’s approval for a space station in 
his memo of February 26, but Mayo’s letter showed that Paine could still hope 
to win approval by working within this process. The list of questions 
amounted to an invitation to justify such a project in detail, with an under- 
standing that when NASA made its case, Mayo’s staff would give it close 
scrutiny. The BOB would give particular attention to its cost.I4 
Though the work of the STG was separate from the budget process, the 
two activities went forward in parallel. On June 11, Nixon sent a memo to 
Mayo that made his own attitude perfectly clear: 
Substantively, the continuation of a restrictivejscal policy to combat the crit- 
ical problem of infzation will be controlling in formulation of the 1971 
budget, and this policy should be applied to the budget requests of all depart- 
ments and agencies. 1 want it made clear to all departments and agencies that 
the budget going to Congress will be my budget and that it should reflect the 
goals and objectives of my Administration.’’ 
Tho weeks later, Whitehead sent a memo to Flanigan: 
As you know, I have expressed in the past some uneasiness about the review 
of the future of our space program. My main concern is that NASA and others 
will use the enthusiasm generated by a success of Apollo 11 to create very 
strong pressures on the President to commit him and the Nation prematurely 
to a large and continuing space budget. 
The immediate problem is that the space task group chaired by the Vice 
President appears to be homing in on a single recommended space program 
14. Letter, Mayo to Paine, April 4, 1969. 
15. Memo, Nixon to Mayo, June 11. 1969. 
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that will involve immediate commitments to high levels of lunar exploration 
simultaneously with a large manned space station program. This may be 
appropriate and may be the President Is ultimate choice. Howevel; a strong 
case can be made for constraining the NASA budget to its present level or 
slightly lower ... 
The President should be informed that NASA is making strong public 
statements about future commitments in space and that there is signifcant 
danger that he may find himself in a very dificult situation in the next few 
months unless he asserts an interest in assessing the desirability of alterna- 
tive space programs in a considered way without unnecessary pressure being 
generated by NASA in the press and on the 
The NASA appropriation for ,FY 1970 was $3.7 billion. Whitehead 
noted that “the President is personally interested in a serious evaluation of 
several alternative NASA budget levels, including one in the vicinity of $2.5 
to $3 billion.” He proposed that “you or I call Bob Mayo to emphasize the 
importance” of treating such a level as a formal budget option. He also sug- 
gested that Flanigan send a memo to Nixon recommending “that NASA be 
calmed down during the enthusiasm of Apollo 11, pending a systematic 
review this fa11.”I7 
Mayo was not about to chop NASA down to $2.5 billion, at least not at 
the moment. However, his staff would certainly consider what it would mean 
to impose cuts to that level, and to even lower levels. Late in August the direc- 
tor of the BoB’s Energy, Science, and Technology Programs Division learned 
of a conversation between Whitehead and the BoB’s deputy director, James 
S chlesinger: 
Mr Whitehead expressed the view that the President was not eager to 
proceed with an expanded space program and in fact would like to see it sig- 
nificantly reduced in the near future. MI: Whitehead had discussed this view 
with other White House people ... and found none of them to be advocates of 
increased space spending and none who indicated any real problem with sig- 
nifcant reductions in the space program .... 
16. Memo, Whitehead to Flanigan, June 25, 1969 
17. Ibid.; NASA SP-4102, p. 188. 
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Mr: Flmigan claimed to have telephoned Dr: Paine and instructed him 
to stop public advocacy of early manned Mars activity because it was caus- 
ing trouble in Congress and restricting Presidential options. According to Dr: 
Schlesingel; Mr: Flanigan believes the President would like options even 
lower than $2.5 billion. Also according to DK Schlesingel; Mr. Flanigan is 
basing his comments on personal conversation with the President. In the light 
of these events, Dr: Schlesinger asked me to define a $1.5 billion per year 
space program.” 
His staff set forth budget options in an internal BOB paper. The options 
would bear comparison with those favored by Paine; but whereas Paine started 
with the current budget and hoped to go upward, the BOB staff started at the 
FY 1970 level and considered the consequences of tilting sharply downward. 
One alternative, at $3.5 billion per year, eliminated NERVA and stopped 
production of Saturn V and Apollo spacecraft. This option, however, would 
maintain a vigorous program in piloted flight, featuring Skylab with three 
visits as well as six additional Apollo lunar missions. Better yet, such a budget 
would accommodate “Space Transportation System and Space Station 
module development with launch of both in 1979.” 
Two other options, at $2.5 billion, also permitted flight of Skylab with its 
three visits, along with the six Apollos. There could even be a space station in 
1980, with Titan 111-Gemini for logistics. However, there would be no Space 
Shuttle. NASA Marshall would close, while activity at the Manned Spacecraft 
Center would fall substantially. 
At $1.5 billion, the piloted space program would shut down entirely: “All 
manned space flight ceases with Apollo 14 in July 1970.” Not only NAS.4 
Marshall but the Manned Spacecraft Center would close, with the Saturn 
launch facilities at Cape Canaveral shutting down as well. Yet NASA would 
continue to maintain a vigorous program of automated space flight. Even at 
$1.5 billion, the agency could send six Viking landers to Mars, and could take 
advantage of a rare alignment of the outer planets to send spacecraft to Jupiter, 
Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, and Pluto. NASA would conduct “at least one plan- 
etary launch each year in the decade,” and would pursue “a relatively 
ambitious science and applications program with 95 launches in the decade.”19 
18. Logsdon, Apollo, chapter 5, pp. 15-16. 
19. Budget Bureau, “NASA Issues Paper,” undated; late August 1969. 
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Here, in stark contrast, were two visions for NASA’s future: Paine’s, who 
hoped for as much as $10 billion and an early expedition to Mars, versus 
Mayo’s, who would consider cuts to one-seventh of that level and a total shut- 
down of piloted flight. Yet while such options might represent the shape of 
things to come, Mayo, at least for the moment, would give Paine consider- 
able leeway to argue for his preferred budget. If Paine’s arguments proved 
inadequate then Mayo could lower the boom. However, he would not hasten 
to do this. 
On July 28, Mayo sent a letter to Paine that carried a decidedly mixed set 
of messages: 
The inflationary outlook, combined with the budgetary momentum of prior 
commitments and existing laws, make it imperative that we adopt a very 
restrictive fiscal policy in the I971 budget. 
Federal spending plans for 1971 must conform to the President’s 
declared intention to eliminate the income tax surcharge. The resulting loss 
in revenue will make a balanced budget impossible unless we apply a firm 
brake on the growth of expenditures. Since a balanced budget is essential to 
our effort to cope effectively with continuing inflationary pressures, we must 
maintain a tight rein on budget outlays. 
Accordingly, a stringent and frugal approach must characterize our 
1971 budget proposals. Very few program expansions and new starts can be 
accommodated. 
An attached sheet gave recommended budget figures. Mayo presented 
“budget authority,” or funds to be appropriated by Congress; he also gave 
“outlays,” which could tap unspent funds from prior years or lay aside such 
funds for use in the future. He cited an “official target”: “the maximum 
amount that would be available for NASA under the current fiscal outlook for 
197 1 .” He also proposed an “alternative target” that represented “a higher 
resource level, in case subsequent events enable changes in current plans”: 
O@cial Target Alternative 
Budget Outlays Budget Outlays 
Funding in millions: $3,470 $3,500 $4,500 $4,200 
Authority Authority 
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The official target assumed that both budget categories would remain 
constant at $3.5 billion per year from 1972 to 1978. This would impose a new 
cut, because the FY 1970 budget stood at $3.7 billion. The alternative target, 
however, assumed a gradual rise to $6 billion in 1978 that would allow Paine 
to get a head start toward Mars. Moreover, Mayo suggested in his letter that 
he might be even more generous: “If you feel that you must request 1971 
budget authority or outlays greater than either of these planning figures, you 
may, of course, do 
Given an inch, Paine would willingly take enough miles to reach the plan- 
ets. He proceeded to disregard both Mayo’s opening paragraphs, with their 
words of caution, and his official target of $3.5 billion. Instead, Paine 
instructed his associates to prepare their final FY 197 1 budget proposals in 
accordance with Program B within his position paper for the STG. This plan 
aimed to reach Mars as early as 1983, and represented the option that he 
hoped Nixon would approve.” 
Paine also faced the issue of having the STG accept his position paper as 
the basis for the official report that would go to Nixon. The staffer Russell 
Drew prepared a draft of this report; it was ready on August 27. The members 
of the STG-Paine, Agnew, DuBridge, Seamans-met anew on September 3, 
and reached agreement on several basic principles, with all members concur- 
ring. This had the important consequence that the STG would not present 
majority and minority views, but would stand united behind their final report. 
They agreed that any program they might recommend was not to include 
merely the use of existing capability such as Skylab, Titan 111, and Saturn V, 
it was to include the development of new capability. In particular, the STG 
accepted the eventual development of both the space station and Space 
Shuttle. This represented a defeat for Seamans, who had rejected the station 
and had accepted the shuttle only with misgivings. Nevertheless, Seamans 
agreed not to press his objections. 
The members also accepted the concept of an eventual expedition to Mars 
as the focus for development of the new capability. However, they did not spec- 
ify the meaning of “eventual,” other than to say that it would be prior to the year 
2000. This brought DuBridge into the fold, as he too accepted the goal of Mars. 
20. Letter, Mayo to Paine, July 28, 1969. 
21. Logsdon, Apollo, chapter 4, pp. 60-62; chapter 5, p. 8. 
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Mayo, sitting with the STG as an observer, insisted that the report present 
a low-cost option that would reflect James Schlesinger’s suggestions. 
DuBridge agreed with Mayo, and Paine agreed to add another alternative, Plan 
E. It resembled the BOB options at the $2.5 billion level, protecting Apollo and 
Skylab but shutting down piloted flight. This option offered neither the station 
nor the shuttle. It did, however, include a strong program of automated space- 
craft, with emphasis on planetary missions. 
Within these options, now numbering five, Paine and Agnew still hoped 
to have the report include a strong recommendation for Plan B. The full STG 
finessed this issue by agreeing not to recommend any particular program to 
Nixon. This allowed each member to maintain his own views of appropriate 
budgets, schedules, and pace, without requiring anyone to yield to others.22 
The next move came directly from the White House. John Ehrlichman, 
one of Nixon’s closest advisors, describes what happened in his memoirs: 
One morning in early September 1969 I had to leave the senior staff meeting 
early to go see the Vice President. Peter Flanigan had alerted me that 
Agnew’s Space Advisory Committee [sic] was about to make some recom- 
mendations to the President that Flanigan knew Nixon could not live with. 
Peter had been unsuccessful in dissuading the President’s science advisor, 
Lee DuBridge, from agreeing with the staff of Agnew’s Advisory Committee 
that there should be a very costly manned mission to the planet Mars in 1981. 
So Flanigan had asked for a meeting with Agnew, the ex-oficio chairman of 
the committee, in the hope that we could persuade him to kill it. 
I had read a briejng paper on the question the evening before, and it 
seemed obvious to me that Agnew and DuBridge owed it to the President not 
to include a proposal our budget couldn’t pay fox A Mars space shot would 
be very popular with many people. r f  the committee proposed it and Nixon 
had to say no, he would be criticized as the President who kept us from find- 
ing life on Mars. On the other hand, if the committee didn’t recommend it, we 
avoided the problem altogethel: 
DuBridge was perhaps to be forgiven for failing to understand such a 
political argument, but I saw no excuse for Agnew ’s insistence that the Mars 
shot be recommended. At our meeting I was surprised at his obtuseness. It 
22. bid., chapter 4, pp. 63-65. 
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was, he argued, a reasonable, feasible option. That was what his committee 
was supposed to come up with, and that was what they intended to do. 
I had been wooed by NASA, the Space Administration, but not to the 
degree to which they had made love to Agnew. He had been their guest of 
honor at space launchings, tours and dinners, and it seemed to me they had 
done a superb job of recruiting him to lead this fight to vastly expand their 
empire and budget. 
Ifinally took off the kid gloves: “Look, Mr. Vice President, we have to be 
practical, There is no money for a Mars trip. The President has already 
decided that. So the President does not want such a trip in the Space Advisory 
Committee’s recommendations. It is your job, with Lee DuBridge’s help, to 
make absolutely certain that the Mars trip is not in there.” 
Mr. Agnew was not happy to be told what to do by me. He demanded a 
personal meeting with the President. This was a matter for Constitutional 
Oficers to discuss. 
I overlooked the obvious innuendo that I was lying to Agnew about what 
the President had decided. “Fine,” I said. “I’ll arrange it at once, and some- 
one will call you.” 
Flanigan and I left Agnew about 9:45 a.m. At 1O:OO a.m. the Vice 
President called me. He had decided to move the Mars shot from the list of 
“recommendations ’’ to another category headed “Technically Feasible.” 
When I saw President Nixon later that day I told him about our session 
with Agnew and his telephone call. 
“Good,” Nixon said. “That’s just the way to handle him; use that tech- 
nique on him anytime.” Nixon looked at me vaguely. “Is Agnew 
insubordinate, do you think?”23 
The STG staff proceeded to modify the draft of the final report, but only 
slightly. NASA’s Plan A, with its mission to Mars in 1981, lost the status of a 
formal option. Plan E, which excluded new programs in piloted space flight, 
also was downgraded. This left Plans B, C, and D, which were redesignated as 
Options I, II, and III. Because the middle option would remain the one for 
Nixon to choose if he wished, this reshuffle amounted to delaying the Mars 
mission from 1983 to 1986-but retaining this expedition as the ~enterpiece.~~ 
23. Ehrlichman, Wifness, pp. 144-145. 
24. Logsdon, Apollo, p. IV-66. 
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The STG’s final report thus showed a close similarity to NASA’s position 
paper of a month earlier. Plan A, with Mars in 1981, appeared with the des- 
ignation “Maximum Pace.” The STG rejected it with regret, presenting it 
“only to demonstrate the upper bound of technological achievement.” Plan E, 
described as “Low Level,” was one with which “the interests of this Nation 
would not be served.” 
With these caveats, the report presented Mueller’s integrated plan in full. 
It described the major elements: space shuttle, space tug, nuclear shuttle, 
space station module. In turn, these would represent “development of new 
capabilities for operkting in space.” The three main options would lift NASA’s 
budget from its 1970 level, $3.7 billion, respectively to $5.5, $7.65 and $9.4 
billion, a decade later. 
Graphs, published with the report, presented curves of funding for all five 
plans, giving particular attention to the three main options. Separate curves 
traced funding levels through 1979 for Plan C ;  they showed clearly that the 
shuttle and station, pursued concurrently, would dominate expenditures for 
new starts through 1976. Their costs would then diminish, while spending for 
additional new starts-space base, space tug, nuclear shuttle, lunar orbiting 
station-would rise rapidly to prominence. Spending for a 1986 Mars expe- 
dition would also increase sharply beginning in 1978. The report concluded: 
As a focus for the development of new capability, we recommend the United 
States accept the long-range option or goal of manned planetary exploration 
with a manned Mars mission before the end of this century as the first target.25 
Agnew decided that Russell Drew, who had drafted the report, would 
brief Nixon on its contents. This briefing took place on September 15; Nixon 
listened attentively, and met as well with STG members and observers, giving 
them opportunities to comment. These panelists stated that they had rejected 
the “extreme options” of Mars in 1981 and of eliminating plans for post- 
Apollo piloted programs. Nixon’s press secretary, Ronald Ziegler, then 
reported that the President “had concurred wholeheartedly in the panel’s 
rejection of the two extremes.”26 
25. Newell, chairman, America’s Nexf Decades; Agnew, chairman, Post-Apollo. Reprinted in NASA SP-4407, 
26. Logsdon, Apollo, p. N-66; New York Times, September 16, 1969, pp. 1,21. 
vol. I, pp. 522-543. 
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While Nixon’s response fell well short of a Kennedy-type commitment to 
Mars, even as an option for future presidents, it did represent a significant 
straw in the wind. By endorsing the STG’s rejection of Plan E, with its phase- 
out of piloted flight, Nixon hinted for the first time that he would want more 
than the Apollo and Skylab missions that he had inherited from previous 
administrations. He would want a piloted program of his own, and Agnew, as 
brash as Paine in these matters, promptly sent a letter to Nixon that strongly 
recommended Plan C (designated Option I1 in the report), which anticipated 
Mars in 1986. This letter amounted to an endorsement of Mueller’s integrated 
plan in its original version, which had also called for Mars in 1986. Paine 
indeed had received the bolder thinking for which he had called. It was clear, 
however, that this boldness had merely given him leeway to back off to the 
far-reaching plan that Mueller had proposed in the first place.” 
Mars: The Retreat 
When Nixon met with the STG, Robert Mayo was among those present. He 
did not need to say much. Everyone knew he had the authority to deal with 
NASA in his own good way. He already had a staff report that came close to 
asserting that NASA should follow Plan E, or something very similar. This 
report had outlined the consequences of holding NASA to future budgets as 
low as $1.5 billion. 
This staff report treated the Space Shuttle at some length, comparing it 
with upgrades of the Titan I11 as an alternative. It concluded that even with an 
active flight schedule of 55 flights per year, the Titan I11 would represent the 
less costly way to proceed, with its advantage growing markedly at lower 
flight rates. The reason for this was that while the Shuttle would reduce the 
cost of space flight, it would take time and cost money to develop. To the 
BOB, dollars in future years held less value than present dollars. This was not 
due to inflation, but rather it reflected the fact that those future dollars would 
have to earn interest to match the worth of present ones. 
NASA had proposed that the Shuttle replace most of the expendable boost- 
ers that were currently in use, excluding only the Saturn V. Mayo’s staff doubted 
that NASA and the Pentagon in fact would do this, even if a shuttle became 
27. Letter, Agnew to Nixon, September 15, 1969. 
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available. They noted “the existence of strong vested interests and established 
working relationships in the existing boosters and facilities.” Their report stated: 
Recommendation: We recommend against Presidential endorsement of the 
Space Transportation System at this time. 
Other conclusions were similar: “We recommend against endorsement of 
a space station now-at least until the orbital workshop [Skylab] is further 
along in development-perhaps until it has flown.” “We recommend against 
endorsement of the manned planetary expedition (Mars) goal either with or 
without a target date. In summary, we believe the Mars goal to be much more 
beneficial to the space program than to the nation as a whole.” 
The BOB staff showed a similar iconoclasm in its overall view of piloted 
space flight: 
The crucial problem with manned space flight is that no one is really pre- 
pared to stop manned spaceflight activity, and yet no defined manned project 
can compete on a cost-return basis with unmanned space flight systems. In 
addition, missions that are designed around man’s unique capabilities 
appear to have little demonstrable economic or social return to atone for 
their high cost. Their principal contribution is that each mannedjight paves 
the way for more manned flight .... 
NASA equates progress in manned space capability with increased time 
in space, increased size of spacecraj?, and increased rate of activity. The 
agency also insists upon continuity of operational flight programs, which 
means we must continue producing and using current equipment concur- 
rently with development of next generation systems. Therefore, by definition, 
there can be no progress in manned space flight without significantly 
increased annual cost. 
Staff members also reviewed the STG report in draft form. Their com- 
ments were scathing, virtually dismissing it out of hand: 
The report is inadequate as 
- a basis for Presidential decision, 
- a published justijication of Administration decision .... 
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What are we asking the President to decide? This is not clear from read- 
ing the report. For example, does Presidential acceptance of the objective 
“Developing new capabilities for operating in space ’’ amount to go-ahead 
decisions on a large earth-orbiting manned Space Station and a Space 
Transportation System involving three major new systems development for 
manned and automated systems with both chemical and nuclear engines? 
The report is susceptible to both “yes” and “no” interpretations. 
The central issue--“What is the future of civilian manned space flight 
activities ’’ is not directly addressed. 
A good catalogue of technical possibilities for the jkture is provided. 
Howevel; in our view these are very optimistic possibilities. For example, 
ESTP Division stag believe it highly unlikely that a mnned Mars mission 
could in fact be undertaken in 1981 or that a space shuttle ... could in fact be 
developed in five years .... 
The report is lacking in identified outputs for the large-scale mannedpro- 
gram recommended. There is therefore little on which to base value judgments. 
Justification for large-scale manned space effort is  only loosely 
derived. It is based on 
- challenge to our spirit of adventure 
- challenge to our national competence in engineering 
The view then is that a space program supported by national acceptance 
- welfare 
- security 
- enlightenment 
In our view, an unmanned flight program, because of its demonstrated 
output and lower costs, can be justified directly on the basis of returns to our 
security, economy, and advancement of science. 
It is the costly, large-scale manned flight program that requires some 
overriding decisive force to keep it going .... 
No low-cost options. The report does not contain any program options 
with annual costs less than current levels. In our vim, such options should 
be identijed in the report, and evaluated in terms of returns to the nation- 
not in terms of entrancing opportunities passed up.28 
of these challenges can be used to enhance our national 
28. Budget Bureau, “NASA Issues Paper,” undated; late August 1969 
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Armed with this staff review, Mayo wrote a letter to Nixon on September 
25, presenting the BOB’S assessment of the final STG report. He described it 
as having “several shortcomings” that “impair its completeness as a vehicle 
for your j n a l  decision.” 
Mayo noted an excessively narrow scope that ignored “the relative stand- 
ing of the space program in our full range of national priorities” as well as 
“the future economic context within which the recommended space expendi- 
ture increases would have to be considered.” He suggested that Nixon have 
the report reviewed by the Cabinet and perhaps the National Security Council 
as well. Such reviews would take time, and would give Nixon excellent reason 
to avoid rushing into any hasty commitments. 
Mayo then warned that the report’s estimates of the costs of future pro- 
grams appeared to be “significantly t~nderestimated.” He also had other words 
of caution: 
The report does not clearly differentiate between the values of the manned 
space flight program versus a much less costly unmanned program with its 
greater emphasis on scient@ achievement and potential economic returns .... 
The report is written in such a way that your endorsement of any of the 
recommended program options implies endorsement of major new long-term 
development projects, which are included in all three of the program options. 
Therefore, in a practical sense, the report gives you little flexibility except as 
to timing (and therefore annual costs) .... All the defined options involve sig- 
nficant budget increases over current levels .... 
Because the Space Task Group report has now been published, your 
endorsement now of any specific option will commit us to annual budget 
increases of at least the magnitudes spec$ed in the report. Therefore, you 
could lose effective JLiscal control of the program. 
I am convinced that a forward-looking manned space program can be 
developed for you that does not involve commitments to signijtcant near-term 
budget increases.29 
This letter, circulated within the White House, drew a succinct response 
from Ehrlichman: “I concur with the Director’s recommendations.” It also 
won support from Henry assinger, the national security advisor and head of 
29. Memo, Mayo to Nixon, September 25, 1969. Reprinted in NASA SP-4407, Vol. I, pp. 544-656 
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the National Security Council.30 With this, Mayo was ready to receive Paine’s 
budget request for FY 197 I. 
Paine had begun by assembling his associates’ estimates totalling $5.4 
billion and including $1.0 billion in new starts. This was too much even for 
him; he responded that their requests were “not consistent with the recom- 
mendations made to the President” by the STG, and “far exceed the dollar 
level that can be reasonably expected.” He met with his colleagues, cut their 
dollar amounts, and presented his proposed budget to Mayo in a letter dated 
October 8. Paine requested $4.2 billion in outlays and $4.497 billion in new 
budget authority, with these levels matching those of the “alternative budget” 
in Mayo’s letter of late July.3’ 
Mayo and his staff, however, had no intention of granting such largesse. 
In a staff paper dated November 13, the BOB gave NASA a tentative 
allowance of $3.349 billion in budget authority and $3.515 billion in outlays. 
The first of these would require congressional appropriation; it represented a 
cut of over a billion dollars or more than 25 percent in Paine’s request. 
Such a budget meant that, at least in FY 1971, NASA would receive no 
commitment to either a space station or a shuttle. It would cut the launch rate 
for Apollo missions to as low as one flight per year7 and would slam the door 
on continued production of the Saturn V. It would so restrict NASA that it 
would prohibit any new starts even in automated ~pacecraft.~’ 
Paine hit the roof. In a letter to Mayo on November 18, he declared that 
“the allowance and rationale are both unacceptable.” He then followed stan- 
dard procedure by filing a “reclama,” a request for review. This too was part 
of the budget process; it was far from unusual for a department or agency head 
to receive a cut in a proposed budget. Rather than compromise, however, 
Paine stuck to his guns, and to his requested budget levels. He got nowhere in 
a November 21 meeting with Mayo. One participant states that the meeting 
“broke fairly quickly because we couldn’t accommodate anything.” Another 
participant adds that P i n e  “went away angry.’733 
One should not see this as a personal fight between Paine and Mayo. 
Paine later noted that “Bob Mayo’s son has his wall plastered with NASA 
30. Memo, Ehrhchman to Staff Secretary, October 7, 1969; memo, Kissinger to Whitaker, November 17, 1969. 
31. Letter, Paine to Mayo, October 8, 1969; Logsdon, Apollo, chapter 5, pp. 19-20 
32. Logsdon, Apollo, chapter 5, pp. 20-22. 
33. Bid., pp. 22-23; letter, Paine to Mayo, November 18, 1969 
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posters,” adding that while Mayo was “a little hard-headed about things,” he 
was “an easy person to get to know. I was always very comfortable going 
over and talking to Bob.” Rather than keep matters at an impasse, they now 
agreed that NASA and BOB staffers were to work together to try to narrow 
their differences. 
Mayo proceeded to raise NASA’s allowance to $3.7 billion, matching the 
appropriation for Ey 1970. Paine’s staff developed alternative budgets that ran 
as low as $3.91 billion, though he insisted to Mayo that an appropriation of 
$4.25 billion “is the lowest level you and I can responsibly recommend to the 
President.” This left a gap of over half a billion dollars between their positions.34 
The reclama procedure called for Mayo to meet personally with Nixon to 
present the BOB’S budget recommendation, and then to inform Nixon of areas 
of disagreement between BOB and the agency. Paine was not to be present; 
Nixon did not wish to act as a referee. The meeting took place on December 
5. Three days later, Paine talked by telephone with Flanigan, who presented 
Nixon’s decision: “The President says that he doesn’t have enough money 
within the next couple of years and must accept limitation of activity, doing 
the best he can within the $3.7 limitation.” Nixon had come down strongly on 
the side of  may^.^^ 
Paine still had one more card to play, as he wrote to Nixon directly, urging 
a “curtailed and spartan” level of $4.075 billion that would keep the Saturn V 
in production, or a level of $3.935 billion that would suspend Saturn V pro- 
duction but provide startup funds for a space station and shuttle. The two men 
met just before Christmas, and again Nixon stood firm. Paine would have to 
accept the BOB figures of $3.7 billion in budget authority and $3.825 billion 
in outlays. These were the numbers that would go to Congress in the 
President’s budget.36 
Ordinarily that would have been the end of the matter, with NASA absorb- 
ing this cut and making the best of it. In fact, the cuts for FY 1971 were only 
beginning, and the first new one came from flanigan. He had tried to develop 
an independent White House view of an appropriate NASA budget, with his 
34. Letter, Paine to Mayo, December 5, 1969; Logsdon, Apollo, chapter 5, pp. 23-24; E. M. Emme interview, 
35. Covert (secretary to Paine), Memo for Record, December 8, 1969; Logsdon, Apollo, chapter 5, pp. 24,28- 
36. Letter, Paine to Nixon, December 17, 1969; Logsdon, Apollo, chapter 5 ,  pp. 29-30 
Thomas Paine, August 3, 1970, p 30. 
29. 
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staff member Clay Whitehead digging into details of this agency’s projects. In 
a letter to Nixon, Paine had warned that at $3.7 billion, “U.S. manned flight 
activity would end in 1972 with an uncertain date for resumption many years in 
the future.” Flanigan and Whitehead wondered if things were really that serious. 
As they pursued their investigations, they became convinced that NASA 
indeed could live with $3.7 billion, could even receive a budget below that 
level and still avoid dire consequences. Flanigan advised Ehrlichman of this. 
Ehrlichman also received counsel from another presidential advisor, Bryce 
Harlow, liaison with Congress, who warned that a $3.7 billion figure would 
not win support on Capitol Hill. Ehrlichman discussed the matter with Nixon, 
and they agreed to seek further cuts. 
Amid a flurry of activity within the White House and BOB, Paine soon 
learned that the $3.7 billion figure that he could not live with now stood at a 
level higher than what he‘would have to accept. Early in January 1970, 
Flanigan presented the news: $3.53 billion in budget authority, $3.6 billion in 
outlays. The latter figure represented a cut of $225 million from an earlier 
estimate of $3.825 billion in outlays. Flanigan’s memo also stated that “there 
is no commitment, implied or otherwise, for development starts for either the 
space station or the shuttle in FY 72. That is a matter to be discussed when 
the ’72 budget is developed.”37 
Paine’s initial response was to order the closing of the Electronics 
Research Center, a NASA facility in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Though it 
was not a center on a par with the likes of NASA Marshall, it had a staff of 
800 and would be missed. Paine then held a press conference on January 13, 
1971. He stated that total employment, within NASA and its contractors, 
would fall from 190,000 to 140,000 during 1971. (As recently as 1966, this 
total had approached 400,000.) Production of the Saturn V would cease, 
Apollo lunar missions would fly only at six-month intervals, and Viking mis- 
sions to Mars would fly in 1975 rather than in 1973, as earlier planned.38 
Meanwhile, back at the White House, a Cabinet meeting was reaching 
decisions that would lead to further cuts. The economist Arthur Burns, a pres- 
idential counselor, had urged Nixon to bring the overall federal budget into 
37. Letter, Paine to Nixon, December 17, 1969 memo, Flanigan to Paine and Mayo, January 6, 1970; 
38. NASA press release no. 69-17]. December 29, 1969; Pane, statement, January 13, 1970; Logsdon, 
Logsdon, Apollo, chapter 5, pp. 27-28, 30-32. 
Apollo, p. V-33. 
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line with new and lower estimates of revenue. He had won support from 
George Romney, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. Romney 
now called for a uniform reduction of 2.5 percent in all department budgets, 
along with restrictions on salaries and pay raises. On January 13, as Paine was 
meeting the press, Nixon met with his cabinet officers and directed them to 
make such cuts. He put Burns in charge of this effort, which they called 
Operation Paring Knife. 
Nixon directed Mayo to inform Paine that NASA would have to reduce 
its budget by another $200 million. Paine received the news just as he was 
arriving at a banquet. He later recalled that 
while I grandly entered this big ballroom for this event the loudspeaker 
boomed out that I was to call the ,White House. And I went with sinking 
heart knowing damned well that they weren’t calling to say that we had 
more money.39 
Paine tried to get by with a cut of only $51 million; Mayo agreed to pre- 
sent this to Nixon. Paine told Flanigan of this, and Flanigan responded 
angrily, “YOU mean Mayo capitulated?’ But Paine’s ploy collapsed within 
hours, as Nixon rejected his compromise. Paine now had no choice but to take 
the full reduction of $200 million. 
This left NASA with $3.333 billion in budget authority and $3.4 billion 
in outlays. As recently as October, Paine had requested $4.497 billion and 
$4.2 billion, respectively. This budget authority represented a cut of 10 per- 
cent from the FY 1970 appropriation of $3.697 billion, with inflation eroding 
its value further. This was merely Nixon’s requested budget; Congress was 
free to make further cuts.”’ 
e T u r ~  of Congress 
The Budget Bureau was part of the permanent Washington bureaucracy, 
staffed by members of the Civil Service who took pride in a tradition of non- 
partisan concern for the national interest. By contrast, Congress was as 
39. Logsdon, Apollo, chapter 5, pp 33-34, interview, Thomas Pame, September 3, 1970, pp 15-16 
40. Letter, Paine to Nixon, January 15, 1970; letter, Paine to Mayo, January 16, 1970; Lcgsdon, Apollo, chap- 
ter 5, pp. 34-35. 
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partisan an institution as that city could offer. Its members paid keen attention 
to public opinion. When Agnew showed up at the Apollo 1 1 launch and called 
for flight to Mars, key senators were quick to respond. 
Mike Mansfield, the Senate Majority Leader, declared that he would rule 
out such efforts “until problems here on Earth are solved.” Following the safe 
return of the Apollo 11 astronauts, Clinton Anderson, chairman of the Senate 
space committee, stated that “now is not the time to commit ourselves to the 
goal of a manned mission to Mars.” Senator Margaret Chase Smith, a 
Republican member of that committee, added that the government “should 
avoid making long-range plans during this emotional period,” following the 
first Moon landing. She warned against becoming involved “in a crash pro- 
gram without the justification we had for Ap0ll0.”~~ 
There was similar sentiment in the House. Congressman George Miller, 
chairman of that chamber’s space committee, warned against decisions that 
would “commit ourselves to a specific time period for setting sail for Mars” 
and proposed that such decisions might be deferred until “five, perhaps ten 
years from now.” Joseph Karth, a space subcommittee chairman, asserted 
that the success of Apollo would not “translate directly into an urgent man- 
date to put a man on Mars by 1980 or, for that matter, any other magical 
date.” He declared that NASA was showing “complete lack of considera- 
tion for the taxpayer.” Congressman Olin Teague, chairman of the powerful 
Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, said a year later that “the easiest 
thing on Earth to vote against in Congress is the space program. You can 
vote to kill the whole space program tomorrow, and you won’t get one 
letter.”42 
These people were members and leaders of the congressional space com- 
mittees. If they were willing to take such candid views, what would the rank 
and file do within the House and Senate? Certainly they would pay close 
attention to public opinion polls-which were strongly adverse to NASA. 
Following Apollo 11, a Gallup Poll took a nationwide survey of views con- 
cerning flight to Mars. Fifty-three percent of the respondents were opposed to 
such a program; 39 percent were in favor. A few weeks later, a Newsweek poll 
41. New York ‘IFmes, July 16, 1969, p. 22; Congressional Record, July 29, 1969, p. S8739; Logsdon, Apollo, 
42. Logsdon, Apcllo, p. IV-54; Aviation Week, August 18, 1969, pp. 16-17; John Logsdon interview, Ohn 
p. IV-53. 
Teague, Washington, August 15, 1970, p 5. 
178 
Winter of Discontent 
found that 56 percent of the public wanted Nixon to spend less on space. Only 
10 percent wanted him to spend m0re.4~ 
While Paine did what he could to plead his case, he faced entrenched 
opposition. He met with Senator Edward Kennedy, brother of the late presi- 
dent, and suggested that Apollo astronauts might carry some memento of JFK 
to the Moon. He quickly learned that the senator had no interest “in identify- 
ing Jack Kennedy at all with this landing. He more or less gave me the 
impression that he felt that this was one of President Kennedy’s aberrations.” 
Unable to sway his critics, Paine soon was dismissing them out of hand: 
One of the games that some people on the Hill might play would be to say, 
gee, let’s hit the space program and wipe it out, and keep the sewers and so 
forth in. The idea was that, well, the reason the country was so crummy was 
because we went to the moon, and by God, if we had only spent that money 
on all these other things that we needed to do, then we would have a great 
country and a crummy space program. Wouldn’t it be better than a great 
space program and a crummy country. This was the line of reasoning they 
slipped into.44 
Nixon sent his budget for FY 1971 to Capitol Hill on February 2, 1970. 
The first step was for the space committees to hold hearings, where NASA’s 
officials included a new Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight. 
George Mueller, who had held that post since 1963, resigned from NASA in 
December 1969 and left government service to become a vice president at 
General Dynamics. His replacement, Dale D. Myers of North American 
Rockwell, had managed the Navaho missile program in the long ago. Myers 
had been a vice president in the Space Division and had been general man- 
ager of Apollo. He also had directed his company’s studies of the Space 
Shuttle. 
Now, in congressional testimony, he spoke of a “shuttle/station” and 
described it as a single integrated program, offering “the first elements of a 
transportation system.” The shuttle would “transport a crew of two, and 
43. Congressional Record, August 13, 1969, p. H7361; Newsweek, October 6, 1969, p. 46. See also NASA 
SP-4407, Vol. I, p. 546. 
44. Paine, Memo for Record, July 1,  1969; interview, Thomas Paine, August 12, 1970, pp 14, 16; E. M. 
Emme interview, Thomas Paine, Washington, September 3, 1970, pp, 6-7. 
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twelve passengers, into low orbit.” In addition to supporting the station, it 
would accomplish “propellant delivery, satellite repair, short-duration 
orbital missions, deployment of satellites,” and the launch of automated 
“planetary probes.” 
The space station would have a crew of 12, “seven men working and five 
men operating the vehicle itself,” and would have “an operational life of ten 
years, with resupply.” It would fly atop a Saturn V, with both the shuttle and 
station entering service by 1978. Significantly, Myers noted that the FY 1971 
budget held no funds for even preliminary studies of a piloted mission to 
Mars. NASA officials understood that such studies and plans could only hurt 
the agency.45 
NASA was requesting $110 million for the shuttlektation, up from $18.5 
million in FY 1970. These funds would pay for extensive design work on both 
projects, including early work on a new engine for the Shuttle. In its original 
proposal to the BOB in October 1969, NASA had requested over $250 million 
for these projects. Olin Teague, the most powerful of the space subcommittee 
chairmen and a power within the full committee as well, was in an expansive 
mood and was far from willing to accept the BOB’S cuts. Proposing to add $80 
million for the shuttlehtation, he asked Myers what NASA would do if it had 
more money for piloted space flight. “I don’t think we have to rubber-stamp 
something the Bureau of the Budget does,” he argued. 
We are going along with the people halfway, going along with the people who 
are supposed to know something. That was the President’s Task Group. What 
should we do, just sit back on our cans and let the Bureau of the Budget dic- 
tate every damn thing we do? We are right, you know we are right, and we 
know more about it than they do, and I bet you this subcommittee of mine 
knows more about this program than the Bureau of the Budget does.46 
The structure of the House space committee paralleled that of NASA. 
NASA had a powerful Office of Manned Space Flight and a much less influ- 
ential Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA) that dealt with 
automated spacecraft. These offices had counterparts among the House sub- 
committees, with Teague chairing the one on piloted space flight. A separate 
45. Logsdon, Apollo, chapter 5, pp. 41.43-44. 
46. Ibid., pp. 43-44; A A S  History Series, Vol. 4, pp. 245,247-248 
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subcommittee dealt with the concerns of OSSA; its chairman was Joseph 
Karth. Karth lacked the clout of Teague, much as OSSA had to defer to 
OMSF. Nevertheless, he was ready to confront Teague, and NASA, when he 
felt this was necessary. 
With their automated orbiters and landers, the Viking missions to Mars 
fell within Karth’s purview. However, he strongly opposed piloted flight to 
that planet. In 1967, he had been working to win support for Voyager, with its 
even more ambitious orbiters and landers, when he learned that NASA was 
requesting proposals for studies of piloted missions to Mars and Venus. He 
stated that this act left him “absolutely astounded. Very bluntly, a manned 
mission to Mars or Venus by 1975 or 1977 is now and always has been out of 
the question-and anyone who persists in this kind of misallocation of 
resources at this time is going to be stopped.”47 
He responded similarly to the work of the STG. In March 1970, address- 
ing a meeting of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, he 
described its plans as 
totally unrealistic. Based on my experience with Rangel; Centaul; Surveyol; 
Marinel; Viking and even Explore6 NASA’s projected cost estimates are asi- 
nine. NASA must consider the members of Congress a bunch of stupid idiots. 
Worse yet, they may believe their own estimates-and then we really are in 
bad shape. 
He opposed Teague’s motion in committee, and when Teague prevailed, 
nailing the $80 million increase to the authorization bill, Karth took his oppo- 
sition to the floor of the House. Teague viewed this as an unprecedented 
breach of congressional practice, for Karth, who chaired a subcommittee that 
did not deal with piloted space flight and who had not participated in the hear- 
ings of Teague’s own subcommittee, was taking a strong stand against the 
recommendations of that subcommittee of which he was not a member. 
Teague became so angry that he vowed that, although Karth was among the 
most senior members of the full committee, he would personally see to it that 
Karth would never become its chair. 
Karth’s amendment called not only for the elimination of Teague’s $80 
million increase; it demanded elimination of all funds for the shuttle/station, 
47. Logsdon, Apollo, chapter 1, pp. 13-17; chapter 4, pp. 47-48; Aviation Week, September 11, 1967, pp. 26-27. 
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and chopped another $50 million from piloted space programs as well. The 
entire House took up this amendment on April 23, with Karth insisting that 
NASA’s plans were premature: “Before the Space Shuttle can be a reality, 
many difficult technological advances must be made in such areas as config- 
uration and aerodynamics, heat protection, guidance and control, and 
propulsion.” Then he dropped a bombshell, suggesting that approval of the 
shuttlehtation would necessarily imply much more: “This in my judgment at 
least-and there is a great deal of evidence to support the theory-is the 
beginning of a manned Mars landing program.” He spoke of a “back door” 
to that planet, adding that a decision to “embark upon a $50 billion to $100 
billion manned space flight landing program to Mars is something I think we 
ought to debate loud and clear.” 
The House had no love for Mars; indeed, even the automated Viking pro- 
gram was controversial. Congressman Edward Koch, a member of Karth’s 
subcommittee and a future mayor of New York City, had stated, “I just can’t 
for the life of me see voting for monies to find out whether or not there is 
some microbe on Mars, when in fact I know there are rats in the Harlem apart- 
ments.” In the floor debate, however, the BOB’S budget cuts now worked 
ironically in NASA’s favor, for these cuts had eliminated all funds directed 
toward such a piloted expedition. 
“There is no money in here for a manned trip to Mars,” countered Don 
Fuqua, a member of Teague’s subcommittee. A Republican member, Richard 
Roudebush, added: “I am puzzled by the statement that the Shuttle is in some 
way mixed up with the Mars landing, when nothing is further from the truth.” 
George Miller, chairman of the full committee, also stated authoritatively that 
there was no relation between the shuttle/station and a Mars expedition. 
These reassurances helped to defeat Karth’s amendment, but only by the 
narrowest of margins. Only about one-fourth of the 435 members of the 
House were present and voting, and the final tally was a tie: 53 for, 53 
against. Under House rules, this meant it had failed to pass. Other amend- 
ments followed, along with other votes, but the opponents of NASA went 
down to defeat more handily. The full $190 million for the shuttlelstation 
survived-to face new opposition in the Senate.48 
48. AAS History Series, Vol. 4, pp. 246-251; Logsdon, Apollo, Chapter 5, pp. 4548; Congressionul Record, 
April 23, 1970, pp. H3384-H3423; Aviation Week, May 25, 1970, p. 27. 
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Like Karth, Senator Walter Mondale was a Democrat of Minnesota, with 
the two men being close colleagues. The Senate had no counterpart of Olin 
Teague, no one who would push successfully to add funds for the shuttlelsta- 
tion in the authorization bill; the bill that reached the Senate floor contained 
only the administration request of $1 10 million. Mondale nevertheless moved 
to strike this entire amount, and offered an impassioned plea: 
This item involves a fundamental and profound decision about the future 
direction of the manned spaceflight era. This is, in fact, the next moon-type 
program. I believe it would be unconscionable to embark on a project of such 
staggering cost when many of our citizens are malnourished, when our rivers 
and lakes are polluted, and when our cities and rural areas are dying. What 
are our values? What do we think is more important?49 
The Senate debated Mondale’s amendment for four hours, then sent it to 
defeat by a vote of 29 to 56. Mondale tried anew in July, when this chamber 
turned to the appropriations bill. This bill totalled nearly $18 billion and 
included funds not only for NASA but for the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development. Senators thus faced a potentially irresistible opportunity 
to add funds to meet the needs of the nation’s cities, and to subtract funds from 
the space program. 
Mondale’s colleagues quickly did the former, adding $400 million for 
urban renewal and for sewer and water projects. Mondale then offered his 
amendment again, as he sought to delete the $1 10 million for the shuttlelsta- 
tion as an appropriation. After several hours of debate, his amendment 
lost-by a margin of only 28 to 32. 
With debate resuming the next day, Paine knew that he faced an imminent 
threat from similar amendments. He discussed the situation at a meeting on 
Capitol Hill with Senator Hugh Scott, the Republican leader. In Paine’s words, 
we decided that the best chance of defeating that would be to offer the 
people who would be on the floor who had to more or less vote against 
increases in space, a bill to vote against. And once they had voted against 
49. Logsdon, Apollo, chapter 5, pp. 48-49; Congressional Record, May 6, 1970, pp. S676846817. For Mondale 
quote see also Chaikin, Man, p. 336. 
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NASA, then when the other bill came up proposing to cut us, that they might 
feel free and a little easier in not voting to cut us, since they had already 
voted against us once. 
The Senate appropriations bill called for a level of spending slightly 
below the president’s budget, and they decided to seek a member of the 
Senate space committee who would introduce an amendment to bring it back 
up to Nixon’s request of $3.333 billion. They quickly settled on Bany 
Goldwater, an active space proponent, as the man they wanted. At that 
moment, Coldwater was on the Senate floor; they sent him a note, and he met 
Paine and Scott in the latter’s office. He agreed with the strategy and invited 
them to prepare an amendment that he would introduce. 
“We went into the outer office,” Paine recalls. “We got the girl to put an 
amendment form into the typewriter there, and she banged out an amend- 
ment. Barry folded it up, put it in his pocket, and walked out.” Scott then 
invoked Senate procedure and arranged for Goldwater to introduce his mea- 
sure after everyone was back from lunch. It met resounding defeat, 15 to 
58-as Paine had expected. 
Following this vote, NASA’s opponents launched their onslaught. 
William Proxmire, an ally of Mondale and a strong critic of NASA in his own 
right, noted that the House had approved a NASA budget that was $136 mil- 
lion below the administration request. This cut had not been aimed 
specifically at the shuttle/station, but had been spread among a variety of pro- 
grams. Proxmire now introduced his own amendment, calling for a cut to this 
level in the Senate appropriation. He asserted that the money saved could 
“provide a subsidy for the building of some 125,000 to 150,000 new low- and 
moderate-income housing units.” This amendment also failed, 34 to 39. 
Senator William Fulbright then introduced yet another amendment, 
demanding a cut of $300 million for NASA. Nixon had described the Senate 
as “spendthrift” for having added $400 million to the bill the previous day, for 
urban programs. “We should all have an opportunity to help balance the cur- 
rent bill,” this senator said, adding that his cut in funding for the space 
program would do precisely that. He presented an explicit appeal to take 
money from NASA and spend it on the cities: “We voted for sewers. Certainly 
sewers are more important than going to the Moon.” Again Paine found the 
support he needed as Fulbright’s measure went down, 32 to 37. 
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The final Senate appropriation passed easily, 68 to 4. It provided $3.3 19 bil- 
lion for NASA, for a cut of only $14 million from the President's budget. This 
bill went to conference with that of the House; the conferees gave NASA a final 
appropriation of $3.269 billion. They also granted $110 million for the shut- 
tlehtation, eliminating Teague's proposed increase but matching Nixon's 
original req~est.~" 
This appropriation represented a drop of $428 million from the level of FY 
1970, with inflation reducing the 1971 allocation even further. It marked the 
fourth year in a row of such cuts, and while no one had a crystal ball, this budget 
at least would offer the solace that future cuts would be considerably less 
severe. NASA funding finally hit rock bottom in FY 1974, barely above $3 bil- 
lion. In constant dollars, this represented only one-third of NASA's peak in the 
50. Logsdon, Apollo, chapter 5, pp. 49-5 1 ; Congressional Record, July 6, 1970, pp. S 106033 10625; July 7, 
1970, pp. S10681-S10700, SlO721-S10727; E. M. Emme interview, Thomas Paine, July 9, 1970, pp 7-9; 
Low, Personal Notes No. 27, July 18, 1970; Paine, statement, September 2, 1970 (with summary of M 
1971 budget). 
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mid-1960s. Subsequent budgets stayed close to that level, with adjustment for 
idation, and continued at that constant-dollar level through the mid- 1980s? 
Yet even in 1970 the final cut, from $3.333 billion to $3.269 billion, gave 
a clear view of congressional attitudes toward Apollo and, by extension, to the 
challenges that might lie beyond the Moon. This reduction of $64 million rep- 
resented only two percent of the administration request, but NASA was already 
so hard-pressed that it had significant consequences. Paine now saved $42 mil- 
lion by canceling two planned Apollo Moon landings. This amounted ts  a 
down payment; those two missions would have cost $800 million, spread over 
several years. 
The Apollo program had spent $23.85 billion through mid- 1970, and had 
accomplished the two Moon landings of Apollo 11 and 12. The equipment 
was in hand for six more. Hence, to save 3.3 percent of the program cost- 
$800 million out of nearly $24 billion-Paine sacrificed one-third of the 
remaining missions. The loss in lunar science was greater still. Lunar landings 
were visiting rugged regions of interest to geologists; indeed, a professional 
geologist, Harrison Schmitt, flew to the Moon aboard Apollo 17. The final 
Apollo missions were able to stay longer on the Moon, as astronauts ranged 
widely by driving a battery-powered vehicle that resembled a dune buggy. 
Such waste is inconceivable unless one understands that, to Congress, 
Apollo was a means to achieve national prestige. By 1970, the nation had 
reached the Moon and had won whatever prestige it was likely to get from 
this. Members of Congress could look at the Moon and say “been there, done 
that.” Each Apollo flight cost up to $400 million. Such a sum, following the 
estimate of Senator Proxmire, could provide housing for as many as a million 
people. In an era when people looked to Washington to do such things, Apollo 
would fail totally in any c~mpetit ion.~~ 
Paine Leaves NASA 
During the year that followed the landing of Apollo 11 in the Sea of 
Tranquillity, NASA received a cold bath in the sea of reality. Yet the experi- 
51. NASA SP-4012, Vol. El, p. 12, Scient@cAAmerican, January 1986, p. 34. 
52. Paine, statement, September 2, 1970; Low, Personal Notes No. 30, September 6, 1970; Avzorion Week, 
September 7, 1970, pp. 18-19; NASA budget data, February 1970. For later Apollo missions, see 
Chaikin, Man. 
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ence left Paine unmoved; he remained as ebullient as ever in his hopes. He not 
only continued to cherish the goals of the STG; he sought to define further 
goals reaching to the year 2000, three decades in the future. He set up a three- 
day meeting at which space experts were to brainstorm on such goals; the 
invitees included Wernher von Braun, Arthur C. Clarke, Robert Gilruth of the 
Manned Spacecraft Center, and astronaut Neil Armstrong. 
Calling for “a completely uninhibited flow of new ideas,” Paine offered an 
“operating manual” for “Spaceship NASA.” He wanted new types of engines, 
“to achieve Wernher’s Metaphysical Goals of extending terrestrial life within 
the solar system and out into the galaxy.” He hoped for an “Intercontinental 
Space Plane,” able to fly “anywhere on Earth in an hour.” He proposed “Global 
TelecommunicatiodSupercomputer Networks” that indeed would take shape 
as the Internet. Another concept called for “Food Man~facture,~’ synthesizing 
food from fossil fuels and “freeing man from his 5000 year dependence on 
agriculture.” The list concluded: “Understand Man’s Origin and Destiny” and 
envisioned “the future evolution of terrestrial life to other worlds with eventual 
communication with other intelligence.” 
He caIIed for “swashbuckling buccaneering courage” and proposed 
“fighting ships: both naval and buccaneering” as a model for NASA. Having 
served personally in the Navy, he proceeded to issue orders: 
Consider NASA as Nelson’s “Band-of-Brothers”-Sea Rovers-combining 
the best of naval discipline in some areas with freedom of action of bold buc- 
caneers in others-men who are determined to do their individual and 
collective best to moving the planet into a better 21st Century. 
INSTRUCTIONS TO CAPTAINS 
Must be competent and hard working, sensitive but steady nerved, visionary 
but tough minded, determined and thoughtjkl. No room for ideology. 
Scholarship 
Know the ocean, storms, rocks and shoals you will face. Know your ship, men 
and fleet commander: keep your watch, quarter and stations bill up to date 
as casualties and rotation take place. Continuously study your course, posi- 
tion, consumables and destination. Keep a sound man with keen vision and a 
good glass stationed in the foretop. 
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Command 
Buccaneer captains with letters of marque and reprisal live dangerously. This 
danger can be reduced by alert lookouts, fast sailing, superior seamanship, 
winning the respect and loyal9 of the crew. Complete your homework before 
talking or issuing orders. Be carejkl of ideology and amateur social science 
and economics. 
The meeting took place in mid-June of 1970. Paine followed with a letter 
to Nixon: “The results are exciting and I would like to request an appointment 
to present to you our best current thinking .... The purpose &...to give you a 
heretofore unavailable Presidential level long-range view of man’s future 
potential in space.”53 
Then in July, he received an attractive job offer from Xerox. The offer 
appealed to him, for his government salary was $42,500 per year. As he put 
it, “with four children in school, 1 can certainly use a little more money to help 
support this family and give them a good start in life.” He called Jack Parker 
at General Electric, an old friend and a member of the board of directors, and 
asked for advice. Parker replied, in Paine’s words, “that they would be very 
anxious to have me come back,” and that GE might be able to offer him a very 
promising position. Paine then talked to the chairman of the board and learned 
that the position would call for him “to head up all of General Electric’s 
power generation activities including both the conventional steam turbine 
business and also the nuclear power plants.” Paine expressed interest and sug- 
gested that he could take the post early in 1971; the chairman replied that GE 
would need him that summer. There was nothing pressing to keep him at 
NASA, and on July 28 he sent Nixon his letter of resignation, to become 
effective on September 15. Having left GE only two and a half years earlier, 
he now returned, with his tenure at NASA representing merely a brief inter- 
lude within a career at GE that spanned nearly three decades.54 
He had been a liberal Democrat in an administration of Republicans, a 
Lyndon Johnson appointee held over to serve Nixon’s loyalists. In addition to 
this, he had spent much effort fighting for his own agenda, rather than promot- 
ing that of the president. Yet he did not leave Washington under a cloud. Peter 
53. Memo, Pame to Addressees, May 25, 1970; Memo for the President, Paine to Haldeman, July 9, 1970. 
54. Biographical data, Thomas 0. Pame papers, Library of Congress; Logsdon, Apullo, p. V-53, E. M Emme 
interview, Thomas Paine. August 3, 1970, pp. 10-14 
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Flanigan described him as a “good soldier” who “accepted decisions after get- 
ting a full hearing.” Ehrlichman compared NASA’s bold proposals to a spring 
that “had to be stretched in order for it to come back to where it belonged.” 
Nixon, on receiving Paine’s letter of resignation, wrote that “the course you 
have done so much to set will help guide our efforts for years to 
His push for Mars fell short, but even within the STG report, he expected 
to defer the serious pursuit of this goal until 1976. Although Congress and the 
BOB cut his budget, this schedule left time for them to experience a change of 
heart. In the words of Dale Myers, “Hope springs eternal. After we came off 
the Apollo peak, it was very difficult to accept that we’d be at a level half or 
a third of that. We always wanted to think that next year would be better.”56 
With all his swashbuckling, what did Paine accomplish at NASA? 
Though he did not build this agency ,in the manner of his predecessor, James 
Webb, he was the captain on its bridge during the run-up to the Moon land- 
ings. He pushed successfully for the dramatic Apollo 8 mission that orbited 
the Moon at Christmas in 1968; he approved the dry workshop for Skylab. He 
was at the helm when the landings took place. 
Amid his setbacks, Paine followed the lead of George Mueller and steered 
NASA onto the new course that Nixon noted. Mueller had tried and failed to 
build a major post- Apollo effort, Apollo Applications, based on use of Saturn- 
class launchers and Apollo spacecraft. This effort was in tatters by mid-1968. 
Mueller responded by envisioning a space shuttle as a focus for the future. 
Paine took this vision, made it his own, encouraged Mueller to strengthen it 
with bolder thinking, and sold it to the STG. 
Though Mars provided a long-term goal, the shuttle/station was to repre- 
sent the main work of the 1970s. When budget cuts hit home, Paine held to this 
plan, preserving options for the future by sacrificing those of the past as he shut 
down Saturn production and canceled Apollo Moon landings. Congress also 
signed on for the shuttlehtation, appropriating $I 10 million to start the work 
during FY 197 1. 
As that fiscal year began, however, in mid-1970, NASA’s situation was ten- 
uous in the extreme. Funding for the shuttle/station had survived by votes of 
53-53 in the House and 32-28 in the Senate, which left the program vulnerable 
55 Logsdon, Apollo, p V-55; John Logsdon Interview, John Ehrlichman, Santa Fe, New Mexico, May 6, 
1983, p 15, letter, Nixon to Prune, July 28, 1970. 
56 Author interview, Dale Myers, Leucadia, California, December 6, 1996 
189 
THE SPACE SHUTTLE DECISION 
to even a slight increase in anti-space sentiment. Similarly, Paine had not won 
the endorsement of Nixon for this program. Lacking such endorsement, NASA 
could proceed with detailed studies of the shuttle/station, but could not award 
the contracts that would build it. 
Arthur Cleaver, a leader in British rocket development, quoted the Duke 
of Wellington in describing the votes in Congress as “a damn close-run 
thing-the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life.”57 If NASA was to 
avoid meeting its own Waterloo, it would need new sources of strength. It 
would find them by abandoning the plans of the STG, dropping the space sta- 
tion, placing all hope in the Space Shuttle as a separate project, and making 
common cause with the Air Force. 
57. Astmnautics &Aeronautics, October 1970, pp. 70-72. 
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“I wouldn’t want to be quoted on this,” President Johnson told a gathering 
in 1967. 
We’ve spent $35 or $40 billion on the space program. And if nothing else had 
come out of it except the knowledge that we gained from space photography, it 
would be worth ten times what the whole program has cost. Because tonight 
we know how many missiles the enemy has and, it turned out, our guesses were 
way 08 We were doing things we didn’t need to do. We were building things 
we didn’t need to build. We were harboring fears we didn’t need to harbol:’ 
Within NASA, Apollo addressed the perception of power that Moscow’s 
highly publicized space spectaculars pointed to communism as the way of the 
future. The Air Force had a separate space program that dealt with the reality 
of power. Working closely with the CIA, the Air Force had the task of launch- 
ing reconnaissance satellites that could determine the Soviet order of battle, 
counting that nation’s bombers and missiles while determining the location of 
their bases and their operational readiness. In turn, these satellites provided 
strategic intelligence that shaped America’s Cold War policies. 
The Air Force in Space 
The background to the Air Force program dated to 1953, shortly after the 
inauguration of President Eisenhower. In August of that year, the Soviets det- 
1 .  Richelson, Secret Eyes, p. 93. 
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onated a nuclear weapon with a yield of 400 kilotons. By studying its fallout, 
American analysts determined that it was not a true hydrogen bomb. 
However, it did represent a large step upward in Soviet nuclear power. In 
addition to this, the CIA learned that the Soviets were building a turboprop 
bomber, the Tu-95, with enough range to strike the United States. An intelli- 
gence estimate, issued early in 1954, predicted that Moscow would have 500 
such bombers in 1957: 
In March 1954, Eisenhower met with a group of advisors and warned 
them that he feared a surprise attack, a new Pearl Harbor that would destroy 
cities rather than battleships. Lee DuBridge, the president of Caltech and 
chair of this advisory group, responded by taking steps to set up a high-level 
commission, the Technological Capabilities Panel. It would recommend new 
policies that could meet this danger. To chair it, Ike recruited James Killian, 
the president of MIT. 
A subpanel, Project 3, dealt with the technical means for surveillance. The 
people who learned of it included Clarence “Kelly” Johnson of Lockheed, one 
of the country’s top aircraft designers. He had already prepared a design for a 
reconnaissance aircraft and, without success, had tied to win support from the 
Air Force. Johnson now joined with Trevor Gardner, a special assistant to the 
Air Force Secretary, and approached Project 3 for a new try. The subpanel’s 
chairman, Edwin Land, had invented the Polaroid camera and was president of 
the Polaroid Corporation. He and Killian took the proposal to Ike and con- 
vinced him to accept it. The plane that resulted was the U-l13 
In mid-February 1955, the full Killian Committee issued its report, titled 
“Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack.” It declared, “We have an offensive 
advantage but are vulnerable to surprise attack” (emphasis in original). 
“Because of our vulnerability, the Soviets might be tempted to try an attack.” 
In Edwin Land’s section of the report, he wrote, 
We mustfind ways to increase the number of hard facts upon which our intel- 
ligence estimates are based, to provide better strategic warning, to minimize 
surprise in the kind of attack, and to reduce the danger of gross overestima- 
tion or gross underestimation of the threat.4 
2 Rhodes, Dark Sun, pp 523-525, Zaloga, Target, pp 85-88 
3 McDougall, Heavens, pp 115-1 17, Burroughs, Deep Black, pp 69-75; Kdlran, Sputtzrk, pp 67-71 
4 klhan, Spurnik, pp 70.7 1,72,79, 302 
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At the time, the available “hard facts” were often meager. The 1953 
Soviet nuclear test had caught everyone by surprise. Then, on May Day of 
1954, at a public air show, the Soviets showed off a new jet bomber, the 
Bison. Here was another surprise-a Soviet jet bomber! It was all the more 
worrisome because no one in the U.S. had known of it until the Kremlin dis- 
played it openly. A year later, in preparations for the next such air show, 
American observers saw a formation of 10 of these aircraft in flight. In mid- 
July came the real surprise. On Aviation Day, Colonel Charles Taylor, the 
U.S. air attach6 in Moscow, counted no fewer than 28 Bisons as they flew 
past a review in two groups. This bomber now was obviously in mass pro- 
duction. The CIA promptly estimated that up to 800 Bisons would be in 
service by 1960. 
In fact, Taylor had seen an elaborate hoax. The initial group of 10 Bisons 
had been real enough. They then had flown out of sight, joined eight more, 
and this combined formation had made the second flyby. Still, as classified 
estimates leaked to the press, Senator Stuart Symington, a former Air Force 
Secretary, demanded hearings and warned the nation of a “bomber gap.” The 
flap forced Ike to build more B-52 bombers than he had planned, and to step 
up production of fighter aircraft in the bargain. Yet even when analysts dis- 
covered the Aviation Day hoax, they took little comfort. If Moscow was trying 
to fool the CIA, it might mean that the Soviets were putting their real effort 
into missiles rather than  bomber^.^ 
The U-2 became operational in mid-1956, and proceeded to deliver 
photos of the highest value. One mission returned with pictures that showed 
far fewer heavy bombers than expected at Soviet bases. This started a process 
of downward revision of Moscow’s estimated air power. One of Ike’s military 
aides declared that “very quickly we found the Bomber Gap had a tendency 
to recede. It was something that each year was going to occur. But in fact it 
did not occur.” The U-2 also looked at targets of opportunity, and Richard 
Bissell, the project manager within the CIA, would recall an example: “He 
was flying over Turkestan, and off in the distance he saw something that 
looked quite interesting and that turned out to be the Tyuratam launch site. He 
came back with the most beautiful photos of this place.” It was one of the 
5. Zaloga, Target, pp. 81-85; Burroughs, Deep Black, pp. 67-68; Prados, Soviet, pp. 41-50 Klass, Sentries, 
pp. 6-9. 
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principal bases for missile and space launches; yet the CIA had not known of 
its existence.'j 
Nevertheless, the U-2 delivered far less than it had promised. When it 
entered service, Soviet radar promptly picked it up. Following the second over- 
flight, the Foreign Ministry lodged a protest. The protests escalated, and after 
only six such missions, all during July 1956, Ike ordered a standdown. 
Subsequent flights required his personal approval; over the next four years, only 
about 15 took place. Then, in May 1960, a Soviet antiaircraft missile downed a 
U-2 near the city of Sverdlovsk. With this, the overflights ceased ~ompletely.~ 
But now a new concern had arisen: the missile gap. Early in 1960, a 
debate developed in Washington in response to a new intelligence estimate, 
which predicted that Moscow would possess up to 450 ICBMs in mid-1963. 
This would be twice America's anticipated strength in missiles. This was 
frightening enough; deeper skepticism was raised by the fact that the estimate 
actually represented a substantial reduction from earlier ones. Senators 
Symington and Johnson asked whether Ike perhaps was cooking the books, 
downgrading the perceived threat during an election year. Clearly the nation 
needed additional strategic reconnaissance, and needed it quickly. 
By then, the CIA's Bissell had been working for nearly two years to 
address this problem. Early in 1958, he had initiated a highly classified pro- 
gram, Corona, that sought to build reconnaissance satellites known as 
Discoverer. These were to fly to orbit atop Thor-Agena rockets. It took a year 
and a half, however, to get the system to work successfully. The first attempt, 
Discoverer 1, did not even reach orbit. Following launch from Vandenberg Air 
Force Base in February 1959, it wound up near the South Pole. Finally, in 
August 1960, Discoverer 13 proved the lucky 13 in the series. Though it car- 
ried no photo equipment, it successfully demonstrated the release of a capsule 
from orbit and its recovery in the Pacific. This was the first spacecraft to reen- 
ter from orbit and be retrieved following descent by parachute. 
With this encouragement, Bissell allowed Discoverer 14 to fly with its 
camera. Its capsule, too, was recovered successfully, this time in midair, on 
August 19. The film soon arrived at the CIA's Photographic Interpretation 
Center, and the photo interpreters gathered in an auditorium. The director, 
6. Prados, Soviet, pp. 46,47; Ranelagh, Agency, pp. 316-317. 
7. Richelson, Espionage, pp. 142-152; Ruffner, ed., Corona, p. 3; Prados, Soviet, pp. 33-35; Powers, Secrets, 
pp. 95-97. 
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Arthur Lundahl, spoke to them about “something new and great we’ve got 
here.” His deputy then presented a map of the Soviet Union.’ These maps had 
previously featured a single narrow line to indicate the coverage along the 
path of a U-2. This one had eight broad swaths running north to south across 
the USSR and Eastern Europe, covering over one-fifth of their total area. 
They represented the regions that this single mission had photographed, and 
people broke out in cheers. Some photos were fogged by electrostatic dis- 
charges, but the resolution was 20 to 30 feet, which analysts described as 
“good to very good.” Clearly, this was a turning point.8 
During the election campaign that autumn, Kennedy stressed the issue of 
the missile gap, warning that the Republicans had done too little to counter its 
threat. After the election, he appointed a deputy defense secretary, Roswell 
Gilpatric, who believed strongly that this gap was real. On taking office in 
January 1961, Gilpatric and his boss, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, 
went to the Air Force intelligence office on the fourth floor of the Pentagon 
and spent several days personally studying Discoverer photographs. 
The Air Force held the view that Moscow was building large numbers of 
well-camouflaged missile sites. Sites for the presumed disguised installations 
included a Crimean War memorial and a medieval tower. McNamara and 
Gilpatric, however, preferred the view of Army intelligence: that the Soviet 
ICBM, designated R-7, was very large and unwieldy and could move only by 
rail or military road. Discoverer satellites had taken photos along the Soviet 
Union’s railroads and principal highway s-and had found no missile launch- 
ers. In February, at an off-the-record press conference, a newsman asked 
about the missile gap. McNamara replied that “there were no signs of a Soviet 
crash effort to build ICBMs.” Reporters raced to their phones, newspapers 
blossomed with the word that no such gap existed, and Kennedy himself had 
to step in, declaring that it was too early to draw such concl~sions.~ 
Then in June and July, Discoverers 25 and 26 flew with nearly complete 
success. While they were only the third and fourth missions to return photos 
having intelligence value, together these four flights covered more than half 
of the regions suitable for ICBM deployment. Within this vast area, photo 
analysts found no more than two new and previously unsuspected ICBM 
8. Prados, Sovret, pp. 82-83, 86-95, MeDougall, Hemens, pp. 219-220, T h e ,  February 8, 1960, pp. 16-19; 
9. Richelson, Secret Eyes, pp. 57-58; Prados, Sovm, pp. 114-1 I f ,  119; Tnne, February 17, 1961, pp. 12-13. 
Ruffner, ed., Corona, pp. 3-24, 119-120; Richelson, Secret Eyes, pp. 41-44. 
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bases. Three others were photographed a second time. By comparing them 
with one another: and with a known testing complex at Tyuratam, the analysts 
came away with a clear understanding of just what an ICBM base would look 
like. That made it possible to eliminate a number of “suspect” launch sites and 
to give a clear and definitive estimate of Moscow’s ICBM strength. 
This assessment, National Intelligence Estimate 11-8/1-61, titled 
“Strength and Deployment of Soviet Long Range Ballistic Missile Forces,” 
came out on September 21. It stated: 
We now estimate that the present Soviet ICBM strength is in the range 
of 10-25 launchers from which missiles can be fired against the US, 
and that this force level will not increase markedly during the months 
immediately ahead. 
The low present and near-term ICBM force probably results chiejly from 
a Soviet decision to deploy only a small force of the cumbersome, first gen- 
eration ICBMs, and to press the development of a smallel; second generation 
system. On this basis, we estimate that the force level in mid1963 will 
approximate 75-1 2.5 operational ICBM launchers. lo 
There indeed was a missile gap-but it favored the United States, and by 
a large margin. In 1961, the US .  was already deploying substantial numbers 
of its first-generation Atlas, Titan, Thor, and Jupiter missiles. In addition, the 
first Polaris submarines were on station at sea. Beginning in October 1962, 
the nation would also have the Minuteman ICBM, which would reach the 
field in even larger numbers.” 
Yet it was hardly a secret in Moscow that the Soviet R-7 was clumsy and 
unwieldy; that nation’s planners had known this from the start. Why, then, had 
they taken the trouble to develop it? An answer was in hand, courtesy of Oleg 
Penkovskiy, a colonel in the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet army. 
He had recently begun working for MI-6, Britain’s intelligence agency, and 
had gone on to help the CIA as well. In May 1961, he delivered rolls of micro- 
film that included minutes of Kremlin meetings in which officials decided to 
use the R-7 for space launches, but not as an ICBM. 
10. Ruffner, ed , Corona, pp. 26-27, 129-130, 137-140; Richelson, Secref Eyes, p. 56; Richelson, Espionage, 
1 I .  Prados, Soviet, pp. 119-122; Neufeld, Ballistic Missiles, pp. 226,234-237 
p. 180. 
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At the outset of the R-7 program, during the mid-l950s, Soviet officials 
had expected to fire it from secret bases. This missile would take up to 20 
hours to fuel and prepare for launch, and during that time, it would be highly 
vulnerable to attack. However, if the U.S. did not know where these bases 
were located, the R-7 would remain safe. The advent of American strategic 
reconnaissance upset this plan, by giving America the intelligence needed to 
strike during pre-launch preparations. The head of the Soviet strategic missile 
force, Marshal Mitrofan Nedelin, accordingly decided to delay the deploy- 
ment of a large fleet of ICBMs until he could receive a more advanced version 
that could be fueled and launched on short notice.” 
The Corona program had sought to use satellites to assess the Soviet threat. 
It did more; it markedly reduced this threat, at least for a time, by piercing the 
secrecy that formed a major element of Moscow’s strategic calculations. Then, 
as the 1960s proceeded, the Air Force and CIA introduced a number of impor- 
tant advances in the satellites and went on to fly them routinely. 
Improved resolution was an early goal. The cameras of 1961 were only 
moderate in resolution, and better versions were in service later in the decade. 
To make the best use of these increasingly sharp images, the post-1961 
Discoverer satellites mounted dual cameras that could photograph a site from 
different directions. This permitted stereophotography, whereby analysts 
could study images that appeared three-dimensional. Later versions of this 
spacecraft also carried more film and stayed up longer. The first Discoverers 
had mission times of a single day; subsequent models stretched this to three 
weeks and longer. 
Resolution always represented a limit for Discoverer imagery. The Thor- 
Agena booster, used by the Discoverer, had only a modest payload capacity. 
Beginning in 1963, however, the Air Force employed the Atlas-Agena and 
then the Titan 111, which could launch larger spacecraft with telescopes of 
greater acuity. These rockets supported a separate program, Gambit, that 
achieved much greater resolution. For the closest looks, the Air Force used the 
closest orbits, with Gambit spacecraft dropping down to perigees as low as 76 
miles, 1 3 
12. Prados, Soviet, p. 116, Richelson, Espionage, pp. 56-65, Zaloga, Target, pp 51-54 
13 Richelson, Secret Eyes, pp. 353-360; Ruffner, ed , Corona, pp. x1v-xv, 27-37, McDonald, ed., Corona, pp 
301-307, Quest, Summer 1995, pp. 22-33 
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What did Corona and Gambit show? They photographed all Soviet bal- 
listic-missile launch complexes, following existing as well as new missiles 
through development and deployment. In particular, they found and repeat- 
edly observed a major center at Plesetsk, near the northern city of 
Arkhangelsk. Plesetsk specialized in launching reconnaissance satellites and 
other military spacecraft. At its height, it accounted for more than half of all 
space launches in the entire world, with Tyuratam a distant second, and Cape 
Canaveral and Vandenberg Air Force Base far behind. 
Corona also was first to see Severodvinsk, the main construction site for 
ballistic missile submarines. This made it possible to monitor the launching 
of new classes of subs, and to follow them through to operational deployment. 
The CIA also observed the rapid growth of the Soviet surface navy. Coverage 
of aircraft plants and air bases kept analysts up-to-date on bombers and fight- 
ers, while other coverage allowed Army experts to learn the nature of the tank 
forces that NATO would face if the Soviets were to invade Europe. 
Corona photography uncovered the construction of antiballistic missile 
sites near Moscow and Leningrad, along with the radar installations that sup- 
ported them. Other photos located antiaircraft batteries and made it possible 
for the Strategic Air Command to find routes for its bombers that could avoid 
these missiles. Specialized satellites, conducting geodetic mapping, became 
the main source of data for the military charts of the Defense Mapping Agency. 
As recently as the mid-l950s, the Soviets had been able to fool the 
Americans concerning their air strength, and to touch off a major Washington 
flap over a supposed “bomber gap,” merely by flying the same aircraft around 
twice at an air show. By contrast, a 1968 intelligence report contained the 
unequivocal statement: “No new ICBM complexes have been established in 
the USSR during the past year.” As early as June 1964, Corona had pho- 
tographed all 25 of the complexes then in existence. If there had been any new 
ones, the CIA would have seen them.14 
The Air Force and NASA 
In 1494, the Treaty of Tordesillas divided up the New World by drawing a line 
down the Atlantic, with Spain claiming lands to the west of this line and 
14. Ruffner, ed., Corona, pp. xiv, 31. 
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Portugal claiming lands to the east. l5 The activities of NASA and the Air Force 
lent themselves to similar demarcation. With NASA emphasizing Apollo while 
the Air Force dealt largely with satellite reconnaissance in low orbit, there was 
little overlap between their concerns. However, these two agencies did not run 
independent programs; there was a great deal of cooperation. 
This cooperation was particularly strong in the realm of launch vehicles. 
In launching automated spacecraft, the most important such vehicles were 
derived from the Thor, Atlas, and Titan ballistic missiles; both NASA and the 
Air Force used these rockets repeatedly, and procured them from the same 
contractors. They also shared in ongoing developments that increased their 
payload capacities. 
As early as February 1961, an agreement between NASA’s James Webb 
and the Pentagon’s Roswell Gilpatric stipulated that neither agency would ini- 
tiate the development of a new launch vehicle without first seeking the consent 
of the other. Then in 1962, a joint NASA-DoD Large Launch Vehicle Planning 
Group issued a report that contained a recommendation: “The 120-inch diam- 
eter solid motor and the Titan 111 launch vehicle should be developed by the 
Department of Defense to meet DOD and NASA needs, as appropriate in the 
payload range of 5000 to 30,000 pounds, low Earth orbit equivalent.”16 
The Titan I11 brought the prospect of wasteful duplication, for it competed 
directly with NASA’s Saturn I-B. This Saturn carried over 36,000 pounds to 
low orbit. The Titan 111-C, the first operational version, had a rated payload of 
23,000 pounds; its immediate successor, the Titan 111-D, raised this to 30,000. 
In addition to this, the projected Titan 111-M promised to carry as much as 
38,000. Nevertheless, as early as 1967, the President’s Science Advisory 
Committee noted that “the launch costs of the [Saturn I-B] are about double 
those of the Titan III-M.”17 
Because NASA was accustomed to receiving launch vehicles that the Air 
Force had developed, it yielded gracefully when the Saturn I-B came under 
pressure. NASA had conducted the initial flight test of a Saturn-class first 
stage as early as October 1961, at a time when the Titan III was still at the 
level of preliminary study. In view of this early start, and because the Saturn 
15. Durant, Reformation, p. 264. 
16. NASA SP-4102, p. 218; NASA SP-4407, Vol. II, pp. 318,323. 
17. NASA SP-4012, Vol. III, pp. 27, 39; Thompson, ed., Space Log, Vol. 27 (1991), p 125; Quest, Fall 1995, 
p. 18; Long, chairman, Space Program, p. 36. 
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Titan III, left, which replaced the more 
costly Saturn I-B. The two launch wehicles 
carried nearly the same payload. Human 
figure at bottom indicates scale. (Art by 
Dan Gauthier) 
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I-B was essential for Apollo, NASA went on to build 14 of them, though 
George Mueller hoped for more as he pursued Apollo Applications. When 
budget cuts hit home, however, NASA abandoned the Saturn I-B and turned 
to the Titan 111-E Centaur. It had the energy to launch large payloads on mis-  
sions to Mars and the outer planets, and did so repeatedly.'* 
In addition to launch vehicles, NASA turned to the Air Force for facilities 
used for launch and tracking. When NASA's rockets flew from Cape 
18. NASA SP-4012, Vol. 11, pp. 54-57; Vol. EI, pp. 40-41; Aviation Week, August 3, 1970, p. 45. 
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Canaveral, they proceeded down the Eastern Test Range-which the Air 
Force operated. That service provided tracking stations, and when NASA 
built stations of its own on the islands of Antigua and Ascension, they were 
co-located near those of the Defense Department. 
The Air Force also built up an extensive array of launch facilities at Cape 
Canaveral. When NASA took over nearly exclusive use of some of them, the 
Air Force transferred them to NASA outright. These included Launch Complex 
12 for Atlas-Agena, LC 36 for Atlas-Centaur7 and LC 19 for the Titan 11. Other 
launch pads served both agencies: LC 17 for Delta, LC 41 for Titan 111. In addi- 
tion to this, NASA launched early versions of Saturn, including the Saturn I-B, 
from LC 34 and 37, which had been built on land owned by the Air Force. 
The two agencies also cooperated closely in research. The Air Force had 
a valuable set of wind tunnels and engine-test facilities at its Arnold 
Engineering Development Center in Tennessee. This service, however, did not 
attempt to duplicate the far more extensive facilities of NASA Ames, Langley, 
and Lewis. In addition to a broad array of supersonic wind tunnels, NASA 
offered such unique installations as a wind tunnel at Ames Research Center 
with a 40 by SO-foot cross section, big enough to hold and test full-size fighter 
aircraft. At NASA Langley, a 60-foot vacuum sphere could accommodate 
large spacecraft and rocket stages.'' 
In addition to sharing facilities, NASA and the Air Force also pursued 
joint ventures in research. The X-15 was one; another, the XB-70, involved 
large aircraft that could fly at Mach 3. The agencies also collaborated in build- 
ing immense solid-propellant rockets. At Edwards Air Force Base, NASA 
built test stands for rocket engines used in Apollo. These complemented ear- 
lier Air Force test facilities. 
Institutional arrangements also bound them closely. Between 1958 and 
1964, NASA and the Defense Department executed some 88 major agree- 
ments. A joint Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board (AACB) 
dealt with such areas as aeronautical research, launch vehicles, spacecraft, 
and piloted space flight. NASA's Deputy Administrator and the DoD's 
Director of Defense Research and Engineering co-chaired this board; as early 
as 1966, an AACB subpanel carried out an important review of concepts for 
reusable launch vehicles. 
19. NASA SP-4102, pp. 213,221,229,236; NASA SP-440. 
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Cape Canavmul in 1972. The Space Shuttle was to use the Apollo facilities, including the 
VAB and LC-39. (NASA) 
Within the Defense Department, the Air Force Systems Command 
(AFSC) held overall responsibility for that service's space and missile pro- 
grams. In downtown Washington, an AFSC liaison office shared a building 
with NASA's Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF). After 1962, NASA had 
its own Office of Defense Affairs that performed a similar function.20 
20. NASA SP-4102, pp. 213,217-220,294 (footnote 17); Ames, chairman, Report. 
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Yet this interagency cooperation would only go so far. In August 1963, 
Webb and McNamara signed an agreement that sought “to ensure that in the 
national interest complete coordination is achieved” in pursuing a joint space- 
station project. Only a month later, McNamara sent Webb a follow-up letter 
that expressed his reservations. Then in December, McNamara made it clear 
that at least for the short term, the Air Force would want a piloted orbital facil- 
ity of its own.21 
When he canceled Dyna-Soar, on December 10, he handed the Air Force 
a consolation prize by inviting that service to conduct studies of a new project, 
the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL). MOL took shape as a cylinder, 10 
feet across by 41 feet long, with a Gemini spacecraft at one end; this ensem- 
ble was to ride to orbit atop a Titan 111. McNamara could not grant formal 
approval for MOL; that had to come from the White House, and this raised 
anew the question of what the Air Force might do with such a facility. While 
that service had failed to provide good justification for Dyna-Soar, this time it 
came up with a fine reason for MOL: strategic reconnaissance. 
The eventual plan called for MOL to carry a telescope with an aperture of 
six feet, offering resolution of nine inches. Astronauts would avoid photograph- 
ing cloud-covered regions, but would scan the ground with binoculars, looking 
for items of interest. The Air Force won support from such key figures as Kermit 
Gordon, director of the Budget Bureau, and Donald Hornig, the White House 
science advisor. In August 1965, President Johnson gave MOL his endorsement, 
which meant it could go forward to contract award and development. 
By then George Mueller was nurturing hopes for Apollo Applications, 
which raised anew the prospect of duplication. NASA ofticials, unwilling to 
affiont the Air Force, supported MOL and took the view that it was not the 
national space station contemplated in the 1963 Webb-McNamara agreement. 
Nevertheless, members of Congress as well as Budget Bureau officials soon 
were asking whether NASA could adopt a version of MOL for its own use.22 
In January 1966, Senator Clinton Anderson, chairman of the Senate space 
committee, sent a letter to Webb that recommended use of MOL. Within the 
House, the Military Operations Subcommittee criticized Mueller’s plan for 
“unwarranted duplication” and called for MOL to proceed as a joint NASA- 
21. NASA SP-4407, Vol. 11, pp. 356-360. 
22. NASA SP-4102, pp. 230-235; Richelson, Secret Eyes, pp. 82-83,90-91; NASA SP-4208, pp. 17-19 
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Air Force program-with the Air Force in charge. Budget Bureau officials 
also supported a common program. In February 1967, the President’s Science 
Advisory Committee added its own views, calling for “maximum utilization” 
of MOL and calling on NASA to carefidly consider its use “before substan- 
tial funds are committed” to Apollo Applications. 
NASA responded by having Douglas Aircraft, the MOL prime contractor, 
evaluate the suitability of MOL for NASA’s objectives. The agency also con- 
ducted in-house studies. These began by acknowledging that the Saturn I-B 
was far more costly than the Titan 111, and considered whether it might be 
advantageous to have the latter launch Apollo spacecraft. The OMSF con- 
cluded that while this was possible, it would cost $250 million to develop 
such a Titan-Apollo, which would then require 17 launches before the savings 
surpassed the initial cost of conversion. 
The OMSF also concluded that MOL was too small for NASA’s needs. It 
was no larger than a house trailer, whereas Mueller had described his pro- 
posed wet workshop as being the size of “a small ranch house.” While the Air 
Force had a proposal in hand for a larger MOL, this would cost an additional 
$480 million and would take four years to develop. In comparison, even the 
Saturn I-B would cost less to use. These arguments mollified the critics, and 
Apollo Applications went forward, though with a reduced budget.” 
MOL also went forward, with strong Pentagon support. The Air Force, 
however, never having carried through the development of a piloted space- 
craft, failed to control its cost. Between 1965 and 1969, the projected cost of 
MOL ballooned from $1.5 billion to $3 billion. During those same years, the 
escalating Vietnam War placed military programs under severe strain. 
The future of MOL came up for discussion at a White House meeting 
between Nixon, national security advisor Henry Kissinger, and Budget 
Bureau director Robert Mayo. Though the program carried the strong 
endorsement of Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
it proved to lack support from a key official: Richard Helms, Director of 
Central Intelligence and head of the CIA, In the words of the analyst Jeffrey 
Richelson, Helms’s advisers “feared that an accident that cost the life of a 
single astronaut might ground the program for an extended period of time and 
cripple the reconnaissance program.” 
23. NASA SP-4208, pp. 43.46-48, 54; NASA SP-4102, p. 232; Long, chairman, Space Program, pp. 23-25 
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Mayo suggested canceling MOL; Nixon and Kissinger agreed. Only then 
did Mayo discuss the matter with Laird, who had not even believed that MOL 
was in trouble. Though Laird appealed directly to Nixon, emphasizing that 
the Joint Chiefs f d y  supported this program, Nixon turned him down. The 
public announcement of the end of MOL came on June 10,1969, with its first 
piloted flight still three years in the future.24 
During the 1960s, the Air Force pursued two major and separate efforts- 
Dyna-Soar and MOL-that sought to place military astronauts in orbit. This 
service ended the decade with both projects canceled and with nothing to 
show for its efforts. Clearly, if it was to send such astronauts aloft, it would 
not do so on its own, but would have to work in cooperation with NASA. 
In addition to this, the experiences of the Titan 111, the Saturn I-B, MOL, 
and Apollo Applications had shown clearly that these agencies could easily 
introduce wasteful duplication by pursuing their own programs. This made it 
plausible that a cooperative NASA- Air Force program, focusing on piloted 
flight to orbit, would take shape as a national program, a unified effort shaped 
to serve the needs of both agencies. 
Clearly, Air Force involvement would emphasize strategic reconnais- 
sance, which represented the main rationale for that service's activities in 
space. The experience of MOL, however, showed that it would not do 
simply to propose that astronauts could operate telescopes and cameras 
from orbit. Instead, the Air Force would have to use piloted flight to support 
its work with automated reconnaissance satellites, such as those of Corona 
and Gambit. 
As early as 1963, NASA and the Air Force had executed the Webb- 
McNamara agreement, which contemplated a joint space station. With MOL 
now canceled, it was difficult to see how the Pentagon could justify major par- 
ticipation in the space station that NASA's Tom Paine wanted so badly. The 
Space Shuttle was another matter. By launching, retrieving, and servicing 
spacecraft, it might significantly enhance the ability of the Air Force to con- 
duct strategic reconnaissance. In turn, by serving Air Force needs, the Shuttle 
might indeed take shape as a truly national system, carrying military as well 
as civilian payloads. Beginning in 1969, the evolution of the space shuttle 
concept took a sharp turn in this direction. 
24. Richelson, Secrer Eyes, pp. 101-103. 
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A New Shuttle Configuration 
When a new round of shuttle design studies got under way, early in 1969, the 
field had seen no truly new concept since Max Hunter’s partially-reusable 
Star Clipper of several years earlier. While work went forward at the con- 
tractors, Max Faget, at the Manned Spacecraft Center, carried through a 
parallel effort of his own that indeed came up with a new approach. His con- 
figuration not only went on to dominate the alternatives; it changed the terms 
of the ongoing discussions. These discussions had emphasized such issues as 
full versus partial reusability, with neither approach finding expression in a 
generally-accepted design concept. Faget now introduced a specific concept: 
a two-stage fully-reusable shuttle. As it gained acceptance, it spurred debate 
over its specific features, notably size, payload capacity, and choice of wing 
design. By focusing the debate, Faget’s work thus narrowed the topics that 
subsequent studies would address, and enabled these studies to achieve 
greater depth. 
Faget was an aerodynamicist who had built his career at NACA’s Langley 
Aeronautical Laboratory. He was a member of the Pilotless Aircraft Research 
Division, an early nucleus of activity in high speed flight. In 1954, he took 
part in an initial feasibility study that led to the X-15. He then found a point 
of departure for his subsequent career in the findings of his fellow NACA 
aerodynamicists, H. Julian Allen and Alfred Eggers. They had shown that for 
a reentering nose cone, a blunt shape would provide the best protection 
against the heat of reentry. 
Working with a longtime associate, Caldwell Johnson, Faget proceeded to 
devise a suitable blunt shape for Project Mercury, which put America’s first 
astronauts in orbit. His Mercury capsule took shape as a cone, with its broad 
end forward and covered with a thick layer of material to provide thermal pro- 
tection. (A cutaway view of this concept, elegantly rendered, hangs in Faget’s 
offices to this day.) He came to Houston as a founding member of the Manned 
Spacecraft Center (MSC), where he became Director of Research and 
Engineering. He also adapted his basic shape to provide capsules for Gemini 
and Ap0Il0.~~ 
25. Author interview, Max Faget, Houston, March 4,1997; AAS History Series, Vol. 8, p. 299; NASA SF-4307 
and -4308, index references under “Faget.” 
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Maxi1 me Faget. (NASA) 
“My history has always been to take the most conservative approach,” he 
declares. In this frame of mind, he disliked much of the work done to date on 
Space Shuttle concepts. Lifting-body configurations were popular; 
Lockheed’s Max Hunter had used them in his Star Clipper. Faget acknowl- 
edged their merits: “You avoid wing-body interference,” which brings 
problems of aerodynamics. “You have a simple structure. And you avoid the 
weight of wings.” He saw difficulties, however, that were so great as to rule 
out lifting bodies for a practical shuttle design. 
They had low lift and high drag, which meant a dangerously high land- 
ing speed. As he put it, “I don’t think it’s charming to come in at 250 knots.” 
Engineers at McDonnell Douglas, studying their Tip Tank lifting body, had 
tried to improve the landing characteristics by adding small wings that 
would extend from the body during the final approach. This appeared as 
very makeshift. 
Because they required a fuselage that would do the work of a wing, lifting 
bodies also promised serious difficulties in development. It would not be possi- 
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Fuget’s shuttle concept. (NASA) 
ble to solve aerodynamic problems in straightforward ways; the attempted solu- 
tions would rami@ throughout the entire design. In his words, “They’re very 
difficult to develop, because when you try to solve one more problem, you’re 
creating another problem somewhere else.” His colleague Milton Silveira, who 
went on to head the MSC Shuttle Engineering Office, held a similar view: 
If we had a problem with the aerodynamics on the vehicle, where the body 
was so tightly coupled to the aerodynamics, you couldn’t simply go out and 
change the wing. You had to change the whole damn vehicle, so ifyou made 
a mistake, being able to correct it was a very di@cult thing to do.26 
Instead, Faget proposed to build each of his shuttle’s two stages as a 
winged airplane, with thermal protection on the underside. Before it could fly 
as an airplane, such a shuttle would first have to reenter, which meant it 
26. Author interview, Max Faget, Houston, March 4, 1997; Joe Guilmamn and John Mauer interview, Milton 
Sdveira, Washington, November 14, 1984, p, 14. 
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would need the high drag of a blunt body. “With extremely high drag,” he 
notes, “you throw a big shock wave in front of you, and all the energy goes 
into that shock.” Even with thermal protection, he did not want to fly his shut- 
tle during reentry, in the manner of an airplane: “It’s a hell of a lot easier to 
do a no-lift entry than a lifting entry, from the standpoint of heat protection.” 
With airplane-style reentry, “you are stuck in the atmosphere, going fast for 
a long time.” Rather than lose energy to a shock wave, the airplane would 
experience drag through friction with the atmosphere which would transfer 
heat to its surface. 
Faget expected to turn his airplane into a blunt body by the simple method 
of having it reenter at a very high angle of attack, with its broad lower surface 
facing the direction of flight. In effect, he would take an Apollo capsule, with 
its large circular heat shield, and trim it to the shape of an airplane with wings. 
This concept drew on the experience of the X-15 that looked like a fighter 
plane but reduced its reentry heating by coming in nose-high. It also revived 
a design approach introduced a decade earlier by NASA’s Charles Mathews. 
He had also proposed to build a winged spacecraft as a glider that would reen- 
ter with its bottom side facing forward. 
Faget wrote that “the vehicle would remain in this flight attitude through- 
out the entire descent to approximately 40,000 feet, where the velocity will 
have dropped to less than 300 feet per second. At this point, the nose gets 
pushed down, and the vehicle dives until it reaches adequate velocity for level 
flight.” This dive would cost some 15,000 feet of altitude. The craft then 
would approach a runway and land at a moderate 130 knots, half the landing 
speed of a lifting body. 
Faget wrote that because its only real flying would take place during this 
landing approach, a wing design “can be selected solely on the basis of opti- 
mization for subsonic cruise and landing.” The wing best suited to this limited 
purpose would be straight and unswept, like the wings of fighter planes in 
World War II. A tail would provide directional stability, again as with a con- 
ventional airplane. By moving control surfaces on the horizontal stabilizer, a 
pilot then could raise the nose slightly just before touching down on a runway, 
in a maneuver called a flare which adds lift and makes the touchdown gentle.27 
27. Astmnautics & Aeronautics, January 1970, pp. 52-61; author interview, Max Faget, Houston, March 4, 
1997; Faget and Sdveua, Fundamental Design Consideratdons, October 1970. 
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Faget’s concept had the beauty of simplicity and, inevitably, knowledge- 
able specialists would criticize it as being too simple. The Air Force Flight 
Dynamics Laboratory (FDL), at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, quickly 
emerged as a center of such criticism. The FDL had sponsored space shuttle 
studies in parallel with those of NASA, and had investigated such concepts as 
Lockheed’s Star Clipper. One of its managers, Charles Cosenza, had been a 
leader in the development of ASSET. Another FDL scientist, Alfred Draper, 
was a leader in the field of space systems. Beginning in early 1969, he took the 
initiative in questioning Faget’s approach.28 
Draper did not accept the idea of building a shuttle as an airplane that 
would come in nose-high, then dive through 15,000 feet to pick up flying 
speed. With its nose so high, the plane would be fully stalled, and the Air 
Force disliked both stalls and dives, regarding them as preludes to an out-of- 
control crash. Draper preferred to have the shuttle enter its glide while still 
supersonic, thus maintaining much better control while continuing to avoid 
aerodynamic heating. 
If the shuttle was to glide across a broad Mach range, from supersonic to 
subsonic, then it would encounter an important aerodynamic problem: a shift 
in the wing’s center of lift. Although a wing generates lift across its entire 
lower surface, one may regard this lift as concentrated at a point, the center of 
lift. At supersonic speeds, this center is located midway down the wing’s chord 
(the distance from leading to trailing edge). At subsonic speeds, this center 
shifts and moves forward, much closer to the leading edge. Keeping an air- 
plane in proper balance requires the application of an aerodynamic force that 
can compensate for this shift. 
The Air Force had extensive experience with supersonic fighters and 
bombers that had successfully addressed this problem, maintaining good con- 
trol and handling characteristics from Mach 3 to touchdown. Particularly for 
large aircraft-the B-58 and XB-70 bombers, and the SR-71-the preferred 
solution was a delta wing, triangular in shape. Typically, delta wings ran along 
much of the length of the fuselage, extending nearly to the tail. Such aircraft 
dispensed with horizontal stabilizers and relied instead on elevons, control 
surfaces resembling ailerons set at the wing’s trailing edge. Small deflections 
28. Jenkins, Space Shuttle, pp. 36, 56; Hallion, ed., Hypersonics, p. 459; Astronautics & Aeronautics, January 
1971, p. 28. 
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Straight-wing orbiter, top, and delta-wing orbiter. (Art by Dennis Jenkins) 
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of these elevons then compensated for the shift in the center of lift, maintain- 
ing proper trim and balance without imposing excessive drag.29 
Draper proposed that both stages of Faget’s shuttle should feature delta 
wings, rather than straight ones. Faget would have none of this. Though he 
acknowledged the center-of-lift problem, he expected to avoid it: “The straight 
wing never flew at those speeds; it fell at those speeds.” A delta wing with 
elevons promised problems at landing, when executing the flare prior to touch- 
down. That flare was to add lift, but raising the elevons would increase the 
drag-with the added lift coming only after the nose had time to come up. This 
momentary rise in drag would make the landing tricky and possibly dangerous. 
To achieve a suitably slow landing speed, Faget argued that the delta wing 
would need a large wingspan. A straight wing, having narrow chord, would be 
light and would offer relatively little area demanding thermal protection. A 
delta of the same span, necessary for a moderate landing speed, would be phys- 
ically much larger than the straight wing. It would add considerable weight, 
and would greatly increase the area that would receive thermal protection. 
Draper responded with his own viewpoint. For a straight wing to deal 
with the shift in center of lift, a good engineering solution would call for 
installation of canards, small wings mounted well forward on the fuselage that 
would deflect to give the desired control. Canards produce lift, and would 
tend to push the main wings farther to the back. These wings would be well 
aft from the beginning, for they would support an airplane that was empty of 
fuel but that had heavy rocket engines at the tail, placing the airplane’s center 
of gravity far to the rear. The wings’ center of lift was to coincide closely with 
this center of gravity. Draper wrote that the addition of canards “will move the 
wings aft and tend to close the gap between the tail and the wing.’’ The wing 
shape that fills this gap is the delta; Draper added that “the swept delta would 
most likely evolve.” 
The delta also had other advantages as well. Being thick where it joins the 
fuselage, it would readily offer room for landing gear. Its sharply-swept lead- 
ing edge meant that a delta would produce less drag than a straight wing near 
Mach 1.  In addition to this, when decelerating through the sound barrier, a 
delta would shift its center of lift more slowly. The combination of a sudden 
drag rise near Mach 1, combined with a rapid center-of-lift shift, would pro- 
29. Hallion, Hypersonic, p. 1032; author interview, Dale Myers, Leucadia, California, December 6, 1996. 
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duce a sudden and potentially disconcerting change in the stability character- 
istics of a straight-winged shuttle when slowing through the speed of sound. 
This change in stability would be much less pronounced with a delta, and 
would give a pilot more time to react.30 
The merits of deltas might have remained a matter for specialists except 
for another important feature of the delta: Compared to the straight wing, it 
produced considerably more lift at hypersonic speeds. Using this lift, a reen- 
tering shuttle could achieve a substantial amount of crossrange, flying large 
distances to the left or right of an initial direction of flight. The Air Force 
wanted plenty of crossrange, and the reasons involved its activity in strategic 
reconnaissance. In particular, these reasons drew on recent experience involv- 
ing the Six-Day War in the Middle East in 1967, and the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
The Six-Day War broke out suddenly, pitting Israel against a coalition led 
by Egypt whose tanks and aircraft came largely from the Soviet Union. 
Though America’s intelligence community sought to follow the fighting 
closely, its means proved to be limited. A ship near the Israeli coast, the USS 
Liberty, monitored the communications of the belligerents-until the Israelis 
bombed it. Though spy planes, such as the U-2 and SR-7 1, could look down 
through clear desert skies, experience had shown that the U-2 was vulnerable 
to antiaircraft missiles. Satellite reconnaissance relied on Gambit and Corona, 
which had been designed to follow the slow development and deployment of 
missiles and other strategic weapons. They were not well-suited to the swift 
battle maneuvers of the 1967 war, and Defense Secretary McNamara does not 
recall that these spacecraft played any role in U.S. intelligence-gathering 
during those six days. By the time Corona photography became available, the 
war was already over. 
Then, in August 1968, the Soviets stormed into Prague. A Gambit space- 
craft, launched on August 6, performed poorly and was deorbited before the 
invasion took place. In addition to this, the CIA had a Corona satellite that 
entered orbit on August 7. It carried two capsules for film return. The first 
one appeared reassuring; it showed no indications of Soviet preparations for 
an attack. The second capsule returned photos that clearly showed such 
30. Author interview, Max Faget, Houston, March 4, 1997; Asfronaufics & Aeruneufzcs, January 1970, pp. 26- 
35; AIAA Paper 70-1249. 
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preparations, including massing of troops. By the time that film reached 
Washington, however, those photos were of historical interest only. The inva- 
sion had already taken place.31 
Clearly, the CIA needed real-time space reconnaissance, and its pursuit of 
this goal would represent one more instance wherein a task originally thought 
to require astronauts would be accomplished using automated electronics. 
The true solution would lie in doing away with photographic film, which took 
time to expose and return. This film would give way to a new electronic 
microchip called a charge-coupled device. With an image focused onto this 
chip, it would convert the image into a rapid series of bits. The data, trans- 
mitted to the ground, would give the desired real-time photography, and with 
very high resolution. In addition to this, by freeing reconnaissance satellites 
from the need to carry and return film, this invention would allow such space- 
craft to remain in orbit and to operate for years.32 
The charge-coupled device grew out of the work of two specialists at Bell 
Labs, William Boyle and George Smith. In 1969, such technology still lay in 
the future. The view in the Air Force was that the CIA would need piloted 
spacecraft to produce the real-time photos. The late lamented MOL had rep- 
resented a possible method, for an onboard photointerpreter might take, 
develop, and analyze photos on short notice. Now, with MOL in its graveyard, 
attention turned to the Space Shuttle. It might fly into space, execute a single 
orbit, and return to its base with film exposed less than an hour earlier. 
Because much of the Soviet Union lies above the Arctic Circle, the Air 
Force was accustomed to placing reconnaissance satellites into polar orbits. It 
could not do this by firing its boosters from Cape Canaveral; geography dic- 
tated that these boosters would fly over populated territory. A launch to the 
north carried the hazard of impact in the Carolinas; a launch to the south would 
compromise security if the rocket fell on Cuba. Hence, the Air Force main- 
tained its own space center at Vandenberg AFB, on the California coast. It 
offered a clear shot to the south, across thousands of miles of open 
While a satellite orbit remains fixed in orientation with respect to distant 
stars, the Earth rotates below this orbit. This permitted single reconnaissance 
missions to photograph much of the Soviet Union. Howyer, it meant that if 
31. Richelson, Secret Eyes, pp. 94-96,97-99. 
32. Ibid., pp. 124-132, 362; Quest, Summer 1995, pp. 31-32 
33. Tlme, December 15, 1958, pp. 15, 4142. 
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a shuttle was to execute a one-orbit mission from Vandenberg, it would return 
to the latitude of that base after 90 minutes in space only to find that, due to 
the Earth’s rotation, this base had moved to the east by 1,100 nautical miles. 
Air Force officials indeed expected to launch the Shuttle from Vandenberg, 
and they insisted that the Shuttle had to have enough crossrange to cover that 
distance and return successfully. 
The Air Force had other reasons to want once-around missions. Its plan- 
ners were intrigued by the idea of using the Shuttle to retrieve satellites in 
orbit. They hoped to snare Soviet spacecraft in such a fashion-and because 
Moscow might defend such assets by deploying an antisatellite weapon, the 
Air Force took the view that if the thing was to be done at all, it was best to 
do it quickly. A once-around mission could snare such a spacecraft and return 
safely by the time anyone realized it ,was missing. 
In addition to this, NASA and the Air Force shared a concern that a shut- 
tle might have to abort its mission and come down as quickly as possible after 
launch. This might require “once-around abort,” which again would lead to a 
flight of a single orbit. A once-around abort on a due-east launch from Cape 
Canaveral would not be too difficult; the craft might land at any of a number 
of sites within the United States. In the words of NASA’s LeRoy Day, “If you 
were making a polar-type launch out of Vandenberg, and you had Max’s 
straight-wing vehicle, there was no place you could go. You’d be in the water 
when you came back. You’ve got to go crossrange quite a few hundred miles 
in order to make land.”34 
The Air Force had ample opportunity to emphasize its desire for cross- 
range by working within the Joint Study Group that Paine and Seamans had 
set up to seek a mutually-acceptable shuttle design. There were informal dis- 
cussions as well. George Mueller, who continued to head NASA’s OMSF 
through the whole of 1969, met repeatedly with Air Force representatives at 
his home in Georgetown, close to downtown Washington. One of his guests 
was Michael Yaryrnovych, an Air Force deputy assistant secretary. Another 
guest, Grant Hansen, was assistant secretary for research and development. 
He and Mueller also were co-chairmen of the joint study.35 
34. Personal discussions with John Pike, Federation of American Scientists, July 1997; John Mauer interview, 
LeRoy Day, October 17, 1983, p. 41; Pace, Engineering, pp. 146-149. 
35. Mueller, Briefing, 5 May 1969, p. 2; Pace, Engineering, p. 103. 
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These Air Force leaders knew that they held the upper hand. They were 
well aware that NASA needed a shuttle program and therefore needed both 
the Air Force’s payloads and its political support. The payloads represented a 
tempting prize, for that service was launching over two hundred reconnais- 
sance missions between 1959 and 1970.36 In addition to this, Air Force 
support for a shuttle could insulate NASA quite effectively from a charge that 
the Shuttle was merely a step toward sending astronauts to Mars. 
Yet while NASA needed the Air Force, the Air Force did not need NASA. 
That service was quite content with existing boosters such as the Titan 111. 
“Sure, NASA needs the shuttle for the space station,’’ Hansen said in the spring 
of 1970. “But for the next 10 years, expendables can handle the Air Force job. 
We don’t consider the Shuttle important enough to set money aside for it.” 
Yarymovych has a similar recollection: 
NASA needed Air Force support, both for payloads and in Congress. I told 
Mueller we %I support the Shuttle, but only if he gave us the big payload bay 
and the crossrange capability, so we could return to Vandenberg afer a 
single orbit. Mueller knew that would mean changing Max Faget’s beloved 
straight-wing design into a delta wing, but he had no choice. He agreed.37 
It was not that simple, of course; no impromptu discussion with Mueller 
would settle such an issue. Rather, it was a matter for the formal protocols of 
Air Force-NASA cooperation. There was strong conflict between these agen- 
cies’ wishes, for a NASA baseline document of June 1969, “Desired System 
Characteristics,” emphasized that NASA needed only 250 to 400 nautical 
miles of crossrange, enough to assure a return to Cape Canaveral at least once 
every 24 hours. Faget’s straight-wing shuttle could achieve 230 nautical miles; 
straightforward modifications would meet NASA’s modest requirements. 
To give the Air Force its 1,100 nautical miles of crossrange would impose 
a serious penalty in design, by requiring considerably more thermal protec- 
tion. The change to a delta wing, even without crossrange, would add 
considerably to the wing area demanding such protection. Crossrange then 
would increase this requirement even further. The Shuttle would achieve its 
36. Quest, Summer 1995, pp. 22-33; Winter 1995, pp. 40-45. 
37. Grey, Enterprise, pp. 67-68. 
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crossrange by gliding hypersonically, and hence would compromise the 
simple nose-high mode of reentry that would turn it into a blunt body. This 
hypersonic glide would produce more lift and less drag. It also would increase 
both the rate of heating and the duration of heating. Crossrange thus would 
call for a double dose of additional thermal protection, resulting in a shuttle 
that would be heavier-and more costly.38 
Even in its simple straight-wing form, Faget’s concept of a two-stage 
fully-reusable shuttle did not take NASA by storm. It won its pre-eminence 
only after a process of review and evaluation that extended through 1969 and 
into 1970. The framework for this process involved the contractors’ studies of 
shuttle configurations that had begun early in 1969. Those studies ruled out 
expendable boosters for a reusable shuttle, for such boosters were found to 
exceed the Saturn V in size. Fully- and partially-reusable shuttle concepts 
38. Day, manager, Task Gmup Report, VoL II, June 12, 1969, pp. 40-42; Astronautics & Aemnaiitics, January 
1970, pp. 57.59; Faget and Silveira, Fundamenfa[ Design Considerations, October 1970, pp. 5, 17. 
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remained in the running, and Faget’s concept counted as a new example of the 
former. NASA proceeded to examine it alongside several alternatives, begin- 
ning in mid- 1969. 
The initial round of studies, during the first half of 1969, had come to $1.2 
million, divided equally among four contractors. NASA now extended these 
studies by giving $150,000 more to each of three contractors, with 
McDonnell Douglas receiving $225,000. The participating companies also 
received new instructions that redirected their work. 
North American Rockwell had examined expendable boosters. With this 
approach now out of favor, this f u n  was free to direct its attention to some- 
thing new. This proved to be Faget’s straight-wing concept, largely in the form 
he recommended. 
McDonnell Douglas, which had examined its Tip Tank stage-and-a-half 
design, now switched to two-stage fully-reusables. These, however, were not 
Faget’s, but rather continued an earlier line of work. They featured orbiter 
designs derived from the HL- 10 lifting body, with this contractor’s engineers 
considering 13 possible configurations for the complete two-stage vehicle. 
At first, the other two contractors saw little change in their assignments. 
Lockheed was to continue with studies of Star Clipper and of its own version 
of the Triamese. General Dynamics, home of the initial Triamese concept, 
was to study variants of this design, and would also apply its background to 
design a fully-reusable concept having only two elements rather than the three 
of Triamese. 
The orders for this redirection went out on June 20, 1969. Within weeks, 
the studies brought a flurry of activity that further narrowed the admissible 
choices. Expendable boosters had already fallen by the wayside. On August 6, 
a meeting of shuttle managers brought a decision to drop all partidly-reusable 
systems as well. With this, both Lockheed’s Star Clipper and McDonnell 
Douglas’s Tip Tank were out. This decision meant that NASA would consider 
only fully-reusable concepts.39 
Partially-reusable designs had represented an effort to meet economic 
goals by seeking a shuttle that would cost less to develop than a fully- 
reusable system, even while imposing higher costs per flight. This approach 
had held promise prior to the spring of 1969, when the shuttle had been con- 
39. Akridge, Space Shuttle, pp. 53,71-72, 90; Jenluns, Space Shuttle, pp. 60-64. 
218 
Shuttle to the Forefront 
Fully-reusable shuttle concepts of 1969; R indicates the stage is  reusable. I )  Triamese of General 
Dynamics. 2 )  Two-stage arrangement with both stages thrusting at launch. 3) Two stages, upper 
stage ignited at high altitude. 4) Faget’s concept. 5) Concept of NASA Langley, with both stages 
as lifting bodies. (NASA) 
sidered largely as a means of providing space station logistics. Now its 
intended uses were broadening to include launches of automated spacecraft, 
which meant it might fly far more often. The low cost per flight of a fully- 
reusable now made it attractive, and encouraged NASA to accept its higher 
development 
There were at least five ways to build a fully-reusable shuttle, and NASA 
had appropriate designations and descriptions: 
FR-1: the Triamese; 
FR-2: a two-stage vehicle with the engines of both stages ignited at launch; 
FR-3: a two-stage vehicle with engines in the orbiter ignited only upon 
staging (Faget’s shuttle was an FR-3; so were the concepts of 
McDonnell Douglas); 
FR-4: a variant of the Triamese with the core stage not of the same length 
as the twin booster stages; 
FR-5: a concept designed to avoid a shift in its center of gravity as its 
propellant tanks would empty, thus easing problems of stability and 
control. 
40. Day, manager, Summary Report, December 10, 1969 
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On September 4, another meeting eliminated the Triamese configurations. 
The initial concept, the FR-1, had called for three elements of common length 
and structural design. It had proven difficult, however, to have one shape serve 
both as booster and orbiter; to Silveira, “it gets all screwed up, so you get a 
lousy orbiter and a lousy booster, but you don’t get one that does well.” 
Advocates of the Triamese had turned to the FR-4, with its unequal-length 
design. This, however, proved heavier than the FR-3, while requiring two 
booster elements rather than one. It also lost much of the potential cost saving 
from design commonality between the three elements. 
The FR-3 and FR-5 remained. The latter had few advocates; the problem 
of center-of-gravity shift was not so severe as to call for the design innova- 
tions of this class of concepts. The manager Max Akridge writes, “It was felt 
at this time that clearly, the FR-3 configuration was the forer~mner.”~~ 
These decisions brought a further redirection in the studies, for while 
North American Rockwell had gotten an early start on Faget’s concept, the 
other three contractors had to change course. McDonnell Douglas, having 
found no advantage in its lifting-body orbiters, turned to winged orbiters 
resembling those of Faget. 
While Lockheed also turned to the FR-3, it did not embrace Faget’s con- 
cept wholeheartedly. This company had spent several years studying Star 
Clipper, which featured a lifting-body orbiter, triangular in shape. This now 
looked like a good way to meet Air Force crossrange requirements, and 
Lockheed‘s new design retained this lifting body, with a broad underside in the 
shape of a delta. 
General Dynamics showed its own individuality. That firm had designed 
its Triamese with retractable wings, which would fold into the body during 
flight but swing outward for landing. This eased the problem of providing 
these wings with thermal protection, because the fuselage would shield them. 
This feature now reappeared in the company’s new FR-3. It drew on more 
than Triamese; it also reflected company experience with swinging wings. 
These were part of the F-111 fighter-bomber, which swung its wings to 
achieve good performance in both subsonic and supersonic flight.42 
41 Akridge, Space Shuttle, p 93; Jenkins, Space Shuttle, pp. 66-70; Joe Guilmartin and John Mauer interview, 
Milton Silveira, Washington, November 14, 1984, pp. 12-13. 
42. Reports MDC E0056 (McDonnell Douglas); GDC-DCB69-046 (General Dynamics); SD 69-573- 1 (North 
American Rockwell); LMSC-A959837 (Lockheed), Jenkins, Space Shuttle, pp. 63-70. 
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Hence, by the end of 1969 NASA had settled on the FR-3 as its choice, 
with Faget’s specific concept in the forefront. This raised important questions 
concerning thermal protection. The booster was to be as large as a Boeing 
747, yet was to outperform the X-15, reaching considerably higher speeds. 
The orbiter would be longer than a Boeing 707. For both, the thermal protec- 
tion had to be reusable. 
Within the industry, a standard engineering solution called for the use of 
hot structures. This approach had a background that included the X-15, 
Dyna-Soar, ASSET, as well as the Lockheed SR-7 1 that was flying routinely 
above Mach 3. Hot structures typically called for titanium as the basic mate- 
rial, covered with high temperature insulation and an outer skin formed of 
metallic shingles. The metal was molybdenum or columbium, to withstand 
extreme temperatures while radiating away the heat. Like the shingles on a 
roof, those on the surface of a hot structure were loosely attached, to expand 
and contract freely with temperature change. 
Such structures were complex, and the shingles posed difficulties of their 
own. Columbium and molybdenum oxidize readily when hot, and required 
coatings to resist this. The Dyna-Soar had been designed to use such thermal 
protection, and Faget declared that “the least little scratch in the coating, the 
shingle would be destroyed during re-entxy.” In turn, lost shingles could bring 
the loss of a vehicle. 
NASA and Lockheed now were developing a new surface material: an 
insulation made of interlaced fibers of silica that could be applied to the out- 
side of a vehicle. These could withstand temperatures of 2,500 degrees 
Fahrenheit, making them suitable for all but the hottest areas on a reentering 
shuttle. The outer surface would radiate away the heat, in the fashion of the 
shingles. The thickness of the silica then would prevent most of the heat 
from reaching the vehicle’s skin. This material would not oxidize. It also was 
light, weighing as little as 15 pounds per cubic foot, or one-fourth the den- 
sity of water. 
This material would form the well-known “tiles” of the Shuttle program, 
being attached to the skin in the form of numerous small shapes somewhat 
resembling bricks. In 1969, their immediate prospect lay in simplifying the 
design of hot structures. These might now dispense with their shingles; engi- 
neers instead would use titanium to craft an aircraft structure, with skin 
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covering an internal framework, then provide thermal protection by covering 
the skin with the tiles.43 
The design studies of 1969 raised another tantalizing prospect: that these 
tiles might offer enough heat resistance to build the basic structure of alu- 
minum rather than titanium. Titanium was hard to work with; few machine 
shops had the necessary expertise. Moreover, its principal uses in aerospace 
had occurred within classified programs such as the SR-7 1, which meant that 
much of the pertinent shop-floor experience itself was classified. This metal 
could withstand higher temperatures than aluminum. Yet, if tiles could protect 
aluminum, the use of that metal would open the Shuttle to the entire aerospace 
industry. In Silveira’s words, building aluminum airplanes was something that 
“the industry knew how to do. The industry had, on the floor, standards- 
things like, ‘What are the proper cutting speeds?’ They knew how to rivet or 
machine aluminum.”44 
Hot structures, built of titanium, would continue to represent an important 
approach in shuttle design. As early as 1969, however, Lockheed took the ini- 
tiative in designing a shuttle orbiter built of aluminum and protected with 
tiles. General Dynamics added its own concept, featuring aluminum protected 
by shingled hot structures that could keep internal temperatures below 200 “E 
At the end of 1969, the contractors’ orbiter concepts were as follows, with 
the boosters being similar:4s 
Configuration Main structure Thermal protection 
North American Faget-type, Titanium Tiles 
Rockwell straight wing 
Genera1 Deployable Aluminum Hot structure 
Dynamics straight wing 
Lockheed Delta lifting Aluminum Tiles 
McDonnell Faget- type, Titanium Tiles 
Douglas straight wing 
body 
43. Author interview, Max Faget, Houston, March 4, 1997; proceedings, NASA Space Shuttle Symposium, 
October 16-17, 1969, pp. 581-591; Report MDC E0056 (McDonnell Douglas), pp. 10-1 I ;  Jenluns, Space 
Shuttle, p. 64. 
44. Heppenheimer, Turbulent Skies, p. 209; Joe Guilmartin and John Mauer interview, MiIton Silveira, 
Washington, November 14, 1984, p. 16. 
45. Reports MDC E0056 (McDonnell Douglas); GDC-DCB69-046 (General Dynamics); SD 69-573- 1 (North 
American Rockwell), LMSC-A959837 (Lockheed); Jenkins, Space Shuttle, pp. 63-71. 
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These represented variants of Faget’s two-stage concept, which showed 
that shuttle design had come a long way during that year. Twelve months 
earlier, the candidate configurations included expendable boosters as well 
as partially- and fully-reusable concepts. The range of alternatives included 
the Titan 111-M with an enlarged Dyna-Soar, the Star Clipper, and the 
Triamese. These were as mutually dissimilar as a fighter, a bomber, and a 
commercial airliner. 
People still debated such issues as delta wings vs. straight, aluminum vs. 
titanium, and hot structures vs. tiles. By year’s end, however, everyone agreed 
that the Shuttle would look much like Faget’s. This meant that the most basic 
issues of configuration had been settled, allowing engineers to advance to 
deeper levels of detail. The studies of 1970 would pursue such levels, and 
would lay important groundwork for the eventual evolution of complete engi- 
neering designs, explicit in all particulars. 
The work of 1969 had given the space station more support than the 
Shuttle. The studies of that year initially had allocated $5.8 million for the sta- 
tion and only $1.2 million for the Shuttle; the additional funds granted for the 
latter at midyear, totalling less than $0.7 million, did little to redress this 
imbalance. In 1970, however, NASA would bring the shuttle to the forefront. 
In this year, the centerpiece of effort would involve two $8-million contracts 
for further work on the Shuttle. There would be no significant amount of new 
funding for the station. These internal NASA decisions would point toward 
abandonment of the station, at least for a number of years, and elevation of 
the Shuttle into the sole focus for NASA’s 
Station Fades; Shuttle Advances 
In preparation for the work of 1970, NASA and its contractors established a 
new set of institutional arrangements. Following a proposal of Dale Myers, 
the agency gave responsibility for managing the upcoming study contracts 
to NASA Marshall and to the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC). Each 
center would hold a complete contract, covering both the booster and 
orbiter. Marshall, however, would provide technical direction for the booster 
46. Logsdon, Apollo, p. III-26; Aviation Week, February 10, 1969, p. 17; Akridge, Space Shuttle, p. 71. 
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portion of both contracts, while MSC would give similar direction for the 
orbiter portions. This continued the arrangements of Apollo, which had 
assigned responsibility for the Saturn V to Marshall and for the Apollo 
moonship to MSC.47 
Within the industry, competing companies made their own arrangements. 
There would be only two principal new study contracts, but there were many 
more than two firms eager for the business, and several of them proceeded to 
form teams. This reflected the Shuttle’s two-stage design, for the complete 
shuttle was likely to be too large a project for a single contractor to handle. 
Accordingly, Lockheed teamed up with Boeing, with the two companies 
proposing respectively to handle the orbiter and booster. North American 
Rockwell joined with General Dynamics, while McDonnell Douglas associ- 
ated with Martin 
Another and highly important set of decisions extended the scope of Air 
Force-NASA cooperation. The two agencies had collaborated on a joint 
study of shuttle requirements as part of the work of the STG; this had led to 
the issuance of a three volume report in June 1969, classified Secret. That 
collaboration, however, had merely served the immediate needs of the STG 
and its supporting studies. Now, in February 1970, Paine and Seamans 
agreed to set up a permanent coordinating committee, with members to be 
drawn in equal numbers from each agency. As in the 1969 joint study, there 
again would be two co-chairmen: Dale Myers and Grant Hansen. Hansen 
had co-chaired the earlier study, while Myers would replace Mueller, on 
behalf of NASA.49 
On the matter of crossrange, at least for the moment, they agreed to dis- 
agree. Neither agency would seek to impose its will on the other. Rather, each 
main study contract would conduct two design exercises in parallel: one for 
an orbiter with crossrange of 200 nautical miles, the second with capability of 
1,500 nautical miles. The first was well within the reach of Faget’s straight- 
wing concepts; the second called for more than the Air Force would need. 
Like a baseball player who swings two bats during w m u p  and then finds 
that his single bat feels lighter, the exercise of designing for 1,500 nautical 
47. Low, Personal Notes No. 5, January 17, 1970, p. 4; Aviation Week, February 16, 1970, p. 14. 
48 Aviation Week, January 19, 1970, pp. 17-18; February 9, 1970, p. 27. 
49. Akridge, Space Shurtle, p. 70; NMI 1052.130, February 17, 1970. Reprinted in NASA SP-4407, Vol. 11, pp. 
367-368; see also p. 369. 
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miles would stretch the minds of engineers and make it easier for them to 
achieve the 1,100 nautical miles that represented the real requirement. 
From the outset, however, Paine and Seamans could agree on an impor- 
tant point which Paine described as “a payload volume of 15 feet diameter by 
60 feet long.” Previous studies had considered payload bays not only of this 
size but of 22 feet diameter by 30 feet long. The new requirement reflected 
the needs of both agencies.5O 
The Air Force needed length, for its reconnaissance satellites amounted to 
orbiting telescopes, and these had to be long to yield the sharpest images. 
Moreover, such satellites were growing markedly in length. The Corona 
spacecraft of the 1960s, each with an attached Agena upper stage, had started 
at 19 feet and quickly grew to 26. The CIA was now readying a new class of 
satellites that would win the name of Big Bird. With dimensions of 40 by 10 
feet, it represented a backup to MOL, whose length and width had been vir- 
tually the same. The next generation of satellites, called Kennan, would keep 
the 10-foot diameter but would grow in length to 64 feet. 
Big Bird was in an advanced state of development in 1970; the first of 
them flew to orbit atop a Titan 111-D in June 1971. Their photos gave a reso- 
lution of two feet. Kennan was still in initial studies, for it would introduce 
long-duration operations and the use of charge-coupled devices rather than 
film. Though it would not fly until December 1976, its images would show 
resolution as sharp as six inches. 
In 1970, the size of Kennan had not been fixed; indeed, very little about 
this project had been fixed. It was clear to Air Force planners, however, that 
they would face an increasing need to launch long satellites. Accordingly, they 
declared that they would need a length of 60 feet for the shuttle’s payload bay. 
While NASA did not need so much length, its officials wanted a 15-foot 
diameter to accommodate modules for a space station. This reflected a new 
approach to the design of such stations. The studies of the 1960s, including 
those that Paine had initiated in 1969, had envisioned a space station as a 
single unit that would fly atop a Saturn I-B or Saturn V. As the prospects for 
Saturns faded while those of the Shuttle seemed to advance, it appeared pru- 
dent to envision a class of stations that could be assembled in space as an 
50. Letter, Paine to Seamans, January 12, 1970; Reports NAS 9-10960 (NASA), p. 2; LMSC-A959837 
(Lockheed), p. 2; Low, Memo for Record, January 28, 1970. Reprinted in NASA SP-4407, Vol. II, pp. 
366-367 
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array of cylindrical modules, one module per shuttle flight. A shuttle bay with 
this diameter would accommodate modules 14 feet across, intermediate 
between the 10 feet of MOL and the 22 feet of Sl~ylab.~' 
In addition, a 15-by-60 foot bay would serve the needs of both agencies 
by providing room for the space tug and its payloads. Many spacecraft would 
fly to high orbit, including geosynchronous orbit, and the payload bay had to 
address such expectations as that future communications satellites would also 
grow larger. Thus, when Dale Myers asked Grant Hansen to weigh the merits 
of a reduction to 12 x 40 feet, Hansen replied: 
The length of the payload bay is the more critical dimension affecting DOD 
mission needs. If the payload bay length is reduced to 40 feet, then 71 of the 
149 payloads forecasted for the 1981 to 1990 time period in Option G and 
129 of the 232 payloads forecasted in Option B of the mission model will 
require launch vehicles of the Titan III family .... 
The 15 foot diameter by 60 foot length payload bay size previously stated 
as the DOD requirement is based upon payloads presently in the inventory, 
on the potential use of a reusable upper stage to accomplish our high energy 
missions, and on a capability to provide limited payload growth. This 
requirement is still considered valid. 
In summary, should you elect to develop the shuttle with a 12 8 x 408 
payload compartment, it will preclude our full use of the potential capability 
and operational flexibility offered by the shuttle .... Also, i f  a portion of the 
present expendable launch vehicle stable must be retained to satisjj some 
mission requirements, then the potential economic attractiveness and the util- 
ity of the shuttle to the DOD is severely diminished.s2 
On February 20, NASA officials issued the formal Request for Proposals 
(RFP) that would lead to awards of the Shuttle study contracts of 1970. In 
addition to studies of the complete two-stage vehicle, a separate RFP solicited 
proposals for similarly detailed studies of a main engine. Competing compa- 
nies had 30 days to respond; the submitted proposals would then go before a 
Source Evaluation Board that would pick the winners. This board included 
members from the Air Force. On May 12, it chose the teams headed by 
51. Richelson, Secret Eyes, pp. 48,90, 105-106, 124-130.361-362; Pace, Engineering, pp. 110-1 16. 
52. Letter, Hansen to Myers, June 21, 1971. 
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McDonnell Douglas and by North American Rockwell and accepted their 
bids. These companies now were to proceed with 1 1-month studies that 
would carry their shuttle designs to new levels of detail, with each study con- 
tract being funded at $8 million. 
A year earlier, those same companies had won similar $2.9 million con- 
tracts for studies of the space station. This reflected their strength, for they 
were the only firms to have designed and built both piloted spacecraft and 
large hydrogen-fueled rocket stages for Apollo. McDonnell had built the 
Mercury and Gemini spacecraft; Douglas’ credits included the S-IVB stage, 
MOL, and the upcoming Skylab. North American’s record included the 
Apollo spacecraft and the S-11, the second stage of the Saturn V. Other com- 
panies had gained strong achievements: General Dynamics’s Atlas, 
Lockheed’s Agena stages used with Corona, Martin Marietta’s Titan family, 
Grumman’s Apollo lunar module. In their experience, however, McDonnell 
Douglas and North American Rockwell were in a class by them~elves.~~ 
They had initiated their current space station studies in September 
1969. By the following July, these companies had carried their designs to a 
good level of detail. Their stations would take shape as a cylinder with 
diameter of 33 feet, suitable for launch by Saturn V, surmounted by an enor- 
mous solar array. Jack Heberlig, a space station manager at MSC, described 
the internal layout as “basically four decks with a cellar and an attic.” The 
cellar and attic would house spacecraft equipment, including storage tanks 
as well as noisy fans and blowers, with acoustic insulation to keep their 
noise from disturbing the crew. The four decks would provide room for 
living and working. 
Mockups, built by the contractors, showed how crew members would 
live in comfort. Each person would have a stateroom resembling a small col- 
lege dorm room, with a bunk bed, desk and chair, television and 
communications equipment, and plenty of storage space in drawers and a 
closet. Two communal lavatories would each provide a shower stall, urinal, 
and a zero-gravity toilet called a “dry john.” The commander’s stateroom 
would feature a personal lavatory, a small conference table, and a computer 
terminal-which was rare in 1970. 
53. Aviation Week, September 22, 1969, p. 100; February 16, 1970, p. 14; February 23, 1970, p. 16; May 21, 
1970, p. 18; letter, Paine to Seamans, January 12, 1970 letter, Paine to Teague, May 28, 1970. 
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Space station concept of 1970, intended for launch with the Saturn V. (North American 
Rockwell) 
A U-shaped galley, with plenty of countertop space, would include ovens, 
dishwasher, trash compactor, refrigerator, and storage cabinets. Tables, each 
with four seats, would stand near a wall of freezer cabinets. Within a recre- 
ation area, a similar table would provide room for hobbies and games, with 
television and movies also being available. A medical room with a treatment 
table would serve as a dispensary and first-aid station, while also supporting 
studies of crew members’ general health. 
Though a Saturn V was to launch this station, its logistics were to depend 
on use of the Shuttle. Heberlig projected “a minimum of 91 Shuttle flights over 
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a 10-year period.” But in July 1970, with the shuttle/station having survived by 
the narrowest of margins in both the Senate and House, it was clear that to pro- 
ceed with simultaneous development of both projects would court di~aster.’~ 
Dale Myers responded by deciding to move ahead with the Shuttle first. 
This brought a major NASA decision that redirected the ongoing space sta- 
tion studies. While work on 33-foot-diameter versions would continue, the 
agency now would emphasize investigation of modular versions, which the 
Shuttle could build in orbit as well as service. 
This decision took shape as part of the broader cutbacks that Paine 
announced in September 1970. Those cutbacks canceled two Apollo mis-  
sions, freeing their Saturn V rockets for other duty, and Paine noted hopefully 
that they might find use “in the Skylab, Space Station or other programs 
where manned operations or a heavy boost capability is required.”55 
Early in 1969, a year and a half previously, it had appeared obvious that 
Paine’s station, with its crew of 12, would fly atop a Saturn V. The space sta- 
tion studies of that decade had all assumed use of Saturn-class launch 
vehicles, with the Shuttle merely as a handmaiden, a logistics vehicle that was 
poorly defined. By mid-1970, however, the Shuttle and station had reversed 
positions. The Shuttle now was ready to stand on its own, justified in large 
part by the work it could do in supporting the Air Force’s automated space- 
craft. With the Saturn V now representing the rarest and most valuable of 
commodities, NASA could expect to use it only after the most searching 
examination of alternatives. These alternatives would particularly include the 
construction of modular space stations, which could avoid use of Saturn-class 
boosters entirely. 
Now it was the station that retreated to the realm of initial studies. There 
was no clear understanding, at least in 1970, of how specifically one might pro- 
ceed with such modular stations, for the work to date had emphasized the 
design of such stations as large single units. North American Rockwell and 
McDonnell Douglas carried through an appropriate round of studies during 
1971, and issued their reports. Then, with budget cuts continuing to squeeze 
future goals, NASA largely dropped its plans for such stations pending com- 
54. 
55. 
Aviation Week, Septembw 22, 1969, pp. 100-1 13; August 3, 1970, pp. 40-45; Report SD-70-536 (North 
American Rockwell), AIAA Paper 69-1064. 
Low, Personal Notes No. 27, July 18, 1970, p. 13; Paine, statement, September 2, 1970; letter, Low to 
Shultz, September 30, 1970, p. 4. 
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Modular space station, with modules to be carried aboard the Space Shuttle. (McDonnell 
D o u g h )  
pletion of shuttle development. Not until 1984, with the shuttle operational, 
would President Reagan finally give the go-ahead for a space station 
After 1970, with the space station off in the wilderness, its supporters 
could at least take heart that the Shuttle’s capacious payload bay had been 
sized to accommodate its modules. The size of that bay also served a more 
immediate purpose, for it helped to nail down Air Force support. During the 
latter months of 1970, events showed that by working to win this support, and 
by deferring the space station to a much later time, NASA was well on the 
way to overcoming its opposition in Congress. 
The NASA appropriation for FY 197 1 had been part of an omnibus spend- 
ing bill that had included funds for the Department of Housing and Urban 
56. Reports MDC 2570, MDC 2727 (McDonnell Douglas), SD 70-153, SD 70-160, SD 71-214, SD 71-217-1, 
SD 71 -576 (North Amencan Rockwell). 
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Development. In debate during July, the Senate had added $400 million for the 
programs that Paine described as This led Nixon to veto the entire 
bill, forcing NASA and the other affected agencies to get by for a time through 
the temporary funding provided by a continuing resolution in Congress. The 
Senate again took up the appropriations measure on December 7, and once 
more Senator Mondale introduced his amendment that sought to delete fund- 
ing for the shuttle/station. 
This time it went down to defeat by a comfortable margin, 26 to 50. 
Several senators switched their votes to support NASA, with one of them 
being John Pastore, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee. 
Following the vote, he stated, “This matter came before the Senate twice; the 
matter has been decided. It has been decided by the House and it has been 
decided by the Senate.” Mondale continued to introduce similar amendments 
on subsequent occasions, but found his quest becoming increasingly lonely as 
they met defeat by even larger margins: 22 to 64 in 1971, 21 to 61 in 1972. 
With the Senate vote of December 1970, however, it was already clear that 
opposition had collapsed.57 
Also during 1970, the joint NASA-Air Force Space Transportation 
System Committee emerged as a forum where representatives of the two 
agencies could hammer out solutions in areas of disagreement. The February 
1970 concordat between Paine and Seamans, in establishing this committee, 
also stated that shuttle development “will be managed by NASA” and “will 
be generally unclassified.” At meetings of this committee, however, Air Force 
officials proved quite frank in presenting classified material to support that 
service’s point of view. 
At a committee meeting on June 29, the Air Force gave a briefing on the 
size and weight requirements of DoD payloads. This began by disclosing the 
size and weight of current payloads, and went on to project the specifications 
of future payloads, eight to ten years ahead. The presentation also reviewed 
the history of Air Force launch vehicle payload capabilities and the length of 
payload fairings. 
This briefing supported the Air Force demand for a 60-by-15 foot cargo 
bay. The length would accommodate both current and future payloads; the 
57. Logsdon, Apollo, chapter 5, pp. 51-52; Congressional Record December 7, 1970, pp. S19525319552; 
Low, Personal Notes No. 37, December 20, 1970, p. 4; Aviation Week, July 5, 1 9 7 1 ,  p. 19; Nafzonal Journal, 
August 12, 1972, p. 1290 May 12, 1973, p. 689. 
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diameter would provide room for a space tug. It would also alleviate design 
complications associated with the restrictions of current launch vehicles such 
as the Titan 111-D, which limited spacecraft to diameters of 10 feet.58 
NASA willingly accepted this requirement, incorporating it explicitly 
within the Study Control Document that would guide the new round of space 
shuttle studies. However, this document did not specify a payload weight. At 
that same meeting on June 29, the Air Force declared that it wanted the 
Shuttle to carry 40,000 pounds to low polar orbit. This again would provide 
room for growth; Big Bird, a year away from its first launch, weighed close 
to 30,000 pounds, and future spacecraft would certainly be heavier. 
NASA officials gave their response at another committee meeting, on 
October 2. They noted that the baseline mission, described in the Study 
Control Document, had continued to involve logistics resupply of a space 
station or space base, in an orbit with an inclination of 55 degrees. The 
Shuttle was to carry 25,000 pounds to this orbit. Following reentry, how- 
ever, it would not glide to its home base, but would fly with power from 
turbojet engines. New studies now showed that an operational shuttle could 
indeed glide safely to this base, dispensing with those jet engines. That 
would save weight; the Air Force’s requirement of 40,000 pounds then 
would indeed be achi~vable .~~ 
By now it was clear that the Air Force was very much in the pilot’s seat 
when it came to steering the Shuttle program. Max Faget learned this late in 
1970, when he wrote a memo to his deputy director at MSC: “The USAF 
appears not to be nearly as firm on the 15 ft. diameter requirements as they 
are in length. NASA has no need for 15 ft. diameter either. It is suggested that 
you attempt to have the payload diameter reduced to 12 ft.” 
Faget was a power within NASA. He was Director of Engineering and 
Development at the MSC and reported directly to the head of that center, Robert 
Gilruth. It took the Air Force only three days to put him in his place, with a reply 
that read: “The USAF fully supports and stands firm on the present Level I 
requirement for a payload diameter of 15 feet and a length of 60 feet.” This 
reply came from one Patrick Crotty-whose rank was no higher than major.“’ 
58 NASA SP-4407, Val. 11, pp. 367-368,373-374: Pace, Engineering, pp. 113-1 14. 
59. NASA SP-4407, Vol. 11, p. 374; Pace, Engineering, p 115: Report NAS 9-10960 (NASA), p. 2: Richelson, 
Secret Eyes, p. 106. 
60 NASA SP-4307, pp 170,212-213; Pace, Engineering, pp. 115-116, 130. 
232 
Shuttle to the Forefront 
Late in December, NASA formally upgraded the Shuttle's status. It had 
been managed by the Space Shuttle Task Group, headed by LeRoy Day. The 
space station had resided within a similar task group. Now the Shuttle 
received a separate program office, headed by Charles Donlan, Deputy 
Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight. Donlan reported directly 
to Dale Myers, an Associate Administrator, and also kept Day as his own 
deputy. On NASA's organization chart, this raised the Shuttle to the status of 
such programs as Mercury, Gemini, and Skylab. 
A month later, on January 19 and 20, 1971, NASA hosted a meeting in 
Williamsburg, Virginia, that included representatives from shuttle study con- 
tractors and from the Air Force. This meeting had the purpose of defining 
shuttle requirements that would guide the work of these contractors. NASA 
used the occasion to give the Air Force everything it wanted. In particular, the 
Shuttle would have a delta wing, with crossrange of 1,100 nautical miles. Its 
payload capacity, 40,000 pounds into polar orbit, would correspond to 65,000 
pounds in a due-east launch from Cape CanaveraL6' 
One sometimes hears that when two parties are in a relationship, the one 
that wants it more is the weaker. NASA certainly had been pursuing support 
for the Shuttle with unmaidenly eagerness, and the Williamsburg rules were 
the result. The agency now was promising to build a bigger and heavier shut- 
tle than it had wanted for its own uses, with considerably more thermal 
protection. It also was prepared to treat the Shuttle as a national asset-which 
meant the Air Force would not pay for its development or production and yet 
would receive the equivalent of exclusive use of one or more of these vehi- 
cles, entirely gratis. That service would not receive the Shuttle on a silver 
platter, but would pay for construction of its own launch facilities at 
Vandenberg AFB. Even so, with the Air Force having by far the larger budget 
as well as greater political clout, the Williamsburg agreement resembled a 
treaty between a superpower and a small nation. 
Max Faget, for one, was not about to bow to the Air Force's superior 
wisdom. He was responsible for providing technical direction on the orbiter 
portions of the shuttle study contracts. His designers duly proceeded to turn 
out representative designs of delta-wing configurations that could guide the 
work of the contractors. His heart, however, remained with the straight wing. 
61. National Journal, March 13, 1971, pp. 541, 545; Pace, Engineering, p. 116. 
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He continued to come forward with new design variants until well into 1971, 
when as Dale Myers recalls, “I just denied MSC further activities on the 
straight-wing version.”62 
Having carried through its elaborate courtship (some people would prefer 
a different word) of the Air Force, NASA was now about to reap its reward. 
This came in March 1971, when Air Force Secretary Seamans presented tes- 
timony before the Senate space committee: 
Now let me address the Air Force views regarding development of the Space 
Transportation System. The DOD supports its development $the results of cur- 
rent NASA Phase B studies and our own complementary studies show that such 
a system is feasible and can ofer the desired peij%omnce and cost advantages 
over current systems. Preliminary indications from these studies are that such 
a system can be developed. I f  the jnal study results confirm this, and we think 
they will, the Air Force will provide a strong recommendation that Shuttle 
development be authorized. When the operational system is achieved, we 
would expect to use it to orbit essentially all DOD payloads, “hasing out” 
our expendable booster inventory with the possible exception of very small 
boosters such as the SCOUT.63 
The DOD investment over the next two to three years is planned to be 
small. Howeve6 in the fiture, we will require major finding to equip a DOD 
jleet and to provide unique DOD hardware, facilities and operational s ~ p p o r t . ~  
While Seamans was not ready to give full consent, or to promise to give 
up the Air Force’s cherished Titan I11 family, he certainly was saying 
“maybe,” and was saying it emphatically. 
The Shuttle program was advancing in another respect. With studies of its 
main engine having been under way for some time, NASA was about to award 
a contract for its actual development. With this engine as a long-lead item, this 
would be the first major component of the Shuttle to reach this level of com- 
mitment, advancing beyond the level of studies and design exercises to 
become a true hardware project. 
62. Jenkins, Space Shuttle, pp. 107-117; Hallion, ed., Hypersonic, pp. 1006-1030, 1048-1051; author interview, 
63. A four-stage solid-fuel launch vehicle with payload capacity of some 425 pounds in orbit. NASA SP-4012, 
64. Seamans, Senate testimony, March 30, 1971, pp. 9-10. 
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The Space Shuttle Main Engine 
The legacies of the 1960s include the use of hydrogen as a rocket fuel, which 
powered two important engines of the period. The RL-10, developed by Pratt 
& Whitney, had a rated thrust of 15,000 pounds. Two of them were in the 
Centaur upper stage. The 5-2 of Rocketdyne was an important component of 
Apollo, with five of these engines in the S-I1 stage of the Saturn V and a single 
5-2 in the S-IVB. Its thrust was 230,000 pounds. 
The RL- 10 and 5-2 certainly did not represent the last word in rocketry. As 
early as 1967, well before the Shuttle began to take shape, the Air Force initi- 
ated an advanced propulsion program that led to new work at both Rocketdyne 
and Pratt & Whitney. These firms selected different approaches toward improv- 
ing the hydrogen-fueled rocket engine, with the intent of building test hardware. 
At Rocketdyne, the point of departure involved an inescapable shortcom- 
ing of conventional rocket nozzles, which had the shape of a bell. Within these 
nozzles, during and after liftoff, atmospheric pressure retarded the free expan- 
sion and outward flow of an engine’s exhaust. This reduced both its thrust and 
exhaust velocity-and did so just when the launch vehicle was heavy with 
fuel and was burning propellant at the most rapid rate, thereby needing all the 
thrust and performance it could get. 
The cure appeared to lie in a new type of engine, the aerospike. It required 
a ring-shaped combustion chamber surrounding a central body that resembled 
an upside-down volcano, with inward-sloping flanks and a central vent. 
Turbine exhaust flowed through the vent; the main engine exhaust expanded 
against the flanks, with no wall or barrier separating this exhaust from the 
atmosphere. Atmospheric pressure thus worked freely to shape the exhaust 
plume as it exited the engine. The aerospike concept offered a compact engine 
installation that could perform nearly as well at sea level as in a vacuum. 
However, this performance was somewhat less than could be achieved with a 
conventional bell nozzle.65 
Accordingly, Pratt & Whitney accepted the disadvantages of the bell and 
sought to achieve the highest possible performance by raising the engine’s 
internal pressure. The 5-2 had operated at 763 pounds per square inch. Pratt 
65. Ibid., pp. 23,27; Sutton, Rocket, pp. 60,62-63; Technology Week, March 13, 1967, pp. 18-19; proceedings, 
NASA Space Shuttle Symposium, October 16-17, 1969, pp. 377-403. 
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Aerospike rocket engine ofRucketdyne. (Art by Dan Gauthier) 
& Whitney expected to go much higher. This pressure increased the exhaust 
velocity. It also allowed an engine to produce high thrust within a compact 
and lightweight package. 
The Air Force awarded a contract to Pratt & Whitney for a new engine, the 
XLR-129. It aimed at 2,740 psi, nearly four times the pressure of the 5-2, and 
was to deliver 250,000 pounds of thrust. NASA went on to support the work at 
Rocketdyne, which went forward with its own program for the development of 
aerospikes. Thus, when concepts of the Shuttle began to jell, during 1969, these 
programs offered two paths toward development of a shuttle main engine.66 
Midway through that year, Wernher von Braun, director of NASA 
Marshall, sent telexes to the nation’s rocket-building companies that asked a 
66. Rocketdyne, ExpendabZe Launch Vehicle Engines; Technology Week, March 13, 1967, p. 18; Aviation Week, 
August 31, 1970, p. 38; Perkins, History, January-June 1970, p. 49. 
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High-pressure rocket engine with bell nozzle, studied at Pratt B Whitney. Note the use of a 
single preburner. (Art by Dan Gauthier 
number of specific questions. One appreciates the flavor of his queries by 
noting a few: 
Is industry ready to commit to hard design and development, an engine 
operating at, say, 8OOK pounds sea level thrust that will meet the require- 
ments of the space shuttle? Is it technically realistic, and can an orderly 
development program be accomplished to meet a PFRT [Preliminary 
Flight Readiness Test] date of mid 1974, with delivery offirst flight engines 
concurrent? 
State the top I O  technical problem areas in order of signijicance that 
would be expected in achieving the development program. 
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I f  a 15 percent to 25 percent thrust uprating became necessary afer the 
engine design is committed, what changes in the design would be required, 
and what is your assessment of the problems involved? 
Other questions raised searching issues in a host of technical areas: turbine 
design for high temperatures, high-speed turbopumps, seals and pump bearings, 
ground-test facilities, and onboard engine checkout using computers. Von 
Braun also expressed concern that engine materials would become brittle when 
exposed to hot hydrogen at high pressures. In addition to this, he sought to 
uncover shortcomings in the aerospike, which faced possible problems of 
delayed ignition, combustion instability, sources of hot gas to drive the turbines, 
and the credibility of estimates for component weights and effi~iencies.~~ 
The aerospike held on through the summer, with shuttle managers not only 
continuing to consider it on an equal basis with the high-pressure bell, but even 
looking at shuttle designs offering interchangeability between both types of 
engine. NASA and its contractors, however, had no real experience with the 
aerospike, though they had plenty with the bell; indeed, all their rocket engines 
built and flown to date had been of the bell type. In October, a meeting of shut- 
tle managers brought a decision to use the bell type only. This decision won 
unanimous support from key technical people at both NASA Marshall and the 
Manned Spacecraft Center. With this, the aerospike was out in the cold.68 
This was bad news for Rocketdyne, which had conducted a limited 
amount of high-pressure work but nevertheless had spent several years plac- 
ing its money on the wrong horse. It was correspondingly good news at Pratt 
& Whitney, which had a solid head start. That firm had already built and 
tested a high-pressure thrust chamber, suitable for the XLR-129, though that 
chamber had lacked its own turbopumps. High-performance turbopumps, 
however, were becoming a specialty of the house within this company, which 
was also pursuing a NASA project. It was building versions suitable for a 
high-pressure engine of 350,000 pounds of thrust.69 
Even so, NASA was not about to accept the XLR-129, for that engine 
promised 250,000 pounds of thrust and NASA wanted 415,000, to reduce the 
67. Von Braun, NASA MSFC Telex No. P1816552, August 1969. Contents reprinted in letters: Mulready (Pratt 
& Whitaey) to Weidner (NASA-MSFC), August 20, 1969; Stiff (Aerojet) to Weidner, August 21, 1969. 
68. Akridge, Space Shuttle, pp. 94-96; Memo for Record, Long (NASA HQ), January 16, 1970, p. 2. 
69. Proceedings, NASA Space Shunle Symposium, October 16-17, 1969, p. 370; Astronautics & Aeronautics, 
June 1971, p. 1 (advertisement). 
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number and weight of the engines in the Shuttle’s booster. In turn, those 
415,000 pounds were to come from an entirely new rocket motor, the Space 
Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). Still, it was highly likely that this SSME would 
take shape as an enlarged XLR-129. 
In February 1970, NASA issued a Request for Proposal that would lead to 
the award of three contracts, each funded at $6 million, for detailed engineering 
studies of the SSME. These contracts went to Rocketdyne, Pratt & Whitney, and 
Aerojet General. Aerojet had its own strong base of experience; it had built the 
hydrogen-fueled NERVA test engines in collaboration with Westinghouse, and 
had also built main and upper-stage engines for the Titan family. Though the Air 
Force now turned the XLR-129 effort over to NASA, Air Force engineers 
remained active within this program, transferring XLR- 129 technology to 
Rocketdyne and Aerojet and making sure that its lessons were understood. 
During 1970, Pratt & Whitney showed anew that it had the team to beat. In 
its work on the NASA 350,000-pound engine, it built a hydrogen turbopump 
that produced over 100 horsepower per pound of weight of its turbomachinery. 
In World War 11, nearly 30 years earlier, builders of aircraft piston engines had 
counted it as a milestone to achieve a single horsepower per pound; the new tur- 
bopump thus was 100 times better. It also had five times the power density of 
Rocketdyne’s 5-2, which offered only 20 horsepower per pound. 
In August, Pratt & Whitney demonstrated a hydrogen turbopump for the 
XLR-129. This test drove its turbine with a flow of hot gas from a preburner, a 
high-pressure auxiliary combustion chamber. This work had particular sign& 
cance because it went forward unusually quickly. In developing turbopumps for 
the 350,000-pound engine, this company had taken two years to raise the work- 
ing pressure of the hydrogen pump to 6,000 psi. Its engineers attained 6,700 psi 
with the new XLR-129 pump in no more than six months. 
The company also used XLR-129 hardware as a testbed for the SSME. The 
latter was to have a combustion chamber pressure of 3,000 psi. While the XLR- 
129 had a design pressure of 2,740 psi, tests of its thrust chamber repeatedly 
demonstrated successful operation at and above the level of the SSME. Pratt & 
Whitney went on to conduct some 200 test firings at these elevated pressures.7O 
70. Aviafion Week, January 19, 1970, p. 17; August 31, 1970, pp. 38-44; March 8, 1971, p. 186; June 14, 1971, 
pp. 51-57; Astronautics & Aeronautics, June 1971, p. 1, proceedings, NASA Space Shuttle Symposium, 
October 16-17, 1969, pp. 326-341; Nayler, Aviation, pp. 148-151; Reports GP 70-35, GP 70-271 (Pratt & 
Whitney); Executive Summary, PWA FP 71-50 (Pratt & Whitney). 
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At Rocketdyne, the head of the SSME effort was Paul Castenholz, a cor- 
porate vice president who had previously been project manager on the 5-2. 
While he knew he would need more than paper studies to win against Pratt & 
Whitney, he also saw an opportunity to go that company one better. The com- 
plete SSME would include preburners driving turbopumps, a main 
combustion chamber fed by an injector, and a nozzle. To build SSME-class 
turbopumps was out of the question; the work would take too long. The rest 
of the engine was another matter. 
Castenholz saw that he could build a complete thrust chamber with every- 
thing but the turbopumps. He could craft it using SSME materials and 
manufacturing processes. Lacking pumps, he would have to feed its propel- 
lants using tanks under high pressure. He then could run tests that would 
demonstrate essential features of a successful SSME: a thrust of 415,000 
pounds, stable combustion, a chamber pressure of 3,000 psi, and cooling of 
the engine. He could do these things at full scale. Pratt & Whitney had already 
done most of them repeatedly, but only in an XLR-129 thrust chamber, of 
250,000 pounds of thrust. By leaping ahead into the realm of the SSME, 
Castenholz hoped to put his firm back in the race. 
The recent NASA engine study contract provided no funds for this work. 
He approached the president of Rocketdyne, William Brennan, and asked for 
up to $3 million in company money. Brennan sent him on to meet with 
Robert Anderson, president of the parent company of Rockwell 
International, who approved this expenditure. Castenholz’s engineers then 
set to work, with an important concern being the prevention of combustion 
instability within the engine. 
Good injector design would suppress this instability. Castenholz started 
with an injector based on that of the J-2, which had shown its stability during 
this engine’s repeated operational use. He then added technical features that 
experience had shown would promote even more stability. In the words of a 
close associate, Robert Biggs, “We put two big preventers on an injector that 
was basically stable to begin with.” While this was like wearing both belt and 
suspenders, it offered a reasonable guarantee that the thrust chamber would 
work properly on its first try. 
The engine testing proceeded at the Nevada Field Laboratory, a rocket 
facility some 20 miles northeast of Reno, in the Virginia Mountains. The ini- 
tial work, late in 1970, involved an uncooled thrust chamber that worked as a 
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Rocketdyne SSME thrust chamber under test in 1970 or 1971. (Rocketdyne) 
heat sink, absorbing heat within thick metal rather than using flows of pro- 
pellant to carry the heat away. While the thickness of the metal made the 
engine strong and unlikely to explode, it still could run only very briefly 
before it would burn a hole in its side and blow up. The first tests dealt only 
with starting the engine, with ignition trials that ran to durations less than five 
seconds and pressures that stayed well below rated levels. 
Early in 1971, the cooled thrust chamber was ready, aiming at NASA's 
requirements: 415,000 pounds of thrust, 14,670 ft/sec in exhaust velocity, 
3,000 psi in pressure. The last test achieved full thrust for only 0.45 seconds. 
It nevertheless bettered these numbers substantially, delivering 505,700 
pounds, 14,990 ft/sec, and 3,172 psi. This was twice the rated thrust of the 
XLR-129, and 60 ft/sec greater in its exhaust velocity. Though small, this 
improvement was significant. It promised a shuttle payload nearly 2000 
pounds heavier than Pratt & Whitney's engine might carry to orbit, along with 
a saving in the program cost of close to $50 mil l i~n.~ '  
71. Author interviews: Paul Castenholz, Colorado Spnngs, August 18, 1988; Ventura, California, March 18, 
1997, Robert Biggs, Canoga Park, California, January 21, 1997; AIAA Papers 70-044, pp 2-3; 71-658, p. 
4; 71-659; Perkms, History, July-December 1967, pp. 36-37; Report RSS-8333-1 (Rocketdyne), chapter IV; 
Aviation Waek, June 21, 1971, pp. 60-62; Execuhve Summary, PWA FP 71-50 (Pratt & Whitney), p. 3. 
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No engine, not even the XLR-129, had yet operated as a complete unit, with 
turbopumps together with its thrust chamber. Pratt & Whitney soon accumu- 
lated a total of 2,877 seconds of test operation of its XLR-129 chamber, rated 
at 250,000 pounds, along with its full-pressure tests of advanced turbopumps 
for both this engine and the 350,000-pound model. Rocketdyne, in turn, had 
demonstrated successful starting and stable operation within its SSME thrust 
chamber, though only briefly. Then, in late January, NASA officials changed the 
requirements, raising the planned t h s t  of the SSME from 415,000 to 550,000 
pounds. This reflected the growing weight of the Space Shuttle as a launch vehi- 
cle, which now was to carry up to 65,000 pounds in payload. Though 
Rocketdyne had not known that this thrust was to increase, its high-thrust 
engine test, delivering 505,700 pounds in a chamber built for 415,000, meant 
that it remained close even to this new requirement. By contrast, the best of 
Pratt & Whitney’s achievements, at 350,000 pounds, lagged well behind.72 
“The highest risk I’ve ever taken, in terms of a rocket engine, was to build 
this full-scale thrust chamber for a proposal,” Castenholz recalls. “We worked 
around the clock. We slept at Rocketdyne in the hospital, every night for a 
month.” Though this did not help his marriage (he and his wife Marilyn later 
divorced), it did provide what he would need to take to NASA. 
High-speed cameras had filmed the tests in Nevada. Those films now 
were ready to show to officials at NASA Marshall, who were managing work 
on the SSME. Castenholz arranged to take along the actual thrust chamber: 
“We thought it was necessary that everyone who would be on the evaluation 
program should see that we’d actually done it.” He wanted them to see his 
chamber and touch it, not just read about it: “If you can touch something, you 
feel more comfortable.” 
Castenholz made a presentation to officials that included Eberhard Rees, 
the center director. He had succeeded von Braun, who had taken a position at 
NASA Headquarters in Washington. Robert Biggs, Castenholz’s associate, 
described this as “the best briefing I’ve ever seen.” It included multiple slide 
projectors and movies with sound, and not all the scenes were of rockets. 
When Castenholz said that they had done the test in winter, his slides showed 
the desert covered with snow. Following the briefing, Rees turned to a col- 
league and said, “Now I really believe it can be done.” 
72. Aviariori Week, June 14, 1971, pp. 51-57; Executive Summary, PWA F’P 71-50 (Pratt & Whitrtey), p. 3. 
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It was March 197 1 ; NASA now was issuing the Request for Proposal that 
would lead to the award of a contract for actual development of an operational 
SSME. Rocketdyne’s proposal included an executive summary, seven vol- 
umes on technical issues, five volumes on management, and 81 more of 
supporting data. “Thousands of pages, and beautifully done,” Castenholz 
recalls. “A thick document devoted to every detail. Materials. What the mate- 
rials included. How it was manufactured-pictures of the manufacturing. The 
tools we used. The test program-how many tests. Each test. Why. Where.” 
Copies of the proposal went off to NASA Marshall on April 21, with each 
complete copy filling a bookcase. The denouement came on July 13, 1971. 
Castenholz recalls that it was rather casual: “I got a call one day. Bill Brennan 
called me in and said, ‘We won.’ Bob Anderson came the next day.” Then 
Rocketdyne held a party, inviting all ,participants. Castenholz recalls feeling 
“tremendous, joyous that we’d accomplished it. The idea that we’d won was 
almost mystical.” He thought of things that could have gone wrong, but con- 
cluded, “I was fortunate to lead a good team. What won? Running that 
chamber won, and writing a super proposal.”73 
There was no joy in West Palm Beach, Florida, the home of Pratt & 
Whitney. That firm had taken out advertisements in major aerospace maga- 
zines, stating, “We can’t wait to start working on the SSME. So we haven’t.’’ 
It had solicited help from the local congressman, Paul Rogers, who had led 
his state’s congressional delegation-including both senators-in writing a 
letter to Nixon on behalf of this company and its proposal. (Nixon had failed 
to intervene, and it would not have escaped his attention that California had 
more electoral votes than Florida.) There was still a possibility, however, that 
Richard Mulready, Castenholz’s counterpart, might yet win the chance to 
build the SSME. Rocketdyne’s margin of victory had been narrow indeed: a 
score of 71 1 to 705 in the score of the source evaluation board. It might not 
take much to tip the balance in the other direction. 
Accordingly, the president of Pratt & Whitney, Bruce Torell, lodged a 
formal protest with the General Accounting Office, with his legal representa- 
tives filing a 100-page brief that listed six areas of complaint. The attorneys 
73. Author interviews: Paul Castenholz, Colorado Springs, August 18, 1988, Robert Biggs, Canoga Park, 
California, January 21, 1997; Aviation Week, March 8, 1971, p 186; July 19, 1971, p 12; AAS History 
Series, Vol. 13, pp. 73-74. 
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asserted that Rocketdyne’s proposal held technical deficiencies that violated 
NASA specifications. NASA also had allegedly failed to conduct meaningful 
negotiations, had treated the Pratt & Whitney proposal in an “arbitrary and 
capricious” manner, and had accepted procedures that “maximize the risk of 
cost overruns.” Rocketdyne had supposedly obtained an unfair advantage by 
diverting funds from the Saturn program to support its SSh4E effort. A sixth 
cause of complaint was perhaps the most heartfelt: “Selection of Rocketdyne 
wastes 11 years of knowledge, test-proven design, and government invest- 
ment in prior Pratt & Whitney programs.” The company had been working on 
high-performance hydrogen-fueled engines since 1960. Yet if the contract 
award could not be overturned through this appeal, the firm would have noth- 
ing but its IU- 10 engine for the Centaur, developed a decade prior to 197 1. 
This appeal put the contract award on hold. The Comptroller General, 
Elmer Staats, would not negotiate directly with the competing companies; 
rather, he would deal with NASA, which had reviewed the contracts and had 
held the legal responsibility to conduct the competition fairly. NASA’s case 
now harmonized with Rocketdyne’s: that the agency had followed proper pro- 
cedures and had conducted a valid assessment of the proposals. Rocketdyne 
retained its own legal counsel; Castenholz recalls that “we had an attorney in 
New York who handled our case.” Until Staats made his decision, however, 
the SSME was moribund.74 
During that summer of 1971, it became clear that the Shuttle program as 
well was in serious trouble. Not only had it failed to win presidential autho- 
rization to proceed; it also was receiving increasingly severe treatment at the 
hands of critics. While NASA’s pact with the Air Force had stilled most of the 
doubters in Congress, these critics would not be mollified so easily. They 
were in the Bureau of the Budget. 
74. Astmnautics & Aeronautics, June 1971, p. 1 (advertisement), letter, Rogers et al. to Nixon, June 16, 1971; 
Aviation Week, August 9, 1971, p. 23, August 23, 1971, p. 23; author interview, Paul Castenholz, Coloradc 
Springs, August 18, 1988. Points of protest are summarized tn letter B-173677, Staats to Eletcher, Marct 
31. 1972. 
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Economics and the Sh Re 
The Space Shuttle effort had a full share of optimists, with one of the more 
noteworthy being Francis Clauser, chairman of the college of engineering at 
Caltech. As a member of the Townes panel that had reviewed the space pro- 
gram, immediately following Nixon’s election, he had written, “I believe we 
can place men on Mars before 1980. At the same time, we can develop eco- 
nomical space transportation which will permit extensive exploration of the 
Moon.” His views of the Shuttle were similarly hopeful. 
In May 1969, Clauser proposed that the coming decade “will see the cost 
of space transportation reduced to the point that the average citizen can 
afford a trip to the Moon.” He emphasized that “when I speak of low-cost 
space transportation, I define low to be so low that the citizenry can afford to 
buy tickets for space.” To achieve such a goal, he put his trust in single-stage 
launch vehicles burning hydrogen for high performance, and capable of rou- 
tine flight to orbit. With such craft, NASA might undertake as many as 
40,000 missions “before flight costs would begin to absorb a major share of 
its minimal budget.” 
Lockheed’s Max Hunter had a similar outlook, as he abandoned his par- 
tially-reusable Star Clipper to embrace NASA’s two-stage fully-reusable 
configuration. Speaking at the University of Michigan in mid-1970, he pro- 
posed that a schedule of 95 flights per year would bring a cost per flight of 
some $350,000, or $7 per pound of payload delivered to orbit. He added that 
Texas Instruments would conduct manufacturing operations in space if the 
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cost went below $50 per pound; at $5 per pound, the Hilton family would 
build a hotel in orbit.' 
Was there any basis for such optimism? There was a modest but significant 
base of experience with existing rocket engines and with the X-15. In addition 
to this, experience with commercial airliners offered a set of approaches that 
appeared to be potentially useful. Other approaches reflected the work of 
design engineers, who expected to meet specifications calling for low cost. 
Why People Believed in Low-Cost Space Flight 
In October 1969, at a Space Shuttle symposium held in Washington, George 
Mueller presented opening remarks: 
The goal we have set for ourselves is the reduction of the present 
costs of operating in space from the current figure of $1,000 a pound 
for a payload delivered in orbit by the Saturn ?? down to a level of 
somewhere between $20 and $50 a pound. By so doing we can open 
up a whole new era of space exploration. Therefore, the challenge 
before this symposium and before all of us in the Air Force and NASA 
in the weeks and months ahead is to be sure that we can implement a 
system that is capable of doing just that. 
Let me outline three areas which, in my view, are critical to the achieve- 
ment of these objectives. One is the development of an engine that will 
provide suficient spec$c impulse,2 with adequate margin to propel its own 
weight and the desired payload. 
A second technical problem is the development of the reentry heat shield, 
so that we can reuse that heat shield time afer time with minimal refurbish- 
ment and testing. 
The third general critical development area is a checkout and control 
system which provides autonomous operation by the crew without major sup- 
port from the ground and which will allow low cost of maintenance and 
repair. Of the three, the latter may be a greater challenge than theJirst 
1. Astronautics & Aeronautics, May 1969, pp. 32-38; seminar, Department of Aerospace Engineering, 
University of Michigan, June 15, 1970; Townes, chairman, Report, letter attached. Reprinted in NASA SP- 
4407, vol. I, p. 512. 
2. A measure of performance, equivalent to exhaust velocity. 
3 Proceedings, NASA Space Shuttle Symposium, October 16-17, 1969, pp. 3-8 
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At that time, when the 50,000-pound payload was still the standard, 
Mueller’s cost goal represented a cost per flight of from $1 million to $2.5 mil- 
lion. This would not allow ordinary citizens to buy tickets into space, and was 
somewhat higher than Max Hunter’s figure of $350,000. Regardless, if real- 
ized, it would be a long leap downward from the $185 million of a Saturn V. 
The X-15 had already established itself as a reusable and piloted rocket 
airplane, with performance approaching at least that of a shuttle booster, 
though not of an orbiter. As program participants developed experience, they 
brought the turnaround time to as little as six working days. Individual X-15 
aircraft could fly as often as three times a month. 
A careful post-ff ight inspection followed each mission and took about 
two days. Inspectors examined the aircraft closely, looking for loose fasten- 
ers, cracks, hydraulic or propellant leaks, and overheating. Technicians 
checked the engine system for leaks using pressurized helium. The pilot 
reported in-flight problems, while other problems became known through 
study of data from onboard instruments. These post-flight activities guided 
subsequent work of maintenance and repair. 
The engine received particularly close attention. At the start of the X-15 
program, an engine run was required before each flight. In subsequent years, 
an engine still required a pre-flight run after replacement or major mainte- 
nance, or after three flights. A test pilot played an essential role during these 
engine tests, sitting in the cockpit and operating the aircraft systems. These 
tests disclosed such problems as rough engine operation and faulty operation 
of a turbine or pump, with the source of the problem being found and fixed. 
All aircraft systems received complete tests prior to the next flight. They 
also received close inspection and overhaul at stated intervals. After every five 
flights, the landing gear, which was under high stress, was x-rayed for cracks. 
Because flaps were essential for a safe landing, their gear boxes were checked 
for wear after every five flights as well. Stability augmentation systems, 
which helped to maintain control during reentry, were tested for alignment. 
An engine demanded major maintenance after 30 minutes of operation; it thus 
had a long life between overhauls, for at full thrust an X-15 would burn a 
complete load of propellant in less than 90 seconds. 
In the X-15 program, the principal maintenance problems centered on 
structural repairs and On propellant and pneumatic leaks. The latter often 
resulted from failures of gaskets or O-rings. Most of the structural repair items 
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were minor. Significantly, the hot structure of the X-15, which absorbed the 
heat of reentry, did not represent an important source of problems. Working at 
Edwards Air Force Base, a ground crew of modest size successfully handled 
most issues of maintenance and repair. Three X- 15 aircraft thus conducted 199 
powered flights between 1959 and 1968, when the program ended.“ 
The X-15 represented one element of experience pertinent to the Space 
Shuttle. Another element involved the high-performance liquid rocket engines 
of the 1960s. The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) was initially planned for 
100 starts and a 10-hour life, representing a twentyfold improvement over the 
engine of the X-15. This long life would be essential for a low-cost shuttle, by 
reducing the number of costly engine overhauls and eliminating downtime due 
to engine changeouts and major maintenance. Although the engines of the 
1960s had not been designed for long life in service, tests had shown that they 
already were close to achieving the requirement for an SSME. 
The RL-10, with 15,000 pounds of thrust, had been the first to show this. 
As early as 1963, individual engines had been operated for over two and a half 
hours, with more than 50 restarts. By 1969, the total duration for a single test 
engine exceeded that of 50 shuttle missions, while a thrust chamber, sans tur- 
bopumps, received a series of test firings that totaled more than 11 hours5 
The engines of Apollo showed similar life. The F-1 was rated for 20 starts 
and 2,250 seconds in total duration. Yet by replacing the liquid-oxygen pump 
impeller and the turbine manifold at 3,500 seconds, test engines achieved as 
many as 60 starts and total durations of 5,000 to 6,000 seconds. The 5-2 did even 
better, with a test engine running for 103 starts and 6.5 hours, without overhaul. 
“We never wore out an engine of the 5-2 type,” recalls Rocketdyne’s Paul 
Castenholz, who managed its development. “We could run it repeatedly; there 
was no erosion of the chamber, no damage to the turbine blades. If you looked 
at a 5-2 after a hot firing, you would not see any difference from before that 
firing. The injectors always looked new; there was no erosion or corrosion on 
the injectors. We had extensive numbers of tests on individual engines,” which 
demonstrated their reliability.6 
4. NASA TM X-52876, vol. V, pp. 33-44; Miller, X-Planes, pp. 106-1 1 1 .  
5. Aviation Week, August 31, 1970, p. 38, Astronautics & Aeronautics, January 1964, p. 44; proceedings, 
6. Proceedings, NASA Space Shuttle Symposium, October 16-17, 1969, p. 401; AIAA Paper 89-2387, author 
NASA Space Shuttle Symposium, October 16-17, 1969, p. 360. 
interview, Paul Castenholz, Ventura, California, Mach 18, 1997 
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This experience meant that existing engine-design practice gave a reserve 
of engine life that engineers could draw on in meeting SSME goals. SSME 
requirements, however, were far more demanding because it was to operate at 
much higher pressures. The chamber pressures of the F-1 and J-2 were 
modest by later standards: 763 and 982 psi, respectively. At full power, that of 
the SSME would be 3,280 psi. Preburners, which fed the main combustion 
chamber, were to operate at pressures up to 5,500 psi. In turn, these preburn- 
ers received propellants from the turbopumps, whose pump discharge 
pressures had to be higher still: as much as 8,000 psi. 
The turbopumps thus would face enormous stresses, produced not only 
by pressure but by extremes of temperature. These turbopumps would be 
driven by hot gases and were to pump liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen at 
temperatures hundreds of degrees below zero. They had to be built as com- 
pact units-which meant that across a distance of no more than two or three 
feet, a red-hot turbine would be driving a deeply chilled pump. These tem- 
peratures would cause the metals and materials of a turbopump to expand and 
contract every time the engine was fired, and designers had to ensure that the 
resulting stresses would not produce cracks. 
In addition to this, the turbopumps were to operate at extraordinary power 
levels. The hydrogen turbopump, more powerful than the oxygen pump, was 
to approach 75,000 horsepower-in a unit the size of an outboard motor. This 
compared with the 55,000 horsepower that drove the liner Titanic early in the 
century, in an era when engine rooms covered an acre of space below decks. 
Moreover, its rotating turbomachinery was to spin at over 36,000 rpm. Yet its 
bearings had to work without lubrication, for the use of oils or greases was 
out of the question. At the hot end of a shaft, these lubricants would evapo- 
rate. At the cold end, they would freeze solid. Within the oxygen turbopump, 
exposed to liquid oxygen, such substances would e~p lode .~  
Pratt & Whitney built prototypes of such pumps for both its XLR-129 and 
its NASA 350,000-pound engine, and Rocketdyne expected to do likewise. To 
deal with thermal stresses produced by the temperature extremes, designers 
were accustomed to using high-strength ceramics that expanded and con- 
tracted less than metals. Though hydrogen made some alloys brittle, designers 
I .  Rocketdyne, Expendable h u n c h  Vehicle Engines; Pocket Data RVRD81-142 (Rocketdyne), pp. 1-9.2-15, 
2-17, 2-29, 2-31; Lord, Night, p. 103. 
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could protect them with thin coatings of gold, deposited on hot engine parts. 
This led to talk of “gold-plated engines,” but gold was desirable because it 
would not corrode. 
There were a variety of means to design turbopumps. Conventional ball 
bearings were of stainless steel, but specialized ceramics and glasses offered 
greater hardness and resistance to wear. It even was possible to dispense with 
ball bearings altogether and introduce hydrostatic bearings that relied on fluid 
pressure to maintain a clearance between a shaft and its housing. This avoided 
having parts in contact that could experience friction and wear. While hydro- 
static bearings demanded a great deal of testing to ensure that they would 
operate properly, Rocketdyne’s Robert Biggs noted that when such bearings 
were used on the SSME, they “worked beautifully.” 
Although a complete SSME would have 45,000 parts, it was not neces- 
sary that all of them last for the rated engine life between overhauls. 
Engineers expected to design for ease of maintenance, by providing for ready 
replacement of some parts and components. “Line-replaceable units” could 
be removed and reinstalled while leaving an engine as a whole attached to its 
mounts. Through these approaches-design for maintainability, design for 
relief of thermal stresses, alternate means for building heavily stressed bear- 
ings, reliance on the reserve of engine life afforded through existing 
experience-engineers expected to meet the challenge of developing an 
SSME with long life.8 
Other alternatives existed in the area of thermal protection for the booster 
and orbiter, to guard against the heat of reentry. Hot structures offered a well- 
established but complex and tricky approach; while tiles of matted silica fiber 
promised simplicity, they were in an early stage of development in 1970. There 
also was a third approach: ablative heat shields of light weight and low cost. 
In their earliest forms, such heat shields dated to the missile nose cones 
of the mid-1950s. They had been standard elements of the Mercury, Gemini, 
and Apollo spacecraft, showing particular merit on the latter, which returned 
from the Moon by reentering the atmosphere with twice the energy of a 
return from Earth orbit. Ablative shields carried away the heat of reentry by 
vaporizing or charring in a controlled manner; hence they were not reusable. 
8. Author interviews: Robert Biggs, Canoga Park, California, January 21, 1997; Paul Castenholz, Ventura 
California, March 18, 1997. 
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New versions, however, had densities as low as 15 pounds per square foot, 
matching the low weight of tiles. There also was strong interest in low-cost 
methods for fabrication of large ablative panels that could be installed and 
removed readily while covering substantial areas of a shuttle’s wings and 
body. Engineers thus were confident that they could use such panels as an 
interim method for thermal protection, allowing them to get a shuttle up and 
flying even if development of the tiles were to encounter delays. 
In addition to this, while the tiles were to cover large areas, they could not 
cope with the reentry temperatures of a shuttle’s nose and wing leading edges, 
which would range from 2,500 to 3,500 “E For these limited regions, still 
another alternative was under development: carbon composites. Carbon had 
an excellent ability to withstand high temperatures; vanes of graphite, dipping 
into the rocket exhaust of the V-2, had steered that missile as far back as 1942. 
Being brittle, graphite was unsuitable for use in thermal protection. The new 
carbon composites, however, were resilient, and reusable. 
These composites drew on a recent invention: carbon fiber, which was not 
fragile, but possessed some strength. Such fibers could be woven into cloth, 
then impregnated with a specialized resin. A contractor would pile layers of 
this resinous cloth within a mold, forming a layup. Heated to high tempera- 
tures in the absence of oxygen, the resin would pyrolize, emitting gases and 
turning into carbon as well. The resulting article, treated with a coating to resist 
oxidation, showed promise at temperatures up to 4,000  degree^.^ 
A strong technical background was also emerging in the third of 
Mueller’s critical areas, which he had described as “a checkout and control 
system which provides autonomous operation by the crew and which will 
allow low cost of maintenance and repair.” Mueller had outlined a basis for 
such a system in a May 1969 briefing to shuttle contractors. He had called for 
an array of sensors and onboard computers that could diagnose the health of 
a shuttle’s engines and other subsystems, returning such messages as “I am 
well” or “I am going to be sick.”1o 
Computerized checkout offered an important path toward low-cost space 
flight. Cost meant people, and it was taking a ground crew of 20,000 NASA 
and contractor employees to prepare and launch a Saturn V with its Apollo 
9. Proceedings, NASA Space Shuttle Symposium, October 16-19, 1969, pp. 581-591; NASA TM X-52876, 
vol. III, pp. 185-200; AL4A Paper 73-31, pp. 14-15,3536; Jenkins, Space Shuffle, pp. 129-131. 
10. See chapter 3 pp. 133-134, for a more complete description. 
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moonship. If computers were to eliminate some of these jobs, here was a good 
reason for this to happen. Computerized checkout also promised more effec- 
tive maintenance, a topic on which people in the airline industry had a number 
of pointed comments.” 
In 1968, with computerized checkout still off in the distance, two mainte- 
nance managers at American Airlines noted “the difficulty of quickly and 
accurately locating a fault in our complex airplanes. As a consequence, much of 
our current troubleshooting efforts are ineffective.” Many aircraft components 
received an allotted time in service prior to removal for test or overhaul; yet over 
80 percent of these “time-controlled” units did not run to their approved time 
limits. Yet, it was not desirable to reduce the time between overhauls. 
Experience had shown that when items were removed for test or for major 
maintenance, they tended to fail more frequently after being reinstalled. 
Troubleshooting also was hit-and-miss. We all have had the experience of 
taking a car to a garage for repair, having a mechanic replace a part, paying 
the bill-and finding that the problem remains unsolved. Such experiences 
were also common in the airline industry. The American Airlines managers 
wrote that 
over a recent six-month period, 44 percent of the components replaced 
during maintenance of the air conditioning system did not eliminate the 
pilot’s complaint. Fifty-two percent of the replacements in the autopilot 
system did not eliminate the pilot’s complaint. 
The nation’s airlines thus had a particularly strong interest in computer- 
ized checkout. While NASA was quite prepared to develop its own system for 
the shuttle, the airlines and their contractors could offer valuable experience, 
while subjecting such systems to the demands of daily use in large fleets over 
long periods. Pan American World Airways was emerging as an industry 
leader in this area; in 1970, it was providing onboard fault detection and 
analysis for cockpit instruments and items of flight equipment. These 
included the radio altimeter, radio receivers used for navigation and low-vis- 
ibility landings, transponders that returned a radar signal to make a plane 
show up brightly on a radar screen, and electrical generating systems. 
11.  Mueller, Briefins, May 5, 1969; Heppenheimer, Countdown, p. 254. 
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Pan Am was also extending the use of such airborne monitoring systems 
to detect faults in engines. Sensors took data on engines during flight; an 
onboard computer used this data to determine solutions to equations that cal- 
culated engine performance. It also compared the solutions to stored values to 
establish trends in performance. If a trend was unfavorable-if an engine was 
beginning to deteriorate-a printer on the flight deck would prepare a mes- 
sage and warn the crew. In 1970, a prototype had already been flight-tested 
aboard a Boeing 707 and was slated for similar testing on a Boeing 747. 
During that same year, those airlines became part of the teams that con- 
ducted the principal space shuttle design studies. North American Rockwell 
worked with American Airlines, leading a team that also included General 
Dynamics, Honeywell, and IBM. McDonnell Douglas linked up with Pan 
Am, while also bringing in TRW and Martin Marietta. Hence, in seeking air- 
line-style operations for a shuttle, these teams had the counsel and experience 
of the airlines themselves.12 
Of course, NASA was going to have to spend money to achieve low-cost 
space flight, and development of the Shuttle would not be cheap. This was 
worrisome, for in pushing the frontiers of technology during the 1960s, the 
agency had often encountered cost overruns. An in-house review, which Paine 
received in April 1969, showed that NASA's principal automated spacecraft 
programs had increased in price by more than threefold, on average, since 
their initiation. The costly programs in piloted flight had performed similarly. 
Gemini had gone from an initial estimate of $529 million, late in 196 1, to a 
final expenditure of $1.283 billion. Apollo, with a program cost estimated at 
$12.0 billion in mid-1963, ballooned to $21.35 billion by the time of the first 
Moon landing in July 1969. That program indeed had fulfilled President 
Kennedy's promise by reaching the Moon during the decade of the 1960s, but 
only because it had drowned its problems in money.13 
What had caused these overruns? Here, too, cost meant people. Major 
overruns resulted when large technical staffs drew salaries to little effect, as 
when projects encountered technical stumbling blocks, forcing major 
redesigns. Such difficulties brought delays and pushed up costs by wasting 
much of the earlier work. Other delays stemmed from unanticipated failures, 
12. Astronautics & Aeronautics, July 1968, pp. 42-51; NASA TM X-52876, vol. V, pp. 1-32; National Journal, 
April 24, 1971, p.875. 
13. NASA SP-4102, p. 155; NASA SP-4012, V O ~ .  III, p. 61. 
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such as the Apollo fire in early 1967; this alone accounted for much of 
Apollo's overrun. The Shuttle was all too likely to encounter such issues, for 
it offered technical challenges aplenty. Budget officials therefore were well 
aware that the cost estimates of the day represented estimates made at the start 
of a program and were subject to potentially large increases several years 
down the road. Even so, low-cost space flight indeed appeared feasible. 
In summary, people believed in this feasibility because leaders such as 
Mueller had identified the most promising routes to low cost: engines with 
high performance and long life, reusable heat shields, and onboard checkout. 
Experience in engine development, supplemented by a wealth of design alter- 
natives for critical technical problems, promised assurance of a good SSME. 
Similar alternatives existed for thermal protection, again promising multiple 
routes to low cost. Major airlines, working in partnership with shuttle con- 
tractors, were already taking the lead in developing onboard checkout. 
Nevertheless, a question remained: Even if NASA could build its Shuttle, 
was it in the national interest for the agency to do this? 
The Shuttle Faces Questions 
In carrying through the increasingly detailed studies that were to precede a 
major program commitment, NASA had adopted a phased approach, which 
Paine described in a letter to Congressman Teague: 
The first phase (Phase A) consists primarily of an in-house analysis and 
preliminary study effort to determine whether the proposed technical 
approach is feasible. Phase B consists of detailed studies and definition, com- 
parative analyses, and preliminary design directed toward facilitating the 
choice of a single approach from among the alternate approaches selected 
through the first phase. Phase C involves detailed systems design with mock- 
ups and test articles to assure the hardware is within the state-of-the-art and 
that the technical milestone schedules and resource estimates for the next 
phase are realistic. The final phase (Phase 0) covers final hardware design 
development and project operations.'4 
14. Letter, Paine to Teague, May 28, 1970. 
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Like the progression of a personal friendship through dating, engagement 
and onward to marriage, this phased sequence carried increasing levels of 
commitment at each step. The most noticeable sign of this commitment was 
the budget. The Shuttle studies of 1969 had held the level of Phase A; they 
had initially been funded at $300,000 for each of four contractors. The stud- 
ies of 1970 would constitute Phase B, and were considerably more costly. The 
SSME alone would receive three such studies, at Rocketdyne, Aerojet 
General, and Pratt & Whitney, funded at $6 million each. The Shuttle itself, 
as a two-stage fully-reusable design, would be the subject of two Phase B 
investigations, conducted by teams led by North American Rockwell and by 
McDonnell Douglas. Their funding was initially set at $8 million each, and 
subsequently raised to $10.8 mill i~n.’~ 
This increasing commitment was sure to bring increasing scrutiny from 
the Budget Bureau, whose analysts were prepared to seek justification of the 
Shuttle by applying a standard economic approach. This approach relied on 
constant or uninflated dollars, thus making it possible to ignore the effects of 
inflation. Its point of departure lay in the indisputable fact that during the 
1970s, the Shuttle program would require substantial outlays of funds to pay 
for its development. In exchange for this, the program could hope to reap valu- 
able savings by lowering the cost of space flight, during the 1980s. One then 
could ask if would not be better and more cost-effective to use the Titan III 
family instead. As an alternative to the Shuttle, the Titan I11 was already in 
hand, and could readily receive technical improvements that would allow it to 
carry heavier payloads. 
On a straight dollar-for-dollar basis, the answer to this question clearly was 
“no.” The Titan III was an expendable launch vehicle, thrown away after each 
flight. Hence, even a modest level of space activity would give advantage to the 
Shuttle, for the continuing costs of Titan III production would quickly exceed 
the one-time-only cost of shuttle development. With the Shuttle being reusable, 
its cost per flight, once operational, would be minimal by comparison. 
The BOB, however, was not about to assess the merits of the Shuttle in this 
straightforward way. Instead, it insisted on the use of discounted dollars, 
reflecting the time value of money. To economists, this concept reflected 
accepted professional practice and was not a subject for argument. It stemmed 
15. “NASA Space Shuttle Studies” (summary of contracts), April 16, 1971. 
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from a simple principle: the dollar of next year is worth less than the dollar one 
holds today, even without inflation. 
We apply this principle in our own personal investments, when we pur- 
chase a certificate of deposit (CD). This CD ties up money for years, and we 
will not buy the CD if it will merely keep that money safe for that duration, 
returning it with no interest earned. Similarly, we will not buy it if it only 
returns interest at a ridiculously low rate such as two percent per year. We 
insist on a reasonable rate such as six percent, or four percent after 
allowance for inflation. That four percent represents the true rate of return, 
in constant dollars. 
On this basis, again in constant dollars, a ten-year CD with value at matu- 
rity of $1,000 will cost $675 in money we hold today. This is as much as to 
say that the sum of $1,000, payable in 10 years, has a value at present of $675. 
This also illustrates that not only is tomorrow’s constant dollar worth less than 
today’s, but that money markets act to determine how much less, and to set 
the price of securities accordingly. 
In working with discounted dollars, the BOB applied a discount rate, anal- 
ogous to the interest rate on that CD. The Bureau was prepared to set this rate 
by invoking a concept analogous to investment risk. In securities trading, it is 
commonplace to demand higher return on investments that carry greater risk. 
Thus the corporate bonds of AT&T, which are very safe and highly rated, may 
return no more than six percent, while bonds of riskier companies may pay 
over eight percent. 
For the BOB, the analogous concept was national priority. Many federal 
programs could be viewed as investments, laying out money in the short-term 
in hope of realizing a social or economic return in the future. Programs hold- 
ing high priority-interstate highways, construction of schools and 
colleges-could receive a low discount rate, analogous to the low interest rate 
of bonds rated AAA. By contrast, programs of low priority resembled specu- 
lative investments, and demanded a high discount rate. Because of the 
priorities of the Nixon administration, the Bureau gave the space program a 
particularly low priority, and imposed discount rates as high as 10 percent. 
This was as much as to say that the Space Shuttle, viewed as an investment, 
was no better than an issue of junk bonds. 
The BOB’S analysts were prepared to compare the Shuttle and Titan 111 
in a variety of ways. The comparison would depend closely on the assumed 
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level of activity, or number of flights per year. For a given level, these ana- 
lysts could determine the discount rate at which the cost of the Shuttle, in 
discounted dollars, would be low enough to save money. For a given discount 
rate, such as 10 percent, the BOB could also show whether the Shuttle indeed 
would be the less costly way to proceed-or whether the Titan I11 would hold 
the advantage. 
Such analyses, using discounted dollars, in no way amounted to a simple 
comparison of shuttle development cost to Titan 111 production cost. If the 
Shuttle would ever pay for itself, it would do so when operational during the 
1980s, using the discounted dollars of the 1980s. Because the discount rate was 
high, those dollars would have little present value at the immediate moment, in 
1970. Hence, the Shuttle would have to promise a discounted cash flow that 
would be enormous indeed. Its discounted cash savings, achievable during the 
1980s and hence worth very little in 1970, would nevertheless have to exceed 
the cost of development, which NASA would incur during the 1970s. 
Therefore, in dealing with the BOB, NASA was in the position of a corpo- 
ration whose officials hoped to finance a major development program by 
issuing bonds. With the program being speculative, the bonds would feature 
high risk and would carry high interest. Investors then might readily fear that 
the company would go broke paying interest before it could realize the return 
from a successful program. To guard against this, company executives would 
have to give those investors excellent reasons to believe that the benefits from 
this return, far off in the future, would be large enough to be worth the wait. 
If NASA had held higher priority, qualifying for a lower BOB discount rate, 
it would have been in the position of a solidly-managed corporation with a gilt- 
edged credit rating. Such a corporation, paying low interest on its bonds, might 
readily carry its indebtedness while awaiting the benefits of its new projects. This 
interest rate would correspond precisely to the BOB’S discount rate, for with 
those benefits being discounted less heavily, they would have greater present 
value and would more convincingly justify the short-term project expense.16 
Thus, in August 1969, the BOB had carried through a comparison of the 
Shuttle and Titan 111 using discounted dollars. This analysis presented low, 
medium, and high scenarios for NASA activity, respectively at 15,20, and 25 
flights per year. It also presented low, medium, and high scenarios for Air Force 
16. AIAA Paper 7 1-806 Standard & Poor’s Bond Guide (any month), p. 3; letter, Mayo to Paine, January 20,1970. 
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Requirements 
Shuttle vs. Titan 111: 
Outlays, 1970-1985 (billions of  dollar^)'^ 
1. NASA High, DoD High 
(Averages 55 flights per year) 
2. NASA High, DoD Medium 
(Averages 45 flights per year) 
3. NASA Medium, DoD Medium 
(Averages 40 flights per year) 
4. NASA Medium, DoD Low 
(Averages 36 flights per year) 
5. NASA Low, DoD Low 
(Averages 28 flights per year) 
Shuttle 
Titan 111 
Benefits 
Shuttle 
Titan Ill 
Benefits 
Shuttle 
Titan 111 
Benefits 
Shuttle 
Titan 111 
Benefits 
Shuttle 
Titan 111 
Benefits 
Gross 
Outlay 
$9.0 
15.0 
6.0 
7.9 
13.0 
5.0 
8.6 
10.6 
2.0 
8.0 
9.5 
1.5 
7.2 
7.7 
0.5 
Caah Outlays 
Discounted to 
1970 Present Value 
5% rate 10% rate 
$ 6.8 $ 5.2 
8.0 5.0 
1.2 - 0.2 
5.9 4.5 
7. I 4.1 
7.2 - 0.4 
6.5 5.2 
6.5 4.1 
0.0 - 0.9 
6.1 4.8 
5.8 3.7 
- 0.3 - 1.1 
5.6 4.4 
4.8 3.1 
- 0.8 - 1.3 
Shuttle 
Discount 
Rate 
Rate of 
Return 
9% 
8% 
5% 
4% 
1.5% 
and Defense Department activity, at 15,20, and 30 flights per year. The 15-per- 
year rate was close to the current DoD level; the high rate was twice this level. 
The analysis showed that at the lowest level of activity, averaging 28 
flights per year, the Shuttle would barely compete with the Titan I11 even on 
a straight dollar-for-dollar basis, without discounting. The Shuttle would save 
only half a billion discounted dollars, and would break even with the Titan I11 
at a discount rate of only 1.5 percent. This was as if a Las Vegas hotel and 
casino, a speculative venture if ever one existed, were to try for a loan with 
interest at 1.5 percent. If the Shuttle had to do this, it would not fly. 
17. Budget Bureau, “NASA Issues Paper,” August 1969 attachment, “Space Transportation System:’ August 
22, 1969. 
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Its prospects, however, improved markedly at the highest activity level 
of 55 flights per year. Now the Shuttle would break even at a discount rate 
of nine percent, encouragingly close to the BOB requirement that the 
Shuttle justify itself at a 10 percent discount rate. True, this projection 
raised the question of whether it was anything more than blue sky and hype, 
for it would call for doubling the recent Air Force activity level. Much of 
that activity had involved the launch of large numbers of Corona recon- 
naissance satellites, which were about to give way to the far more capable 
Big Bird spacecraft-with Big Bird flying in much-reduced numbers. 
Nevertheless, under these BOB ground rules, it was clear that the best way 
to justify a shuttle program was to project the largest possible number of 
operational flights. ’* 
The Bureau’s analyses carried a thoroughness that could put a tax audit 
to shame. Even so, its analysts would give NASA full opportunity to argue 
in favor of the Shuttle, and particularly of the two-stage fully-reusable con- 
figuration that now was the agency’s desire. In doing this, the BOB would 
repeat the experience of 1969. Its director, Robert Mayo, had given Paine 
free rein to deveIop the post-Apollo plan of his dreams and even to see it 
endorsed by the Space Task Group, largely without change. Then Mayo had 
lowered the boom, cutting NASA’s budget and putting that plan out of 
reach. His colleagues now were ready to give NASA similar leeway during 
the studies of 1970, amid a general awareness that their budget axe was 
close at hand. 
Robert Lindley, an engineering director at NASA Headquarters in 
Washington, held the initial responsibility for studies of shuttle economics. 
Though he was well aware that the Shuttle would have to make its living by 
providing low-cost space transportation, he appreciated that even this might 
not be enough. President Nixon’s budget for FY 1971, which went to Congress 
early in 1970, provided $125 million for procurement of expendable launch 
vehicles. This was 3.7 percent of the total request of $3.333 billion and offered 
a useful estimate of the amount NASA might have saved that year if it already 
had a shuttle. This was not an aberration. The nuclear physicist Ralph Lapp, a 
Manhattan Project vetera and a leading critic of the Shuttle, would shortly 
note that during the eight years of 1964- 197 1, procurement of expendables had 
18. Ibid. 
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cost an average of some $130 million per year, or 2.9 percent of NASA’s 
cumulative budgets.19 
NASA certainly was not going to justify the Shuttle on such a basis, par- 
ticularly since these minimal savings would fall much further in present value 
through use of the 10 percent discount rate. It was not clear how to invent 
additional savings, and some officials seemed constrained to conjure them out 
of little more than thin air. Dale Wyatt, an assistant administrator, put his hope 
in the fact that just then, in early 1970, the Shuttle still held close links to the 
space station. He assumed that the nation and not just NASA would need this 
station. He further assumed that it would demand logistic support at the rate 
of a resupply mission every two weeks. If those missions were to use con- 
ventional expendables, including an enlarged Gemini capsule for the crews, 
they would cost $1.625 billion per year. If, however, they were to use the 
Shuttle, their cost would drop to $480 million. Thus, out of these calculations, 
Wyatt came up with savings of over a billion dollars per year, more than 
enough to justify shuttle development.20 
This, however, represented a retreat toward viewing the Shuttle once 
again as a vehicle for use in space station logistics. During 1969, the Shuttle 
had gained considerable headway through a different approach, which had 
presented it as the linchpin of a program of automated rather than of piloted 
spacecraft. Lindley saw that he could provide a more convincing justification 
by extending this approach. He asserted that the Shuttle could achieve addi- 
tional cost savings not only by reducing launch costs, but by cutting the cost 
of the payloads themselves. 
Lindley proposed that the availability of such inexpensive payloads could 
stimulate new uses for space, encouraging satellite contractors to build more 
such spacecraft. The Shuttle could thus promote the growth of its own traffic, 
for it would carry not only the planned payloads of 1970 but many others 
besides. The Shuttle then might repeat the experience of commercial aviation, 
which had achieved vast growth by cutting the prices of its passenger tickets. 
How could the Shuttle achieve such “payload effects?’ It would do this 
by completely revamping standard practice in satellite design and develop- 
ment. The spacecraft of 1970 faced stringent limits on weight and volume, 
19. Letter, Paine to Shultz, September 1, 1970; U.S. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 
20. Wyatt, memo, “Cost Effectiveness of the Shuttle,” February 12, 1970. 
Hearings, FY 1973, pp. 1079-1086. 
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Synchronous Equatorial Orbiter (SEO) 
A Medium-Size, Semi-Complex Payload 
Operating in Synchronous Equatorial Orbit 
Conventional Launched 
Configuration 
(Minimized Weight and Volume) 
Space Shuttle Launched 
Configuration Using 
Low Cost Module Construction 
High 
Gain 
Antenna 
Solar 
Array 
Panel 
Weight 495 krlograms 
Cost - $36 million 
Volume (Undeployed) - 3 cubic meters 
+ 
Earth 
Weight 1420 kilograms 
Cost - $21 million 
Volume (Undeployed) - 18 cubic meters 
The concept of payload effects. The large volume and payload capacity of the shuttle’s cargo 
bay made it plausible that spacecraft might cut cost by relaxing constraints on weight and size. 
(NASA) 
imposed by the restricted capacities of that era’s launch vehicles. Because 
there was no way to recover a failed satellite for study, much effort went into 
extensive ground tests that could assure reliability. Quality assurance 
demanded extensive documentation, to assure that engineers could use lim- 
ited data from telemetry to trace and recreate the cause of an in-flight failure. 
To cope with such a failure, the project staff had to remain on call, drawing 
salaries all the while. A large technical staff would also be necessary to assure 
success, conducting extensive pre-launch checkouts and then working with 
the spacecraft after it reached orbit. 
The Shuttle offered a completely different outlook. Already its capacious 
payload bay was promising to ease restrictions on weight and volume. To 
Lindley, this meant that the electronics of future spacecraft might be packaged 
in modules mounted in racks, having standard connections for power and 
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data. Like the cockpit instruments of Pan Am with their provisions for 
onboard fault detection, these modules would indicate their health to the 
Shuttle flight crew. 
Satellite checkout would occur after reaching orbit, not on the ground. 
Astronauts would locate problems using the satellite’s fault detection system, 
removing faulty modules and replacing them with spares. A satellite also 
would incorporate other systems: solar panels, power conditioning, attitude 
control, and data and telemetry. These could also receive on-orbit checkout. 
In addition to this, because they would provide standard functions, they could 
be built to standardized designs. They would take shape as additional mod- 
ules, listed in a catalog. 
Existing practice called for new spacecraft to have new subsystems in all 
these areas, designed from scratch and meticulously tested. The use of stan- 
dard subsystems, however‘, would turn satellite design into an exercise in 
choosing and assembling these off-the-shelf components. They would usually 
demand more weight, volume, and power than custom versions, but would 
offer great cost savings through their standardization. Other savings would 
accrue through the Shuttle’s low cost per flight. When a spacecraft began to 
fail after years of service, a shuttle mission might refurbish and restore it for 
a fraction of the cost of a replacement.21 
Lindley’s work received an attentive audience at the BOB, where Mayo 
wrote a letter to Paine in mid-March that called for NASA to prepare a 
detailed economic analysis of the Shuttle. Mayo accepted that payload effects 
represented a promising route toward justifying the Shuttle, and called on 
Paine to conduct a study that would define their cost savings. He also urged 
NASA to compare the merits of four alternative programs: 
1. Full scale development of afully reusable space shuttle. 
2. Develop a hybrid system with a reusable spacecraft and expendable 
boostel: 
3. Develop a fu l ly  expendable low-cost launch system. 
4. Continue to rely on the current family of launch vehicles or improved 
versions of these vehicles. 
21. Low, Personal Notes No. 16, March 28, 1970; Report LMSC-990594 cockheed); Astronautics & 
Aeronautics, June 1972, pp. 50-58. 
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Mayo wanted estimates of the expected potential demand for payloads in 
orbit, with the understanding that payload effects could increase this demand. 
He also wanted estimates of the cost of development of his four alternatives. 
Finally, he requested calculation of the discount rate for each alternative, 
equivalent to a rate of return. He described this as “the discount rate which 
equates the annual benefits to the annual program costs through 1990.” He 
added in his cover letter that “we request general use of a 10 percent discount 
rate”; it was up to Paine to show that the Shuttle could achieve this?’ 
NASA was to conduct the analyses in-house while working with a BOB 
staff member, Earl mode. Though Lindley was the man in charge, it soon 
became clear that he was getting in over his head. Joseph McGolrick, a man- 
ager of advanced programs, later recalled what happened: 
Lindley had this group of people from all over Headquarters, and he was 
drawing frompeople their estimates of “How much could be saved?” He was 
an extremely charming and extremely shrewd man who was getting out of this 
group of people a set of numbers for what the economics of the shuttle might 
be downstream. I mean, people would object about “This is not knowable, or 
if it is knowable, we don’t have the information yet: we would have to do a 
study.” But he really charmed them and said, “Hey, you know, let’s just get 
an estimate. ’’ 
It was obvious to me what he was doing was focusing, steering this 
group of Headquarters people into a totally subjective, qualitative kind of 
justijication of the shuttle, without any real basis at all. And he went through 
about four orfive iterations of this thing, finding out where the critical prob- 
lems were, and finding solutions to these little problems. [The] problems, 
from their point of view, in justifiing the shuttle.23 
Lindley knew that he needed more than arm-waving. He required an 
assessment of payload effects by an aerospace corporation with actual expe- 
rience in building spacecraft. He wanted “mission models,” projections of the 
specific spacecraft, and payloads that the shuttle might carry, and he needed 
such mission models for the Air Force as well as NASA. The BOB also 
encouraged him strongly to have the economic analysis-including the vital 
22. Letter, Mayo to Paine, March 18, 1970. 
23. John Mauer interview, Joseph McGolrick October 24, 1984, pp. 22-24 
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determination of discount rates-conducted by professional economists with 
experience in this area. 
He proceeded to set up a series of studies. For mission modeling and for 
payload and launch vehicle cost estimates, he turned to the Aerospace Corp., 
which had strong ties to the Air Force and was widely known as a center of 
expertise. Lockheed, builder of the Corona spacecraft, took charge of work on 
payload effects. For the overall economic evaluation, which these other con- 
tracts would support, LindIey followed recommendations from the BOB and 
approached the firm of Mathematica, Inc., in Princeton, New Jersey. 
Mathematica was the lengthened shadow of its founder, the economist 
Oskar Morgenstern. Expelled from a professorship at the University of 
Vienna following the Nazi occupation in 1938, Morgenstern had taken a post 
at Princeton's Institute for Advanced Study, where he proceeded to work with 
John von Neumann, one of the world's leading mathematicians. Together they 
developed the theory of games, which provided mathematical analysis of sit- 
uations where competitors act independently and with conflicting interests, 
while influencing one another's actions. Their book of 1944, Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior, became a landmark. In turn, its mathemati- 
cal methods proved applicable not only in business and economics but in 
military planning and nuclear arms negotiations. Morgenstern set up his firm 
of Mathematica to pursue such applications.24 
In addition to analysis that might justify NASA's Shuttle, BOB officials also 
wanted further studies of alternate shuttle configurations. Though NASA might 
be ready to push ahead at full speed with a detailed study of two-stage fully- 
reusable designs, as early as February 1970, agency officials assured industry 
representatives that NASA would pursue other concepts as well. These might 
offer lower development cost, or reduce the outlays in the near term. 
In mid-May, NASA awarded the main Phase B contracts to North 
American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas. The chairman of Grumman, a 
losing bidder, responded with a vigorous protest. In phone calls and meetings 
with NASA officials, he stated that he opposed NASA's preferred shuttle con- 
cept, that the Request for Proposal had been faulty, and that NASA's deci- 
sion was tantamount to declaring that Grumman would have to get out of the 
24, National Journal, March 13, 1971, p. 540; August 12, 1972, p. 1292; Report LMSC-A990594 (Lochrheed), 
p. 1-1; Blaug, Economists, pp. 172-174; New York E m s ,  Fehruaq 13, 1977, section 3, pp. I ,  9. 
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business of piloted space flight. He also complained that Grumman lacked 
strong support from the senators of New York, its home state, and that the 
company’s top executives lacked rapport with their NASA counterparts. 
Paine’s colleagues responded in kind, noting that selection of contractors was 
not a popularity contest and adding, frankly, that in its technical aspects, 
Grumman’s proposal had been the worst of the four received. 
At the same time, NASA was ready to supplement the main Phase B con- 
tracts with additional Phase A studies of alternatives. Grumman walked away 
with the largest of these, funded at $4 million. This company had a strong 
background in piloted space flight, having built the lunar module that had car- 
ried Apollo astronauts to the Moon’s surface. Grumman did lack experience, 
however, with large rocket stages. Its management redressed this deficiency 
by teaming with Boeing, which had designed and built the first stage of the 
Saturn V. Boeing’s own Phase B bid had failed, but this team was potentially 
as strong as that of North American Rockwell or McDonnell Douglas. 
The Grumman/Boeing alternatives included the use of expendable pro- 
pellant tanks, in the fashion of Lockheed’s Star Clipper. They also included 
several approaches to phased development, whereby an initial version of the 
Shuttle would fly with interim systems. Rather than use the SSME for the 
main engines of both stages, a two-stage fully reusable shuttle might use a dif- 
ferent engine, Rocketdyne’s 5-2s. This was a simplified version of the 
standard 5-2, with its thrust increased to 265,000 pounds. At 14,030 feet per 
second, its exhaust velocity would not match that of the SSME. Still, it was 
2.6 percent higher than that of the standard 5-2, representing a modest but 
useful increase. 
A more far-reaching approach to phased development called for the ini- 
tial use of an expendable booster. This could be a Saturn V first stage; it also 
might be a large new stage using solid propellant. This approach would allow 
NASA to delay the development of a reusable shuttle first stage while allow- 
ing the stage that counted-the orbiter-to enter initial service.25 
Two other companies also received Phase A contracts, each worth $1 mil- 
lion. Lockheed was to study new versions of Star Clipper, including a variant 
that might fly as a second stage atop the reusable booster of McDonnell 
25. Low: Personal Notes No. 22, May 16, 1970; No 23, May 19, 1970; Rocketdyne, Expendable Launch 
Vehicle Engines; Aviation Week, June 22, 1970, p. 251. 
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Shuttle concept of Chrysler Corporation: left, as a booster stage with a conventional shuttle 
orbiter; right, cutaway view, which allegedly could carry payload to orbit. (Art by Dennis Jenkins) 
Douglas. The second such contractor, Chrysler Corp., had operated since the 
early 1950s as Wernher von Braun’s manufacturing arm and had built most of 
the k s t  stages of the Saturn I-B. its alternative shuttle concept was strange 
indeed, with a reusable first stage powered by Rocketdyne’s aerospike 
engines and shaped like an enormous Apollo capsule. Though it was defi- 
nitely a wild card in NASA’s deck, it showed that even at this late date, Paine 
was still willing to look at concepts that did not reflect the views of Max 
Hunter or Max Faget.26 
The following is a summary of the studies that were under contract by 
mid- 1 970.” 
Phase E-Fully Reusable Space Shuttle 
North American Rockwell: $8 million (late6 $1 0.8 million} 
McDonnell Douglas: $8 million (late6 $1 0.8 million) 
Pratt & Whitney: $6 million 
Rocketdyne: $6 million 
Aerojet General: $6 million . 
Phase B-Space Shuttle Main Engine 
26. Aviation Week, June 22, 1970, p. 96; Jenlans, Space Shuttle, pp. 96-100. 
27. “NASA Space Shuttle Studies,” summary, April 16, 1971. 
266 
Economics and the Shuttle 
Phase A-Alternate Space Shuttle 
Grummafloeing: $4 million 
Lockheed: $1 million 
Chrysler: $I million 
Aerospace Corp.: Payloads and launch costs, $1,625,000 
Lockheed: Payload effects, $399,000 
Mathematica: Cost-benefit analysis, $400,000 
Economic Studies and Analysis 
The Phase B contracts, initially totalling $34 million, reflected NASA's 
hope that the detailed study of vehicle and engine designs could lead rela- 
tively quickly to award of contracts for Phase C and D, covering mainstream 
design and development. NASA would fulfill this wish for the SSME by 
granting its development contract to Rocketdyne in July 1971. The agency 
hoped to choose a single main contractor for the Shuttle itself soon afterward. 
Under the spur of questions from the BOB, however, NASA now would 
give the Shuttle an unusually close level of scrutiny. Its economic analysis 
would go beyond standard cost-benefit analysis, with its emphasis on dis- 
counted cash flows, by introducing the new topic of payload effects. This 
topic, with its promise of sweeping changes in methods of satellite develop- 
ment, promised to broaden anew the significance of the ShuttIe. Studies of 
alternative designs would go beyond the earlier issue of reducing develop- 
ment cost while accepting higher operational cost. These studies would now 
include phased development, with the prospect of treating the shuttle effort as 
three separate projects-booster, orbiter, SSME-that might go forward in a 
sequence rather than simultaneously. The resulting program stretchout then 
might allow NASA to proceed with the Shuttle while fitting its year-to-year 
costs within a tight budget ceiling. 
Change at NASA and the Bureau of the Budget 
Tom Paine, who had been reporting to James Webb as Deputy Administrator 
during much of 1968, took over as Acting Administrator following Webb's 
resignation that October. During 1969, as Paine became full Administrator, he 
served without a deputy. In September, he moved to remedy this situation by 
recommending George Low for that post. Low, who had been managing the 
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George M. Low, NAS 
Deputy Administrator, 
1969-1 976. (NASA) 
‘A 
Apollo spacecraft program at NASA’s Manned Spacecraft Center, started 
work as Paine’s deputy in December. When Paine left NASA in September 
1970, Low became Acting Administrator in his turn.” 
The BOB saw considerably more far-reaching changes that grew out of a 
revamping within the Executive Branch. Nixon had a strong interest in man- 
agement and policy development; in April 1969, he set up an advisory council 
to recommend changes within the White House that could enhance its effec- 
tiveness in these areas. During the following year, his personal experience 
stimulated his desire for change. As Vice President under Eisenhower, and 
now as President, he had worked with the National Security Council (NSC), 
which had dealt in an orderly fashion with contrasting recommendations from 
the Pentagon, the State Department, and the intelligence agencies. Nixon felt 
the lack of any similar institution to coordinate policy in domestic affairs. 
In March 1970, he announced his decision. He would set up a Domestic 
Council within the White House, as a Cabinet-level counterpart of the NSC. 
Its membership would include the Vice President as well as nine Cabinet sec- 
28. Press release, White House, November 13, 2969; Low, Personal Notes No. 1, January 1, 1970. 
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retaries. Nixon chose his assistant John Ehrlichman to direct it, thus giving 
him power on a par with that of Henry Kissinger, the National Security 
Advisor and head of the NSC. 
Nixon also proposed to reorganize the BOB, to strengthen an emphasis on 
management while enhancing its activity in program evaluation and coordina- 
tion. The BOB would also receive a new name: the Office of Management and 
Budget ( O m ) .  In Nixon’s words, “The Domestic Council will be primarily 
concerned with what we do; the Office of Management and Budget will be pri- 
marily concerned with how we do it, and how well we do it.” 
The BOB had long since established itself as an elite group within 
Washington. Its responsibilities covered the whole of the federal budget, with its 
myriad of programs and agencies. Yet the BOB staff rarely numbered more than 
550, with some 350 being professiofials, many with two or more college degrees. 
They stayed away from the media; they were not a good source of leaks. Veteran 
staffers, proud of the BOB’S small size and central responsibilities, viewed them- 
selves as unique. They said that if an army of Martians marched on the Capitol, 
while everyone would flee to the hills, the BOB staff would stay behind and pre- 
pare for an orderly transition in government. 
Robert Mayo, head of the BOB, did not stay on. He had worn out his wel- 
come by interceding in the shaping of the Pentagon budget, which Nixon had 
sought to develop through talks with only Henry Kissinger, the Joint Chiefs, and 
the Secretary of Defense. John Ehrlichman would recall that “Nixon felt that he 
understood enough of the general budget process that he didn’t need Mayo. 
Nixon just froze him out. And he also just plain didn’t like Mayo.” 
The new OMB had plenty of clout. Mayo’s successor, George Shultz, had 
been Nixon’s Secretary of Labor. After taking over as head of the OMB, he 
received an office within the White House itself. He started work on July 1,1970, 
the day the OMB formally came into existence, and quickly emerged as one of 
Nixon’s closest intimates. 
“I think he has the most important position in government,” AFL-CIO 
president George Meany said in Iate August. “He is, in my book, the execu- 
tive vice president of the corporation. In other words, he is the guy who runs 
the corporation from day to day. He is without question over all the Cabinet 
members. They are just department heads under him.” In January 1971, 
NutionaE Journal reported that “Shultz sees and communicates with Mr. 
Nixon on official business more than any other senior White House aide. 
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Several times a day he is summoned to the President’s oval office; the two talk 
by phone frequently. He regularly receives memoranda from the President 
with the notation penned in the margin, ‘What do you think, George?’”29 
For NASA, during the summer and fall of 1970, the immediate matter at 
hand was the budget for FY 1972. On August 7, Shultz sent a letter to Paine 
that set a target of $3.215 billion in outlays, representing a further cut from the 
already much-reduced level of FT 1971. Low responded on September 30, 
replying: yes, we could meet this mark with additional cancellations, includ- 
ing termination of NERVA and scrapping plans for Apollo 17. He would much 
prefer, however, an outlay of $3.411 billion. “We strongly advise against the 
actions that would be required to achieve the target level,” he c~ncluded.~” 
Subsequent exchanges with the OMB did not go well. In late November, 
Low hosted a meeting at his home to discuss what to do next. Participants 
included Dale Myers, head of the Office of Manned Space Flight, and Charles 
Donlan, head of the Space Shuttle program. As Low noted in a personal 
memo, a few days later: 
We held the meeting because of our collective concern that the shuttle pro- 
gram, as now constituted (two-stage fully reusable vehicle), would probably 
cost more than we could afford on an annual basis in the middle of the ’70s. 
A phased program, wherein we would first procure only the orbiter and 
launch it on a mod$ed S-IC stage3‘ and only subsequently build a boostel; 
would make more sense from the point of view of annual funding. It might 
also make more sense technically because we would face only one major 
problem at a time. At the same time, we could also adopt a Block IBlock II 
approach, wherein many of the “nice to have features” would be reservedfor 
Block I1 and would not be incorporated into Block 
On December 7, late in the evening, Low received a phone call from 
Donald Rice, an OMB assistant director. Rice said that NASA would receive 
outlays of $3.206 billion, less than Shultz’s mark of four months earlier, with 
29. Berman, Ofice, pp. ix-x, chapter 5; National Journal, March 21, 1970, pp. 620-626; January 23, 1971, pp. 
151-165; June 12, 1971, pp. 1235-1244, December 13,1975, pp. 1690-1691; John Logsdon interview, John 
Ehrlichman, Santa Fe, New Mexico, May 6, 1983, pp. 17-18. 
30. Letters: Shultz to Pine, August 7. 1970; Low to Shultz, September 30, 1970. 
3 1 .  The first stage of the Saturn V. 
32. Low, Personal Notes No. 36, November 28,1970. 
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new obligational authority of $3.283 billion. The latter represented the request 
for appropriations that Nixon would send to Congress. Apollo 17 remained in 
the budget, while NERVA would survive with support from key senators. The 
Shuttle, however, took a heavy hit. 
Low still hoped to receive approval to proceed with shuttle development 
during FY 1972. Four days later, he sent Rice a letter proposing language for 
a formal statement on shuttle policy: 
The FY 1972 budget provides forproceeding with the development of a space 
shuttle system. 
Detailed design and development of the shuttle engine-the longest lead 
time component-will be begun in FY 1972. 
Airji-ame design and development will proceed on an orderly step-by- 
step basis leading to detailed design or initiation of development during FY 
1972 depending on progress in studies now underway. 
Rice sent this letter down through channels to Daniel Taft, an OMB 
staffer who worked with this issue. Taft replied with his own letter to Rice, 
noting that Low was proposing that “the Administration has approved pro- 
ceeding with the space shuttle system.” Taft continued: 
We recommend that the Administration presewe flexibility by: 
A. Making no commitment to proceeding with the development of the entire 
shuttle system. 
B. Making no commitment to an FY 1972 decision on initiation of develop- 
ment of the airframe. 
Taft added a draft of a letter with which Rice replied to Low. While Rice 
agreed to proceed with development of the SSME, he made no such commit- 
ment to the Shuttle itself. This had obvious potential for an embarrassing 
situation wherein people would regard a commitment to the engine as aback- 
door commitment to the shuttle. The SSME therefore received the provisional 
name of Advanced Space Engine, with the understanding that it might power 
a new low-cost expendable launch vehicle instead.33 
33. Low, Personal Notes No. 37, December 20, 1970; letters: Low to &ce, December 11, 1970; Taft to Rice, 
December 15, 1970; Rice to Low, December 17. 1970; Wiskanen to Rice, December 26, 1970; Taft to Rice, 
January 8, 1971. 
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Rice’s phone call of December 7 did not mark the end to the budget nego- 
tiations. In Nixon’s formal budget, late in January, NASA received another 
cut. It now was slated for $3.271 billion in new obligational authority. The 
only hopeful note was that at least this matched the $3.269 billion appropri- 
ated for FY 197 1, with no allowance for inflation. NASA, however, was to set 
aside over $100 million of this to spend in future years; its outlays were to 
total only $3.152 billion. 
In initial discussions, NASA had sought $220 million for the Shunle. A pre- 
liminary review at OMB had cut this to $195 million. In a subsequent review, 
however, the OMB swung its budget axe much harder, chopping the final 
number to $105 million, or $100 million in budget authority. This included $35 
million for studies of the orbiter and booster along with $44 million for engine 
development. The space station was still alive within the FY 1972 budget and 
would receive $15 million, fo cover continuing studies. While the shuttle was 
healthier than the station, it now would be on hold for another year.34 
The Administration’s intention to keep NASA on a tight leash was reem- 
phasized as the agency received a new Administrator, James Fletcher. Fletcher 
had been president of the University of Utah. While his predecessor, James 
Webb, had spent much of his career as a high-level Washington apparatchik, 
and while Tom Paine had been a research manager at General Electric, James 
Fletcher brought hands-on experience in aerospace development. During the 
1950s, he had headed a guidance-system group at the fm of TRW. That 
company had provided a technical staff that managed the development of the 
Air Force’s major missiles: Atlas, Titan, Thor, and Minuteman. 
The aerospace industry was well aware of the leadership that had come 
out of the Navaho missile program at NAA: NASA’s Dale Myers, Paul 
Castenholz of the SSME, and Sam Hoffman who had been president of 
Rocketdyne. TRW had produced leadership that was even more stellar, for 
this company’s Air Force work had placed it at the center of the nation’s most 
important military efforts. 
George Mueller had been a TRW manager before coming to NASA. Other 
TRW alumni included Richard DeLauer, who became an under-secretary of 
defense; Louis Dunn, who had headed the Jet Propulsion Laboratory; Ruben 
34. Low, statement, January 28, 1971; letter, Shultz to Low, February 19, 1971; Aviation Week, January 25, 
1 9 7 1 , ~ .  13; February I ,  1971, pp. 18-19. 
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977. (NASA) 
Mettler, who stayed at TRW and became its chairman and chief executive; 
George Solomon, who went on to serve as TRW’s executive vice president; 
and Albert Wheelon, who pushed the development of the Big Bird reconnais- 
sance satellite within the CIA, and later became chairman of Hughes Aircraft.35 
Having served amid such company, Fletcher’s pedigree was sterling. To 
Nixon’s colleagues, however, he was merely a man who might help NASA toe 
the line. In February 1970, Peter Flanigan of the White House asked his 
staffer Clay Whitehead to prepare a memo on the subject of NASA, which 
Flanigan sent over to Ehrlichman: 
This Administration has never really faced up to where we are going in Space. 
NASA, with some help ffom the Vice President, made a try in 1969 to get the 
35. Heppenheimer, Countdown, pp. 80, 149, 259; Ramo, Business, p. 102. 
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President committed to an “ever-onward-and-upward’’ post-Apollo program 
with continuing budget growth into the $6-10 billion range. We were success- 
ful in holding that of at least temporarily, but we have not developed arty 
theme or consistency in policy. As a result, NASA is both drifting and lobby- 
ing for better things-without being forced to focus realistically on what it 
ought to be doing .... 
NASA is--or should be-making a transition from rapid razzle-dazzle 
growth and glamor to organizational maturity and more stable operations for 
the long-term. Such a transition requires wise and agile management at the 
top i f  it is to be achieved successjidly. NASA has not had that. (Tom Paine may 
have had the abilio, but he lacked the inclination - preferring to aim for con- 
tinued growth.) They have a tremendous overhead structure, far too large for 
any reasonable size space program, that will have to be reduced. ... 
We need a new Administrator who will turn down NASA’s empire-building 
fervor and turn his attention to ( I )  sensible straightening away of internal man- 
agement and (2) working with OMB and White House to show us what broad 
but concrete alternatives the President has that meet all his various objectives. 
In short, we need someone who will work with us rather than against as, and 
will seek progress toward the President’s stated goals, and will shape the pro- 
gram to reflect credit on the President rather than embarrassment .... 
We really ought to decide if we mean to muddle through on space policy 
for the rest of the President’s term in ofice or want to get serious about it.36 
The Fall of the Two-Stage Fully-Reusable Shuttle 
Mayo’s letter of March 18, 1970, which directed Paine to compare the merits 
of four alternatives, set a date of May 1 for an interim report. With a week to 
spare, Lindley concluded that economic criteria showed that the fully- 
reusable shuttle was best. It would cost the most to develop, but even when 
using discounted dollars, its low cost per flight would yield the largest sav- 
ings. The report ranked the other choices in order: a new low-cost expendable 
booster, a partially reusable shuttle, and continued use of current expendables. 
In sum, NASA’s preferred design offered the greatest advantage, but anything 
would be better than the expendables that represented current practice. 
36. Memo, Whitehead to Flanigan, February 6,1971. Reprinted in NASA SP-4407, vol. I[, pp. 50-52. 
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This interim report impressed ofticials at the OMB; it also drew favorable 
new report asserted that 
uction in launch costs. In 
from contention.” 
May 1971 were a time of 
gements for award of the 
A for alternative designs. 
e OMB strengthened its 
an, to review the analysis of 
ve work to date on the Shuttle design and its 
ptics at OMB, these reports 
would swing it to an upright position and mount it to a Launch Umbilical 
37. Letter. Mayo to Paine, March 18, 1970; NASA interim report, “Alternate Systems for Reducing the Cost of 
Payload in Orbit,” April 24, 1970; memo, Rhode to Young (OMB), July 23, 1970; NASA report, “Economic 
Analysis: Alternate Systems for Reducing the Cost of Payloads in Orbit,” August 15, 1970; NASA, 
“Documentation of the Space Shuttle Decision Process,” February 4, 1972. 
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Saturn V, on its launch platform with tower, aboard an enormous tracked vehicle as it exits the 
VAB. NASA expected to use these facilities and equipment in launching the shuttle. (NASA) 
Tower, a massive steel platform carrying a red-painted tower with arms that 
would connect to the Shuttle. Next, an orbiter would go onto the booster’s 
back. A crawler, a diesel-powered vehicle weighing 3,000 tons, then would 
move beneath the platform and lift it to ride atop a flat surface the size of a 
baseball infield. 
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Eight tractor treads would begin to clank, each 40 feet long and 10 feet 
high. The entire array-crawler, platform, tower, booster, orbiter-would 
make its way through the immense door. The crawler would proceed down a 
roadway paved with crushed rock and resembling an interstate highway, with 
two sets of lanes divided by a median. That entire roadway, however, would 
serve the crawler alone, with those divided sections accommodating the 
crawler’s widely-separated treads. The crawler would head for a launch pad, 
three miles away, and in this fashion the Shuttle would set out for orbit at the 
speed of those treads-one mile per hour. 
Fueled and cleared for launch, the Shuttle would thunder into the air with 
the thrust of 12 SSMEs in the base of the booster. The orbiter would separate 
and fly onward, propelled by its own SSMEs. The booster, empty of fuel, 
would come down through the atmosphere and return to a runway at the 
Cape, with power from up to 12 jet engines. After completing its mission in 
space, the orbiter would reenter and land on the same runway. Preparations 
for the next flight, covering both the booster and orbiter, would take as little 
as two weeks.38 
North American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas both presented esti- 
mates for the development costs of their shuttles, and for operational costs. 
Analysts at the Aerospace Corp. prepared separate estimates, which fed into 
the economic studies of Mathematica. These projected $9.92 billion for shut- 
tle development along with a cost per night of $4.6 million. The latter number 
represented “marginal cost,” which would pay for one additional shuttle flight 
once the system was up and flying routinely. It was less than the cost of a 
Delta expendable vehicle, $5.4 million. While a Delta could carry some 5,000 
pounds to orbit, the Shuttle would carry 65,000. This capacity would show a 
substantial increase over the 40,000 pounds of a Saturn I-B, with this Saturn 
showing a cost per flight of some $55 million. Hence, if all went well, the 
Shuttle indeed would cut the cost of space flight by an order of magnitude.39 
The Aerospace Corp. received wish lists from NASA, the Air Force, and 
from the commercial Communications Satellite Corp., describing the pay- 
loads these agencies hoped to launch during the years 1978-1990. It is 
38. Heppenhetmer, Countdown, p. 224; Jenkins, Space Shuttle, pp. 86-94, Aviation Week, June 7, 1971, pp. 55- 
61; A I M  Papers 71-804, 71-805; Reports MDC E0308 (McDonnell Douglas); SD 71-114-1 (North 
American Rockwell). 
39. Report Am-72 (7231)-1 (Aerospace Corp.); AIAA Paper 71-806; Jenkins, Space Shuttle, p. 125. 
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difficult to characterize those payload lists as reflecting more than wishes, for 
while these agencies had some sense of what they hoped to do during the 
1970s, the 1980s were too far off for serious attention. Nevertheless, although 
NASA and the Pentagon were subject to year-to-year funding approvals, their 
planners blithely proceeded to describe what they hoped to be doing some 20 
years in the future. 
The ensemble of these lists defined a baseline mission model, with each 
individual payload described in at least an introductory fashion. Each payload 
had an estimated weight which Aerospace Corp. analysts used as a basis for 
work that would compare the Shuttle to alternatives calling for expendable 
launch vehicles. Based on its weight, each payload could be assigned to a par- 
ticular rocket having a known launch cost, such as a Delta or Titan 111. These 
analysts also determined a cost for each payload by using “cost estimating 
relationships,” which drew on historical data. These relationships gave good 
approximations of the actual costs of existing spacecraft and satellites, which 
served as benchmarks. 
In treating shuttle payloads, payload effects were at the forefront. 
Lockheed selected four spacecraft, three being satellites that together spanned 
a broad range of sizes and the fourth being a Mars orbiter. Company engineers 
examined these spacecraft in considerable detail, at the level of subsystems. 
They then prepared a design guide for low-cost shuttle payloads, which would 
emphasize minimal weight and volume constraints, modular electronics and 
subsystems, and on-orbit checkout and refurbishment. The Aerospace Corp. 
then used this Lockheed work to derive new payload cost and weight esti- 
mates, redefining the entire baseline mission model in the light of payload 
effects. This baseline mission model thus called for 736 shuttle flights during 
1978-1990, or some 57 flights per year>0 
The Aerospace analysis also presented year-by-year costs for both pay- 
loads and launch vehicles, treating three alternatives: a fully-reusable shuttle, 
a new low-cost expendable booster, and the continued use of existing expend- 
ables. These covered three of the four alternatives that Mayo had presented to 
Paine in his letter of March 18, 1970. The fourth alternative, a hybrid or par- 
tially-reusable shuttle, was not treated, a point that would not escape the 
40. Reports ATR-72 (7231)-1 (Aerospace Corp.); LMSC-A990556, -A990558 and -A990594 (Lockheed); 
Astronautics &Aeronautics, June 1972, pp. 50-58; MAA Paper 73-73. 
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Costs of Three Space Vehicles 
(in millions of dollars): 
Expected Launch Vehicle Costs 
Research and development 
Facilities and fleet 
Total incurring costs 
Launch-by-launch recurring costs 
Total launch costs 
Expected Payload Costs 
Research and development 
Production and recurring costs 
Total payload costs 
Expected total space program costs 
(Aerospace Corporation) 
Current 
Expendable 
$ 960 
584 
1,544 
13.115 
$14,659 
12,382 
31,254 
43,636 
$58,295 
New 
Expendable 
$ 1,185 
727 
1,912 
12,981 
$14,893 
11,179 
28,896 
40,075 
$54,968 
Fully 
Reusable 
Shuttle 
$ 9,920 
2.884 
12,804 
5.510 
$1 8,3 14 
10,070 
15,786 
25,856 
$44,170 
attention of the OMB. Aerospace Corp. presented its findings in undiscounted 
dollars, leaving the discounted cash-flow analyses to Mathematica. Even so, 
these findings were valuable, and revealing (above). 
Current expendables would also require funds for research and develop- 
ment, to enhance their capabilities. Their launch facilities would receive their 
own enhancements. Nevertheless, even with an extraordinarily generous mis- 
sion model and with undiscounted dollars, the Shuttle would fail to pay its 
way-if one considered launch costs only. The large size of the mission model 
would amplify the substantial difference between recurring launch costs of the 
Shuttle versus those of expendables. Still the high cost of shuttle development 
and procurement, some $12.8 billion, would swamp these savings derived 
from lower launch costs, to give the current expendables a strong advantage. 
Payload effects promised to change this picture dramatically. These 
effects promised modest but welcome reductions in the cost of payload 
research and development. They also promised savings of some 50 percent in 
payload recurring costs, which represented the largest single item in all three 
space programs. As a consequence, when one extended the comparisons to 
include payload costs and not merely launch costs, the Shuttle-based space 
program gave a projected saving of as much as $14 billion when compared to 
a program based on current expendables. 
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Economic justification for the Shuttle. The dotted area at left, 1971-1 977, represents the cost 
of Shuttle development. The much larger shaded area at right, 1978-1 990, represents cost 
savings thought to be achievable using the Shuttle. (Mathematica Corporation) 
A year-by-year comparison showed that the Space Shuttle would operate 
at a strong financial disadvantage between 1971 and 1977, for it would incur 
its cost of development during those years. As early as 1979, however, the 
Shuttle-based program would show a billion-dollar saving in annual outlays, 
due to payload effects as well as lower launch costs. That advantage would 
top $2 billion per year during most of the following decade. 
In discounted dollars, the heavy outlays of the 1970s would be equiva- 
lent to money borrowed at an interest rate of 10 percent. The savings of the 
1980s then would amount to repayments of these borrowed sums, with inter- 
est plus principal. Using discounted cash flow, however, it would not be 
necessary for the Shuttle to show an advantage of $14 billion. It would suf- 
fice if the Shuttle could break even. Its $14 billion in undiscounted savings 
then would amount to the total of interest paid on the initial borrowings. Put 
another way, that $14 billion would provide a cushion, ensuring that the 
Shuttle would save enough discounted and therefore less-valuable dollars 
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during the 1980s to repay in full the more-valuable dollars that would pay for 
its development during the 1970s. 
At Mathematica, analysts led by the economist Klaus Heiss considered a 
broad range of mission models. They did not treat only the baseline model with 
its 736 shuttle flights, but examined other models that called for from 500 to 
900 shuttle flights, again between 1978 and 1990. In addition to this, they car- 
ried through two types of economic analysis. “Equal capability” analysis, 
using discounted dollars, assumed that a particular mission model represented 
the whole of the nation’s space activity, with shuttle and expendables launch- 
ing the same payloads and therefore having the same capability. In this view, 
the economic benefits of the Shuttle would consist entirely of cost savings, due 
to both launch cost reductions and to payload effects, in flying this standard set 
of missions. The table, “Cost of Three Space Programs” (p. 279), gives an 
example of an equal-capability analysis, in undiscounted dollars. 
This type of analysis could be described as highly conservative, for it 
ignored the likelihood that with the Shuttle chopping the cost of space activity, 
government and commercial agencies would seek to do more in space. The 
second type of economic analysis, “equal budget,” addressed this issue. It took 
the view that total space spending would stay the same, even with the Shuttle 
bringing lower costs. Shuttle-derived cost savings then would not represent cash 
returned to the United States Treasury, but instead would pay for additional 
spacecraft and their Shuttle flights. In turn, those additional missions would have 
economic value, and Mathematica could estimate what this value would be. 
Equal-budget analysis captured the cost savings of the equal-capability 
case. It asserted, however, that the Shuttle’s economic benefits would also 
include the value of those additional payloads, with the Shuttle spurring the 
growth of its own traffic. This type of analysis broadened the Shuttle’s eco- 
nomic rationale-and increased the cost that the program could incur for 
development and procurement, while still breaking even through discounted 
cash flow. 
Mathematica’s equal-capability studies showed that with the Shuttle incur- 
ring $12.8 billion in total nonrecurring costs, it would pay for itself with 506 
flights between 1978 and 1990, or 39 flights per year. The baseline mission 
model with its 736 flights, in turn, would support a shuttle program with non- 
recurring costs as high as $18 billion, in undiscounted dollars. Results from 
equal-budget analysis were even more hopeful, showing that this baseline mis- 
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“Equal Capability” Cost Analyses 
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Equal-capability cost analysis. By prujecting a large number of Shuttle flights, economists could 
justify a large expense for Space Shuttle dewelopment. (Mathemtica Corporation) 
sion model could justify nonrecurring costs approaching $24 billion, nearly 
twice NASA’s planned level.4I 
The work of Mathematica was brilliant. If its sole purpose had been to 
allow one of Klaus Heiss’s graduate students to win a PhD, it would have 
succeeded magnificently. At the OMB, however, key people hardly believed 
a word of it. 
These people were prepared both to criticize the Mathematica report 
severely, and to conduct their own independent assessments as well. This 
drew on strengthening capabilities within the OMB for program management 
41. Morgenstem and Heiss, Analysis, May 31, 1971; Astronautics & Aeronautics, October 1971, pp. 50-62 
Alk4 Paper 71-806. 
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dewelopment costs. (Mathematica Corporation) 
and evaluation. Those capabilities had long been present within the BOB; 
NASA’s James Webb, who had headed the BOB during the Truman years, 
often said that “its name conceals its function.” Under Lyndon Johnson, the 
BOB included an Office of Program Evaluation. Newly strengthened, its coun- 
terpart within the OMB became the Evaluation Division, with the economist 
William Niskanen as its director. 
Niskanen, from the University of Chicago, counted himself as a disciple 
of the economist Milton Friedman, a leading advocate of the free market and 
a strong critic of government programs. Niskanen himself went on to build a 
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reputation as a supporter of tax cuts, heading the libertarian Cat0 Institute. He 
did not love the Space Shuttle in 1971, and his criticisms were blunt. He dis- 
missed out of hand the Aerospace Corp.’~ mission models: “My impression is 
that the mission models that NASA is projecting for the 1980s are unrealistic. 
They start at a number that strains credibility and go up from there.” 
The Mathernatica report had tried to make such models appear plausible 
by noting that “the 1964-1969 U.S. traffic equivalent is represented by an 
annual traffic of 5 1 Space Shuttle flights.” This was close to the 57 flights per 
year of the baseline mission model. Because a rising tide lifts all boats, 
NASA’s flight rates during the 1960s had been buoyed powerfully by the 
agency’s generous budgets. The OMB had no intention of granting such 
largesse during the 1970s. In addition to this, the Air Force had flown large 
numbers of Corona reconnaissance satellites, modest in size. These were about 
to give way to the much larger Big Bird, which would fly far less frequently. 
Niskanen also struck at the heart of NASA’s rationale for the Shuttle, as he 
rejected the idea that payload effects would lead to large cost savings: “A large 
part of the presumed savings come from relaxed design, repair, and refurbish- 
ment of satellites. I was struck, however, with the fact that payload design is so 
far down the road-in miniaturization, sophistication, and reliability-that you 
wouldn’t get manufacturers or users to go for much relaxati~n.”~~ 
The payload-effects concept amounted to asserting that the Shuttle indeed 
would meet its cost goals, including cost per flight as low as $4.6 million, and 
hence would spark a revolution in spacecraft design. The first statement was 
a speculation; the second then amounted to a speculation that rested on a 
speculation. Moreover, while payload effects drew strong enthusiasm from a 
coterie of supporters, this concept flew in the face of the hard-won lessons 
through which engineers indeed had learned to build reliable spacecraft. 
Much of this experience had accumulated within Lockheed itself, which 
had struggled through a dozen failures in the Corona program, during 1959 and 
1960, before finally achieving success. “It was a most heartbreaking busi- 
ness,’’ Richard Bissell, the program manager within the CIA, would later 
recall. “In the case of a [reconnaissance] satellite you fire the damn thing off 
and you’ve got some telemetry, and you never get it back You’ve got no hard- 
42. John Mauer interview, Willis Shapley, October 26, 1984, p. 29; NationaI Jouml,  August 12, 1972, p. 1296; 
Who’s Who in Economics (1986), p. 641; Morgenstem and Heiss, Analysis, May 31, 1971, p. 0-37. 
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ware. You never see it again, and you have to infer from telemetry what went 
wrong. Then you make a fix, and if it fails again you know you’ve inferred 
wrong. In the case of Corona it went on and on.”43 
NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory had a similar experience. This lab had 
developed after World War I1 as a center for the Army’s battlefield missiles, 
which did not demand particular care in development. Failure was acceptable 
in test flights of such missiles because other rounds were readily available for 
future launches. During the 1 9 5 0 ~ ~  a new director, William Pickering, redi- 
rected the lab as it became a center of expertise in electronics. By 1960, the 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory was ready to proceed with Ranger, a series of lunar 
spacecraft that would carry television cameras to photograph the Moon’s sur- 
face at close range. 
The program suffered three highly embarrassing failures during 1962, all 
involving onboard circuitry within the spacecraft. Pickering reshuffled his 
managers and ordered a standdown that lasted over a year. It didn’t work; the 
next Ranger failed as well. Now the lab was really up against it and heads 
rolled anew, for everyone understood that another such failure could bring 
cancellation of the program. Fortunately, the next one indeed succeeded, as 
did two later ones. This showed that the Jet Propulsion Laboratory indeed had 
learned to build successful spacecraft. 
The historian Clayton Koppes notes 
the precision engineering and quality assurance necessary for spacecraft 
which had to operate nearly peljfectly every time. God was in the details-in 
spotless cleanliness, in thorough testing, and in ruthless follow-up to make 
sure each failure report was corrected rather than accepted on faith. 
This new culture carried over to subsequent projects. When the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory built the Mariner 4 spacecraft that flew to Mars in 1965, it became 
necessary to remove an onboard instrument that had been prone to electrical 
arcing. Jet Propulsion Laboratory technicians then installed a dummy instru- 
ment of the same weight, polished to give the same reflectivity, and engineered 
to use the same electric current.@ 
43. Ruffner, ed., Corona, pp. 16-24; Mosley, Dulles, p. 432. 
44. Heppenheimer, Countdown, pp. 291-295; Koppes, JPL, p. 164, Emc, July 23,1965, p. 37. See also NASA 
SP-4210, index references. 
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Such experiences flew in the face of the payload effects concept, which 
amounted to asserting that spacecraft of the future would resemble stereo sys- 
tems assembled from components. Yet there also was excellent reason to 
believe that even if the users of satellites were in a position to do so, they 
would not want to pursue payload effects. 
On-orbit refurbishment of spacecraft represented an important aspect of 
payload effects. NASA’s Joseph McColrick noted that “the users that were 
contacted indicated no interest in doing that. Usually, what you were talking 
about was a satellite that was at the end of its life or was partway through its 
life, and they really didn’t want it back. It was, effectively, garbage.” 
Refurbishment on the ground was even less promising: “you’re bringing 
back junk and relaunching, and you’ve got an extra launch in there to be 
paid for.” 
On-orbit checkout of payloads was another important concept. It drew 
fire from NASA’s Philip Culbertson, Director of Advanced Manned Missions: 
We asked the communications satellite people if they expected to check their 
payloads out in low earth orbit. And the answer came back that they would 
not anticipate doing an extensive test of the satellites, $for no other reason 
than that would require deploying solar arrays and then retracting them and 
putting them back together again. They felt that the benejitfiom that was out- 
weighed by the additional risks that they would go through in going through 
that additional deployment and retra~tion.~’ 
Niskanen was one influential skeptic within the OMB; another was 
Donald Rice. He had served as director of cost analysis within the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, at a time when Defense Secretary Robert 
McNamara viewed cost-benefit analysis as a key to successful procurement 
and military management. In 1972, Rice left OMB to become president of the 
Rand Corp. Willis Shapley, a senior NASA official, would later describe 
Rice’s approach to the Space Shuttle: “He was very much enamored of, and 
very capable in, Rand-style systems analysis. And so he treated this as well 
he might: as a classic case for a Rand-style study of what system to select.” 
45. John Mauer interviews: Joseph McGolrick, October 24, 1984, pp. 34-36; Philip Culbertson, October 29, 
1984, p. 15. 
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At the OMB, between 1970 and 1972, Rice served as an assistant direc- 
tor. The Economics, Science, and Technology Programs Division, which 
covered NASA, was part of his purview, and he developed his own complaints 
about the Mathematica study. He was not pleased that NASA had refused to 
allow that study to treat alternate shuttle designs. He also would have liked to 
see “a good careful scrubdown of the operating costs. That number [$4.6 mil- 
lion per flight] that NASA was carrying around was absurd.”46 
Cost overruns represented another sticking point. If the Shuttle did no 
worse than Apollo, which increased in cost by over 75 percent between 1963 
and 1969, then its expense would leap to well over $20 billion. Mathematica 
itself admitted that it was difficult to see how any plausible level of space 
activity would justify such o~tlays.4~ 
The whole of that company’s analysis thus was open to challenge: Shuttle 
development costs, launch costs, mission models, payload effects. The one 
point that was beyond challenge was OMB’s insistence on a 10 percent dis- 
count rate. This was bad news for NASA officials, who had cherished the 
hope that if only they could present a good justification of the Shuttle on eco- 
nomic grounds, OMB would allow this program to proceed. 
Significantly, however, the OMB did not reject the basic premise of 
NASA and Mathematica: that technical means existed to build a shuttle capa- 
ble of low-cost and routine access to space. Those means-including rocket 
engines with long life, onboard systems for automated checkout, and reusable 
thermal protection-all appeared within reach. Rather, the OMB argued that 
the Shuttle would cost too much when compared to the benefits it promised, 
and that those benefits had been overstated. This argument invited a response 
wherein NASA would seek shuttle designs having lower development costs, 
which might win the OMB’s favor. Such a strategy would carry NASA 
through the months that lay ahead. 
In May 1971, in a briefing to O m ,  NASA officials stated that, as early as 
August, they intended to issue a Request for Proposal covering mainstream 
development of a fully-reusable shuttle. This Request for Proposal then would 
follow closely the completion of the Phase B design studies, at North American 
Rockwell and at McDonnell Douglas. Those studies, complemented by work 
46. John Mauer interview, Willis Shapley, October 26, 1984, pp. 29-30; National Journal, January 23, 1971, p. 
47. National Jouml, August 12,1972, p. 1293. 
161; John Logsdon interview, Donald Rice, November 13, 1975, p. 5. 
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at the Aerospace Corp., were projecting peak funding requirements of as much 
as $2.3 billion in the mid-1970s. NASA hoped for a budget to match this?8 
Though Apollo was nearing its end and Skylab would soon pass the peak 
of its funding, NASA had wide-ranging responsibilities in space flight and 
could not give itself over predominately to the Shuttle. The OMB was about 
to present NASA with a preview of its FY 1973 budget allowances. On May 
14, George Low met with Daniel Taft, an OMB staffer who dealt with NASA. 
Low stated that he viewed annual funding levels of $4.5 to $5 billion as rea- 
sonable to expect. This would represent a marked rise from recent levels, with 
$3.27 billion appropriated in FY 1971 and requested in Nixon’s budget for FY 
1972. Low, however, was an optimist. 
Three days later, his hopes received a rude shake. An in-house OMB 
analysis repeated the findings of the economic review of August 1969: The 
fully-reusable shuttle would not be cost-effective when compared with the 
Titan III family. NASA had done its best, using mission models and payload 
effects to get the answer it wanted in the Mathematica study. The OMB, how- 
ever, was well aware that economic analysis was certainly not a disinterested 
exercise seeking demonstrable merit. It was highly political, and the OMB’s 
new in-house study reflected this. 
On that same day, May 17, Rice sent a letter to Fletcher that rejected all 
hope for Low’s increased budgets. Rice would not budge from his proposed 
five-year NASA plan with a peak at $3.2 billion per year. Fletcher would later 
recall him wanting a budget that would “trail off to nothing, really. He didn’t 
ever say ‘nothing,’ but at various times he said, ‘well, why don’t you just make 
it constant in terms of absolute dollars and let inflation take it down.’ Don 
Rice wouldn’t give up. He wanted to do away with the manned space pro- 
gram; and quite honestly, I think he probably wanted to close down Marshall 
Space Flight Center.”49 
NASA had now taken three heavy hits in only a year and a half. The first 
blow, in the fall of 1969, had come when the BOB had cut the agency’s budget 
request by over a billion dollars. This had forced Tom Pabe to abandon his 
hopes for Mars and to fall back on the Shuttlehtation. While this combined 
48. NASA, “Documentation of the Space Shuttle Decision Process,” February 4,1972; Morgenstem and Heiss, 
49. NASA, “Documentation of the Space Shuttle Decision Process,” February 4, 1972; letter, Rice to Fletcher, 
Analysis, p. 0-15; AIAA Paper 71-804, p. 19; Report MDC 0308 (McDonnell Douglas), p. 28. 
May 17, 1971; John Logsdon interview, James Fletcher, September 21,1977, pp. 8, 15. 
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program survived near-death experiences in the House and Senate during 
1970, as the budget received new cuts during that summer, Paine chose to 
emphasize the Shuttle while deferring the space station for the indefinite 
future. Now, with Rice bringing more bad news, Fletcher saw that even the 
Shuttle was about to fall, at least as a two-stage fully-reusable design. The 
Shuttle concept that could fit the budget was nowhere in sight. 
On May 22, George Low summarized his agency’s dilemma: 
The question, therefore, is, “is there a phasing of the shuttle OK alterna- 
tively, a cheaper shuttle that will not reach the very high expenditures in the 
middle of the decade?” In spite ofthe fact that I have been pushing this point 
for about six months now, we have not yet been able to come up with an 
answe,: It may well be that there is no viable answel: One then has the choice 
of foregoing the shuttle altogether for the 1970s and starting it in the 1980s. 
In that case and with the argument that manned spaceflight must go on, one 
would go back to something like a “big G” approach” and a cheap space 
station. Of course, I’m not sure whether that alternate approach would be 
any more acceptable in this period of time.5’ 
50. “Big G” was a proposal for an enlarged Gemini spacecraft canying up to nine people 
51. taw, Personal Notes No. 47, May 22, 1971. 
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Aerospace Recession 
The poor prospects for the Space Shuttle, midway through 1971, emerged 
within a broad and sweeping downturn within the aerospace industry as a 
whole. This industry has long been highly cyclical. For instance, orders for 
military aircraft have soared during wars and Air Force buildups, only to fall 
off sharply in times of peace. The nation's aerospace efforts have also 
included major activities in civil aviation and in space flight, which at times 
have tended to counteract downturns on the military side. 
During the early 1970s, however, all three of these industry components 
went into downturn simultaneously. The waning of the Vietnam War 
brought a sharp falloff in military procurement, which dropped from $23.3 
billion in 1968 to $18.4 billion only three years later. The waning of Apollo 
led to a similar falloff in NASA contractor employment, which plunged 
from 394,000 in 1966 to 144,000 in 1971. The nation as a whole went into 
a recession during 1970, which caused new orders for airliners to dry up as 
well. This brought extensive layoffs at Boeing, along with severe distress 
within its home city of Seattle.' 
Total aerospace employment reached a peak of over 1.4 million in 1967. 
It then slid downhill very rapidly, dropping to 900,000 in mid-1971. 
Employment of production workers fell by nearly 50 percent, from nearly 
800,000 to just over 400,000.It was nearly as bad for scientists and engineers, 
as their ranks dwindled from 235,000 in 1968 to 145,000 four years later.* 
1. Astronautics &Aeronautics, February 1912, p. 21; NASA budget data, February 1910. 
2. Astronautics &Aeronautics, February 1972, pp. 27.28. 
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Aerospace recession, which fobwed the boom of the i960s. (Aerospace industries Association) 
Much of this was unavoidable. The nation certainly was not about to keep 
the NASA and military programs at 1967 levels merely to maintain full 
employment within the industry. In addition to this, the layoffs at Boeing 
stemmed from a cyclic downturn in civil aviation. Indeed, the aerospace 
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recession cut deepest on the commercial side. Three programs held particular 
significance: the Boeing 747, the supersonic transport (SST), and the 
Lockheed L-1011. The SST and L-1011 also brought unprecedented forms of 
federal involvement in commercial planeb~ilding.~ 
This involvement proved highly controversial, and led to a series of close 
congressional votes during 1971. These votes made it clear that neither 
Congress nor the Nixon Administration would sit back and allow major aero- 
space corporations to wither on the vine. Rather, despite heated controversy, 
Washington would step in to offer support. With this, the prospects shifted for 
aerospace, and for the Shuttle. With the industry taking its lumps, it lost some- 
thing of its reputation as a recipient of undeserved largesse. This made it 
politically feasible to support the Shuttle, not with interim funding from one 
year to the next, but as a long-term national effort. 
The Boeing 747 
The background to the 747, and the source of most of its troubles, lay in its 
engines. These were of a new type, known as the high-bypass turbofan. In 
contrast to earlier jet engines, which had the long and slender shape of a cigar, 
they introduced an enormous and gaping mouth, with a very large rotating fan 
in the front. This arrangement produced high thrust with relatively low noise 
and excellent fuel economy. The term "high-bypass" reflected the fact that 
most of the air blown by the fan would bypass the engine core, allowing the 
fan to act as a high-speed propeller." 
During the mid-l960s, the Air Force held a burgeoning interest in such 
engines, which were to power transport aircraft of unprecedented size. These 
would support the policy of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, whereby 
the U.S. was to build up its airlift and sealift capacity to be ready to cany 
troops and equipment wherever America might choose to intervene. In August 
1965, the Air Force picked a high-bypass design from General Electric, the TF- 
39, and marked it for development. Mounting a fan with diameter of eight feet, 
this engine was to produce 40,000 pounds of 
Discussion of these three programs, within the present chapter, generally follows Heppenheimer, Turbulent, 
chapters 8 and 9. 
NASA SP-468, pp. 225-227; Newhouse, Sporty, pp. 1 1  1-1 12; Eight Decades, p. 152; Bathie, Gas Turbines, 
pp. 167-170. 
Newhouse, Sporty, p. 113; Eight Decades, p. 131; Rice, C-SA, p. 3. 
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Schematic of High-Bypass Turbofan Engine 
Example: Rolls-Royce RB-211 
High-bypass turbofan engines, key to the widebody airliners that entered service after 1970. 
(Art by Don Dixon and Chris Butler) 
A month later, in September, the Air Force awarded a contract to 
Lockheed for the C-5A, the transport that this engine would power. Newsweek 
later referred to this aircraft as Moby Jet. Placed within a football stadium, it 
would stretch from the goal line to the opponents’ 18-yard line. Its wings 
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would overhang both teams’ benches. Its cargo would accommodate heavily- 
armored tanks. Fully loaded, its weight of 769,000 pounds would double that 
of the largest commercial jetliners.6 
Douglas and Boeing had competed with Lockheed for this award, 
coming forth with similar designs. At Boeing, the immediate question was 
how to turn such a concept into something that looked like an airliner. For 
several reasons, the C-5A as such would not do. It was too big; it could carry 
far more passengers than the market would provide. Its planned cruising 
speed, 506 mph, would also be too slow. It would be costly to operate, and 
its design was to emphasize the military requirements necessary for opera- 
tion from short and unpaved landing strips rather than from hard-surface 
airports. Nevertheless, Boeing’s work on the C-5A offered a basis for an air- 
liner that took shape as the 747.7 
Right at the start, this project held the strong interest of Juan Trippe, 
chairman of Pan American World Airways. Pan Am was the nation’s leading 
overseas carrier. While it held no domestic routes, in its chosen realm of 
international travel, it carried more passengers than all other U.S.-flag airlines 
combined. Within the aviation industry, Trippe was a power in his own right. 
He had single-handedly launched the jet age, in October 1955, by placing a 
$269 million order for Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8 jetliners. Now, a decade 
later, he had the strength to launch the 747.8 
His vice president of engineering, John Borger, began talking with 
Boeing officials on the very day that Lockheed won the C-5A. Now, by pre- 
arrangement, Boeing’s advanced-design policy shifted focus to the 747. The 
group’s manager, Joseph Sutter, knew he would head up the new project as 
soon as the Air Force gave the C-5A to Lockheed. Market projections also 
favored the 747-and called for it to be huge in size. 
As the Boeing vice president John Steiner describes it, aircraft are 
designed to fit the market four years after they enter service. For the 747, that 
was to be 1973 or 1974. Traffic had been shooting up for several years at 
annual rates of increase of 10 to 12 percent; lately those rates had gone up fur- 
ther. Pan Am, carrying nearly six million passengers in 1965, would top the 
ten million mark only four years later. Yet, if one projected no more than that, 
6. Rice, C-SA, p. 1; Pedigree, p. 57; NASA SP-468, p. 497. 
7. Rice, C-SA, p. 2; Daley, Saga, p. 435; Aviation Week, April 26, 1965, pp. 35-38. 
8. Lehman Brothers, Prospectus (Pan Am); Daley, Saga, pp. 41 1-412. 
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growth rates would stay below 12 percent, then airliners delivered in 1970 
should accommodate 350 to 375 people? 
An early issue called for selection of an engine. The big General Electric 
TF-39 was far from being the obvious choice. GE’s management, believing 
that this engine would find a civilian market, expected to pitch it to the air- 
lines after the Air Force had paid for its basic development. It quickly became 
apparent, however, that for the 747, the TF-39 was too noisy. While this prob- 
lem was far from insuperable, it would demand a major rework, a significant 
civilian effort that would run parallel to the military’s. GE took the view that 
the Air Force would receive priority. That did not suit Boeing, and the chance 
for a deal fell through. 
GE’s main competitor, Pratt & Whitney, had a different spirit. That firm 
had built a high-bypass turbofan of its own for the Air Force engine competi- 
tion. While it had lost to GEas TF-39, Pratt’s design won new life as an engine 
for the 747. The initial concept called for 41,000 pounds of thrust, matching 
the performance of the TF-39. Pratt called its engine the JT-9D. In turn, the 
selection of Pratt was propitious, for this contractor had a virtual monopoly 
(with a market share of some 90 percent) on jetliner engines that were already 
in production. By contrast, GE’s strength lay in military engines.l0 
At Boeing, Joe Sutter’s engineers proceeded to prepare design concepts for 
Trippe’s latest world-beater. Initial thinking, during 1965, held the view that 
the 747 might emerge as something resembling a big 707 with a double-deck 
cabin. Trippe, who had a strong interest in air freight, insisted, however, that 
the 747 wasto permit easy conversion for use in cargo hauling. His require- 
ment called for the plane to accommodate two side-by-side rows of containers 
of the type that were traveling by ship, rail, and truck. Their standard dimen- 
sions included width and height of eight feet. To fit them into a fuselage of 
circular cross section, then, would require a diameter of 21 feet. Here was the 
origin of the wide-body cabin, with Its double aisles and ten-abreast seating. It 
would give a feeling of spaciousness that travelers would greatly appreciate. 
From this basic decision came others. The 747 might sustain hard land- 
ings in which those containers would rip free of their moorings and hurtle 
forward with crushing force. Hence it would be a good idea to put the pilot 
9. Newhouse, Sporty, p. 113; Steiner, Jet Aviation, p. 25. 
10. Newhouse, Sporty, pp. 117-120; Aviation Week, April 25, 1966, p. 41. 
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and crew out of the way, with the flight deck high above the cargo deck. That 
would also offer the opportunity to install a big upward-swinging nose door 
for easy loading of freight, as on the C-5A. 
For aerodynamic reasons, however, this flight deck could not simply sit 
atop the front fuselage like a camel’s hump. It would have to be faired 
smoothly with the rest of the fuseiage, sweeping gently to the back. This 
meant there would be a good deal of extra space to the rear of the cockpit. 
Sutter thought this would be a good place to put air-conditioning ducts. Trippe 
had other ideas. 
Some 20 years p,arlier, Trippe had supported Boeing in another venture 
that had built a four-engine airliner called the Stratocmiser. It had featured a 
downstairs cocktail lounge that longtime travelers remembered with pleasure. 
He now took the view that a similar lounge in the 747, reached by a spiral 
stairway, would be just the thing. In subsequent versions of the 747, it would 
grow into a true passenger deck. But even in the earliest models, this lounge 
would offer a popular center of cheer.” 
Meanwhile, other Boeing officials were addressing the question of where 
to build their leviathan. The company’s existing production facilities were 
busy building the 707,727, and 737; hence Boeing would need new facilities 
for the 747. The search for a new plant site led to Everett, a lumber town 30 
miles north of Seattle. The new factory, quite simply, would feature the largest 
enclosed space in the world, within a building spanning 40 acres. At Cape 
Canaveral, the Vehicle Assembly Building had held the previous record, with 
130 million cubic feet under roof; the new Boeing plant would be 50 percent 
larger. The completed production center would span more than a square mile 
and would have a concrete apron with room for 20 of the big jets.” 
Then in April 1966, Trippe formally ordered 23 passenger and two freight 
versions of the 747, for a total of $53 1 million. A decade earlier, his $269 mil- 
lion jetliner order had set a record for dollar value; this 1966 order now set a 
new record. Over the next three months, five other airlines signed on for 28 
more 747s. With these orders, the die was cast.I3 
11. Newhouse, Sporty, pp. 115, 116, 163; Steiner, Jet Aviation, p. 26; Bender and Altschul, Instrument, p. 504, 
Irving, Wide-Body, p 204; Pedigree, p. 44, Kuter, Gamble, pp. 7-9, 19, 24; Aviation Week, November 20, 
1967, pp. 60-61. 
12. Serling, Legend, pp. 287-290; Pedigree, p. 62; Steiner, Jet Aviation, p. 26. 
13. Newhouse, Sporty, pp. 113-114, 120-121;Aviation Week, April 18, 1966, pp. 38-40. 
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As the orders rolled in, however, managers at Boeing and Pan Am fol- 
lowed a course that soon had the weight of the 747 running badly out of hand. 
Initial design decisions had been relatively straightforward, with the planned 
weight being 655,000 pounds as of April 1966. Pratt & Whitney was prepared 
to accommodate such a design using its proposed engine, the JT-9D, and 
expected to increase its power according to a careful plan. 
When it entered service in 1969, the engine was to produce 41,000 
pounds of thrust. This thrust would increase to 44,000 in new versions 
planned for 1972. Pratt’s designers would do this by pushing up the turbines’ 
operating temperatures; in essence, this engine would deliver more power by 
running hotter. There are, however, a number of other ways to boost an 
engine’s rated power. The view within Boeing, strongly encouraged by Pan 
Am, was that Pratt could deliver a 44,000 pound engine a lot sooner and 
enable the 747 to grow larger still. 
Once this point of view took hold, Boeing’s managers began acting like 
kids in a candy store. As early as April 1966, as Trippe was placing his 
order, Boeing was already anticipating that the plane’s weight would run to 
680,000 pounds. There were plenty of opportunities to go further. For a 
while, people talked of putting a swimming pool in the upstairs lounge. 
Though that notion fell by the wayside, the cocktail lounge by itself added 
more than two tons to the empty weight. More tons went in when Boeing 
lengthened the fuselage to accommodate extra seats. The additional passen- 
gers meant larger and heavier galleys for the food service, which in turn 
called for weightier structural bracing. The British airline BOAC declared 
that noise rules of the London Airport Authority would demand quieter 
engines. The 747’s engine pods took on an additional half-ton of sound- 
absorbing linings. 
Pratt & Whitney now had to play catch-up. Its basic engine would now be 
quite inadequate; it had to offer more thrust, and quickly. In October 1966, 
Pratt achieved a small rise in the turbine temperature, pushing the thrust to 
42,000 pounds. This was pushing limits as well and would be all it could offer 
for a while. 
In June 1967, Bruce Connelly, Boeing’s vice president of sales, sent a 
letter to Pan Am’s chief technical managers. He stated that the 747’s weight 
was on its way to 710,000 pounds. Even then, the 747 would be lighter than 
the C-5A. It was to fly considerably faster, however, which is why its engines 
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needed more power. To Pan Am, the 747’s weight meant a cut in the passen- 
ger capacity that would slice the profit on each flight by as much as $20,000. 
Alternately, the plane would fall short in range on a number of key overseas 
routes. Either way, this design would be unacceptable. 
Boeing nevertheless hoped that Pan Am would accept such limitations on 
the grounds that better engines soon would restore the 747 to its full promise. 
Yet, in the words of Laurence Kuter who headed Trippe’s technical staff, 
There was no doubt that Pan Am was convinced that it was Boeing, not Pan 
Am, that became pregnant when the 747 was conceived. Pan Am expected 
Boeing to make good on all commitments to the time of delivery and all ele- 
ments of guaranteed airplane peflormance that were specified in the half 
billion dollar contract. l4 
Fortunately, Pratt had some power in reserve. By strengthening the 
engine’s compressor and turbine, it could arrange for the engine to run at 
higher rotational speeds, processing more airflow and yielding more thrust. 
This would boost takeoff power to 43,500 pounds. Late in 1967, Pratt offered 
more. By providing water injection, that firm would boost the takeoff thrust 
to 45,000 pounds. Pratt promised to deliver such engines late in 1969. 
Water injection was a specialty of the house at Pratt, dating to the piston- 
driven aircraft motors of World War 11. Small quantities of water injected into 
an engine’s airflow would evaporate within the engine, cooling the air and 
making it denser. This denser air then could burn more fuel, for extra power. 
This same principle had carried over to jet engines. Pratt had used water 
injection on the engines of the Boeing 707. Its additional thrust helped assure 
safe takeoffs. One senior Pan Am captain declared that he would rather lose 
an engine on takeoff than lose his water supply. 
In 1967, however, Pratt, too, was overextending itself. It was promis- 
ing a hotter, heavier engine of greater complexity: the plumbing and 
design of the JT-9D had been so much less demanding. It was these engines 
that would determine whether Boeing could build complete airplanes 
14. Kuter, Gamble, pp. 23-32; Newhouse, Sporty, pp. 162-165; Irving, wide-Body, p. 277; Aviation Week, April 
18, 1966, pp. 38-40,42-43; November 20, 1967, pp. 79-85. 
299 
THE SPACE SHUTTLE DECISION 
rather than gliders, and whether Pan Am and other airlines could put the 
747 into service.I5 
In pursuing this program, Boeing faced difficulties that went beyond the 
sheer size of the aircraft and the need for its vast new Everett facility. The 747 
set new marks in complexity. For instance, it was so large that not one of its 
control surfaces, such as ailerons or rudder, could be deflected through the use 
of a pilot’s muscles. The demands of safety then required four independent 
hydraulic systems. Earlier jetliners, such as the 727, had gotten along with 
only two. The demands on suppliers also were correspondingly greater than 
on the earlier programs. In turn, the task of assembling wings and tail surfaces 
was that much more complex. l6 
At the outset, Boeing’s senior management had been well aware that the 
747 would soak up money for several years before it could begin to generate 
revenue by delivering complete aircraft. The up-front expenses would include 
building and equipping the Everett factory, paying wages and benefits for its 
workforce, and assembling the first flyable 747 aircraft. Yet even then the 
company would not be ready to deliver them to customers such as Pan Am, 
Those initial production aircraft would first undergo extensive flight tests that 
would win a federal Certificate of Airworthiness for the 747. During these 
tests, Boeing would have to continue paying salaries as well as interest on 
borrowed money. This process of certification represented a legal requirement 
that the 747 would have to meet before it could see use in scheduled service. 
Only after completion of this process would Boeing be free to deliver those 
airliners and receive payment. 
Hence, during 1966, the company laid financial groundwork by assem- 
bling a billion-dollar kitty. It raised $420 million through sale of notes, 
convertible debentures, and stock. Boeing’s bankers helped as well, with a 
$400 million line of credit. The firm owned a subsidiary that was building 
gas turbines; the president, William Allen, ordered it sold. Airlines, placing 
orders for the 747, also contributed. They had usually paid no more than 
one-fourth of the purchase price prior to delivery. For the 747, however, 
they would pay half. Pan Am, for one, would pay as much as $275 million 
in advance. Then in 1967, company underwriters converted recently-issued 
15. Solberg, Conquest, pp. 396-397; Irving, Wide-Body, p. 306; Kuter, Gamble, pp. 62, 72-73; Bee-Hive (Pratt 
16. Newhouse, Spony, p. 102; Eddy et al., Disaster, pp. 30,98. 
& Whitney), January 1947, p. 3; Aviation Week, November 20, 1967, pp. 79-85. 
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debentures into new stock, thus placing Boeing in a position to sell still 
more securities. l7 
As work began at Everett, however, the 747’s assemblers proved not nec- 
essarily to be the highly skilled production workers upon whom Boeing had 
long relied. The mid-1960s had brought a boom and had taken available air- 
craft assemblers for existing programs, leaving relatively few for the 747. 
During 1967, amid the buildup for this newest effort, Boeing hired 37,000 
employees and let 25,000 go. The company was resting its prospects on its 
most inexperienced workers. 
Then the engine problems hit home. Coming to the fore following the 
rollout of the first 747 in September 1968, these problems dogged the pro- 
gram as it proceeded through initial production and flight test. No one ever 
expected that the rollout would lead in mere weeks to commercial service, for 
Boeing had planned from the outset to use the entire year of 1969 in testing 
five such aircraft. Still, in the words of John Newhouse of the New Yorker: 
William Allen, now the honorary chairman, says that what he 
remembers best about the engines is that “they didn’t work.” 
Boeing used eighty-seven engines in testing the 747; sixty of them 
were destroyed in the process. At one time, Boeing had four 747s 
to be tested, and couldn’t get more than one of them ojf the ground 
at a time, because so few of the engines were working. By 1969, 
finished 747s were rolling o f t h e  line, but there were no engines 
for them. Instead, Boeing was obliged to hang cement blocks on 
the wings so as to balance the airplanes and prevent them from tip- 
ping ovex18 
The flight tests disclosed a new engine problem known as “ovalization,” 
which cropped up only after hundreds of hours in the air. It resulted from wear 
in the compressor assemblies that distorted the circular cross sections of ele- 
ments of the compressor into an oval shape, with loss of power and 
considerable increase in fuel consumption. This resulted from the engines 
high thrust, which reacted against their supports and bent the engine casings. 
17. Newhouse, Sporty, pp. 120-121; Business Week, December 24, 1966, p. 44; Aviation Week, November 20, 
18. Newhouse, Sporty, p. 166; Serling, Legend, p. 335; Astronautics &Aeronautics, June 1969, pp. 26-29. 
1967, p. 59. 
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Though cure emerged in the form of a steel yoke that would stiffen the case, 
it took time to apply.I9 
Meanwhile, new orders were drying up. During 1967, 1968, and 1969, 
the total value of airliners on order from Boeing, of all types, fell from $3.2 
billion to $1.1 billion. This did not reflect a falloff in passenger demand, for 
airline traffic was zooming. The carriers, however, had anticipated this 
demand and had provided for it with their earlier purchases. Then, in 1970, as 
a nationwide recession blew in, passenger traffic went flat. It would not rise 
again until 1972. Airlines responded by cutting new orders close to zero. 
Boeing’s John Steiner notes that “at the bottom, we did not sell a single com- 
mercial airplane to a U.S. trunk carrier for a period of seventeen months.” 
The 747 took its lumps as well. Airline executives, sensing an opportu- 
nity, moved to sweeten their terms of purchase. Instead of paying 50 percent 
of the purchase price prior to delivery, they dropped the amount to 30 per- 
cent. It did not help; in the year and a half after September 1970, Boeing 
sold only two 747s in the world, and went nearly three years without a single 
sale to a domestic carrier. Total orders were barely 200, too few to cover the 
program’s costs. 
Even when the Everett facility rolled out production 747s, they were not 
always in condition for service. In March 1970, two dozen of these craft were 
parked outside the factory waiting for their engines. Together with other 747s 
in final preparation, Everett had a total of $800 million worth of aircraft on 
hand. Boeing could not receive the airlines’ checks, for payments due on 
delivery, until these planes were actually ready for commercial use. 
These cash-flow problems brought dreadful consequences for the com- 
pany’s debt. Following conservative accounting practices, Boeing had 
maintained the trust of its bankers. This helped as the firm’s debt, owed to a 
syndicate of banks, topped the billion-dollar mark. In 1970, however, William 
Allen and Hal Haynes, his chief financial officer, tried for a further increase 
in their credit line and met defeat. 
To win further leeway, Boeing had few choices. Its executives could not 
seek a merger, for the firm was heavily burdened with debt; who would want 
to buy it? Nor could the company raise capital by issuing new stock; its shares 
on Wall Street were in a slump. Because it was indebted beyond the value of 
19. Newhouse, Sporty, p. 164; AIAA Paper 2987 (1991), p. 8. 
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its net worth, there was no equity on which to base an offering of new bonds 
or debentures. 
Bankruptcy loomed. “We have never revealed how close we got to the 
edge,” wrote Steiner. In speaking of the 747, William Allen noted that “the 
magnitude of the risk and the capital required were sufficiently great that, at 
best, we knew that it would strain the Boeing Company. It was really too large 
a project for us.” Though he had hoped to keep his debt below the billion- 
dollar mark, the actual amount topped $2 billion. Much of the difference lay 
in nearly-complete but undelivered aircraft that sat outside the Everett plant, 
waiting for their engines. At the worst, Boeing’s syndicated debt, owed to its 
banks, reached $1.2 billion. This set a record, not only within the aviation 
industry, but for all corporate borrowing.20 
The company could do little more than to fall back on its own resources, 
instituting sweeping reorganizations aimed at boosting efficiency. Massive 
layoffs paced these changes. The Commercial Airplane Group was by far the 
largest part of Boeing, and its employment peaked at 83,700 during 1968. 
Layoffs proceeded at a modest pace during 1969 but stepped up abruptly 
during 1970. The number of employees fell below 30,000 by year’s end, drop- 
ping toward a nadir of 20,750 late in 1971. This was part of an industrywide 
trend, for from December 1970 to June 1972, employment in the commercial 
airplane industry fell by nearly one-third. 
During one week alone, some five thousand of Boeing’s people received 
pink slips. Firings reached to the top of major organizations; even vice presi- 
dents got the axe. People took to saying that an optimist was someone who 
brought a lunch to work; a pessimist kept his auto engine running while he 
went inside. 
In the Seattle area, the consequences were devastating. Each unemployed 
Boeing worker cost the job of at least one other person, due to the loss of the 
worker’s purchases and spending. The resulting multiplier effect sent unem- 
ployment to 14 percent, the highest in the nation, according to the Department 
of Labor. About the same number of people were on welfare or receiving food 
stamps. Enrollment in a free-lunch program for schoolchildren soared more 
than fiftyfold. 
20. Steiner, Problems, pp. 1, 15; Serling, Legend, p. 333; Newhouse, Sporty, pp. 168-169; Forbes, July 1, 1970, 
pp. 33-34; Business Week, March 28, 1970, pp. 124-128; April 1, 1972, pp. 42-44; author interview, John 
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A brand-new car went on sale at half price-and drew no takers. A former 
Boeing employee had to back out of a deal to buy a house with a federal low- 
interest loan, for nothing down. Apartment managers offered a month’s free 
rent along with a free stereo. Nevertheless, vacancy rates reached 40 percent 
in some suburbs and topped 16 percent within the area, up from one percent 
during the boom of 1967. Night after night, near the main airport, fewer than 
half the available motel rooms were full. The operator of one motel, the Sky 
Harbor, declared that he would “rent any room for any price right now.” 
Auto sales dropped by as much as 50 percent, and more than a dozen 
dealerships went under. Seattle’s sister city, Kobe in Japan, sent food parcels 
and relief funds. As people fled the area in droves, the demand for U-Haul 
trailers grew so large that local agencies ran out of equipment to lease. Two 
real-estate men put up a billboard near the airport, showing a light bulb hang- 
ing on a wire and captioned: 
Will the last person 
leaving SEA7TLE- 
Turn out the lights 
As lights dimmed across the city, another Boeing project, the Supersonic 
Transport (SST), was flying toward its own day of decision.21 
The Supersonic Transport (SST) 
The SST took shape as a response to a joint Anglo-French venture, the 
Concorde. Like the 747, the push for supersonic commercial flight demanded 
heavy dollops of advanced technology. While the 747 developed into an exer- 
cise in corporate management and finance, the Concorde and SST programs 
were marked by politics. The politics featured international agreements, com- 
peting centers of influence in Washington, congressional hearings, and the 
rise of environmentalism as a major popular movement. 
The Concorde grew out of a strong base of experience, in both Great 
Britain and France, in commercial aviation as well as supersonic flight. 
21. Steiner, Problems, p. 2; Serling, Legend, pp. 334-337; Astronautics &Aeronautics, February 1972, pp. 27, 
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Britain’s Sir Frank Whittle had invented the jet engine; the Yankees had for a 
time been little more than apt pupils of the British, with General Electric 
building British-designed engines under license. Sir Geoffrey de Havilland, a 
leading planebuilder, then had parlayed this engine technology into the 
Comet, the world’s first commercial jetliner. Though it aimed at the transat- 
lantic market, it proved uneconomical and failed to compete with the 707 and 
DC-8. It did, however, demonstrate a clear penchant for pioneering. 
The French followed with the Caravelle, a small short-range jetliner built 
by Sud Aviation in Toulouse. Significantly, its engines also were British: 
Avon turbojets from Rolls-Royce, with 12,600 pounds of thrust. In this fash- 
ion, the Caravelle set a precedent for future Anglo-French cooperation. It 
sold well in Europe, and won sales in America as well. United Airlines 
bought 20 of them, putting the first ones in service in mid-1961. For France, 
this was a breakthrough; never before had a French manufacturer sold air- 
craft to a U.S. airline.22 
Another French planebuilder, Marcel Dassault, spent the 1950s leading 
his country into supersonic flight. The company he headed, Avions Dassault, 
built the Mystere IV-B, the first European plane to break the sound barrier in 
level flight. It accomplished this feat in February 1954, only nine months 
after an American fighter, the F-100, did the same. Then, in October 1958, 
another Dassault aircraft, a Mirage 111-A, became the first European aircraft 
to fly at Mach 2. 
The British were also making sonic booms. The firm of Fairey built an 
experimental jet, the Delta FD-2. In March 1956, it set a world speed record 
at Mach 1.7 1, or 1,132 mph. Another company, Bristol Siddeley, developed a 
highly capable engine called the Olympus; an upgraded version would power 
the Concorde. In addition, the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough 
was a world-class center of aeronautical re~earch.2~ 
Two planebuilding firms, Sud Aviation and British Aircraft, carried 
through the design studies that led to the Concorde. For the engine, Bristol 
Siddeley cooperated with SNEC at had built engines for 
the Mirage fighters of Dassault. As design concepts took shape, leaders in 
both countries cherished the hope that they might leap past the era of subsonic 
22. Eight Decades, pp. 30.42-55; Davies, History, pp. 451-455,487-489; Wilson, Fiasco, p. 16. 
23. Gunston, Fighters, pp. 38, 46, 171; Wilson, Fiasco, p. 17; Burnet, Concorde, pp. 19, 151; Costello and 
Hughes, Concorde, p. 43. 
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jets, in which America had taken a strong lead, and take the initiative in a new 
realm of supersonic flight. 
France, led by the strongly nationalistic Charles de GaulIe, had reasons of 
its own to proceed. De Gaulle had vowed to challenge what he called “America’s 
colonization of the skies,” and won strong support from his nation. There was 
widespread resentment of American corporations that were dominating a host of 
European markets, including commercial aviation. This resentment was quite 
similar to what Americans themselves would feel, two decades later, as Japan 
took over increasing shares of the automobile and electronics industries. 
The joint commitment to Concorde took the form of an intergovernmental 
agreement in November 1962, with the force of a treaty. Each nation agreed to 
carry half the cost. In turn, the four participating companies-Sud, British 
Aircraft, Bristol Siddeley, SNECMA-would all work as contractors to their 
respective  government^.^^ 
This challenge was too serious for President Kennedy to ignore. 
America’s planebuilders had nothing like Concorde in the offing. Moreover, 
there was never any prospect that an American SST would go forward as a 
purely commercial venture, with corporations raising the needed funds 
through bank loans and sales of securities. The costs of an SST would be too 
great, as were the technical uncertainties. In addition to this, airline execu- 
tives, busily purchasing the current generation of jets, were far from thrilled 
at the thought of being stampeded into a supersonic era. Within the Kennedy 
Administration, however, the SST found a persuasive champion in Najeeb 
Halaby, the head of the Federal Aviation Agency.25 
Halaby started in early 1961 by winning a congressional appropriation of 
$1 1 million with which he launched feasibility studies. Late in 1962, with the 
study results in hand and the Concorde under way, he urged JFK to initiate a 
major SST program in response. Though Kennedy was not quite ready just 
then, he responded by commissioning an interagency review headed by Vice 
President Lyndon Johnson, a strong SST supporter. While this review pro- 
ceeded, Juan Trippe proceeded to stir the pot. 
24. Dwiggins, SST, pp. 197-198,201-202; Newhouse, Sporry, pp. 193-194; Wilson, Fiasco, pp. 24-32; Knight, 
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During the spring of 1963, Trippe let it be known that he intended to place 
a “protective order” for six Concordes. He, however, would much prefer to 
purchase American SSTs, should they become available. In June, he 
announced that he was taking options on the European airliner, putting down 
money to reserve positions on the production schedule, though he was not 
actually committing to make the purchases. By then, Kennedy had the favor- 
able results of the interagency review. On the day after Trippe’s 
announcement, he also made a favorable statement of his own. Addressing the 
graduating cadets of the Air Force Academy, he declared: 
It is my judgement that this Government should immediately commence a 
new program in partnership with private industry to develop at the earliest 
practical date the prototype of a commercially successjid supersonic trans- 
port, superior to that being built in any other country in the world.26 
In his formal message to Congress, sent in mid-June, he emphasized that 
the government would put up no more than $750 million, while the manufac- 
turers would carry at least 25 percent of the development costs. 
Halaby got the program off to a running start in August, as the FAA 
issued a formal Request for Proposal to interested companies. As they pre- 
pared their proposals, however, executives of major planebuilders also came 
forward with complaints. They objected strongly to the cost-sharing arrange- 
ments, under which they were to put up 25 percent of the program expense. 
This was their way of declaring that the SST looked like a fine way to lose 
money. Nevertheless, they would do their duty as patriots if Uncle Sam would 
carry more of the financial load. Boeing’s William Allen was particularly 
blunt: “Government must be prepared to render greater financial assistance 
than presently proposed.” 
Kennedy responded by commissioning an outside review of the issue, 
putting it in the hands of Eugene Black, former president of the World Bank, 
and Stanley Osborne, chairman of Olin Mathieson. He asked them not only to 
review the cost-sharing issue but also to cast a broad net by talking as well to 
government officials. Their report reached the White House a week before 
Christmas, with Lyndon B. Johnson now holding the presidency following the 
death of Kennedy. 
26. Dwiggins, SST, pp. 1-9, 118-126, Horwitch, Wings, pp. 53-54; Aviafion Week, June IO, 1963, p. 40. 
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The report’s conclusions were devastating to Halaby. It rejected his view 
that the SST should go forward as a race with Concorde. Instead, the effort 
was to focus initially on building a test aircraft to serve for research. The 
report went so far as to recommend that the program should be taken out of 
Halaby’s hands altogether, for the FAA had no staff ready to manage such a 
task. On the cost-sharing issue, it recommended that the government should 
pick up 90 as opposed to 75 percent. 
These conclusions generally suited the preferences of another player: 
Robert McNamara. He had faced down the Air Force in dealing with a tech- 
nically similar program, the North American B-70, that sought to build 
supersonic bombers with the size and speed of an SST. Though Air Force gen- 
erals had called for its rapid development and production, McNmara 
endorsed an Eisenhower Administration decision to build only three proto- 
type craft, XB-70s7 for use in flight test. McNamara also had developed an 
interest in the SST itself, and had served as a member of Vice President 
Johnson’s interagency review panel. 
The Black-Osborne report set in motion a Washington debate that eased 
Halaby toward the margins of SST management and made McNamara a cen- 
tral figure. In April 1964, Lyndon B. Johnson picked him to head a 
presidential advisory committee on the SST. Though the program remained 
within the FAA, high-level decisions went into the hands of this advisory 
panel. As defense secretary, McNamara had insisted that new military pro- 
grams were to receive extensive study and analysis before their managers 
could cut metal for prototypes. He now approached the SST from the same 
perspective, arguing that the FAA should commit to building a prototype only 
after suitably refined designs were in hand and only after serious economic 
analyses showed a reasonable prospect for success.27 
It would take nearly three years, till the end of 1966, before SST studies 
would reach this level of depth. An initial issue for research involved public 
response to sonic booms. These are different from ordinary loud noises, as 
from a jackhammer. A sonic boom arises from an airplane’s shock wave, 
which spreads behind the aircraft like the bow wave of a ship. The shock pro- 
duces a moving wall of compressed air that trails along the ground, sweeping 
27. Pace, XB-70, pp. 15-19; Horwitch, Wings, pp. 64-73; Dwiggins, SST, pp. 12, 15-16, 108-1 11, 128-133,138- 
143, 147, 149-152; Fortune, February 1964, pp. 118-122, 168-172. 
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out a swath up to 50 miles wide and the full length of the supersonic flight- 
path. Within this swath, every person feels the boom when the shock passes. 
The pressure rise is not large, rarely more than a thousandth of atmospheric 
pressure. It is, however, both sharp and sudden; hence it can startle people and 
crack plaster. The strength of a sonic boom is measured as an overpressure; 
designers expected that an SST would produce values of around two pounds 
per square foot during cruise. By contrast, loud noises have their intensity 
measured in decibels, a completely different unit. Hence the FAA wanted to 
know how boomy an SST could be and still produce no more annoyance than 
conventional subsonic jets. 
An initial exercise, Operation Bongo, took place around Oklahoma City 
during 1964. It was a joint FAA-Air Force experiment that sought to deter- 
mine whether people could learn to accept sonic booms as just another type 
of noise, akin to that of railroad trains or trucks on a highway. For six 
months the Air Force sent supersonic F-104 fighters over the city, day after 
day and at specified times. Observers found reason to believe that there 
might indeed not be much of a problem, for a number of people put the 
booms to their advantage. 
A secretary used the recurring booms as an alarm clock. She got out of 
bed at the window-rattling crack of the seven a.m. boom, then took a shower. 
She shut off the water when she heard the next boom, for this meant it was 
7:20, time to start her day. Other people also treated the eight daily booms as 
if they were blasts from a factory whistle. One group of construction workers 
used the 11 a.m. boom as their signal for a coffee break. Animals as well went 
undisturbed. In El Reno, a nearby town, a farmer saw a tom turkey chasing a 
hen. Though a boom rattled the barn, the tom never broke stride. 
In several respects, these tests were biased toward minimizing citizen 
complaints. Oklahoma City was strongly aviation-minded, with a major FAA 
center and an Air Force base. The booms came by day, never at night, and 
people knew when to expect them. They also knew that the test would run for 
only a few months. The booms themselves were weaker than those of an SST 
and carried less energy, though they did increase in strength over the months. 
Nevertheless, the results were enough to give pause, as some 4900 people 
filed claims for damages. Though most involved little more than cracked plas- 
ter, one man did receive a payment of $10,000. Two high-rise office towers 
sustained a total of 147 cracked windows. During the first three months of the 
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tests, polls indicated that 90 percent of the people felt they could live with the 
booms. After six months, this number was down to 73 percent. This meant 
that some one-fourth of these citizens believed they could not live with them 
and would regard them as unacceptable. 
This was bad news at the FAA in Washington. The news soon grew worse, 
as a second series of tests, at Edwards Air Force Base, introduced the use of 
larger supersonic aircraft. These included the XB-70, the only plane in the 
world with the size and speed of an SST. The workhorse of the new studies, 
the B-58 bomber, was only slightly smaller. Already it had shown its uses in 
sonic-boom tests, flying from Los Angeles to New York in two hours. 
Unfortunately, it had shattered windows as well as speed records, showering 
offices and living rooms alike with broken glass. Police switchboards from 
coast to coast had lit up with calls as frightened peopIe reported they had 
heard a terrible explosion.28 
The tests at Edwards took place during 1966, and Karl Kryter, a sonic- 
boom specialist at Stanford Research Institute, summarized the findings in the 
journal Science: When both European and American SSTs are fully opera- 
tional, late in the 1970s, 
it is expected that about 65 million people in the United States could be 
exposed to an average of about ten sonic booms per day. ... A boom will ini- 
tially be equivalent in acceptability to the noise from a present-day 
four-engined turbofan jet at an altitude of about 200 feet during approach to 
landing, or at 500 feet with takeoff powel; or the noise from a truck at maxi- 
mum highway speed at a distance of about 30feet. 
The historian Me1 Horwitch would note that when these results reached 
an SST coordinating committee, “an almost instant consensus developed that 
the American SST could never fly overland.” 
This did not rule out going ahead with the program. Boeing and the FAA 
estimated that even if the SST was restricted to overwater flights, it could 
still sell 500 airplanes. That would suffice to ensure commercial success. 
With no restrictions, Boeing’s managers believed they could sell as many as 
twelve hundred. Even so, Business Week noted that “at $40 million per SST, 
28. Fortune, February 1967, p. 117; ShurcH, SBR, pp. 3-521-38; Dwiggins, SST, pp. 57-62,69-73,77-78.80. 
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a ban would mean a sales penalty of $28 billion-greater than Boeing’s total 
sales for the last fifteen years.” 
Similar warnings came from Senator William Proxmire, an eventual 
opponent of the Space Shuttle who was already taking the lead as a strong 
opponent of the SST: “The SST will start by flying the ocean routes. Soon the 
economic pressures of flying these high-cost planes on limited routes will 
force admission of the planes to a few scattered land routes. And ultimately 
they will be flying e~erywhere.”~~ 
Also during 1966, design studies and analyses reached a level that 
allowed the FAA to select contractors through a design competition. Boeing 
won, with a proposal that called for engines from General Electric. This con- 
tract award came through on the last day of that year; a four-year program 
now lay ahead, aimed at building two prototype aircraft. This selection of 
contractors was crucial. The program now was in a new phase, no longer one 
of endless study but rather of mainstream airliner development. 
This shift in status brought a quick response from SST critics, as the 
beginnings of organized opposition took form. The man who did the organiz- 
ing was William Shurcliff, a physics professor at Harvard. Early in 1967, he 
set up the Citizens League Against the Sonic Boom. His son and sister were 
founding members; its office was in his home. He did not set out to arrange 
protest demonstrations. Instead, he proceeded to run a clearinghouse for crit- 
ics, taking out newspaper ads, writing letters, raising questions, and generally 
working to argue that the emperor had no clothes. His organization was never 
large, its peak membership running to only a few thousand. The rudder of a 
ship is also quite small. Like that rudder, Shurcliff would prove to be highly 
influential in steering the SST to its fate. 
Shurcliff s activities unfolded within a burgeoning environmental move- 
ment that was about to rise to a height of influence. This movement drew 
strength from a surge in public outrage against air and water pollution. As 
early as 1965, the Opinion Research Corp., a polling organization, found that 
up to one-third of the American people viewed such issues as serious. Here 
was a level of concern that no political leader could ignore. By 1970, nearly 
three-fourths of the public shared this attitude, representing a power capable 
of sweeping everything before it. 
29. Hmitch ,  Wings, p. 148; Science, January 24, 1969, p. 359; Business Week, October 28, 1967, pp. 64-68. 
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Matching this rise was a dramatic increase in the prominence and clout of 
leading environmental organizations. In 1967, the Sierra Club, then with only 
55,000 members, was already one of the largest and most active of these 
groups. Though its emphasis was on protecting wilderness areas, its focus at 
the time was on a regional issue, fighting the construction of Marble Canyon 
Dam on the Colorado River. To win political support, it had to bend to the 
needs of such powerful senators as Henry Jackson, chairman of the Senate 
Interior Committee and a strong SST supporter. By 1971, its membership was 
at 200,000 and rising, and its leaders were taking pivotal roles in the fight 
against the SST. 
The rapid growth in environmental concern during the late 1960s recalls 
the widening power of the civil rights movement. A turning point for that 
movement had come in Birmingham, Alabama in May 1963, when the nation 
watched as that city’s commissioner turned police dogs and fire hoses against 
protesting black citizens. For the nation’s environmentalists, a similar 
moment came early in 1969 in Santa Barbara, California. 
The Santa Barbara Channel is rich in offshore oil; a line of drilling plat- 
forms stands six miles out to sea. Early that February, an oil-well blowout sent 
vast flows of crude into the water, where it quickly drifted onto the beaches. 
The Santa Barbara beaches, as highly prized as those of Malibu, now turned 
from shining white to gummy black. The very waves of the ocean lay 
unformed as they drowned beneath the thick suffocating scum. Its stink blew 
into the canyons, a mile and more inland. It took live steam to remove this ugly 
mess from the hulls of boats, and the toll of birds and sea life was immense. 
The historian William Manchester would write that “pelicans drove straight 
into the oil and then sank, unable to raise their matted wings, and the beaches 
were studded with dead sandpipers, cormorants, gulls, grebes, and loons, their 
eyes horribly swollen and their viscera burned by petroleum.’730 
Shurcliff had been proceeding with his anti-SST activism. In July 1969, 
he received valuable support as David Brower, who had been executive direc- 
tor of the Sierra Club, founded Friends of the Earth. It took a strong stand 
against the SST. The following March, a wealthy Baltimore man, Kenneth 
Greif, took the lead in organizing a nationwide coalition of SST opponents. 
30. Wattenberg, America, pp. 226-227; Manchester, Glory, pp. 1173- 1174; Horwitch, Wings, pp. 221-224,233- 
239,310; Fortune, February 1967, pp. 113-1 16,227-228. 
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The Sierra Club now signed on. So did the National Wildlife Federation, the 
Wilderness Society, and the Consumer Federation of America. In this coali- 
tion, opponents now had an instrument suited for work in the political arena. 
A nucleus of anti-SST sentiment already lay at hand within the Senate, 
where William Proxmire regarded its economics as most curious. The plan 
called for the FAA to put up $1.3 billion to carry the program through the con- 
struction and test of two prototypes. The SST then would go into production, 
and Boeing would pay the government a royalty on each plane sold. The fed- 
eral outlay thus was “not a subsidy, it’s a loan,” said William Magruder, a 
Lockheed man who had taken over as SST program manager. “By the time 
the 300th airplane is sold, all of the Government’s investment will be returned 
to the U.S. Treasury, and when we sell five hundred airplanes, there will be a 
billion dollars in profit to the Government.” 
Proxmire responded by arguing that Uncle Sam was not a venture capi- 
talist. If this “loan” was so profitable, then Boeing should tap into its banks 
instead, as it had done in financing the 747. Referring to Nixon’s SST budget 
request for fiscal 1971, Proxmire added, 
We are being asked to spend $290 million this year for transportation for one 
half of one percent of the people-the jet setters-to fly overseas, and we are 
spending $204 million this year for urban mass transportation for millions of 
people to get to work. Does that make any sense? 
His colleague Gaylord Nelson, another Senate opponent, described the SST as 
a high-cost, high-fare plane being built to serve a small constituency that 
may be willing to pay a substantial extra fee to save three hours’ travel time 
to Europe. These people are flying on expense accounts or fat pocketbooks. 
I f  there is suficient demand to support such a plane, it should stand on its 
own and be built without subsidy.3’ 
The immediate focus of attention was a congressional hearing held in May 
1970, with Proxmire as chairman. He chose the witnesses with care. Among 
31. Honvitch, Wings, pp. 276-278; Newsweek, December 14, 1970, p. 83; US. News & World Report, March 
15, 1971, pp. 68-69. 
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them was Richard Garwin, a senior physicist at IBM who had participated in 
a White House review of the program. Calling for an immediate end to its fed- 
eral support, Garwin asserted that “the SST will produce as much noise as the 
simultaneous takeoff of fifty jumbo jets.” He drew concurrence from Russell 
Train, a member of Nixon’s Council on Environmental Quality, who described 
such noise as the SST’s “most significant unresolved environmental problem.” 
Train also opened a new attack by introducing the issue of whether a fleet 
of SSTs might damage the ozone layer in the upper atmosphere. The air at its 
cruising altitude, some 65,000 feet, is very dry and low in humidity. It also is 
rich in ozone, which forms a layer that protects the Earth from the Sun’s dan- 
gerous ultraviolet rays. The atmospheric scientist Conway Leovy, writing in 
the Journal of Geophysical Research, had set forth a “wet photolysis” theory 
whereby water vapor in the stratosphere could speed the destruction of ozone. 
Train stated in his testimony that the SST would discharge “large quanti- 
ties of water vapor, carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides and particulate matter.” He 
added that “500 American SSTs and Concordes flying in this region of the 
atmosphere could, over a period of years, increase the water content by as much 
as 50 to 100 percent.” This water vapor, formed copiously from the burning of 
jet fuel, could destroy some of the ozone, putting the world at greater risk from 
the ultraviolet. Proxmire welcomed Train’s statement as a “blockbuster.” 
The turn of the tide quickly became evident. During the previous autumn, 
SST funding had passed by large margins in both the House and Senate. On 
May 27, however, voting on the 1971 budget, the House passed the bill by 
only 13 votes, 176 to 163. Opponents took new heart, for they understood that 
with the margin of victory having narrowed so dramatically, the SST might 
quickly fall during the next round of congressional action. 
During the summer of 1970, critics sprouted anew. In July, the Airport 
Operators Council, representing all major airports, stated that the SST should 
receive funding only if it could meet stringent noise standards. In August, a 
group at MIT, conducting the Study of Critical Environmental Problems, gave 
further support to concerns about the upper atmosphere. It stated that a fleet of 
SSTs could produce effects similar to those of the 1963 eruption of the volcano 
Mt. Agung, which had increased stratospheric temperatures by as much as 12 
degrees. In September, the prestigious Federation of American Scientists came 
out against the SST. So did the mayor of New York, John Lindsay, who was 
widely viewed as the Republicans’ answer to the Kennedys. 
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Also in September, Kenneth Greif‘s coalition orchestrated a devastating 
attack on the SST’s economic prospects. Over a dozen prominent economists 
signed individual statements stating their criticisms. The group included Paul 
Samuelson, Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, John Kenneth Galbraith, 
Wassily Leontief, Walter Heller, and Arthur Okun, who had chaired the White 
House’s Council of Economic Advisors. The group thus spanned the political 
spectrum from Friedman on the right to Galbraith on the left. Only one lead- 
ing economist, Henry Wallich, came out in favor of the SST. 
Senate leaders put off their vote until after the November election, a move 
that SST supporters hoped would allow some senators to vote with less fear 
of public pressure. Instead, the delay gave opponents more time to organize. 
Leading supporters included the senators from Washington state, Warren 
Magnuson and Henry Jackson. On November 30, sensing defeat, they intro- 
duced a last-minute bill to ban overland flights that would produce sonic 
booms. It was too late; such bills had been in the congressional hopper since 
1963, and the fact that this one passed unanimously was not important. After 
all, it would have to pass the House as well, where it quickly died. Early in 
December, the Senate voted to kill funding for the SST, 52 to 41. 
This was not the end of the matter. The House, after all, had passed the bill 
in May, albeit narrowly. Now a conference committee recommended a com- 
promise: to continue the SST program, but with reduced funding. The issue 
was not settled; it now would take the form of whether Congress would accept 
or reject this new arrangement. The vote would not take place for three months. 
Again, though, time worked for the opponents. In January 1971, the citi- 
zens’ group Common Cause, which was growing in influence, announced its 
opposition. So did Charles Lindbergh, the man who had flown to Paris in 
1927. Still active after all those years, he had long held a seat on Pan Am’s 
board of directors, and had become an ardent environmentali~t.~’ 
Another round of hearings would precede the votes, and again the oppo- 
nents had new ammunition. James McDonald of the University of Arizona, a 
member of a National Academy ciences panel on climate modification, 
asserted that 500 SSTs could deplete enough ozone to produce 10,000 cases 
32. Kent, Safe, pp, 302-306; HorwitcR, Wags, pp. 282-289,303-311; Dwiggins, SST, pp. 68-69,81; Bender and 
Altschul, I m t m n t ,  p. 501; Newsweek, December 14, 1970, p. 83; Aviation Week, December 14, 1970, p. 
18; Science, July 24, 1970, pp. 352-355; Time, December 14, 1970, pp. 13-14; Journal 0fGeophysical 
Research, Janua~y 15, 1969, pp. 417-426. 
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Artist’s conception of American SST in the late 1960s. ( N A S A  HQ RA69-15944) 
per year of skin cancer within the US. This would result from the increased 
power of the solar ultraviolet. His statement caused a sensation. 
McDonald had based his conclusions on the threat to ozone from water 
vapor. Ironically, this wet-photolysis theory was overturned within months, as 
new research in atmospheric science showed that the effects of water vapor on 
ozone were all but nil. Another scientist, Harold Johnston of the University of 
California at Berkeley, rode to the rescue by asserting that nitrogen oxides 
would also damage the ozone layer. SST engines would produce such oxides 
in large quantities. Johnston calculated that 500 SSTs would destroy up to 
half the ozone in the air over the United States.33 
33. Honvitch, wilzgs, pp. 319,327; Astmnautics &Aeronautics, December 1972, pp. 56-64; Science, August 6,  
1971, pp. 517-522; JournaZ of PlanetaryandSpace Science, April 1971, pp. 413-415. 
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Not all the arguments were on Proxmire’s side. During 1970, the pro-SST 
forces had consisted largely of the usual corporate interests. By early 1971, 
however, these forces were stiffening their strength. A key argument involved 
jobs: With the Concorde as an SST in being, an American riposte was essen- 
tial. That argument had failed to win more than divided support among union 
leaders, but now George Meany, head of organized labor’s powerful AFL-CIO 
federation, came out in favor of the SST. Nixon Administration officials also 
weighed in with endorsements. Even William Ruckelshaus, director of the 
new Environmental Protection Agency, argued in favor of building at least the 
two prototypes. 
Acoustics expert Leo Beranek, chief scientist of the fm of Bolt, 
Beranek, and Newman, concluded that production SSTs could be quiet 
enough to meet FAA noise restrictions. There also was countering testimony 
on the atmosphere, as William Kellogg, associate director of the National 
Center for Atmospheric Research, stated that effects due to SSTs would be 
imperceptible amid those due to natural causes. 
Yet, by 1971, the issue was well past being one of whether design refine- 
ments might address specific objections or whether new research might lay 
scientists’ concerns to rest. The public was simply against the SST, by over 85 
percent in opinion polls. In 197 1, barely half of all Americans had ever flown 
in any kind of airplane; supersonic flight to Europe was as far beyond most 
expectations as a visit to Shangri-La. Many people thus viewed the SST as 
useless, as well as being harmful to the environment. The Los Angeles Times 
cartoonist, Paul Conrad, caught this spirit neatly by showing an SST’s four 
engines as garbage cans spewing refuse that included a dead cat. 
Even so, the final vote was close. As recently as December 1970, the 
House had maintained its narrow margin of support. Now, however, 
Congressman Sidney Yates, a key SST opponent, took the floor and said, “I 
demand tellers with clerks.” This set in motion a new procedure, in use only 
since the beginning of the year, whereby the votes would be recorded. 
Unable to vote in secrecy, as it had done before, the House turned thumbs 
down on the SST, 215 to 204. The Senate repeated its earlier no vote, and it 
was all over.34 
34. Horwitch, Wrzgs, pp. 314-327; Ti: March 22, 1971, p. 15; March 29,1971, pp. 13-14; April 5,1971, pp. 
11-12,77; Newsweek March 8, 1971, pp. 81-82; March 29, 1971, pp. 23-24; April 5, 1971, pp. 19-21. 
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These votes eliminated further federal funding for the SST. They did not 
ban the construction of SSTs using private-sector funding; Boeing was per- 
fectly free to proceed with the program, if it could win the necessary support 
through banks or sale of securities. The company, however, was already mort- 
gaged to the hilt; its financial leeway was close to zero. When the SST died 
on Capitol Hill, it died for good. 
This congressional action had important consequences. It marked an end 
to the policy of having the FAA take on a new role by underwriting the devel- 
opment of new jetliners. The funding of such projects now returned to the 
private sector. The FAA returned to its permanent responsibilities, which 
included air traffic control and certiiication of airliners and their equipment. 
The demise of the SST also brought an end to a half-century of continu- 
ing advance in the performance of commercia1 airliners. The industry would 
continue to come forth with new designs, but these would be conventional in 
form. The nation’s airlines would find their future below the speed of sound 
and at altitudes well under the ozone layer. 
In the struggle over the SST, the environmental movement came of age 
and took its place as a major and powerful political force. In defeating the 
SST, the nation’s environmentalists showed that they had the clout to block 
such a program even when it held support from the AFL-CIO, the 
Administration, and the aerospace industry with its well-funded lobby. 
With its votes against the SST, the House and Senate showed that they 
would cancel an important aerospace program even in the face of an indus- 
try-wide recession, and with the national economy as a whole in a slump. 
This raised the question of whether Congress as a whole would continue to 
oppose the interests of this industry. This question would not take long in 
receiving an answer, for in the immediate wake of the SST controversy, 
Congress faced a debate over another project: the Lockheed L-1011 airliner. 
The Lockheed L-1011 
The new high-bypass turbofan engines, in launching the Boeing 747, also 
launched a parallel effort that proved less ambitious but better-suited to the 
workaday needs of the nation’s domestic carriers. At American Airlines the vice 
president of engineering, Frank KO&, was responsible for determining what 
type of equipment his airline would need and for working with the manufactur- 
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ers to get it. When Juan Trippe ordered his 747s, in April 1966, Kolk saw that 
this aircraft was far too large for his market. He quickly took the initiative in 
recommending the development of another new airliner, one that would offer 
wide-body comfort along with the economy of the new turbofans. His plane, 
however, would be intermediate in size between the earlier jets and the 747. 
Kolk’s initial concept was well suited to American’s route structure, 
which featured large numbers of flights between New York and Chicago. 
Indeed, it was a little too well suited; it lacked the size and performance that 
other airlines demanded. Kolk held discussions with his counterparts at 
Eastern, TWA, United, and Delta, and together they agreed that the new air- 
liner was to have three engines and a larger passenger capacity. These four 
carriers along with American would be the initial customers, and Kolk and his 
colleagues proceeded to develop a qomrnon set of requirements. 
Two planebuilders, Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas, proceeded to 
craft designs. This, however, was no federal competition for a contract, 
wherein one would win and the other would lose; this was an exercise in free- 
market competition, in which both firms had the opportunity to vie for 
success. The designs that emerged, the DC-10 and L-1011, were highly sim- 
ilar in size, performance, and general appearance, reflecting their compliance 
with Kolk’s specifications. 
During 1966, Lockheed was matched with Boeing in a federal competi- 
tion that was the mirror image of the one in 1965. That earlier bidding war 
had involved the C-5A; when Boeing lost, its management immediately 
moved to pursue the 747. In 1966, the focus of attention was the SST, with 
these same firms competing for the FAA contract, and this time it was 
Boeing’s turn to win. Lockheed’s president, Daniel Haughton, learned the 
news on the last day of the year. Like his counterparts at Boeing, he immedi- 
ately ordered that the people who were working on the SST shift gears and 
turn their attention to Kolk’s airliner. 
In aerospace design, small details can have large consequences, and this 
would be true of the L-1011. This airliner was to install one of its engines at 
the rear end of the fuselage, receiving its air through a curving duct that ran 
beneath the vertical fin. At the outset, Lockheed’s engineers knew that they 
needed a short engine to fit this installation. Neither General Electric nor Pratt 
& Whitney had what they wanted, but a third player was at hand: Britain’s 
Rolls-Royce. That company had a design on paper for a new engine, the RB- 
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Lockheed L-1011, showing its rear engine installation. (Lockheed) 
21 1, along with a very aggressive head of its Aero Engine Department, David 
Huddie. Above all, he wanted to place his company’s engines within 
America’s new generation of wide-body jetliners. Rolls had never cracked the 
domestic market in America, the world’s most lucrative, but Huddie saw his 
opportunity in the L- 101 1. He succeeded, and in return he later received 
knighthood from the Queen.35 
By 1971, however, Lockheed’s Dan Haughton was finding that he had 
hatched some chickens that now were coming home to roost. This had hap- 
pened during 1965, when he had presided over his company’s bid for the 
C-5A. The company had needed the work quite badly; if it had lost the con- 
tract, it would have had to shut down a division in Georgia, a major operating 
arm. To guard against this, Haughton had “bought in,” submitting an unreal- 
istically low bid of $1.95 billion. Even the Air Force had estimated that $2.2 
billion would be more like it. 
Then, amid escalation of both inflation and the Vietnam War, the C-5A 
program encountered major strains and delays. Costs went through the roof. 
35. Newhouse, Sporty, pp. 122-123, 141-155; Astronautics & Aeronautics, October 1968, pp. 64-69; Fortune, 
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By 197 1, the Pentagon had budgeted $1.3 billion to cover Lockheed’s share 
of the overrun. Though most of this would be charged to the taxpayers, 
Lockheed would take its lumps as well. Early in 1971, Haughton, now chair- 
man, agreed to accept an additional loss of $200 million. That wiped out a 
modest profit; it even cut into the company’s net worth. This news would not 
be welcome at the annual meeting, but business was business, and this trans- 
action meant that Lockheed could begin to put the messiness of the C-5A 
behind it.36 
Haughton executed the agreement, headed for the airport, and flew to 
London to talk about the L-1011 with people from Rolls-Royce. As he later 
put it, “For about fourteen hours I felt good.” But Rolls had been buying in as 
well, and for the same reason: it needed the business. Its 1968 contract with 
Lockheed had committed Rolls to, develop its turbofan, the RB-211, for a 
fixed price of $156 million and Lockheed to pay $840,000 for each engine. 
Rolls was also pushing onto new technical ground. This became apparent as 
the development of the RB-2 1 1 proceeded. 
Rolls had been pioneering in the use of carbon fiber, a strong and very 
lightweight material. In selling the RB-211, a key point had been the firm’s 
intention to build its fan of Hyfil, a proprietary carbon-reinforced epoxy. Hyfil 
resembles plastics used in today’s tennis rackets, and its use in the three 
engines of an L-1011 stood to save 900 pounds of weight. Such fans must 
stand up to collisions with seagulls in flight. Hyfil’s merits would rest on its 
ability to pass the chicken test. This involved a cannon that would fire four- 
pound chicken carcasses at an engine operating at full speed on a test stand. 
The blades broke under the impact, which meant that these blades would have 
to use the conventional material, titanium. Titanium was heavier than Hyfil, 
and this change marked a sharp setback for the RB-211 program. 
It was one of a number of probIems that drove up the program’s cost. As 
this cost escalated, Rolls reported a loss of $1 15 million for the first half of 
1970. Its chairman, Sir Denning Pearson, turned to the recently-elected Tory 
government of Prime Minister Edward Heath. The Tories responded by offer- 
ing a subsidy of $100 million. Pearson, however, had failed to control his 
costs and hence he would have to go; the firm would have a new chairman, 
Lord Cole. His board members would include a representative of the govern- 
36. Rice, C-5A, pp. 8-16, 18,25,27, 195; Time, May 31, 1971, p. 78; Fortune, June 1971, p. 69. 
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ment, Ian Morrow, who specialized in healing sick companies. Morrow soon 
arranged for an independent accounting firm, Cooper Brothers, to audit 
Rolls’ books. 
There was ample opportunity for questions, for Pearson had been using 
accounting practices that made bankers wince. Since 1961, he had avoided 
debiting the expenses of jet-engine development in the years they were 
incurred. Rather, he held them over and debited them in subsequent years, as 
these engines reached their customers. This practice amounted to prorating 
the development cost against income from sales. In this fashion, Rolls had 
reported a string of profits prior to 1970. Now it was difficult to know the 
firm’s total liabilities. 
The Cooper audit even had difficulty in estimating the cost of completing 
the development of the Rl3-2 1 1. The 1968 contract had specified $156 million. 
Early in 1971, it was at least $408 million. In turn, Lockheed had contracted 
to pay $840,000 for each engine, a price that supposedly would allow Rolls to 
make a profit. However, the bare-bones cost of production, even without profit, 
would now be $ 1 , 1 million. In addition to this, Rolls would deliver the engines 
late. As a consequence, it faced penalties for late delivery of an additional $120 
million. 
All this meant that Rolls was well past the point where an extra $100 mil- 
lion from the government, or even $200 million, could make a difference. 
Late in January 1971, Lord Cole learned that he lacked the funds to proceed 
with the RB-211. His board of directors promptly voted to place the entire 
company in receivership. In a word, Rolls was bankrupt. 
This would be very bad news for Haughton. Britain’s bankruptcy laws 
are far more stringent than those in the United States. American law works to 
protect a company against its creditors, shielding the firm against debts and 
legal claims while seeking a reorganization that can open a path to prof- 
itability. In Britain, however, creditors come first. A company is not permitted 
to operate if it has no prospect of success. Rather, it must sell off its assets 
and go out of business. 
Though the Rolls-Royce board reached this decision on January 26, it did 
not announce it publicly. A week later Haughton, newly arrived at the Hilton 
Hotel, received a phone call from Lord Cole of Rolls: Could they meet pri- 
vately at the Grosvenor House? Cole proceeded to tell him the news, which 
was both unexpected and crushing. When other executives arrived, for a pre- 
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viously scheduled luncheon, they found Haughton looking “as if he had got a 
bullet between the eyes.” 
The bullet was aimed more at Lockheed than at its chairman, for those 
engine intakes on the L-1011 now were all too likely to suck the company into 
its own bankruptcy. There simply was no easy alternative to the Rolls engines. 
To turn to Pratt & Whitney for its JT-9D turbofan or to General Electric for its 
own commercial engine, the CF-6, would cost a year in time and $100 million 
in development costs. That was because neither of these engines would slip in 
neatly as a replacement. There would be need for extensive redesign of engine 
housings and installations, starting with wind-tunnel tests, proceeding through 
reconsideration of weight distributions, and ending with extensive new tests 
necessary to win FAA certification. Lockheed would receive a triple blow: a 
massive overrun, a set of prices charged to airlines that would bring further 
losses on each sale, and penalties payable to the airlines for late delivery. 
In addition to this, Lockheed already was deep in hock, having drawn 
$350 million from a $400-million credit line held by a syndicate of its banks. 
It could not seek help from the Defense Department; the settlement of the C- 
5A had also settled other outstanding issues. The company’s stock was 
depressed. Worse, the L-1011 itself was stirring little interest. Though it had 
pulled in as many as 168 orders back in 1968, the total since then had grown 
by only ten more. Lockheed had not booked a single order for it in over a year. 
Yet to abandon the L-1011 was unthinkable. Its overhang of bank debt could 
drive Lockheed into insolvency as well. 
Rolls’ receiver, Rupert Nicholson of Peat, Marwick, and Mitchell, took 
control of that company on February 4. On the same day, the bankruptcy was 
announced in the House of Commons. As one official told the magazine 
Fortune, “The news was like hearing that Westminster Abbey had become a 
brothel.” Prime Minister Heath might have bailed everyone out by nationaliz- 
ing the whole of Rolls, but he had excellent reason not to do so. His legal 
advisers held that by doing so, the government could become liable for 
Rolls’s debts, the magnitude of which was unknown even to the auditors from 
Cooper Brothers. Instead, Heath would take over only the portions of the 
company that were building military equipment. The receiver could sell off 
the division that was building the famous motorcars, which was profitable and 
would readily find a buyer. As for the RB-211, Heath would Ieave it to twist 
slowly in the wind. 
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This approach drew vigorous objection in Parliament. Jeremy Thorpe, 
leader of the Liberal Party, stated that the L-1011 would then be “the largest 
glider in the world.” Worse, a default on Rolls’ contract with Lockheed would 
“throw into doubt our credibility, our commercial competence and our good 
faith in all spheres of advanced science.” Labour M.P.’s raised the issue of 
jobs, for some 24,000 people were working on the RB-211 at Rolls and at its 
subcontractors and suppliers. 
Faced with such arguments, Heath unbent slightly, agreeing to have his 
defense minister take a closer look at the engine’s prospects. This minister, 
Lord Carrington, appointed three investigators that he called his “ferrets,” 
whose report a few weeks later struck a more hopeful note. The RB-211 was 
meeting its performance goals in runs on the test stand. This was important; 
it meant the engine after all could be a technical success. Moreover, its devel- 
opment could go to completion for an extra $288 million. 
Even so, the odds were formidable against saving the RB-211 , and hence 
Lockheed. Twenty-four banks were directly involved as Haughton’s creditors. 
All were highly averse to risk. Nevertheless, they would have to live with it and 
accept more; they might even have to throw good money after bad. Nine cus- 
tomers also had ordered the L-1011. Each had its own financial problems and 
could solve them in part by enforcing contract provisions requiring Lockheed 
to pay out money as a penalty for late delivery. 
Though his hand was weak, Haughton was not without cards of his own to 
play. The banks, after all, wanted him to succeed; a Lockheed bankruptcy would 
leave them with bad debts, whereas with forbearance they might yet continue to 
hold profitable loans. The customers also had reason to stick with the L-1011, 
for they had already laid out substantial down payments. They also had pur- 
chased this airliner on highly favorable terms. This had resulted from 
Lockheed’s competition with the McDonnell Douglas DC- 10, wherein 
Lockheed had won orders by lowering its price and sweetening the terms of sale. 
Even under the best of circumstances, the problems with the program would 
bring delays of several months in delivering the L-1011. However, most major 
airlines had lost money in 1970. They were in no hurry to receive the new air- 
liners in accordance with the contracted schedule. To the contrary, delays in 
delivery would also put off the dates when they would have to pay the balance 
of the purchase price. The chairman of TWA went so far as to suggest that “a 
delay of a year would have as many advantages as disadvantages, maybe more.” 
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Hence, the report to Lord Carrington meant that the outlines of a deal 
could begin to emerge. In essence, it would call on everyone to go back to 
Square One and renegotiate their contracts, paying little heed to the legal 
commitments of the previous years. Heath would need assurance that 
Lockheed would indeed stay in business and would not abandon the L- 101 1. 
Haughton would need more money from his bankers to give him a base from 
which to offer such guarantees. He also would have to pay more for his 
engines, while waiving penalties for late deliveries. For their part, the airlines 
would have to accept higher prices and later deliveries for their airplanes, 
again without receiving penalty payments. 
Haughton now was the man who had to make it come together. He had 
a prodigious capacity for work, on which he now drew. Often he had flown 
in from the East Coast in his Lockheed JetStar, sleeping en route on a couch, 
checking in at home for a quick shower, then reaching his desk at three or 
four in the morning to begin his day’s work. He also had extensive experi- 
ence as a salesman. In this business this certainly did not make him a Willy 
Loman in the play by Arthur Miller, riding on a smile and a shoeshine. It 
meant, rather, that although he was Lockheed’s chairman, he had a strong 
personal involvement in its sales. If an airline executive raised a question, 
Haughton himself might turn up the next day in that person’s office to answer 
it. 
In dealing with his banks and airlines, Haughton had to do a lot of hand- 
holding. Two financiers, one a vice president from Bank of America and the 
other a vice president from Bankers Trust, accompanied him on his travels, as 
representatives of the entire banking syndicate. Still, each airline and every 
bank would have to agree that such a deal would represent the best possible 
outcome for its investors and stockholders. Each of them would naturally 
prefer to hold back and try for better terms. All would have to agree at the 
same time, however, or the chance for a deal would fall through. As Nixon’s 
treasury secretary, John Connally, put it, “Dan, your trouble is you’re chasing 
one possum at a time up a tree. What you’ve got to do is get all those possums 
up the tree at the same time.” 
The most elusive of those possums would be the U.S. government. Early 
that spring, Haughton became aware that he could build a fragile arch that 
might support Lockheed, Rolls, and the L-1011. Its keystone, however, would 
be a new line of bank credit totaling $250 million. Lockheed lacked the assets 
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to pledge as collateral, and its creditors would certainly demand security. That 
might be available, however, through a federal loan guarantee, a pledge that 
the Treasury would reimburse the banks if Lockheed should fold. On May 6, 
Connally met with Nixon at the White House and announced that the 
Administration would send the necessary legislation to Congress. 
There it would face a minefield of opposition. Congressman Wright 
Patman, chairman of the House Banking Committee, had blocked federal 
support for the bankrupt Penn Central Railroad only a year earlier. He was 
highly skeptical of the proposed Lockheed loan guarantee. Senator William 
Proxmire, slayer of the SST and a harsh critic of Lockheed, was ready to 
filibuster against the bill. Though Lockheed was an important defense con- 
tractor, the L-1011 was entirely a commercial venture. If the firm went 
bankrupt, the Pentagon would find a way to rescue its military projects, 
most likely by having other aerospace firms buy up the pertinent company 
divisions. Moreover, the L-1011 was to use British engines, a point that did 
not escape the attention of lawmakers with ties to General Electric and Pratt 
& Whitney. An alternative, the DC-10, was already on the verge of entering 
service. 
Weighing against these arguments was a single word jobs. Haughton, tes- 
tifying before Patman’s committee, stated that as many as 60,000 people 
would be out of work if the L- 101 1 were to fail. The Democratic Party, which 
controlled both House and Senate, was still the party of Senator Hubert 
Humphrey, the presidential nominee of 1968 and a strong labor man. Having 
shot down the SST as recently as March, Congress could not lightly affront 
the unions a second time, particularly since the country was still in a reces- 
sion. Moreover, 1972 would be an election year. 
The outcome was thin indeed. On July 30, the House approved the bill, 
192 to 189. The measure then moved to the Senate, which was to recess for a 
month on Friday, August 6. Hstughton, however, had warned that by 
September, Lockheed would be out of cash. The Senate leadership responded 
by bringing the bill to a vote the previous Monday. 
California’s Senator Alan Cranston, a principal backer, had been doing 
the nose-counting and calculated that it would lose by the margin of a single 
vote. He tried to win over Lee Metcalf of Montana, whose no vote seemed 
soft, and as the calling of the roll reached its conclusion, Metcalf saw that his 
vote was likely to be decisive. He told Cranston, “I’m not going to be the one 
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to put those thousands of people out of work.” He voted yes, and the loan 
guarantee passed by a margin of 49 to 48.37 
With this, the main stone of Haughton’s arch fitted into place. The threat 
of a Lockheed bankruptcy receded, while Rolls now could emerge from its 
own receivership. With its RB-211, it would become a leader in the business 
of building engines for wide-body airliners. In turn, Lockheed now was free 
to proceed with its L- 101 1. 
Aftermaths 
The L-1011 did not succeed in the market. Though the program went through 
development and production, Lockheed went on to construct only 252 of 
these airliners, rolling out the last,in 1983. The program did not earn back its 
development costs; in fact, this firm sold few if any at a profit, for this com- 
pany faced strong competition first from the DC-10 and Iater from the Boeing 
767 and Airbus A-300. Hence to win further sales, Lockheed had to offer 
prices that were very low. The program had received over $1.7 billion at the 
time of the near-collapse of Rolls; the final losses, at the time of program can- 
cellation, dame to $2.5 billion. With this, Lockheed retired from the ranks of 
the commercial plane-builders and proceeded to make its living almost 
entirely as a military c~ntractor .~~ 
By contrast, Boeing came back strongly following its own brush with 
bankruptcy. Though the company’s sweeping layoffs were painful, they were 
part of a set of management reforms that brought sharp reductions in the time 
necessary to build a 707,727, or 737. In 1966, this had averaged 17 months, 
from customer order to delivery. By 1972, it was down to 11 months. “You 
may ask why the hell we didn’t do that earlier,” said Jack Steiner. “We never 
had to. We could have done better. Any time you’re threatened with extinction 
you develop abilities you didn’t know existed.” 
In turn, the company saved itself by offering new versions of its narrow- 
bodied 727 and 737. To compete with the wide-bodies, they needed new 
37 Newhouse, Sporty, pp. 48, 153, 173-183; Eddy et al., Disnster, pp. 100-104, 120-121; Fortune, August 1, 
1969, p. 77, June 1971, pp. 66-71,156-160; Business Week, February 13, 1971, pp. 64-68; March 13,1971, 
pp. 42-43; January 29, 1972, pp. 72-74; Time, February 15, 1971, pp. 68-69; February 22, 1971, pp. 84-86; 
May 31, 1971, pp. 78-79; August 9, 1971, p. 57; August 16, 1971, pp. 70-72; Newsweek, August 9, 1971, 
pp. 51-53; August 16, 1971, pp. 65-66. 
38. Newhouse, Sporty, p. 4; Fortune, June 1971, p. 68. 
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features: longer range, quiet engines, low operating cost, plenty of seats for 
the purchase price. Boeing introduced such improvements, which amounted 
to offering more airplane for the purchaser’s dollars, and won new income 
through increased sales. 
At the nadir, in 1971, Boeing indeed had been close to ruin. Production 
of the 707,727, and 737 was forecast to fall to three per month during 1972 
(not three of each model but three of the entire group). The SST was dead, 
and sales of the 747 were flat. As sales of the improved 727 and 737 took 
hold, prospects brightened. By late 1974, production of the three narrow- 
bodies was up to 15 a month. Debt went down rapidly; in 1973 alone, Boeing 
paid off nearly half a billion dollars. Better yet, orders for the 747 finally 
picked up. In 1978, the company was back on its feet and was strong enough 
to launch not one but two new programs: the 757 and 767.39 
The demise of the SST‘might have opened a major opportunity for the 
Concorde. Early in 1973, however, Pan Am declined to exercise its option 
to purchase these airliners, noting “significantly less range, less payload 
and higher operating costs that are provided by the current and prospective 
widebodied jets.” TWA, Pan Am’s principal rival, foIlowed suit by declin- 
ing to exercise its own option, with its chairman noting Concorde’s “dismal 
economics .” 
Significantly, these U.S. carriers made these decisions nearly a year 
before the energy crisis sent the price of fuel soaring. The airlines of the 
1960s had grown rapidly in an era of cheap fuel; the price of jet fuel was only 
11 cents a gallon in 1973, and builders of the SST expected the price to stay 
at this level for the next two decades. Needless to say, it did not; to the con- 
trary, the second and more severe oil crisis, in 1979, pushed this price above 
a dollar per gallon. Though this hurt all of commercial aviation, it particu- 
larly hurt Concorde whose supersonic speed demanded high fuel 
consumption. In the end, only 14 of these aircraft entered service, divided 
equally between British Airways and Air France. Taxpayers’ subsidies built 
those planes, and to paraphrase Sir Winston Churchill, rarely have so many 
given so much for so little.40 
39. Steiner, Problems; Steiner, Jet Aviation, pp. 31-34; Pedigree, pp. 67-68; Business Week, April 1 ,  1972, pp. 
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These developments unfolded in the wake of the House and Senate votes 
of 1971. As exercises in raw vote-counting, the narrow margin of the 
Lockheed loan guarantee-192 to 189 in the House, 49 to 48 in the Senate- 
recalls the near-death of NASA’s shuttlehtation a year earlier, which survived 
by 53-53 in the House and 32-28 in the Senate. Even the players were the 
same, with Senators Walter Mondale and William Proxmire playing active 
roles in both controversies. Proxmire had also taken the lead in the fight 
against the SST.41 
The two votes, however, had very different meanings. The shuttle/station 
was a standard federal project, of the type that NASA had been set up to 
pursue. Though critics challenged the wisdom and desirability of such an 
enterprise, no one sought to repeal the Space Act of 1958, which had created 
NASA and gave it the charter to pursue such initiatives. In turn, this challenge 
proved to be addressable through such means as having the shuttle stand on 
its own, supporting it with an Air Force endorsement, and allowing the station 
to fade in significance. By mid-1971, the Shuttle was well past its time of 
danger in Congress, as its funding authorization passed the House on a voice 
vote and the Senate by a vote of 64 to 22.42 
In both the SST and Lockheed debates, however, the issues were more 
far-reaching. Though the drama of environmentalism captured the headlines, 
the SST debate also introduced a disturbing economic question: Was the fed- 
eral government to provide funding for this project as a risky venture that 
could not win financial support in the private sector? Similarly, the Lockheed 
loan guarantee amounted to proposing that Washington should underwrite a 
line of credit that this firm could not back with collateral, and that therefore 
was also too risky for banks. 
Neither of these ventures were simple exercises in corporate welfare. 
Federal support for the SST was to be repaid through royalties from sales. 
Recall the remarks of the project manager, William Magruder, that the SST 
41. These senators were liberal Democrats. More importantly, they were from Wisconsin and Minnesota, which 
lacked important aerospace corporations. Other liberal Democrats took different views, reflecting the inter- 
ests of their states. Senator Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) took the lead in fighting for the Lockheed loan 
guarantee, because that company was a major employer in his home state. Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) 
was known as “the senator from Boeing” because of his strong support for that company. Newsweek, 
October 8, 1962, pp. 25-28. 
42, Aviation Week, July 5, 1971, p. 19. 
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would return a profit to the government by selling 500 of these airliners. 
Similarly, the funds advanced to Lockheed came from banks, not from the 
Treasury, with the loan guarantee merely providing security in lieu of collat- 
eral. Both ventures, however, were controversial because they opened the 
door for the government to assume risks that had traditionally rested within 
the domain of corporate finance, with its banks and securities markets. 
In the face of these well-founded objections, the House and Senate nev- 
ertheless voted to support Lockheed, even though their members were well 
aware that they might be setting an unwelcome precedent for further such 
interventions. In doing this, Congress showed that it would fight the aero- 
space recession by passing a measure-the Lockheed loan guarantee-that 
went well beyond the usual demand for pork-barrel spending to provide jobs 
during hard times. This meant that to support the aerospace industry in its 
time of difficulty, Washington would go the extra mile and would enact legis- 
lation that ordinarily it would not consider. Against this background of 
industry woes, the Shuttle, which had stirred such controversy during 1970, 
appeared in 1971 as a straightforward initiative that could win backing on its 
merits. In this spirit, though continuing to face opposition within the Office of 
Management and Budget, the shuttle would gain support where it counted 
most: from Nixon himself. 
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A Sihuttle to  FZt the Budget 
In May 197 1, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) proposed to limit 
NASA’s spending to a peak of $3.2 billion during the next five years. George 
Low, working with his NASA associate Willis Shapley, responded by propos- 
ing a constant budget, with shuttle spending rising no higher than a billion 
dollars per year. Low would later describe this approach as “the only one 
which could convince the OMB that we could do the shuttle and at the same 
time have a balanced space program.” Unfortunately, this billion-dollar limit 
left NASA with funds to build an orbiter but not a booster. Could the agency 
find a way to build both? 
The Orbiter: Convergence to a Good Solution 
As early as 1969, during the initial Phase A studies, Lockheed had taken the 
initiative in proposing a two-stage fully-reusable design with both stages built 
of aluminum and using silica tiles for thermal protection. While the final 
design for the shuttle orbiter would in fact use this approach, one must not 
think that Lockheed was prescient. Though that company indeed was in the 
forefront in developing such tiles, they were items for laboratory research. A 
design that specified their use had no more intrinsic credibility than one that 
proposed to use the miracle metals Unobtanium and Wishalloy. Nevertheless, 
the work at Lockheed suited an emerging preference within the Air Force. 
Late in 1969, Air Force officials stated that they wanted to build the 
orbiter using a conventional aluminum airframe, along with whatever form of 
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thermal protection would be appropriate. In contrast to strong reliance on tita- 
nium in hot structures, this preference for aluminum stemmed from an Air 
Force finding that the aerospace industry faced a shortage of the specialized 
machine tools needed to fabricate large structural parts from titanium alloy. 
Within NASA and its contractors, design studies weighed the relative 
merits of aluminum and titanium as primary structural materials. The alu- 
minum airframe promised to be lighter in weight, reflecting the fact that 
aluminum is lighter than titanium. It also would be less costly to build, reflect- 
ing the industry’s long experience with aluminum. By contrast, titanium 
structures promised to cost up to three times as much as their aluminum coun- 
terparts, and would carry greater risk in development. 
Titanium, however, could overcome these disadvantages with its ability to 
withstand temperatures of 650 O F ,  compared with 300 degrees for aluminum. 
This brought a considerable reduction in the weight of the thermal protection, 
for two reasons. The temperature resistance of titanium would make it possi- 
ble to build the top areas of the wing and fuselage of this metal alone, without 
additional thermal protection, for they would be shielded against the extreme 
temperatures of re-entry by the bottom of the vehicle. In addition to this, a 
titanium structure could function as a heat sink, absorbing some heat and 
thereby reducing the thickness and the effectiveness of thermal protection 
where it would be needed. 
Overall, the advantages of titanium promised a complete orbiter, includ- 
ing thermal protection, that would weigh some fifteen percent less than a 
counterpart built of aluminum. With the titanium orbiter requiring less ther- 
mal protection, it also would cost less to refurbish between missions. Though 
the higher cost and risk of titanium would militate in favor of aluminum once 
NASA faced the O m ’ s  cost ceiling, the merits of titanium encouraged its 
use during NASA’s design work of 1970 and 1971 .’ 
The Phase B studies represented the main line of effort, with John Yardley 
directing the work at McDonnell Douglas and Bastian Hello managing the 
activity at North American Rockwell. Both contractors proposed fully- 
reusable orbiters, carrying all propellant tankage within the fuselage. They 
looked like large delta-winged fighter planes; indeed, the McDonnell concept 
1. Aviation Week, January 18, I97 1, pp. 36-39; Jenkins, Spuce Shuttle, pp. 67.95; letter, Low to Professor John 
Logsdon, January 23, 1979. 
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Fully-reusable shuttle of North American 
Rockwell. (North American Rockwell) 
somewhat resembled that company’s F-4 Phantom aircraft, which were seeing 
extensive use in Vietnam? 
Both orbiter concepts called for building the propellant tankage of alu- 
minum. Though the tanks would be empty of propellant during reentry, they 
would require insulation to keep their contents-liquid hydrogen and liquid 
oxygen-from evaporating. That same insulation then would protect the alu- 
minum from heat that would soak through the thermal protection. Similarly, 
the crew compartment was to be of aluminum, with the crew members riding 
amid an insulated and air-conditioned coolness that would protect the adja- 
cent structure from overheating as well. 
In the structural frames and outer skin of the wings and fuselage, the con- 
tractors proposed to use titanium freely. They differed, however, in their 
approaches to thermal protection. McDonnell Douglas continued to favor hot 
structures, with insulation to protect the underlying framework and tempera- 
ture-resistant metal panels facing the heat of reentry. Metallurgists had 
developed specialized alloys of nickel and cobalt for the turbine blades of jet 
engines; these metals resisted oxidation when hot, making them suitable for 
2. Aviarion Week, April 5, 1971, pp. 36-38; June 7, 1971, pp. 55-61. 
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Thermal p-otection on the North American orbiter. (North American Rockwell) 
the skin of this orbiter. For instance, most of its underside was to be covered 
with shingles of Hastelloy-X, a chrome-nickel alloy. The wing leading edges 
would use struts and beams of columbium; shingles of coated columbium 
protected areas that were too hot for Hastelloy. Though only a small coterie 
of engineers had experience with such materials, the McDonneII Douglas 
designers were not reticent about pushing the state of the art.3 
3. AIAA Paper 71-804: Report MDC E0308 (McDonnell Douglas). 
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Fully reusable shuttle of McDonnell Douglas. (NASA) 
North American also had a strong interest in titanium hot structures, 
expecting to use them as well on the upper wing surfaces and the upper 
fuselage. Everywhere else possible, this company’s design called for apply- 
ing thermally-protective tiles directly to a skin of titanium. Such tiles would 
cover the entire underside of the wings and fuselage, along with much of 
the fuselage forward of the wings. The main exceptions included the nose 
and leading edges, protected with carbon composite, and the vertical fin, 
designed as a hot structure with a skin of Inconel 718, a heat-resistant 
nickel steeL4 
These orbiter concepts represented the fruit of several years of experience 
in the design and study of two-stage fully-reusable shuttles. They also were 
quite representative of what NASA now would not be e to build, under the 
fiscal limits of the O m .  The agency, however, had an ace in the hole, for in 
parallel with these Phase B efforts, Lockheed and Grumman had been pursu- 
ing studies of alternatives. 
4. AIAA Paper 71-805; Repoas SV 71-28, SD 71-114-1 (North American Rockwell). 
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Theml protection on the McDonnell Douglas orbiter. (McDonnell Dough) 
For both companies, the point of departure lay in partially-reusable con- 
figurations that would carry their propellant in expendable tanks. This offered 
a route to lower development cost because the orbiter could shrink in size by 
carrying its propellant externally. The tanks could take form as simple alu- 
minum shells, while the orbiter would have much less volume to enclose 
within its hot structures, and much less surface area to protect thermally. 
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Such approaches dated to the original Star-Clipper concept of 1965. They 
had lost favor because the throwaway tankage would cost money, in dollars 
that literally would be thrown away. Partial reusability was attractive to the 
OMB because it would cut the all-important development cost, the year-to- 
year line item in the federal budget. NASA's fully-reusable approach promised 
huge up-front costs in return for the goal of large savings through reduced cost 
per flight. The OMB insisted on smaller short-term outlays in exchange for the 
prospect of a somewhat greater cost of launch, 15 years down the road. The 
OMB held most of the cards. 
Among the alternative shuttle designs, Lockheed was continuing to exam- 
ine variants of Star-Clipper, with a lifting body for its core vehicle and 
external tanks flanking this core. The new versions included a two-stage fully- 
reusable design that placed the propellant tanks within the core and used a 
McDonnell Douglas shuttle booster as the first stage. NASA by now had little 
interest in lifting bodies, for they promised difficulty in development along 
with high landing speeds. With the main line of design activity now defined 
by delta-winged versions of Max Faget's two-stage rocket airplanes, NASA's 
continuing support of Lockheed amounted to telling the OMB: Since you 
want us to look at alternatives, here is what we have.5 
By contrast, Grumman began its examination of alternative designs with 
no preconceived views as to how to proceed. When the work began, in mid- 
1970, this company started with 29 configurations in three categories: 
two-stage fully reusable, reusable orbiter with expendable booster, and 
reusable orbiter with expendable propellant tankage. Like everyone else, the 
Grumman manager, Lawrence Mead, concluded that full two-stage 
reusability would be best in the long run. His report, however, noted point- 
edly that the other approaches offered promising means of reducing the 
peak funding. 
Meanwhile, during the fall of 1970, the Grumrnan group supplemented its 
NASA funds with company money, to broaden further the range of alterna- 
tives. The most promising modified the basic two-stage fully-reusable 
approach by removing the orbiter's liquid hydrogen fuel from within its fuse- 
lage, and storing it in a pair of expendable tanks. Grumman managers 
presented this concept to officials at the Manned Spacecraft Center in 
5. Report LMSC-A989142 (Lockheed); Jenkins, Space Shuzrle, pp. 98-103. 
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November 1970. Within weeks, these managers were instructed to concentrate 
their efforts on further and more detailed study of this expendable-tank orbiter, 
and to compare it with a fully-reusable variant having internal tankage. This 
approach gained further favor in March 197 1, as NASA instructed McDonnell 
Douglas and North American Rockwell to develop variants of their fully- 
reusable configurations that would also place the orbiter’s liquid hydrogen 
within expendable tankage.6 
Why was this approach so promising? Liquid hydrogen is bulky, having 
only one-fourteenth the density of water. Thus, although it makes up only 
about one-seventh of a shuttle’s propellant load by weight, with six-sevenths 
being liquid oxygen, liquid hydrogen accounts for nearly three-fourths of the 
volume. Being low in density and hence light in weight, this fuel could be car- 
ried in external tanks of similar light weight. Being bulky, its removal would 
bring a welcome reduction h the vehicle size and surface area. 
In addition to this, Grumman’s approach brought a useful shrinkage in the 
size and weight of the complete two-stage shuttle, including the booster. In 
designing two-stage vehicles, standard procedures exist for choosing the best 
staging velocity, so as to achieve the lowest weight of the two stages together. 
At a higher staging velocity, the first stage becomes excessively large and 
heavy; at a lower velocity, the orbiter requires more size and weight. Ground 
rules set at Marshall Space Flight Center, based on such optimization, defined 
this staging velocity as being close to 10,000 feet per second. For Grumman’s 
two-stage fully-reusable configuration, used as a reference for purpose of 
comparison, it was 9,750 fdsec. 
With the liquid hydrogen now to be carried in lightweight external tank- 
age, a re-calculation of this optimum showed that it would be advantageous 
to make these tanks larger, allowing them to carry more of this fuel. The 
orbiter then would have to carry more liquid oxygen, stored within its fuse- 
lage. This, however, would be easy to accommodate. Liquid oxygen is dense, 
denser than water. Hence, the extra quantity would require little additional 
volume and would not compromise the overall design of the orbiter. 
The upshot was that the optimum staging velocity, concomitant with the 
lowest overall weight, would drop to only 7,000 fdsec. This would greatly 
ease the task of designing the booster. The booster now could be considerably 
6.  Report B35-43 Rp-I 1 (Grumman), Section 1; Aviarion Week, March 29, 1971, pp. 45-46. 
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Grumman’s two-stage shuttle, which put the orbiter’s liquid hydrogen in expendable tanks. 
(Art by Dennis Jenkins) 
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smaller and lighter in weight, reflecting its reduction in required performance. 
It also would be much easier to protect thermally, 
The orbiter design followed standard practice, with a main structure of 
titanium. Grummm’s report stated that the company would rely on “materi- 
als, analysis, manufacturing and test procedures developed for the F-14 
aircraft,” a Navy fighter that was just entering service. The orbiter’s thermal 
protection was to rely primarily on hot structures, in the fashion of 
McDonnell Douglas, with carbon composite and silica tiles at the nose and 
leading edges. The use of external tankage cut the dry or unfueled weight of 
the complete two-stage shuttle by nearly one-third, from 1.02 million pounds 
to 692,000 pounds. In the words of the report, this weight saving “means 
structure we eliminate from design, do not provide tooling for, nor build, 
maintain, refurbish or otherwise pay for.” 
This comparison of weights drew on the fact that Grumman had worked 
to encourage such comparisons deliberately, by carrying through studies of 
designs with both external and internal orbiter tankage, according to the same 
ground rules. The report noted that 
for those who have in the past undertaken to compare configurations from 
several contractors, the necessity for a dual effort of this nature is readily 
apparent. There is nothing more frustrating and inaccurate than to attempt to 
compare weighl, p e ~ o r m n c e ,  and cost from several contractors, using, by 
definition, their own unique preliminary design groundrules and criteria. 
As a consequence, Grumman’s work had to be taken seriously when it 
pointed to financial advantage: 
Fully Reusable External Hydrogen 
Development cost, $ M 7,777 6,497 
Peak funding, $ B 2.20 1.85 
Cost per flight, $ M 4.29 4.22 
The peak funding level, $1.85 billion, was a long way from the OMB 
requirement of $1 billion. Nevertheless, it was $350 million closer to this goal 
than the fully-reusable design. Moreover, in a brilliant example of having 
one’s cake and eating it, Grumman proposed that the expendable tankage 
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would actually reduce the cost per flight. The tanks per se would cost 
$740,000 per flight. Other savings, however, would more than offset this, with 
the largest of them stemming from a substantial cut in the amount of propel- 
lants for a flight, and from eliminating the need to refurbish the thermal 
protection of the now-simpler b~os ter .~  
While Lockheed's Star-Clipper was widely known for its use of external 
tankage, it used no booster, relying on a single set of engines in the core to 
carry it from liftoff to orbit. The use of a reusable booster, in conjunction with 
expendable tankage on the orbiter, now opened new prospects to explore. An 
important group of explorers worked at McDonnell Douglas, where they pro- 
posed particularly large external tanks that would allow the orbiter to ignite 
its engines at liftoff, with these engines burning all the way to orbit. Though 
this shuttle still needed a booster, its staging velocity fell even further, to 
6,200 ft/sec. This booster's dry weight, 346,000 pounds, was only three-fifths 
that of the booster in the fully-reusable system. For the complete two-stage 
shuttle, cost of development dropped from $9.82 billion to $8.67 billion, 
yielding a reduction on a par with that projected by Grumman.' 
Another group of designers worked with Max Faget at NASA's Manned 
Spacecraft Center. Decisions dating to early 1970 had given that center 
responsibility for technical direction of orbiter concepts, with NASA 
Marshall receiving similar responsibility for boosters. Faget had responded by 
initiating studies of a succession of two-stage, fully-reusable configurations, 
indulging to the full his taste for straight wings and for lightweight payloads 
in small payload bays that would suit the mission of space-station resupply. 
In January 1971, when NASA officials had met with Air Force counterparts, 
they had agreed that the orbiter should have delta wings along with a payload 
capacity of 60 x 15 feet and 65,000 pounds. Faget, nevertheless, had gone his 
merry way, as if this agreement did not apply to him. He continued to pursue 
his personal preferences in shuttle design; it was well into 1971 before he 
caught up with the rest of the world. 
He knew a good thing when he saw it. Although he had strongly advo- 
cated the fully-reusable orbiter with internal tankage, he quickly turned to 
designs with expendable tanks. The Grumman and McDonnell Douglas con- 
7. Report B35-43 RP-11 (Gumman); Aviation Week, July 12, 1971, pp. 36-39; Powers, Shuttle, p. 240. 
8.  Report MDC EO376-1 (McDonnell Douglas). 
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MSC-020 
May 1971 
I- LH, External Tank + Solid Rocket Booster ” 
MSC-021 
May 1971 
3 
External Tank ------+ Solid Rocket Boo 
e 
LCbTank J . .  
How Max Faget &opted external tankage and moved toward the find orbiter concept, 1971. 
(Art by Dennis Jenkins) 
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MSC-023 / MSC-024 
May 1971 Booster Air-Breathing 
Orbiter \ I A 
External Tank - Recoverable Booster -1 
MSC-037 
June 1971 
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cepts had carried their hydrogen in long cylinders running alongside the 
orbiter fuselage, just above the wing. As early as May 197 1, Faget prepared a 
set of drawings designated MSC-020 that put the hydrogen in a single tank, 
slung beneath the front of the vehicle. This concept followed his preferences 
by specifying straight wings, a 20,000-pound payload, and a 30 x 15-foot bay. 
It showed that, at least in this respect, he was willing to change with the times. 
The next step was to lengthen this single external tank to allow it to carry 
liquid oxygen as well. This would reduce the size of the orbiter to a bare min- 
imum. The tank, attached to the orbiter’s belly, would demand structural 
strengthening, for its store of liquid oxygen would be quite heavy. With all 
propellant removed from the orbiter, that vehicle could achieve a standard 
design, independent of the tank. The tank could grow to a particularly large 
size, further lowering the staging velocity of the booster. In turn, this lower 
staging velocity would further reduce the size of the booster, cutting the cost 
of the Shuttle program anew. 
The first such concept, the MSC-021, came forth during that May. Again, 
it featured straight wings and the same payload weight as in the MSC-020. 
Though the bay now had a length of 40 feet, it still was much shorter than what 
the Air Force would accept. During that same month, Faget also proposed the 
MSC-023, again with all propellants for the orbiter in a single large underbelly 
tank. It featured delta wings and a full-size bay, 15 x 60 feet. Here, for the first 
time, was the outline of a shuttle orbiter that would actually be built. 
Even so, Faget was not ready to offer an uncritical embrace of delta wings 
and large payload bays. Though he now had an external tank that he liked and 
would stick with, his subsequent designs continued to show small bays and 
straight or swept wings, and sometimes both. He also examined a number of 
variations in the arrangement of the orbiter’s main engines. Though the MSC- 
023 had only a single such engine, in June he released the MSC-037, 
amounting to a variant with three engines and a 40,000-pound payload. It 
matched the final design in important respects. 
The contractors quickly followed this lead, as they launched new studies 
that assessed its merits. Grumman, which initially put only the hydrogen in 
external tanks, declared that an orbiter such as the MSC-037 was at least as 
promising. Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, and North American found that 
it was superior, with all three firms giving it a strong endorsement. Indeed, 
as early as September I ,  North American presented its own version of the 
344 
A Shuttle to Fit the Budget 
LO2/ LH:! Low Cost Configuration 
(15 x 60 Cargo Bay) 
IlOft 
82 25 ft 
Orbiter Dry Weight 148 klb 
Tank Dry Weight 48 klb 
Gross Weight (Gen 1) 1034 klb 
Orbiter concept of September 1 ,  1971, which foreshadowed the Shuttle that NASA would 
build. (North American Rockwell) 
LO:! / LH2 Orbiter vs. LH:! 
(15 x 60 ft Cargo Bay) 
202 n 
Shrinkage of the shuttle orbiter. Planforms compare the sizes of the fully-reusable orbiter with 
internal tankage; the orbiter with internal LO, and with LH, in external tanks; and the final 
orbiter, with all propellants carried externally. (North American Rockwell) 
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MSC-037, singling out this design as the one to pursue. An artist’s rendering 
showed an orbiter closely resembling the one that NASA would build. 
Eleven days later, NASA formally instructed its contractors to adopt a 
variant, the MSC-040, and to use it as a basis for comparison within their 
ongoing s t ~ d i e s . ~  
The Booster: Confusion and Doubt 
In contrast to the rapid convergence of the orbiter designs, the booster studies 
fell into disarray. The initial points of reference lay in the Phase B booster 
concepts of McDonnell Douglas and North American Rockwell. Both con- 
tractors proposed vehicles somewhat larger than a Boeing 747, and weighing 
some five times as much when fueled. The North American concept had two 
dozen engines: 12 SSMEs and 12 jet engines, the latter serving during flyback 
to the launch site. McDonnell Douglas’s booster, only slightly less ambitious, 
was to use a dozen SSMEs as well, with ten turbojets. 
The North American orbiter had featured a primary structure and skin of 
titanium, with tiles providing most of the thermal protection. The booster 
design was more eclectic. Its front section, which enclosed the crew com- 
partment, had frames and skin of Ren6 41, a nickel-chromium alloy that 
contained cobalt and molybdenum. Though it was strong and oxidation-resis- 
tant, it was hard to fabricate. Wings, vertical fin and canards, small 
forward-mounted winglets used for control, all were of titanium. The fuselage 
and its tankage were largely of aluminum. 
Then came the thermal protection, which avoided the use of tiles in favor 
of hot structures. The designers might have simplified matters by specifying 
the wide use of tiles, as on the orbiter. Tiles, however, were in their infancy and 
North American had to show that it also understood the design of hot struc- 
tures. As usual, bare titanium skin sufficed for the upper surfaces of the wings 
and fuselage. The underside, nose and forward fuselage, however, were a met- 
allurgist’s delight-or nightmare. The wing leading edges would use coated 
columbium. Large surface areas would rely on the alloys Ren6 41 and Haynes 
188, which were exotic mixtures of nickel, cobalt, chromium, tungsten, and 
9. Jenkins, Space Shuttle, pp. 107-116; Hallion, Hypersonic, pp. 1018, 1048-1068; Reports SV 71-40 (North 
Amencan Rockwell); (Grumman); LMSC A-995931 (Lockheed), Section 1 ,  Intenm Reporr (McDonnell 
Douglas). 
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molybdenum. Because these metals would expand when hot, designers pro- 
posed to build the thermal protection in the form of shells, free to slide over 
the underlying strucfxre. On paper, at least, the shells would not come loose. 
Such a design certainly was not in keeping with the preferences of Max 
Faget, who always sought the most conservative approach. It was an engi- 
neering efflorescence to match the economic efflorescence of the 
cost-benefit studies at Mathematica, and was likely to raise just as many eye- 
brows. Moreover, it showed that the exuberance of 1969, when Tom Paine 
wanted to go to Mars, was still alive. By contrast, much engineering experi- 
ence is summed up in the acronym KISS: Keep It Simple, Stupid. This is 
what John Yardley's designers had done at McDonnell Douglas, in crafting 
their own booster concept. 
One can describe it succinctly: aluminum primary structure throughout, 
including wings, canards, and tail, with tiles of varying thickness to provide the 
thermal protection. Though metallic shingles would protect the leading edges, 
they would see use only in the limited areas where tiles would fail to suffice." 
These design exercises gave both contractors the opportunity to conduct 
detailed investigations using a range of approaches: hot structures, aluminum 
and titanium primary structures, tiles, and metallic thermal protection. 
Neither contractor offered anything so simple as an aluminum orbiter pro- 
tected with tiles, though McDonnell Douglas used this approach in its booster. 
Despite their complexities, however, the concepts were not obviously infeasi- 
ble, and some people believed they could actually be built. 
Along came the Grumman design studies, which put the orbiter's liquid 
hydrogen in external tanks and lowered the booster's staging velocity from 
9,750 to 7,000 fdsec. Boeing, which had built the first stage of the Saturn V, 
was teamed with Grumman and had responsibility for the booster. Its engi- 
neers determined that this reduction in velocity would bring a 
disproportionate reduction in the size and weight of the booster, which now 
would require much less propellant. In addition to this, the lower velocity 
meant that the booster would be much closer to the launch site when it 
released the orbiter and began its return. Being closer, it would need less fuel 
for its jet engines, further reducing its size. The upshot was that whereas the 
IO. Brady and Clauser, Materials, pp 241, 272, Lynch, Handbook, pp 552, 822, Avrarion Week, January 18, 
1971, p. 37; June 7, 1971, pp. 55-61; AIAA Papers 71-804.71-805; Reports LE 71-7, SD 71-114-1 (North 
American Rockwell); MDC E0308 (McDonnell Douglas) 
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fully-reusable orbiter’s booster would have a dry weight of 798,500 pounds, 
the new orbiter would cut this booster weight to 494,900 pounds. 
Better still, the lower staging velocity virtually eliminated the need for 
thermal protection. The booster now would need neither tiles nor exotic 
metals. Instead, it would use its structure as a heat sink, just as with the X-15. 
During reentry, it would experience a sharp but brief pulse of heat, which a 
conventional aircraft structure could accept and absorb without exceeding 
temperature limits. Hot areas would continue to demand a titanium hot struc- 
ture, which would cover some one-eighth of the booster. The rest of this 
vehicle, however, would make considerable use of aluminum. 
How could bare aluminum, without thermal protection, serve in a shut- 
tle booster? It was common understanding that aluminum airframes would 
lose strength due to aerodynamic h,eating at speeds beyond Mach 2; higher 
speeds required titanium, with its greater temperature resistance. These prin- 
ciples, however, dealt with aircraft in cruise, which would face their 
temperatures continually. The Boeing booster would reenter at Mach 7. Its 
thermal environment, however, would resemble a fire that does not burn 
your hand when you whisk it through quickly. Across part of the underside, 
the vehicle would protect itself by the simple method of using metal with 
more than usual thickness, to cope with the heat. Even these areas would be 
limited, with the contractors noting that “the materia1 gauges [thicknesses] 
required for strength exceed the minimum heat sink gauges over the major- 
ity of the vehicle.”” 
In 1954, amid the early feasibility studies that led to the X-15, investiga- 
tors found, to their pleasant surprise, that they could follow standard aircraft 
design practice in crafting this research airplane. As a bonus, they also dis- 
covered that its metal skin, designed for strength rather than for heat 
resistance, nevertheless would have enough thickness to serve effectively as a 
heat sink. Now, in 1971, engineers at Boeing were learning that their booster 
could offer the same bonus, while providing the convenience of aluminum, 
the most familiar of metals and the easiest to use. 
When McDonnell Douglas went further, introducing an external-tank 
orbiter that lowered the staging velocity to 6200 ft/sec, its engineers designed 
a winged booster that was 82 percent aluminum heat sink. Though these 
1 I .  Report B35-43 RP-I 1 (Grumman); Aviuriun Week, July 12, 1971, pp. 36-39 
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designers could have lowered the staging velocity still further, by putting 
more propellant in the orbiter’s tanks, their selected configuration brought the 
largest savings in the weight of thermal protection.‘2 
Unfortunately, while the move to external tankage brought a welcome 
reduction in peak annual funding, it took NASA less than one-third of the dis- 
tance from the $2.2 billion peak funding of the fully-reusables to the $1 
billion of the OMB. This move had addressed the easiest part of the problem; 
the rest of the solution would prove considerably more elusive. 
The next step came during June 1971, as the new NASA Administrator, 
James Fletcher, embraced what his agency had previously rejected: a phased 
approach to shuttle development. This called for the extensive use of interim 
systems that would make it possible to build and fly an initial shuttle orbiter, 
with development of the final systems being delayed for several years. Such 
an approach would be wasteful, for the interim arrangements would cost 
money and yet would serve merely as a stopgap. Phased development also 
carried political risks, for in Washington, few things are so permanent as a 
temporary solution. If NASA could get any kind of shuttle into space, even 
one of interim design, it might face strong opposition and long delays before 
it could win permission to build the shuttle it truly wanted. A phased 
approach, however, would spread the program over a term of years, reducing 
the all-important peak funding level. 
Eletcher had formally taken over his office on May 1. On June 16, in his 
first major decision, he made an announcement: 
The preferred configuration which is emerging from these studies is a two- 
stage delta wing reusable system in which the orbiter has external tanks that 
can be jettisoned. 
Although our studies to date have mostly been based on a concurrent 
approach in which development and testing of both the orbiter and booster 
stages would proceed at the same time, we have been studying in parallel, the 
idea of sequencing the development, test and verijication of critical new tech- 
nology features of the system. We now believe a “phased approach” is 
feasible and may offer significant advantages.I3 
12. Report MDC E0376-1 (McDonnell Douglas). 
13. Fletcher, statement, June 16, 1971; Aviation Week, June 21, 1971, p. 19; June 28, 1971, p. 16; Gomersall 
and Wilcox, Working Paper. 
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The SSME represented a potentially important element of this approach. 
It had been slated to receive early attention and funding, for it was to power 
both Shuttle stages. Its development therefore would pace the entire program. 
An alternative engine did exist: Rocketdyne’s J-2s was an uprated variant of 
the J-2 engine used in Apollo. It would lack the performance of the SSME, 
while delivering considerably less thrust. A cluster of these engines neverthe- 
less would push a shuttle orbiter into space, though with a greatly reduced 
payload weight. Also, use of the J-2s would permit a delay (potentially a long 
one) in proceeding with the SSME. Indeed, Max Faget was already incorpo- 
rating the J-2s in a number of his orbiter de~igns.’~ 
Most of the cuts in peak funding, however, would come by putting off 
plans to develop a fully-reusable booster, even one of smaller size and sim- 
plified design such as one of the new heat-sink versions. NASA instead would 
fly its orbiter atop an existing rocket stage such as the S-IC, the first stage of 
the Saturn V. By delaying development of a fully-reusable booster for three 
years, the agency could cut the peak funding to $1.3 billion per year. This 
would represent a reduction of nearly a billion dollars from the proposed peak 
funding levels of the Phase B studies, and would put NASA within hailing 
distance of the OMB requirement. 
While the move to external orbiter tankage represented ingenuity, 
Fletcher’s decision amounted to desperation. Dale Myers, the Associate 
Administrator for Manned Space Flight, admitted to Aviation Week that 
phased development might prove to be impractical. Fletcher himself wrote a 
letter to a leading shuttle critic, the space scientist James Van Allen: “The 
political cards are so heavily stacked against this pro gram... that no opposi- 
tion from the scientific community is necessary. I think you are shooting at 
a dead horse.”15 
Nevertheless, the prospect of an interim booster spurred hope among the 
contractors that had products ready to offer. Boeing’s situation now was 
advantageous, for that company’s S-IC was the only immediately-available 
stage with the power to carry a full-size shuttle orbiter. For Boeing, NASA’s 
new interest in that stage also represented a reversal of fortune. Only a few 
months earlier, the fm was looking ahead to an imminent shutdown of its 
14. Rocketdyne, Expendable Launch Vehicle Engines; Jenkins, Space Shuttle, pp. 110, 113-1 15. 
15. Letter, Fletcher to Van Allen, July 12, 1971; Aviation Week, June 21, 1971, p. 19. 
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Saturn production facility. Now it could cherish the hope that production of 
this rocket stage might continue after all. 
Martin Marietta was also in the picture. This firm had actively promoted 
the Titan 111-M, in an era when NASA had been willing to consider a small 
shuttle orbiter that would amount to an enlarged Dyna-Soar. Though the com- 
pany had done little of significance for the Shuttle after 1969, now, in 
mid- 197 1, it came forward with a new concept, the Titan 111-L (“large”). This 
would use a new liquid-fueled core with a diameter of 16 feet, compared to 
10 feet for the standard Titan III, and with up to six solid-fuel boosters of 120- 
inch diameter. 
David LeVine, Martin’s vice president for launch vehicles, noted that the 
solid boosters were already in production at United Technology Corp., and 
could readily be lengthened to yield more thrust. Though the core would be 
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new, it too would use existing engines from Aerojet General. Though the 
Titan 111-L would be expendable, it would cost no more than $30 million per 
launch, compared to $73 million for the S-IC. The Shuttle orbiter riding atop 
the new Titan would certainly not resemble Dyna-Soar; it would be a full-size 
orbiter, carrying up to 65,000 pounds of payload.I6 
The principal builders of solid rocket motors-Thiokol, Aerojet, United 
Technology, Lockheed Propulsion Co.-were prepared to make a pitch for 
their own units as well, arguing that suitable clusters could also provide a 
good interim shuttle booster. A few years earlier, these firms had built and 
test-fired rockets with diameters of 156 and even 260 inches. This technology 
had subsequentIy been set aside as having no immediate application. Now, 
however, with the Shuttle needing an interim booster, these big solid motors 
might see their day. 
A fourth approach came from NASA Marshall: the pressure-fed expend- 
able booster. It amounted to reinventing the liquid-fueled rocket, using 
approaches selected for their simplicity. Conventional rocket stages used 
structures of thin-gauge aluminum that saved weight. Their engines relied on 
turbopumps that pumped the propellants to high pressures, with the engines 
operating under internal pressures that were similarly high. Such engines 
offered good performance and strong thrust from compact and lightweight 
units. The turbopumps, however, were costly and difficult to develop, and at 
times were prone to failure. 
Marshall’s new concept did away with the turbopumps, relying on gas 
pressure within the propellant tanks to push the fuel and oxidizer into the 
engines. Though these engines would have to be of new design, their lack of 
turbopumps would greatly ease the problem of development. They would be 
larger and heavier than their pump-fed counterparts and would give less per- 
formance. Moreover, the booster would gain weight, for it would require heavy 
thick-walled tanks to contain the pressure. Though this approach was inele- 
gant, flying in the face of the quest for high performance that marked the 
SSME, it offered one more route toward reducing the peak annual fUnding.l7 
This plethora of possibilities reflected the use of external orbiter tankage, 
which reduced the staging velocity and made it easier for a booster to do its 
16. Aviation Week, June 28, 1971, p. 16; July 12, 1971, p 38; August 2, 1971, pp. 40-41, Report MCR-71-309 
17. Jenluns, Space Shuttle, pp. 122-123; Aviation Week, June 28, 1971, p. 16 
(Martin Marietta). 
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job. This diversity of boosters meant that there now was no clear reason to 
choose any of them. The wide range of alternatives recalled the era of the late 
196Qs, when a hundred flowers had bloomed and when neither NASA nor the 
Air Force had yet developed a convincing idea of how a shuttle should look. 
Though the contractors might have helped by settling on a preferred type 
of booster, this happened only in part. Early in September, North American 
declared that all of them appeared acceptable, and recommended deferring a 
choice. Grumman also found little reason to prefer any of them-but noted 
that within an interim program of 30 flights or fewer, the S-IC, built by its 
partner Boeing, would offer lower costs because it was already in hand and 
would not demand up-front spending for development. Lockheed gave the 
nod to a cluster of 156-inch solid boosters. McDonnell Douglas did the same, 
but also had nice words for the Titan III-L.18 
Having thoroughly muddied the waters with these expendable boosters, 
NASA officials proceeded to do an about-face as they learned that they might 
indeed build a reusable booster after all. This happened as further studies of 
external-tank orbiters showed that they could cut the staging velocity to 5,000 
18 Reports SV 71-40 (No& American Rockwell); LMSC-A995931 (Lockheed); B35-43 Rp-21 (Gntmman), 
Inrerim Repon (McDonnell Douglas). 
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and even below 4,000 ft/sec. This further enhanced the prospects for reducing 
the booster size and easing the problem of its thermal protection. 
Though it lacked wings, the pressure-fed booster became a candidate for 
reusability because its thick aluminum skin would easily serve as a heat sink. 
This same robust skin would allow the vehicle to come down by parachute and 
land in the ocean, surviving the impact and the subsequent perils of the sea. It 
would enter the water 200 miles offshore; a boat would then bring it back. No 
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one was prepared to describe this as graceful; with this form of makeshift 
added to those of its design, the concept was unofficially called the Big Dumb 
Booster. Such dumbness seemed, however, to promise a new path to wisdom. 
A more elegant reusable booster concept came from Boeing, which 
proposed to remodel its S-IC by turning it into a big airplane. It would receive 
wings, a tail, a nose with a flight deck, and 10 jet engines for the return to its 
launch site. Though the standard S-IC had never been built for reentry and 
reuse, thermal protection would not be a problem; modest thickenings of its 
aluminum skin now would provide heat sink. To emphasize its near-term 
feasibility, Boeing’s technical artists presented top and side views in lavish 
detail, even specifying the location of the onboard power units and the choice 
of tires for the landing gear. At a time when NASA still expected to defer 
building a flyback booster for several years, one member of the study team 
emphasized that “our proposal is the reusable booster.” 
By late September, NASA was ready to abandon phased development, 
returning to the original plan of simultaneously building the booster and orbiter. 
The booster would be either the winged S-IC that used standard F-1 engines, or 
the Big Dumb Booster with pressure-fed propulsion. In turn, the orbiter would 
use phased technology. It would have a full-size payload bay, but would use 
four J-2s engines; the SSME program would go on the shelf. For thermal pro- 
tection, the orbiter would rely on an ablative heat shield, even though this would 
demand costly replacement after every flight. In time, however, the SSME 
could be resurrected for use in an upgraded orbiter. This orbiter would also use 
tiles or hot structures, as reusable and low-cost thermal protection. 
The development costs and peak annual funding for the complete Shuttle, 
in billions of dollars, now looked highly en~ouraging:’~ 
Pressure-Fed Reusable Winged S-IC 
Development Peak Development Peak 
Grumman $4.08 !$ 1.02 $4.5 $ 1.11 
North American 5.12 0.94 5.79 1.21 
McDonnell Douglas 5.16 0.81 7.51 1.30 
Lockheed (Not given) 4.41 0.99 
19 Aviation Week, September 20, 1971, pp. 16-17; October 11, 1971, p. 23; October 25, 1971, pp. 12-13, 
Reports LMSC-A99593 1 (Lockheed); MDC E-0497 (McDoimell Douglas); B35-43 W-30 (Grumman); SV 
7 1-50 (North American Rockwell); Bullistic Recoverable (Boeing) 
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These costs compared with estimates prepared by the Aerospace Corp. for a 
two-stage fully-reusable shuttle: development, $9.92 billion, with a peak of 
$2.34 billion.20 The pressure-fed booster yielded a development cost less than 
half that value, with a peak comfortably under the OMB ceiling of $1 billion. 
The winged S-IC was only slightly more costly, and it preserved all the oper- 
ational advantages of the fully-reusable boosters of Phase B, on which NASA 
had placed so much hope. 
The new booster concepts did even more, for they addressed major tech- 
nical deficiencies of the Phase B boosters. Thermal protection had appeared 
particularly difficult, at a time when tiles were too new to trust. Charles 
Donlan, the Shuttle program director, put it this way: 
Phase B was the first really extensive effort to put together studies related to 
the completely reusable vehicle. As we went along, it became increasingly 
evident that there were some problems. You had to develop two hypersonic 
aircrafl configurations, simultaneously. The engine problem was compro- 
mised. Trying to use common engines made them not optimized for either 
case. We ran into a problem of pilot escape from the booster in the event of 
an abort. We never could quitefigure out what to do about it. And then as we 
looked at the development problems, they became pretty expensive. 
We learned also that the metallic heat shield, of which the wings were to 
be made, was by no means ready for use. The slightest scratch and you are in 
trouble. It became increasingly evident that you want to have the cheapest 
possible configuration, but you put all this time and effort on a vehicle, the 
biggest part of which (the j r s t  stage), its only role was to get the orbiter up 
high enough for it to f l y  itselJ: So here you’re spending all this effort on a part 
of the system that had no basic pay08 The important thing is the orbiter- 
that is the pay08 
So you see, it was easy to say, “Why do we break our necks putting 
twelve engines in this damn big reusable booster? You cannot get the pilots 
away, the metallic heat shield is going to give you all kinds of problems, to 
do it with ablative stuff makes it too heavy; drop it entirely. That started the 
ball rolling into other types of boosters for the orbitel: 
20. Morgenstem and Heiss,Analysis, May 31, 1971, p. 0-15. 
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The merits of an aluminum heat-sink booster appeared stronger yet when 
one recalls that the most plausible Phase B alternative, which used hot struc- 
tures in the fashion of the North American Rockwell design, amounted to 
covering much of the surface of a craft the size of a Boeing 747 with alloys 
that had previously seen use only in turbine blades. By comparison, the sim- 
plicity of aluminum heat sink was overwhelming. It was as much as to say 
that instead of attempting to leap with one swoop into the metallurgy and 
launch vehicle design of the twenty-first century, engineers instead could 
build the booster using design methods that dated to World War 11. 
The Phase B work had also pointed to demanding issues of safety. To 
reduce weight to a minimum, the internal tanks had to carry part of the 
Shuttle’s weights and loads. The resulting stresses would tend to produce 
leaks. Hydrogen leaks are difficult to detect, raising the prospect that hydro- 
gen could build up beneath the skin of an orbiter, to produce a damaging fire 
or explosion. External tankage solved this problem, at least for the orbiter. A 
leak of propellant now might indeed be detected, since it would occur in plain 
view. The leak would also be far less dangerous, for the propellant would waft 
away on the winds rather than build up to form a dangerous concentration. 
The Phase B shuttles also promised severe difficulty in technical devel- 
opment. Airplanes and spacecraft, as a rule, tend to gain weight in the course 
of development. A two-stage shuttle could accommodate such weight growth 
by enlarging the tanks, to allow them to carry more propellant. With the tank- 
age being internal in both stages, this would demand extensive redesign of 
one or both stages-which would introduce opportunities for further weight 
growth. External tankage addressed this problem as well. A simple lengthen- 
ing of the tanks would do, leaving both booster and orbiter untouched.” 
It thus appeared that in mere months, NASA had scored an impressive 
coup, addressing these technical issues while simultaneously meeting the 
OMB’s cost limits. As with the Mathematica study, however, OMB officials 
again found reason aplenty to view this work with skepticism. 
The new configurations closely suited NASA’s institutional arrangements, 
which dated to the time of Apollo. Those arrangements had given NASA 
Marshall responsibility for the Saturn launch vehicles and their engines, with 
21. John Mauer interview, Charles Donlan, Washington, October 19, 1983, pp. 19-20; Loftus et al., Evolution, 
pp. 15-18. 
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the Manned Spacecraft Center holding responsibility for the Apollo moonship, 
with its piloted spacecraft and lunar lander. This division of authority had car- 
ried over to the Shuttle, with Marshall in charge of the booster and MSC 
dealing with the orbiter. The Shuttle certainly needed an orbiter; hence MSC’s 
prospects were clear. It was less obvious, however, that the Shuttle needed a 
booster, particularly if it was to be complex and costly. At Mathematica, Klaus 
Heiss had managed the Shuttle studies and now was recommending simplified 
designs within NASA. He met resistance, and as he told the NationaZ Journal, 
“For a long time some people over there kept seriously telling us, ‘We can’t go 
that route, because we’ve got to have something for the Marshall Space Center 
as well as something for the Houston Space Center.”’22 
NASA Marshall had taken shape as a reflected image of Wernher von 
Braun, its founder and longtime director. He and his fellow veterans of the 
wartime V-2 effort, who still held senior positions, had long since nailed their 
flag to the mast of liquid-fuel rocketry, and had left the development of large 
solid rockets to the Air Force. The recent Shuttle studies reflected this strong 
Marshall preference. Thus, early in September, the prospect had emerged that 
the Shuttle might use a cluster of 156-inch solids as its booster. Lockheed and 
McDonnell Douglas had both made outright selections of this choice, while 
North American and Grumman had found no reason to reject it. 
NASA thus had a clear opportunity to seek a phased-development pro- 
gram with these solids as the interim booster. Instead, in a directive dated 
September 12, 1971, NASA had instructed its contractors to set aside their 
studies of phased development and to return to assessments of concurrent 
development, using two new reusable booster concepts: the pressure-fed and 
the winged S-IC. Both had NASA Marshall written all over them. Of course, 
Marshall was the world’s leading center for rocket development; its voice 
would certainly be heard. NASA’s decision, however, had amounted to a 
peremptory dismissal of solids. The results of the new studies were a little too 
good to be true.23 
The winged S-IC, for one, promised the fully-reusable booster of NASA’s 
hopes. Its shuttle would do nearly everything that the Phase B fully reusables 
were to accomplish, with a billion dollars less in peak annual funding. Yet 
22. National Journal, August 12, 1972, p. 1299 
23. NASA Tech. Directive GAC-3, September 16, 1971; Reports B35-43 W-28 (Grumman), p. 1 1 ,  SV 71-50 
(North American Rockwell), pp 2, 3 , s .  
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because this booster was to grow out of the standard S-IC and would use the 
F-l engine, it would continue to demand work aplenty from both Marshall 
and its contractors. The budget analysts at OMB had been trained to spot flim- 
flam. They had reason for doubt when they saw that in an astonishingly brief 
time, NASA had succeeded in devising a new shuttle design with a flyback 
booster that would make the agency’s wishes come true-while still purport- 
ing to meet the cost goals of the OMB. 
Projected cost savings also raised questions, for they seemed dispropor- 
tionately large when contrasted with the relatively modest engineering 
changes that had led to the shuttle with the winged S-IC. Were the Phase B 
cost estimates valid? They were certainly high, and if NASA could receive 
largesse on such a scale, it could continue to maintain itself in the style to 
which it had become accustomed. On the other hand, one could equally ques- 
tion the low estimates of the recent exercises. Lockheed’s invited particular 
scrutiny, for it was the lowest-and its peak level, interestingly, was just a hair 
under the OMB mark of $1 billion. Everyone knew that Lockheed had won 
the C-5A contract with an unrealistically low bid; everyone also knew that the 
man who had presided over that bid, Dan Haughton, was now the firm’s 
chairman. Was Lockheed attempting again to buy in? Were the other contrac- 
tors very far behind? 
Even if one cared to accept everyone’s cost estimates as reflecting good 
faith, the trend of these estimates invited further questions. On its face, this 
trend meant that in only six months, NASA had cut the planned cost of devel- 
opment in half, from $10 billion to $5 billion, while sacrificing little in the 
Shuttle’s capability. These cuts had been won at a price, for the cost per flight 
was now on the rise-while still remaining low enough, at least in the pub- 
lished estimates, to make the Shuttle attractive to users. Still, it was 
appropriate to ask if NASA had any other rabbits it might pull from a hat. 
Thus, late in November two OMB staff members, Daniel Taft and the econo- 
mist John Sullivan, sent a memo to Donald Rice, an OMB assistant director: 
In the light of the innovative Shuttle designs which have been forthcoming 
over the past several months, we believe that the best procedure would be to 
provide NASA with a constraint in terms of total investment cost (say, $3-4 B) 
rather than have us try to define a preferred conjiguration. If NASA’s 
resourcejklness to date in changing the Shuttle’s design is any guide, we have 
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not yet begun to see what they could achieve ifthey really tried to optimize a 
system for $3-4 B.24 
Rice’s domain included the Economics, Science, and Technology 
Programs Division, which covered NASA. He reported directly to the OMB 
deputy director, Caspar Weinberger. Rice also had noted that NASA’s recent 
exercises in redesign had brought the Shuttle very close to what NASA had 
wanted originally. Four years later, he noted particularly that NASA’s basic 
assumptions had seemed to be set in concrete: 
I guess what sticks in my mind more than anything else about it was the dif- 
ficulty of getting any solid attention paid to alternative designs. I don’t mean 
alternative in the technical detail sense, but alternative in terms of mission 
requirements and why that mattered. How hard it was to get an examination 
of alternative specijications of what you would like to accomplish, and the 
systems designs that reasonably derived from that will lead to each different 
specijication of what you wanted to do. 
He added that within the Pentagon, “they do a hell of a lot better job of 
looking through the alternatives before they head down one of those 
Even so, there had been change within the Shuttle program, at least in 
terms of its engineering design. The two-stage fully reusables were dead, and 
Charles Donlan would not miss them, later declaring, “It wasn’t till the phase 
B’s came along and we had a hard look at the reality of what we meant by 
fully reusable that we shook our heads saying, ‘No way you’re going to build 
this thing in this century.’ As I say, ‘Thank God for all the pressures that were 
brought to bear to not go that route.”’26 
The winged S-IC soon would die as well, for it appeared more costly than 
the pressure-fed reusable booster. That one might look and fly like an ugly 
duckling, but it was a graceful swan in the realm of budgets, and would sur- 
vive into the next round of designs. This round would resurrect the 
solid-propellant booster, and would determine the shape of the Shuttle in the 
form that would actually be built. 
24. Memo, Taft and Sullivan to Rice, November 29, 1971. 
25. John Logsdon interview, Donald Rice, November 13, 1975, p. 1. 
26. John Mauer interview, Charles Donlan, Washington, October 19, 1983, pp. 23-24. 
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End Game in the Shuttle Debate 
Within the internal debates of the Executive Branch, the end game, during the 
second half of 197 1 had much in common with the opening gambits of early 
1969. Those gambits had featured opposition to NASA’s plans from the 
Budget Bureau, along with the high-level review panel of Charles Townes that 
had recommended much less than Tom Paine had hoped to pursue. Now, two 
and a half years later, a similar review would introduce a concept for a mini- 
shuttle that would win support from NASA’s critics-and that this agency 
could not accept. 
Congress was not a significant player within these debates, as it remained 
generally supportive. The flurry of design changes, in the wake of Phase B, did 
not dent this support. Congressman Don Fuqua, a leader within the House space 
committee, notes that these changes initially produced “great consternation” 
among his colleagues: 
We had just finished defending one configuration on the floor and then sud- 
denly they announced they were going to change it. Tiger Teague got the top 
brass from NASA over here and raked them over the coals. 
We all wanted to know how long they had known they were going to 
change and how much of this kind of thing was going on behind the commit- 
tee’s back. They explained the reasons behind the changes, and everybody 
calmed down. After that, though events moved pretty fast, they did try to keep 
us reasonably well informed.” 
The President’s Science Advisory Committee, however, wanted its own 
sources of information. Nixon’s first science advisor, Lee DuBridge, had 
retired in August 1970, citing his wish to step down “well in advance of my 
70th birthday in 1971.” His successor, Edward David, had been executive 
director of communications research at Bell Labs. David inherited the exist- 
ing staff of the Office of Science and Technology. Within this staff, Russell 
Drew soon proposed that a new PSAC panel should review the Shuttle’s 
prospects and offer views on how NASA should proceed. Daniel Taft, an 
OMB stdffer with responsibility for the NASA budget, warmly endorsed this 
review and urged his management to support it as well. 
21. National Journal, August 12, 1972, p. 1294. 
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The resulting panel took shape in mid-1971, with its chairman being 
Alexander Flax, president of the Institute for Defense Analyses, a Pentagon 
think tank. In July, at the outset, Rice presented David with a list of questions 
he hoped that Flax would address. The first meeting of this Flax Committee 
was a three-day affair in mid-August, at Woods Hole, Massachusetts, far from 
the heat and humidity of Washington, with Martha’s Vineyard visible across 
the ocean. The group proceeded to meet about once a month, holding discus- 
sions with NASA officials and Shuttle contractors. During the summer and 
autumn, as these meetings proceeded, NASA replayed anew its familiar strug- 
gle with the OMB.” 
On June 16, when Fletcher announced that he was extending the ongo- 
ing contractor studies to consider phased development, he had formally 
advised the OMB of this in a letter. A month later, in mid-July, Daniel Taft 
drafted a letter of reply for Don Rice, which asked NASA to “identify an 
orbiter with minimum performance characteristics.” These would include 
low crossrange, along with substantial reductions in payload size and weight. 
Rice’s letter urged Fletcher to place emphasis on “defining approaches which 
will substantially reduce the overall investment cost” of the Shuttle, citing a 
number of design approaches that would cover “the full range of alterna- 
tives.” Rice, however, did not have to cite a preferred configuration that the 
OMB would support. 
On August 2 the OMB deputy director, Caspar Weinberger, sent a letter 
to Fletcher that set forth budgetary ceilings for use in preparation of NASA’s 
budget request for FY 1973, which was due at the end of September: 
The planning ceilings established for your agency for the 1973 budget are: 
(in millions) 
Net budget authority .......................... $2,835 
Net outlays ................................. $2,975 
The above figures provide the basis for developing your 1973 budget 
submission. The Presidents budget decisions require that you submit your 
28. Science, August 28, 1970, pp 843-844, September 18, 1970, p. 1185; October 23, 1970, pp. 417-419; 
MutiurzalJounzaZ, August 12, 1972, p 1295; memo, Taft to Young, January 22, 1971; letters, h c e  to David, 
July 14, 1971; David to Fletcher, July 26, 1971, memo, Drew to PSAC Space Shuttle panel members, 
August 4, 1971; Myers, Memo for Record, August 19, 1971; NASA, “Documentation of the Space Shuttle 
Decision Process,” February 4, 1972. 
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budget at or below those figures. [Emphasis in original] .... It should also be 
understood that subsequent developments may necessitate reducing these 
planning ceiling amounts; thus, there is no assurance that yourjnal budget 
allowance will remain at this level. 
These budget marks, if enacted, would represent a further and substantial 
cut from recent levels: $3,268.7 million appropriated in FY 1971, $3,298 mil- 
lion in FY 1972. With such a budget, NASA certainly would not be able to 
start the Shuttle during the upcoming fiscal year.29 
Weinberger was well aware of this. He also knew that these budget marks 
reflected staff recommendations that had reached his desk by making their way 
upward through the OMB chain of command. He was willing to listen to 
Fletcher’s viewpoint as well, and three days later he met with Fletcher and with 
John Young, the head of OMB’s Economics, Science, and Technology Programs 
Division. In notes from that meeting, Fletcher presented several conclusions: 
1. 
2. 
Come in with budget that meets spec. 
Present several alternatives (incl. shuttle) which bring us back to 
3.2 outlay & maybe 3.27 authority. 
Cap ... didn’t realize manned would be out of business if we made no 
new starts a la shuttle. Jack Young concurred. 
3. 
When Weinberger heard that a $2.8-billion budget would mean the end of 
piloted space flight, he suggested that NASA might be able to stay at the FY 
1972 level. On August 12, he wrote a memorandum to Nixon: 
Present tentative plans call for mjor  reductions or change in NASA, by elim- 
inating the last two Apollo flights (16 and 17), and eliminating or sharply 
reducing the balance of the Manned Space Program (Skylab and Space 
Shuttle} and many remaining NASA programs. 
I believe this would be a mistake. 
1. The real reason for sharp reductions in the NASA budget is that NASA 
is entirely in the 28% ofthe budget that is controllable. In short we cut it 
29. NASA SP-4012, vol. ID, p. 12; letter, Fletcher to Rice, June 16, 1971, memo, Taft to Rice, July 15, 1971, 
letter, h c e  to Fletcher, July 20, 1971; letter, Weinberger to Fletcher, August 2, 1971. 
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Caspur Weinberger with Nixon. (National Archives) 
because it is cuttable, not because it is doing a bad job or an unnecessary 
one. 
2. We are being driven, by the uncontrollable items, to spend more and 
more on programs that offer no real hope for the future: Model Cities, OEO, 
Welfare, interest on the National Debt, unemployment compensation, 
Medicare, etc. Of course, some of these have to be continued, in one form or 
another, but essentially they are programs, not of our choice, designed to 
repair mistakes of the past, not of our making. 
3. We do need to reduce the budget, in my opinion, but we should not 
make all our reduction decisions on the basis of what is reducible, rather 
than on the merits of individual programs. 
4. There is real merit to the future of NASA, and its proposed programs. 
The Space Shuttle and NERVA particularly ofer the opportunity, among other 
things, to secure substantial scientific fall-out for the civilian economy at the 
same time that large numbers of valuable (and hard-to-employ-elsewhere) 
scientists and engineers are kept at work on projects that increase our knowl- 
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edge of space, our ability to develop for lower cost space exploration, travel, 
and to secure, through NERVA, twice the existing propulsion efJiciency for our 
rockets. 
He warned against canceling Apollo 16 and 17, noting that such action ... 
... would have a very bad effect, coming so soon after Apollo 15’s triumph. It 
would be conjrming, in some respects, a belief that 1 fear is gaining credence 
at home and abroad: That our best years are behind us, that we are turning 
inward, reducing our defense commitments, and voluntarily starting to give 
up our super-power status, and our desire to maintain our world superioriq. 
America should be able to aford something besides increased welfare, 
programs to repair our cities, or Appalachian relief and the like .... 
7. I believe 1 can find enough reductions in other programs to pay for con- 
tinuing NASA at generally the $3.3 - $3.4 billion level I propose here. This 
figure is about $400 - $500 million more than the present planning targets. 
Here was a milestone. For the first time since the heyday of Apollo, 
NASA now had an advocate who had real clout within the budget and poli- 
cymaking process. What was more, Weinberger’s memo brought a response, 
as Nixon read it and wrote in the margin, “I agree with Cap.”30 
By mid-August George Low, the deputy NASA administrator, had reason 
to believe that piloted flight might survive, if only at a bare-bones level. He 
wrote, “My own view is that we might be able to bring the 1973 budget back 
to the 1972 level, but that our chances of bringing it above that level are essen- 
tiaIly nonexistent.’’ The. 1972 budget had been too small to launch the Shuttle 
as a new start, and if future budgets would continue at that level, a shuttle 
would be out of the question. Taking the bull by the horns, he added that in 
this situation, “we should drop the Shuttle right now”: 
My view is that we should assume that this is a permanent situation, that we 
should drop the shuttle, and that we come up with a new manned spaceflight 
program. In my view, this program should be based on an evolutionary space 
30. Fletcher, meeting notes, August 5, 1971; Weinberger, Memorandum for the President, August 12, 1971. 
Reprinted in part in NASA SP-4407, volume 1, pp. 546-547. For Nixon’s comment see attachment to memo, 
Huntsman to Shultz, September 13, 1971. 
366 
A Shuttle to Fit the Budget 
station development, leading from Skylab through a series of research and 
applications modules to a distant goal of a permanent space station .... The 
transportation system for this manned spaceflight program would consist of 
Apollo hardware for Skylab; a glider launched on an expendable booster for 
the research and applications modules; and finally, the shuttle but delayed 5 
to 10 years beyond our present thinking. The new element in this plan is the 
expendable booster-launched glidel: The whole program ties together in that 
none of it is dead-ended. The glider would be both an up and down logistics 
system for the research and applications modules, and, at the same time, lead 
toward the development of a shuftle in the future. 
The glider would lack engines; it thus would resemble, once again, an 
enlarged Dyna-Soar. Martin Marietta had advocated such vehicles as recently 
as 1969; now, with its proposed Titan 111-L, it had a launch vehicle suited to 
this task. Low’s notes amounted to admitting that with piloted flight in 
extremis, this glider might form the basis of a fallback position that NASA 
might accept if continued budget reductions were to force the agency to aban- 
don its plans for a Shuttle. 
Two days later, in a review of Shuttle configurations and alternatives, 
Low described the glider more fully: 
The glider itself would look somewhat like the shuttle, but would be 
smallel: It would carry a payload of 12 feet by 40 feet and a payload weight of 
about 30,000 pounds. It would have suficient propulsion for on-orbit maneu- 
vering but would not have the engines or propellant tanks required to propel 
itself into orbit. It would make use of current technology in avionics and other 
on-board systems. The glider would be placed into orbit with a two-stage vehi- 
cle of the Titan IIIL class. The glider and its payload would be reusable but 
both booster stages would be expended. The requirement for a 153- by 60ft., 
65,000-lb. payload, could be met with the same expendable launch vehicle.3‘ 
Needless to say, this was not an approach that NASA would embrace 
willingly. The agency was still a gung ho outfit, deeply engaged even at that 
31. Low, Personal Notes No. 52, August 15, 1971; Low, “Space Transportation System Planning,” August 17, 
1971. 
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moment in sending astronauts to the Moon, and its senior officials were not 
about to go back to Dyna-Soar if they could avoid it. Dale Myers, head of the 
Office of Manned Space Flight, wrote a memo to Low in which he scoffed at 
the glider, declaring that its advocates wanted no more than to send an astro- 
naut “‘whirling about the Earth’ with no evident use for him in space. In the 
meantime, these people can get back to doing things as they do them now, 
with various sized ballistic systems, a relatively constant budget, and a rela- 
tively ‘status quo’ sort of operation.” 
LeRoy Day, deputy director of the Shuttle program, would criticize the 
glider more pointedly: 
You had to put this thing on top of an enormous booster which you had to 
throw away each time. And so you had an operating cost that was getting to 
be kind of ridiculous. The vehicle size and everything-it didn’t have much 
utility. It was kind of a demonstration. It would certainly have been a 
research vehicle that you could have studied re-entry with. When you got all 
through with that then you would have said, “Gee, that would be nice if it was 
big enough to really do something.” Then you would have to turn around and 
build another vehicle. And with the way the budget climate looked, we were 
pretty sure that we’d be shut out. We’d never be able to say, “Okay, now let’s 
start up a real program and build another one that will be an enlarged ver- 
sion and have more capability..” The OMB and Congress would never support 
it; it would be like two different programs, and we said, “That’11 be the death 
of it for sure.”32 
Then in mid-September, just when it counted, George Shultz, director of 
the OMB, received a staff memo: 
The President read with interest and agreed with MI: Weinberger’s memo- 
randum of August 12, 1971 on the subject of the fiture of NASA. 
Furthel; the President approved MI: Weinberger’s plan to find enough 
reductions in other programs to pay for continuing NASA at generally the 
3.3-3.4 billion dollar level, or about 400 to 500 million more than the pre- 
sent planning targets. 
32. Memo, Myers to Low, September 29, 1971; John Mater interview, Leroy Day, October 17, 1983, p. 29. 
368 
A Shuttle to Fit the Budget 
Significantly, this approval did not embrace the Space Shuttle itself. Low 
writes that during the next two weeks, “Fletcher and I debated whether we 
should not forego the Shuttle entirely and develop instead some alternative 
manned space flight program.” Late in September, however, in presenting 
NASA’s formal budget request for FY 1973, Fletcher screwed his courage to 
the sticking point and indeed sought funds for a Shuttle. 
This budget request took the form of a 13-page letter to Shultz. Fletcher 
stated, “My minimum recommended program requires budgetary authority of 
$3,385 million and outlays of $3,225 million for FY 1973.” He placed the 
Space Shuttle at the top of his agenda, and asked for funding of $228 million: 
$200 million for research and development, and $28 million for facilities. 
Three weeks later, in a follow-up letter to Weinberger, he emphasized the 
Shuttle anew: 
Space shuttle development should be started no later than the summer of 
1972 [emphasis in original]. Our studies have led to a shuttle concept that 
minimizes peak finding requirements, and at the same time drastically 
reduces development cost required for the first manned orbital flight. Yet this 
concept still leads to a productive space transportation system to meet the 
needs of U S .  civilian and military space programs.33 
Fletcher, however, was not the only one with ideas on how to build a 
piloted spacecraft. Within the Flax Committee, reviewing the Shuttle program 
on behalf of the White House, a member named Eugene Fubini had taken a 
leading role. He had been the Pentagon’s deputy director of research and engi- 
neering, and he had willingly met with the same officials of Martin Marietta 
who had been recommending the Titan 111-L and its glider in lieu of a true 
Space Shuttle. 
Influenced by Fubini, Flax sent an interim report to Edward David on 
October 19. This report presented a set of alternatives in which the glider, far 
from ranking lower than the least acceptable form of piloted space vehicle, 
was actually the most ambitious option that the Flax Committee was willing 
to endorse. Moreover, the committee’s glider would carry only 10,000 pounds 
33. Memo, Huntsman to Shultz, September 13, 1971; letter, Fletcher to Shultz, September 30, 1971; Low, 
Personal Notes No. 55, October 2, 1971; letter, Fletcher to Weinberger, October 19, 1971. 
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of payload, one-third as much as the version hesitantly considered by NASA’s 
George Low. 
What could be less ambitious than this glider? There was the possibility 
of modifying Apollo spacecraft to make them refurbishable and continuing to 
fly them using the existing Saturn I-B, on rare occasions. Another option 
called for developing the Titan 111-M and its Big Gemini, a variant of this 
existing spacecraft that would grow to carry as many as nine people. Such 
alternatives might keep piloted space flight alive-but it would resemble a 
patient on life support. 
Flax’s report also addressed the subject of shuttle economics. He dealt 
specifically with NASA’s preferred concept, which called for concurrent 
development of booster and orbiter, with the orbiter using phased technology. 
People described this orbiter as “Mark m a r k  11,” referring to an initial ver- 
sion that would later be upgraded with SSME engines, reusable thermal 
protection, and advanced onboard electronics. 
NASA’s estimated cost per flight was $9.0 million for Mark I, falling to 
$5.5 million for the improved Mark 11. Significantly, and like the OMB, Flax 
did not challenge these estimates. He merely denied that they promised 
advantage. As his report stated, 
Considering all of the technological and operational unknowns involved in 
the shuttle development and the fact that no vehicles of similar finction have 
ever been designed before or have ever operated over the range of flight 
regimes required for the shuttle, prudent extrapolation of prior experience 
would indicate that estimated development costs may be 30 to 50 percent on 
the low side. Thus, the estimates of $6.5 billion in RDT&P4 for the Mk I.Mk 
I1 shuttle program may range between $8.5 to $10 billion, reflecting 
increased program costs of $2.5 to $3.5 billion. Similar uncertainties must be 
considered to apply to other non-recurring costs such as production and 
facilities (amounting to about $4 billion). Thus a possible cost uncertainty of 
about $5 billion for total program costs might be envisioned giving a high 
estimate of total non-recurring cost of about $15 billion. 
At a launch rate of about 40 per year (000, NASA and other) over the 
13 years used in the NASA cost model and an average payload cost of $30 
34. Cost of development: Research, Development, Test and Engineering. 
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million (not unrepresentative of the mix of current unmanned payloads), the 
total payload costs would be $15.5 billion. Thus, even [f the total payload 
cost were saved (including those launched to Mars, Venus, etc.) over a 13- 
year period by recovery and reuse at zero refurbishment cost, it would, in the 
case of the high-end cost estimate, barely offset the cost of the shuttle pro- 
gram without discounting. A more realistic (although probably generous) 
estimate of the savings possible through payload recovery might be 50 per- 
cent of payload costs which could account for only $7.5 billion. 
The other area of savings which is offered by the shuttle is its launch 
cost. Average launch cost with current expendable boosters is $12 million 
(projected into the 1978-90 era in the NASA cost model). Thus, with current 
expendable boosters, the annual launch cost will be $500 million. The cost 
of Mk II  shuttle operation perflight is usually cited at $5.5 million: thus the 
cost for 4Oflightsper year will be $220 million. The saving of $280 million 
annually for 13 years amounts to $3.6 billion. Howevel; a doubling of the 
operational cost would reduce the saving to $60 million annually or $780 
million .... 
The operating cost estimates of $5.5 million per flight for the shuttle, 
within narrow limits, must be considered to be a very rough estimate at this 
time, particularly for the early years of shuttle operation. The actual value 
will depend upon the time between overhaul of equipment not yet designed, 
refurbishability of thermal protection system materials not yet out of the lab- 
oratory, and on the feasibility of operating in the shuttle in an “airline” 
mode radically different from all past experience in space  operation^.^^ 
These few paragraphs delivered a body blow to the Shuttle’s economic 
prospects, for although their conclusions were highly unfavorable, they actu- 
ally carried a strong bias infavor of the Shuttle. This was because this analysis 
used current or undiscounted dollars. The Mathematica study had moved 
heaven and earth to try to justify the Shuttle in dollars discounted at ten percent 
per year, and members of the Flax Committee had little use for that study’s 
findings. In the words of a committee staff member, “No one believed all the 
fancy economics and no one believed the mission model. I think they were on 
35. Note, Frank Williams tovon Braun, August 23, 1971; Low, Personal Notes No 56, October 17, 1971; letter, 
Flax to David, October t9, 1971. 
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hemp when they were talking about sixty flights per year.” Yet it had seemed 
easy to show that the Shuttle could be cost-effective in undiscounted money. 
Now, however, Flax was saying that the Space Shuttle would fail this test 
as well. NASA might have moved mountains to try to cut the Shuttle’s cost of 
development, but the complete nonrecurring cost, taking account of a plausi- 
ble overrun, could easily approach $15 billion. The undiscounted savings, 
with a reasonable mission model and an optimistic cost per flight, would 
barely top $1 1 billion and could be less. The OMB economist John Sullivan, 
who had made shuttle studies his specialty, summarized the matter within a 
memo to Don Rice: “A Shuttle cannot be justified when using cost-effective- 
ness as the criterion.” 
Nevertheless, no one wanted to shut down the piloted-flight effort. In 
early October, Low wrote of a meeting with the OMB’s John Young: 
I took Jack Young to lunch about a week ago, largely because I had heard 
that he was the one most negative toward manned spaceflight within OMB. 
During our discussions, he agreed that the manned space program and the 
unmanned planetary programs were the big swing factors in the NASA 
budget. He indicated, however, that he understood that only the level of 
manned spaceflight was in question and not whether to have a manned 
space flight program at all. He agreed that the President would not, and 
could not, stop the nation’s manned spaceflight effort.% 
Yet if piloted space flight was to involve more than infrequent missions 
in which astronauts would show the flag, then NASA would need help, and in 
a hurry. The help came from Mathematica, which now gave a strong endorse- 
ment to a preferred shuttle configuration. 
TAOS: A New A l t e ~ ~ a ~ v e  
The Mathematica analysis of May 3 I, 197 1, had drawn criticism because it 
had dealt only with the two-stage fully-reusable approach of Phase B, paying 
no heed to design alternatives. Yet a comparison of such alternatives, on eco- 
36. Memo, Sullivan to Rice, October 19, 1971; Low, Personal Notes No. 55, October 2, 1971; John Logsdon 
interview, Dave Elliot, p. 3. 
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nomic grounds, promised insights that even the Flax Committee was willing 
to pursue. Flax’s interim report stated that while direct cost-benefit analysis 
lacked “sufficient credibility to serve as a primary basis for deciding to under- 
take such an expensive and high-risk program,” economic comparisons “are 
undoubtedly extremely valuable in making cost tradeoffs and in considering 
alternatives in design and program planning.” 
In studying such alternatives, designers traded reduction in development 
cost against an increase in cost per flight. This tradeoff had to stay within 
bounds; if the cost per flight was too high, the Shuttle would fail to capture 
traffic from existing expendables. Yet the Mark I orbiter, as discussed in 
Flax’s report, would cost $9 million per flight, comfortably under the $12 
million of expendables. This was enough of a margin to give this design a 
strong advantage. 
Klaus Heiss, who was continuing to direct the Mathematica studies, was 
not in a position to introduce new design concepts of his own. Instead he pro- 
ceeded by receiving the contractors’ concepts, comparing them using 
methods of economics. As he pursued such comparisons, he concluded that 
NASA had not pushed its tradeoffs far enough. The opportunity existed to 
push the cost per flight as high as $10 million, in exchange for a further 
reduction in development cost and in peak annual funding. Even at $10 mil- 
lion per flight, all but five percent of the Shuttle’s planned missions would 
remain cost-effective when compared with similar missions using expend- 
able launch vehicles. 
Heiss saw that a specific class of Shuttle designs would do this. He called 
this class TAOS (Thrust Assisted Orbiter Shuttle). It would use a standard 
orbiter, possibly of the Mark m a r k  I1 type, with an external tank large enough 
to permit the orbiter’s engines to operate with “parallel staging,” burning from 
liftoff to orbit. Two booster rockets would flank this tank, giving added thrust 
after liftoff, then falling away at staging velocity. The boosters might use pres- 
sure-fed liquid-fuel engines. Alternately, they could use solid propellant. 
“If you could go to $10 million,” Heiss later told National Jour-nul, “then 
some kind of thrust-assisted orbiter shuttle beat out all other systems. It had 
the lowest development costs of any system capable of sustaining continuous 
manned flight.”37 
37. Letter, Flax to David, October 19, 1971, p. 6; National Journal, August 12, 1972, pp 1298-1299 
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Sketch made by George Low in 1979, illustrating the trade-off between cost per flight and 
dewelopment cost. (Drawing by George Low courtesy ofJohn Logsdon) 
Such designs already existed. McDonnell Douglas had one called RATO, 
Rocket Assisted Take-Off. It put the orbiter's propellants in two external tanks, 
with a 180-inch solid rocket mounted to the belly. C r u m m  had TAHO, 
Thrust Assisted Hydrogen-Oxygen, with a single external tank flanked by twin 
pressure-fed liquid boosters. This background meant that key NASA contrac- 
tors already had people who had introduced TAOS concepts and had studied 
some of their engineering issues. 
For TAOS, the 260-inch solid motor would not do. It would be difficult 
to develop, hard to handle due to its enormous size, and yet it would offer no 
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Example of T A O S .  G r u m m n  concept of a shuttle with a single large solid-propellant booster 
and propellants in external tankage. McDonnell Douglas had a similar concept called RAT0 
(Rocket Assisted Take-Off} . ( G r u m m n )  
cost advantage. The TAOS approach, however, specifically included the 
selected Shuttle configuration of 1972, with twin solids, smaller in size, for 
the booster. Ironically, this specific configuration appears to have originated 
within the Institute for Defense Analyses, the think tank whose president, 
Alexander Flax, was challenging NASA’s approaches so effectively. 
The IDA had close ties to the Air Force, which had been using solid 
boosters for years on the Titan 111, and NASA’s Charles Donlan gives credit 
for the twin-solid TAOS to two IDA staffers, Reinald Finke and George 
Brady. In 1986, Donlan declared that “Brady came up with the configuration 
that’s almost identical” to the one that NASA built. “And so a year or so ago, 
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I recommended that NASA give him one of their awards, when they were rec- 
ognizing Shuttle contributors.” 
During 1971, however, TAOS had a strong disadvantage: those booster 
rockets, whether with liquid or solid propellant, would be unpiloted. NASA 
still was pinning its hopes on a piloted booster, quite possibly the winged S- 
IC, and its officials paid little heed to Heiss’s proposals. Heiss h e w  why: “In 
the first place, there was the irresistible urge to go for the most advanced 
design and technology possible. And then there was a deep-seated bureau- 
cratic bias for two manned vehicles.” There also were the institutional 
prerogatives of NASA Marshall, which might accept pressure-fed liquid 
boosters in a pinch, but had little background in solids. The OMB’s Don Rice 
would note that NASA “pushed so hard for the liquid fuel thing in the first 
place, because it was hard to find something for Marshall to do. A reason to 
keep Marshall around if they didn’t have one of those big booster develop- 
ment programs 
Heiss nevertheless pressed the case for TAOS within NASA, working 
with Robert Lindley, the director of engineering and operations within the 
Office of Manned Space Flight. Lindley had carried out initial cost-benefit 
studies of the Shuttle, as an in-house NASA effort, and had worked closely 
with Heiss when Mathematica pursued its subsequent efforts. Heiss would 
describe Lindley as “one of the few people over there to grasp clearly the real 
economic and design tradeoffs.” 
Through September and October, Heiss and Lindley exhorted McDonneIl 
Douglas and Grumman to include TAOS designs in their presentations to 
NASA. Says Heiss, however, “some NASA officials kept telling them to 
forget it, the configuration had no chance.” As late as October 15, in a pre- 
sentation to the Flax Committee, NASA failed to include TAOS. Toward the 
end of the month, Heiss adds, “we thought the whole program was on a cat- 
astrophic course.” 
“There were still many people in NASA who believed they could sell the 
Administration an $8-billion to $10-billion two-stage flyback system,” which 
might be even more ambitious than the phased-technology orbiter with winged 
S-IC. “At the other end of the spectrum, the OST [White House Office of 
38. Report B35-43 Rp-28 (Grumman); Interim Report (McDonnelI Douglas), pp. 13,25; John Maner interview, 
Charles Donlan, October 19, 1983, pp. 28-29; John Lngsdon interview, Donald Rice, November 13, 1975, 
p. 2, Narional Journal, August 12, 1912, p. 1299. 
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Science and Technology] and OMB seemed to be drawing back toward some 
kind of advanced expendable system,” based on the Titan 111-L or the even less 
capable Titan 111-M. A major shuttle design review loomed during November, 
and in Heiss’s words, “We decided to try and get to Fletcher.” 
Heiss and his boss, Oskar Morgenstern, wrote a 15-page report that called 
strongly for TAOS. Under standard procedures, they would have submitted it 
through channels; senior officials with axes to grind could have sat on it or 
downplayed it before the report could reach the policymaking level. Instead, 
Heiss and Morgenstern sent it to Fletcher directly. “Those who say 
Mathematica was a kept child of NASA really don’t know what they’re talk- 
ing about,” Donlan later said. “Morgenstern was nobody’s kept child. In fact, 
we had no way of controlling what he did.’’39 
The conclusions of his report dealt not only with the Shuttle but addressed 
the Space Tug, a reusable rocket stage intended to carry spacecraft to and 
from high orbit: 
39. Nationnl Journal, August 12,1972, p. 1299; John Mauer interview, Charles Donlan, October 19, 1983, p. 28. 
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The TAOS concept foregoes the development of a Two Stage Shuttle System. 
With the use of thrust assists of either solid rocket motors or high pressure feed 
systems-which can be made in part reusable for low staging velocities-the 
TAOS concepts promise a reduction of the non-recurring costs (RDT&E and 
initial fleet investment) from about $9 billion or more (two stage systems, 
including reusable S-IC) to about $6 billion or less, with a minimal operating 
cost increase, if any, in the operating phase of the TAOS system. 
The detailed economic justifications of the TAOS concept-when com- 
pared to any two stage reusable system are: 
I .  
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
The non-recurring costs of TAOS are estimated by industry to be $6 
billion or less over the period to 1979 or to 1984-85, depending on 
the objectives and choices of NASA. 
The risks in the TAOS development are in balance lower but still 
substantial. Intact abort with external hydrogen and oxygen tanks is 
feasible; lagging performance in the engine area can be made up by 
added external tank capacity. A large reusable manned booster is 
not needed. 
The TAOS 's that were analyzed promise the same capabilities as the 
original two stage shuttle, including a 40,000 pound liji capability 
into polar orbit and a 60 x 15 feet payload bay. 
The TAOS can carry the Space Tug and capture high energy mis- 
sions from 1979 on. 
The most economic TAOS would use the advanced orbiter engines 
immediately. Our calculations indicate that among the alternative 
TAOS configurations an early full operational capability (i.e., high 
pegormance engines on the orbiter) is economically most advanta- 
geous, and feasible, within budget constraints of $1 billion peak 
finding. 
The TAOS can use J-2s engines on the orbiter for an interim period. 
The TAOS abolishes completely the immediate need to decide on a 
reusable booster and allows postponement of that decision without 
blocking later transition to that system if still desired. Thereby, 
TAOS eliminates or lowers the risk and potential cost overruns in 
booster development. 
The TAOS can use '"parallel burn" concepts, which, iffeasible, may 
change the reusable booster decision. 
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9. Technological progress may make tank costs, and thrust assisted 
rocket costs less expensive, thus further aiding TAOS concepts when 
compared to two stage concepts. 
10. TAOS assures NASA an early program definition, and a purpose to 
the agency. An agreement on TAOS will allow NASA Headquarters 
a quick and clear reorganization of major NASA centers to meet the 
TAOS development requirements economically. 
11. The TAOSfunding schedule makes an early Space Tug development 
possible. The Space Tug is an important part of the Space Shuttle 
System. A 1979 Space Tug should recover its complete development 
costs before 1985 even with the stretched build up of Space Shuttle 
missions from 1979 to 1985. 
12. A clear policy on TAOS development will give an incentive to 
European countries to undertake and fund the Space Tug develop- 
ment-thereby possibly even eliminating Space Tug funding from 
NASA budget considerations. 
13. The cost per launch of TAOS can be as low as $6 million or even less 
on an incremental cost basis, with reuse of parts of the thrust iassist 
rockets (either SRM or pressure-jied). With Point 9 realized, the costs 
of TAOS would practically match the costs per launch of the two 
stage fully reusable system. 
14. TAOS practically assures NASA of a reusable space transportation 
system with major objectives achieved.4Q 
Like Grumman a few months earlier, Mathematica, with Point 13, was 
not above assuring Fletcher that he might have his cake and eat it too. This 
low cost per flight indeed might be attained-but only if it proved possible 
to dunk a pressure-fed booster into the Atlantic and fish it out none the worse 
for wear, ready for refurbishment and reuse at minimal cost. Contractor stud- 
ies, however, soon supported Mathematica’s high hopes, showing that TAOS 
indeed offered low cost-and that solid boosters promised costs that were 
lower still:41 
40. Heiss and Morgenstern, Factors Reprinted in NASA SP-4407, vol. I, pp. 549-555. 
41. Reports MDC E0497 (McDonnell Douglas), p. 1-23; B35-43 W-30 (Grumman), pp. 2, 17 
379 
THE SPACE SHUTTLE DECISION 
Coacept Development 
cost 
$ B  
twin pressure-fed 4.02 
twin pressure-fed 4.83 
twin solid motors 4.34 
Grumman: 
McDonnell Douglas: 
McDonnell Douglas: 
Peak annual cost per 
funding flight 
$ B  $ M  
0.97 8.2 
0.74 6.4 
0.71 9.9 
TAOS did not take NASA by storm. Its design concepts were already part 
of the mix of alternatives; they had merely been languishing for want of atten- 
tion. TAOS, however, proved highly useful as it provided a fallback concept, 
less costly than the winged S-IC, which NASA would adopt as it continued to 
yield to pressure from the OMB. 
A Time to Decide 
For NASA, it was time to have the OMB fish or cut bait. Fletcher had sub- 
mitted his budget request on September 30, with a line item of $228 million 
to initiate Shuttle development. This NASA request was one of many budget 
proposals from federal agencies and cabinet departments; the OMB would 
modify them and then assemble them into the President’s budget, which 
would go to Congress early in 1972. An early milestone in this budget 
process, the Director’s Review, included a session titled “Space and General 
Research.” Weinberger ran those reviews in 197 1. They represented meetings 
at which OMB staff would recommend actions on agencies’ requests, with 
Weinberger being free to respond. Following standard rules, NASA officials 
would not be present. 
OMB staff members were well prepared for this session. A staff paper, 
prepared in early October, admitted that the use of a single pressure-fed 
booster would be more cost-effective than use of the winged S-IC. This rep- 
resented a response to NASA’s booster alternatives of September; the 
pressure-fed option was a rocket stage of the usual type, and the Shuttle 
was not a TAOS. While this configuration looked better than the alternative, 
it still was not good enough. The paper concluded that the most cost-effec- 
tive option of all, more so than any shuttle, was an uprated Titan I11 with 
Big Gemini. 
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By contrast, Fletcher wanted his shuttle and he wanted it very soon. In a 
letter to Weinberger of October 19, he pressed his point: 
The aerospace industry will be hurt by continuing indecision and firther 
delay in the shuttle program. A j r m  go-ahead, on the other hand, will quickly 
create jobs in the industry. 
It will not be possible to sustain the momentum now built up in the shut- 
tle program much longer. A loss in momentum will have serious and costly 
consequences, and may even be irre~ersible.~~ 
It would not be possible to maintain the Shuttle effort indefinitely as an 
exercise in design study and analysis. The aerospace industry was set up to 
build, not to dither endlessly. Its preliminary-design groups, which had car- 
ried forward the Shuttle work to date, practiced a highly skilled and 
specialized trade. If their efforts were not to bear fruit, their companies would 
be weakened unless senior management could reassign these people to the 
preparation of other proposals. 
NASA’s Director’s Review session took place on October 22, and the OMB 
staff recommendation was blunt: cancel the Shuttle program. Staff members also 
proposed that if this was not feasible, the decision should be held off for another 
year, when the OMB would deal with the budget for Fry 1974. Weinberger was 
not eager to accept such options. Neither was he willing to flatly override his 
staff, even though this was his prerogative, and endorse NASA’s position. NASA 
wanted the Mark YMark II orbiter with winged S-IC booster, and Weinberger 
was interested in alternatives studied by the Flax Committee. 
That committee had held a key meeting only a week earlier, with the 
OMB staff economist John Sullivan attending as an observer, and Flax had 
reviewed shuttle alternatives only three days earlier, in his interim report to 
the White House’s Edward David. These alternatives included the glider. As 
Weinberger later described the meeting: 
The stafi in effect, decided they weren’t going to do it. The stafthen told me 
that, if we wanted to do it, it could be done less expensively. So I was 
42. Letters: Fletcher to Shultz, September 30, 1971; Fletcher to Weinberger, October 19, 1971; NASA, 
“Documentation of the Space Shuttle Decision,” February 4, 1972; Space Polrcy, May 1986, p. 112. 
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delighted to hear that; and so they went back and worked with NASA to work 
out a diferent configuration. 
I could have cut it off at the Director’s Review and insist that we are 
going to do it the way NASA wants it. But the opportunity to do it at a lower 
cost on additional analysis appealed to me. I never had any doubt in my own 
mind but, one way or another, I wanted to do it. I thought it was the proper 
thing for the government to do at that time, and that we needed some for- 
ward-looking new activities geared toward the fiture instead of the past. 
With Solomonic precision, Weinberger then split the difference between 
the views of NASA and of his staff. He told Don Rice that some sort oi  shut- 
tle indeed would be approved; NASA would not have to settle for Big Gemini. 
Rice and his staff, however, would have a free hand to seek lower costs. If this 
meant that NASA would wind up with nothing more than the glider-well, no 
one in Washington expected the OMB to come forward as a bearer of 
NASA had some support on the White House staff, but its critics were 
both numerous and well-placed. In mid-November, George Low gave a sum- 
mary view of the players that reflected the assessments of William Anders, a 
former astronaut who now was running the interagency National Aeronautics 
and Space Council: 
Weinberger: is a real space b u .  The only one in OMB really positive toward 
the NASA program. Causes Rice to over-balance in the opposite direction. 
Everybody lower in OMB is negative. 
Rice: the most knowledgeable opposition comes from Rice. Feels that NASA is 
out of control; howevel; he will probably support a glider on a Tfl’ IIIL 
Ed David: was noticeably quiet, measuring his words, and repeatedly saying 
that he only represented science and that other factors are also involved. ... 
Not really plugged into the President. 
Flax: Fubini is really running the Flax Committee. Flax apparently states that 
no program as large as the Shuttle will gain continuing support. We need a 
less costly program .... Anders feels that Flax is driving David toward the 
glider and not vice versa. Anders believes David will support the Orbiter 
43. NASA, “Documentation of the Space Shuttle Decision,” February 4, 1972; John Logsdon interview, Caspar 
Weinberger, San Francisco, August 23, 1977, pp. 5, 13; Space Policy, May 1986, p. 113; Science, May 30. 
1986, pp. 1102-1103. 
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with the parallel staged pressure-fed booster ifF1a.x so recommends. 
Whitehead. Whitehead could be helpful in making Flanigan a meaningjkl 
communications link to the President, which Anders believes Flanigan 
needs to be. Whitehead’s main motivation now is to improve the 
FletchedFlanigan communications link. Whitehead can be extremely help- 
ful in selling the NASA desired Shuttle approach .... Believes in a $3.5 
billion NASA. 
Rose: is the California unemployment buff in the White House. Tries to be 
helpfil and sees Flanigan all the time. He defers to Whitehead when 
Whitehead is present. 
Flanigan: states that the Shuttle story is improving; however, he is by no 
means convinced that there should be a Shuttle. Is strongly influenced by 
Whitehead, Rose and David. . 
Peterson: is the most negative of all about NASA. Perhaps the most danger- 
ous opposition we have within the White House. Believes the space 
program is the place to take money to stimulate technology. Asked why not 
take $1 billion out of space and who needs manned spaceflight. 
Ehrlichman: asked the question, “Given the public attitude on space, why 
not put the money in aeronautics?” However, he is very much concerned 
about the aerospace industry and will probably go along with whatever 
OMB/OST/Flanigan recommend.44 
These were not the scoundrels depicted in the subsequent bestseller on 
Watergate, All the President’s Men. Though skeptical, they were open to argu- 
ment and perhaps even to persuasion, and it was up to Fletcher and Low to try 
to sway them. 
On November 22, Fletcher responded to a request from Jonathan Rose, a 
member of Flanigan’s staff, and sent him a 10-page paper that presented 
NASA’s case for the Shuttle. On that same day, Low addressed a request from 
Rice and offered his own paper, which gave a reply to Flax’s interim report 
of a month earlier. Flax had discussed a range of alternatives that included 
Big Gemini and a small glider. Low now gave his own range of alternatives, 
with each receiving a succinct description. Big Gemini was conspicuous by 
its absence, but in other respects, Low’s list covered the most important con- 
44. Low, Memo for Record, November 15, 1971. 
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figurations of 197 1. 
At the high-cost end of this Iist were two-stage reusables, both the fully- 
reusables of Phase B and the variant with external hydrogen tanks on the orbiter. 
In the middle was the Mark m a r k  11 orbiter with a single large tank carrying 
both propellants, and four choices of booster: winged S-IC, single pressure-fed 
first stage, TAOS with twin pressure-fed boosters, TAOS with twin solids. 
Anchoring the low-cost end was the Titan UI-L with a glider carrying payload 
of 30,000 pounds. Low recommended a version of TAOS: “The most promis- 
ing candidate configuration today is the Mark W a r k  I1 orbiter with the 
parallel-staged pressure-fed booster,” with all engines burning at liftoff. 
Low also went to a meeting of the Flax Committee and drew a diagram 
on a blackboard, summarizing the points of this paper. Fletcher sent a copy to 
Edward David at the white House, with a cover letter: 
All of these configurations of the Shuttle can be developed for  costs substan- 
tially below those we planned six months ago. We have progressed to the 
point where a decision to proceed with the shuttle in connection with the FY 
1973 budget process is definitely in order? 
Needless to say, the OMB staff had its own views of the matter. Low’s 
glider had a 12 x @foot payload bay; it was the lowest in his range of 
options, but was the most ambitious of OMB’s. On November 29, OMB 
staffers Daniel Taft and John Sullivan sent their own memo to Rice: 
Even a small (1O’x 20’) glider could capture all manned spaceflight trafic, 
e.g.: Space station visits and return to Earth (station modules could be 
launched unmanned by expendable rockets). 
Since the Shuttle is not an economic system under optimistic assumptions, 
the importance of whether or not all of the payload benefits are realized 
becomes less signiJicant. The important factors are really such considerations 
as national prestige, continuation of a manned space flight program, and 
advancement of technology. Any of the reusable vehicles discussed in this 
paper (even a 10’ by 20’ glider) provide this type of intangible benejit. 
A 10’x 20’glider would provide virtually the same intangible benefits as 
45 Memo, Fletcher to Rose, November 22, 1971; letters: Low to Rice, November 22, 1971; Fletcher lo David, 
November 24, 1971; Low, Personal Notes No. 59, November 28, 1971. 
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Space Shuttle Cost Comparison 
Glider 
Titan Ill-L 
Plus Second Stage 
- 30 000 Ib Payload 
12x40ft  Bay 
Mark I I Mark II Orbiter 
-with Flyback Booster 
-with Pressure Fed Booster 
-With Parallel-Staged Pressure Fed Booster 
-with Parallel-Staged Solid Rocket 
65,000 Ib Payload 
15 x 60 ft Bav 
65 000 Ib Payload 
15 x 60 ft Bay 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Development Cost - Billions 
Alternate concepts of November 1971, showing cost per fight and development cost. Compare 
with figure on page 374. (NASA) 
a 1.5’~ 60’ orbiter for less than half the investment cost. 
A 12 x 4O’glider or orbiter would provide more operational experience 
with larger payloads than would a IO’x 20’ and hence would make it easier 
to grow to a larger system should that later be desired.46 
The elements of a consensus now appeared to be at hand. Following Low’s 
presentation to the Flax Committee, its members felt that NASA had “finally 
come around to something reasonable’’-with the reasonable thing being the 
glider, not the TAOS booster and orbiter. Such a glider also appeared on the 
option Iists of both Low and the OMB staff. Within the White House, Flanigan 
met with two of the top executives of North American Rockwell. He told them 
that there definitely would be a Shuttle program, that the government was 
about ready to make the decision, but that some issues still had to be sorted out. 
Weinberger had already rejected Big Gemini; Low now argued against 
the glider. Lacking its own propulsion, it could not make use of designs such 
as TAOS to keep the cost per flight within bounds. Instead, a glider would 
46. Memo, Taft and Sullivan to Rice, November 29, 197 1. 
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require its own two-stage rocket, which would drive the cost per flight as high 
as $35 million. Low met with Rice, Whitehead, Rose, and Edward David, and 
wrote that “we demonstrated quite conclusively that a glider would not be 
cost-effective. Apparently, we also made considerable headway with all the 
glider advocates in convincing them of this point.” 
A moment of decision came on December 2, as the OMB sent Nixon a 
Memorandum for the President. It dealt with space policy, covering a range of 
issues. The memo included a two-page discussion of the Space Shuttle, and 
presented the OMB’s recommendation: “a smaller reduced cost version of a 
manned reusable Shuttle with an investment of $4-5 billion over the next eight 
years-less than one-half NASA’s original proposal.” With a stroke of his pen, 
Nixon would grant his consent: 
Approve Disapprove 
1. Initiate reduced-cost smaller 
Space Shuttle program ....................... 
2. Conduct Soviet docking mission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
3. Conduct other manned Earth-orbital missions . . . . . .  
4. Apollo 16 and 17 
Cancel both missions ........................ 
Cancel just Apollo 16 ........................ 
Reschedule Apollo 16 and fly both . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
For NASA, however, this Shuttle that would fit the budget amounted to 
a throwback to earlier years, when NASA had considered only its own needs 
and had not yet introduced the large payload capacity that the Air Force 
would demand. The new shuttle would not be a glider; it would have its own 
propulsion. It would, however, carry only 30,000 pounds, in a 10 x 30-foot 
bay. It offered considerably less than the lowest-cost version of TAOS con- 
sidered to date. 
For months, NASA’s senior administrators had been negotiating with the 
OMB, which time and again had pressed for less costly designs. These same 
administrators then had to turn around and act as an in-house version of 
OMB, pressing their engineering managers to pursue such designs. These 
managers operated at the working level; meetings with Weinberger or 
Flanigan took place far over their heads. They liked the two-stage fully 
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reusable Space Shuttle; they had nurtured it and did not want to give it up. 
Low and Myers thus had to put a good deal of effort into keeping their troops 
in line. 
This internal NASA debate, paralleling that between NASA and the 
OMB, brought such contretemps as Max Faget’s reluctance to accept Air 
Force requirements, the resistance that Heiss and Lindley encountered when 
they advocated TAOS, and insistence at NASA Marshall that the booster had 
to be liquid-fueled. The December 2 Space Shuttle, which the OMB proposed 
and Nixon endorsed a week later, fell outside the bounds of what NASA was 
willing to take. Fletcher, dealing with both the White House and the OMB, 
would promptly declare that it was ~nacceptable.4~ 
47. OMB, Memorandum for the President, December 2, 1971; OMB, “Space Shuttle Program:’ December 10, 
1971; Low, Personal Notes No. 60, December 12, 1971, letter, Low to John Logsdon, January 23, 1979 
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ixon’s Decis lon 
Richard Nixon liked space flight. “1 can remember Nixon coming off a 
phone conversation with the astronauts,” John Ehrlichman recalls. 
And you know, they are up on the moon, and [Nixon was] as high as a kite. 
He got a big charge out of them. Then when the astronauts would come to the 
White House for dinner afterwards, he would always be enormously stimu- 
lated by contact with these folks. He liked heroes. He thought it was good for 
this country to have heroes. 
Like other presidents before and since, he basked in the reflected glory of 
spacefarers. When the crew of Apollo 11 returned from the first landing on the 
Moon, he was aboard the aircraft carrier USS Hornet to greet them. He then 
used this triumph to gain diplomatic advantage, for after hailing the achieve- 
ment, he set out on a nine-day world tour that took him to capitals in 
Southeast Asia, India, Pakistan, and Europe. Significantly, he had planned this 
tour well in advance of the Apollo 11 fight, anticipating its safe return. “The 
President had rather daringly pegged his trip to the success of this operation,” 
Tom Paine later remarked. 
Had he gone out to the Pac@c to be present at the splashdown and had there 
been some kind of an accident, it might have harmed considerably his abil- 
ity then to have the successful trip, which was his first trip abroad as 
President. I was scared to death that we would have a fiasco or even a 
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tragedy. We just wondered whether he knew the odds as well as we did. Well, 
fortunately Apollo 11 was a success, and in the ensuing world trip, every- 
where the President went, the only thing about the United States that 
anybody wanted to talk about was of course the lunar landing.”‘ 
Yet while Nixon willingly embraced Apollo, which he had inherited from 
Lyndon Johnson, he took his time in committing the nation to new initiatives, 
whether in space or in other areas of technology. Between 1960 and 1980, 
such civilian initiatives were largely a province of Democrats: Kennedy and 
Johnson with Apollo and NASA, Jimmy Carter with his ambitious synthetic- 
fuels program in the late 1970s. But when George Shultz presented Nixon 
with NASA’s plan for the space shuttle and urged him to accept it, he did. 
Nixon and Technology 
If Nixon had wished to emulate Kennedy by supporting a new push in space, 
he could have endorsed the September 1969 report of the Space Task Croup, 
with its recommended focus on a piloted mission to Mars. Nixon did no such 
thing. He did not even respond to this report in a timely fashion, waiting 
nearly six months before issuing his own statement on space policy. Nor did 
this statement come from a senior advisor such as Ehrlichman or Henry 
Kissinger. Instead, it was the work of two middle-ranking staffers, William 
Kriegsman and Clay Whitehead, who reported to Peter Flanigan. 
John Kennedy, while in the White House, had repeatedly spoken of space 
flight with the ring of a clarion call, and it is appropriate to note the contrast. 
Here is JFK, speaking at Rice University in September 1962: 
The exploration of space will go ahead whether we join in it or not, and it is 
one of the great adventures of all time, and no nation which expects to be the 
leader of other nations can expect to stay behind in this race for space. 
For the eyes of the world now look into space-to the moon and to the 
planets beyond-and we have vowed that we shall not see it governed by a 
hostileJaag of conquest, but by a banner offeedom and peace. 
1. Manchester, Glory, pp. 1159-1 160 John Logsdon interview, John Ehrlichman, Santa Fe, May 6, 1983, pp. 
21.25-26; Eugene Emme interviews, Thomas Paine, Washington, August 3, 1970, pp. 27-28; September, 
1970, pp. 13-14. 
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We set sail on this new sea because there is new knowledge to be gained 
and new rights to be won, and they must be won and used for the progress of 
all people. 
But why, some say, the moon? Why choose this as our goal? And they 
may well ask, why climb the highest mountain? Why, thirty-five years ago, jZy 
the Atlantic? Why does Rice play Texas? 
We choose to go to the moon! We choose to go to the moon in this decade, 
and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard. 
Because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies 
and skills. Because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, one 
we are unwilling to postpone, and one we intend to win.2 
Similarly, here is Nixon in his statement of March 1970, which amounted 
to a most uncertain trumpet: 
Having completed that long stride into the future which has been our objec- 
tive for the past decade, we now must define new goals which make sense for 
the Seventies. We must build on the successes of the past, always reaching out 
for new achievements. But we must also recognize that many critical prob- 
lems here on this planet make high priority demands on our attention and our 
resources. By no means should we allow our space program to stagnate. 
But-with the entire future and the entire universe before us-we should not 
try to do everything at once. Our approach to space must continue to be 
bold-but it must also be balanced. ... 
We must realize that space activities will be apart of our lives for the rest 
of time. We must think of them as part of a continuing process-one which 
will go on day in and day out, year in and year out-and not as a series of 
separate leaps, each requiring a massive concentration of energy and will 
and accomplished on a crash timetable .... We must also realize that space 
expenditures must take their proper place within a rigorous system of 
national priorities. 
The statement endorsed the activities that were under way at the moment 
or were well along in preparation: additional Apollo flights, Skylab, planetary 
2. New York Times, September 13, 1962, p. 16. 
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missions, and Earth-orbiting spacecraft. It called for further moves toward 
international cooperation in space. It stopped, however, well short of endors- 
ing the Space Shuttle: 
We should work to reduce substantially the cost of space operations [empha- 
sis in original]. Our present rocket technology will provide a reliable launch 
capability for some time. But as we build for the longer-range future, we must 
devise less costly and less complicated ways of transporting payloads into 
space. Such a capability-designed so that it will be suitable for a wide range 
of scient@, defense and commercial uses-can help us realize important 
economies in all aspects of our space program. We are currently examining 
in greater detail the feasibility of re-usable space shuttles as one way of 
achieving this objective. 
This paragraph amounted to a Nixonian blessing for the continued 
“examining” that would proceed during the next two years. The overall state- 
ment, however, endorsed only one new initiative: “Grand Tour,” a program 
that would take advantage of a rare alignment of the outer planets to visit 
Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune. Moreover, Nixon’s statement specifi- 
cally supported his budget for FY 1971, which continued a policy of cuts in 
appropriations that dated to 1966. In 1970, NASA was still in retreat, and this 
statement underscored this march to the rear.3 
Yet amid this retreat, Nixon maintained strong support for his existing 
program, with the SST being a prime example. In Ehrlichman’s words, 
Nixon died very hard on the SST, and he had a commitment to that which had 
to do with chauvinism, I think, is the proper word. We had to be at the lead- 
ing edge of this kind of applied technological development. And i f  we weren’t, 
then a great deal of national virtue was lost, and our standing in the world 
and all that. He was terribly troubled to go to an international conference 
and have the French president arrive in an SS1: That was why that was very 
hard on him. 
In an attempt to recoup, Nixon borrowed an idea of the Democrats: that 
the government should use the resources of aerospace to solve domestic 
3. Nixon, “Statement by the President,” March 7, 1970. Reprinted in Launius, NASA, pp. 216-221 
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problems. During the second half of 197 1, several of his senior advisors tried 
to launch an effort called the New Technology Opportunities Program 
(NTOP), which sought to define specific projects that might be ripe for fed- 
eral support. The key man in this effort, William Magruder, had been Nixon’s 
head of the SST program. Ehrlichman recalls that Nixon gave an instruction: 
“Let’s keep in science and technology, and let’s find something good for 
Magruder to do.”4 
The activity began on July 1, when Ehrlichman sent letters to 15 agencies, 
asking for proposals. The responses went to the Office of Science and 
Technology, where Edward David’s staff carried out initial evaluations. Then 
in September, Nixon bypassed David as head of this program, even though 
David had come up within Bell Labs as a technologist, and even though his 
purview specifically included technology. In an action that effectively down- 
graded this side of David’s domain, Nixon named Magruder as head of NTOP. 
The OST staff continued its assessments, but Magruder broadened the review 
to include people from the Treasury Department and the Council of Economic 
Advisers. Magruder also worked with the OMB’s Donald Rice, who assigned 
a staff member, Hugh Loweth, to work full-time on budgetary aspects. 
The effort went forward under tight deadlines, for Ehrlichman wanted to 
have a finished set of proposals in hand by the end of 1971, in time for inclu- 
sion in the FY 1973 budget and the President’s State of the Union message. 
Magruder expanded his reach by seeking ideas from private industry, sending 
out hundreds of letters to corporations and trade associations. “We were con- 
tinually in a crisis situation,” said one OST manager. “Toward the end, we were 
killing those guys in the OMB, hitting them with more and more proposals 
every day. Poor Hugh Loweth was working practically a 24-hour day.” 
The reviewers quickly discovered, however, that the prospective domestic 
initiatives carried difficulties that ranged well beyond the merely technical. One 
important proposal called for full-scale development of high-speed rail trans- 
portation in the Northeast, laying new rail and refurbishing passenger stations. 
The New York Central and Pennsylvania railroads, recently merged into the 
Penn Central, had allowed this service to deteriorate badly; the Penn Central had 
gone bankrupt in 1970. Yet its tracks and rights-of-way were still se~iceable .~ 
4 John Logsdon interview, John Ehrhchman, Santa Fe, May 6, 1983, pp. 2-4 
5. National Journal: October 23, 1971, pp. 21 14-2124; October 30, 1971, pp. 2156-2163; May 6, 1972, pp 
756-765; Audacity, Summer 1993, pp. 52-62. 
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We pushed that pretty hard,” said Lawrence Goldmuntz, who directed the 
OST’s proposal evaluations. 
And who can argue that it shouldn’t be a high-priority item? But in analyz- 
ing that proposal the White House also had to take into account the fact that 
there are several thousand government jurisdictions involved, that the Penn 
Central is not the most popular railroad in the country today, that it might get 
athwart union work rules-and well, a number of complicated issues like this 
came up. 
Another proposal envisioned the development of two- way television, 
which would foreshadow today’s personal computers with e-mail. Two-way 
TV would allow individual citizens to communicate directly with city social- 
service agencies, including health, welfare, and police-protection programs. 
“But we quickly got caught in a crossfire between the Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting, the Office of Telecommunications Policy, and the cable TV 
interests,” said Goldmuntz. “The policy questions were just too complex.” 
Another concept promised to develop integrated utilities, which would 
combine sewage and solid-waste disposal, power, heat, and light within a 
single system. Such systems, built as modules, offered major savings through 
lower fuel consumption, with the modules being installed in office towers and 
apartment buildings. Such integrated services, however, would have raised 
opposition from unionized municipal workers. 
Other proposals ran afoul of recent changes in the national mood. The 
Atomic Energy Commission had a long-running interest in peaceful uses of 
nuclear explosives. Its officials endorsed a demonstration project that would 
use multiple detonations to fracture impermeable rock formations that held 
natural gas. The concept gained high marks from Magruder’s reviewers; the 
AEC plan even seemed to promise commercial feasibility. However, 1972 
was an election year, and with environmentalists showing their strength, the 
Administration could not touch it. 
Still other proposals faced political opposition, such as a plan to build off- 
shore terminals for deep-draft supertankers that drew too much water to enter 
conventional ports. Such terminals promised to cut shipping costs by elimi- 
nating the need to route the supertankers to the Caribbean, where they would 
transfer their cargoes of oil to smaller tankers of lesser draft. This proposal, 
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however, faced strong opposition from governors of states in the Northeast, 
who feared oil spills. It also would have tended to push the White House 
toward endorsing expansion of oil imports, a policy that Nixon was reluctant 
to support. 
Four senior White House officials carried out the final review: John 
Ehrlichman, head of the Domestic Council; OMB director George Shultz; 
Peter Flanigan, special assistant to the President; and Peter Peterson, director 
of the Council on International Economic Policy. They declined to endorse any 
of Magruder’s proposals, and the main reason was that in the course of the 
NTOP exercise, key people had come to realize that they truly knew little about 
the process of technological innovation. By Christmas, NTOP was moribund. 
“We did think in the summer that we could do more and do it quickly,” said 
Peterson. “By December, we were. determined to go slow and keep our feet on 
the ground. I didn’t think we should jump into anything before we knew where 
we were going.” Edward David added that “one of the things many of us had 
driven home more clearly than before was that R and D is not the whole story- 
you’ve got to take into account customs, mores, politics, existing structures, 
and a whole host of other things when you attack a technological issue.” 
Raymond Bisplinghoff, deputy director of the National Science Foundation, 
concluded that this exercise “verified that we do not know how to make major 
interventions by the federal government in the R and D sector.” 
It is a matter of record that as the NTOP fell, the Space Shuttle rose and 
won Nixon’s approval. The latter event, however, did not follow from the 
former. Edwin Harper, assistant director of the Domestic Council, told 
National Journal, “I was at all the relevant meetings and the two programs 
were never discussed in terms of a trade-off. The timing of the space-shuttle 
decision had an independent history.” Both NTOP and the shuttle had to stand 
on their respective merits; in the end, only the Shuttle survived the cut. 
NTOP nevertheless was important, for it represented a serious White 
House attempt to redirect the resources of aerospace toward new domestic 
priorities. When the attempt faltered, it soon became clear that Nixon would 
not try to help the beleaguered aerospace industry by having its people work 
on mass transit or pollution control. Instead, he would give them an election- 
year gift by keeping that industry’s resources within the realm of aerospace.6 
6. National Journal, May 6, 1912, pp. 156-165. 
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Space Shuttle: The Lust Moves 
In mid-November, three weeks after the Director’s Review and three weeks 
before the OMB would request Nixon’s approval for a downsized shuttle, 
Low wrote: “The shuttle configuration is beginning to be focused on a con- 
siderably smaller orbiter with external hydrogen and oxygen tanks (but with 
the same payload size and weight) and with a pressure-fed recoverable 
booster which might be parallel staged.” The use of a pressure-fed booster 
was an option dating to the studies of early summer; the possibility of paral- 
lel staging, with booster and orbiter engines all burning at liftoff, showed the 
influence of TAOS. On November 22, in his report to Rice, Low was more 
definite: “The most promising candidate configuration today is the Mark 
m a r k  I1 orbiter with the parallel-staged pressure-fed booster.” 
Ten days later, the OMB’s Memorandum for the President acknowledged 
NASA’s recent design revisions but called on the agency to accept a version 
of the shuttle that would be less costly still: 
Last year NASA was proposing a $10-12 B Shuttle. In response to questions 
from OMB and OST about whether the benefits justiJied such a large invest- 
ment, NASA has since designed a $6 B Shuttle which can do all the missions 
of the Eargel; more expensive one because it has exactly the same payload 
capability. (We think both costs are underestimated, perhaps by 50%, i.e., cost 
overruns are likely on both but more likely on the more expensive version.) 
In either case, NASA would plan to replace all of the U S .  expendable 
booster programs with the Shuttle. Thus, one program, the Shuttle, would 
dominate NASA for the coming decade, as did Apollo in the 1960’s. This 
would make efforts to reorient NASA to domestic pursuits more dificult, and 
tend to starve unmanned earth applications missions for resources. 
The Shuttle alternative that is chosen must balance costs, benejits and 
subjective considerations. 
What are the Options? NASA, NASA contractors, OST, PSAC and OMB 
have all given consideration to alternatives to NASA’s large Space Shuttle 
proposal. In summary these alternatives run the gamut from: 
- large systems with both reusable powered orbiters and boosters ($12 B)  to 
- small systems with an unpowered reusable orbiter and a non-reusable 
launch vehicle ($3 B). 
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A Parallel Burn 
Series vs. parallel burn. Series burn calls for conventional staging, with the orbiter engines 
ignitingfollowing cutoff of the first stage. Parallel burn ignites both booster and orbiter engines 
m'or to liftoff. TAOS concepts culled for parallel burn. (Thiokol) 
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N o s e  Cone 
Thrust Termination 
Igniter 
Propellant 
Insulation 
Case 
AFT Skirt 
Nozzle 
Space Shuttle Booster Candidates 
Solid Rocket Motor Pressure Fed Liquid 
Nose Cone 
LNz 
LN2 Tank 
LOX 
LOX Tank 
Pressurization 
Line 
lntertank Structure 
Pressure System 
He and NzH4 Tanks 
LOX Lines 
RP- 1 
RP-I Tank 
AFT Skirt 
Thrust Chamber (7) 
TAOS alternatiwes: solid rocket motors and pressure-fed liquid boosters, to fly as strap-ons. 
(Thiokol) 
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3,900 Ibs 5,720 Ibs 10,200 Ibs 33,000 Ibs 65,000 Ibs 
Delta 2914 Delta 3914 Atlas Centaur Titan Centaur Shuttle 
Expendable launch vehicles of the 1970s, intended for replacement by the Shuttle. (NASA) 
Operating costs vary from a high of $30 million per launch for the lowest 
investment cost option to a low of $5 million per launch for the highest inwst- 
ment cost option. 
The revised program proposed in this memorandum would develop a 
smaller reduced cost version of a manned reusable Shuttle with an invest- 
ment of $4-5 billion over the next 8 years-less than one-half NASA’s 
original proposal. 
The OMB proposal was not the result of a thoughtless exercise aimed at 
pressing NASA until the pips squeaked; it represented a serious alternative. 
With its 10 x 30-foot payload bay and 30,000-pound capacity, the OMB 
shuttle would still capture some 80 percent of the payloads of the larger 
designs. Similarly, the OMB would not pennit its shuttle to be all things to 
all people; its memo to Nixon stated that “for national security purposes, we 
may not want all our eggs in one basket.” The OMB stated explicitly that the 
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nation was to “retain the reliable Titan I11 expendable booster to launch the 
few largest payloads that would not fit the smaller Shuttle. These include 
space telescopes and large intelligence ~atellites.”~ 
Nixon took about a week before he read and accepted the OMB memo. 
On Saturday, December 11, Fletcher and Low met with Rice, David, and 
Flanigan. These NASA officials learned that Nixon indeed had decided to go 
ahead with the shuttle-provided that it was the downsized version of the 
OMB. This brought considerable and heated discussion. Fletcher finally 
declared that he could not accept such a decision, and that he wanted to see the 
President. This meeting did not take place, for Fletcher subsequently decided 
that he would not help his cause by staging a confrontation with Nixon. 
Fletcher nevertheless would fight for a larger shuttle, and in doing this, he 
would stand for NASA in the fashion of his predecessors. Paine had been the 
visionary, pushing toward Mars. Low had succeeded Paine; as Acting 
Administrator, he pushed strongly for two-stage fully-reusable designs. He 
also sought OMB approval to initiate shuttle development during FY 1972, 
and won permission to proceed with the SSME on such a schedule. By con- 
trast, Fletcher had acquiesced to OMB pressure from the outset, abandoning 
the high-cost alternatives as he struggled to meet the OMB’s stringent cost 
limits. He nevertheless had a limited amount of wiggle room, and he would 
make the most of it. 
Though the OMB memo to Nixon specified a development cost, it did not 
state a payload size or capacity. The OMB presented its numbers separately 
in a paper for NASA: 10 x 30 feet, 30,000 pounds. Low responded quickly; 
on Monday, December 13, he sent a memo to Dale Myers that asked for an 
in-house assessment of this OMB shuttle, to be completed by the end of the 
month. In this assessment, Myers was to try once more for the full-capacity 
Shuttle of 15 x 60 feet and 65,000 pounds, by comparing its merits with those 
of the OMB’s configuration. 
Flanigan also proved helpful, as he sent a memo to Fletcher from the 
White House: “None of the figures in the paper given to you are set in concrete. 
Rather, they should be viewed as a new way to approach the problem, against 
which an initial estimate will be made within a couple of weeks. Obviously, 
7. Low, Personal Notes No. 58, November 14, 1971; letter, Low to Rice, November 22, 1971; OMB, 
Memorandum for the President, December 2, 197 1. 
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those figures will have to be refined in succeeding weeks.” He added pointedly, 
“There is no written directive from the President on this subject.”* 
Fletcher, however, had to prepare once again to give ground. The OMB 
was willing to permit NASA to build its shuttle with the SSME; it was will- 
ing to bypass the interim Phase I orbiter with its J-2s engines. The QMB also 
would allow a booster “of the reusable pressure-fed type,” which Low had 
recommended. Nevertheless, while rejecting the OMB’s small payload size 
and weight, Fletcher and Low had to find new ways to save money and to cut 
the developmental cost anew. 
With OMB ready to toss the Air Force’s payload bay out the window, and 
with the QMB calling for continued use of the Titan HI for large Air Force 
payloads, it was appropriate to take a fresh look at another Air Force require- 
ment, which had demanded a crossrange of 1,100 nautical miles. This had 
been a prime reason for the choice of a delta wing for the orbiter, which drove 
up the weight of the Shuttle and increased its cost by requiring more thermal 
protection. With the QMB now pressing NASA to return to the payload 
capacity recommended by Max Faget, the agency had to consider whether it 
might cut costs by also returning to Faget’s straight-wing orbiter design. 
Charles Donlan, acting director of the Shuttle Program Office, ruled this 
out. In a memo to Low, he emphasized that high crossrange would be “fun- 
damental to the operation of the orbiter.” It would make the Shuttle 
maneuverable, greatly broadening the opportunities to abort a mission and 
perhaps save the lives of astronauts. A high crossrange would also afford fre- 
quent opportunities to return to Cape Canaveral in the course of a normal 
mission, following launch from that site. 
Delta wings also promised advantages that were entirely separate from 
crossrange. A delta orbiter would be stable in flight from hypersonic to sub- 
sonic speeds, throughout a wide range of nose-high attitudes. The 
aerodynamic flow over such an orbiter would be smooth and predictable, with 
the delta wing thus permitting accurate predictions of heating during reentry 
and giving confidence in the design of the thermal p tion system. In addi- 
tion to this, the delta vehicle would experience relatively low temperatures of 
600 to 800 O F  over its sides and upper surfaces. 
8. OMB, “Space Shuttle Program,” December 10, 1971; Low, Personal Notes No. 60, December 12, 1971; 
memos. Low to Myers, December 13, 1971; Hanigan to Fletcher, December 17, 1971; Science, May 30, 
1986, p. 1103. 
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By contrast, straight-wing configurations would produce complex hyper- 
sonic flow fields, with high local temperatures and severe changes in 
temperature on the wing, body and tail. Temperatures on the sides of the fuse- 
lage would run from 900 to 1,300 degrees, making the analysis and design of 
thermal protection more complex. During transition from supersonic to sub- 
sonic speeds, the straight-wing orbiter would experience unsteady flow and 
buffeting, making it harder to fly. 
Because of this combination of aerodynamic and operational advantages, 
Donlan favored the delta wing for reasons that were entirely separate from 
those of the Air Force. Fletcher, however, still could back off on the issue of 
payload-bay capacity. A smaller bay would give a smaller and somewhat less 
costly orbiter. Reducing the payload weight would trim the size and mass of 
the entire Shuttle, cutting costs even further. Moreover, for the past several 
weeks Fletcher had been holding in reserve the possibility of such cuts. 
He had gone to lunch on October 19, 1971, with David Packard, the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Packard had stated that he felt very uneasy 
over the Air Force’s design requirements for the shuttle. As Fletcher wrote in 
a memo to Low, 
The requirements which he was particularly concerned about were the cross- 
range requirement, and payload requirement, and the size requirement. He 
felt that the cross-range requirement might have been an artificial one and 
although he didn’t filly understand the implications of it felt that if it were 
causing dificulties, it could easily be modijied. I assured him that the diam- 
eter requirement came primarily from NASA and not from the Air Force, but 
that the length probably came from the Air Force. He knew quite well which 
program caused the length dificulty and although it can’t be discussed in this 
memorandum, it is clear to both of us that something could be done in this 
regard also. We both agreed that the payload requirement was somewhat 
arbitrary at this point. 
Retcher did not discuss this with Rice or Weinberger, for he was about to 
engage them in the high-stakes game that followed the Director’s Review, and 
he did not want to tip his hand. Two months later, however, with Fletcher 
preparing to play this card of shuttle capacity, Low’s memo of December 13 
directed Myers to compare four cases: the OMB shuttle, the full-size NASA 
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shuttle, a design of 12 x 40 feet and 30,000 pounds that NASA had studied 
previously, and a new case of 14 x 50 feet and 65,000 pounds. They all knew, 
however, that they could not start with a smaller bay and then enlarge it. 
Donlan had written that such a course “is not considered practical. The most 
cost effective system is one sized properly at the outset for its intended use.”’ 
In addition to this, with Low presenting new alternatives to the NASA 
staff for evaluation, Don Rice found himself in a position to add a few alter- 
natives of his own. He had formal channels for receiving information from 
NASA, but now he opened up some back-channels that gave him access to 
additional sources. “Some of my information came from the Defense 
Department, but not very much of it,” he later remarked. “Some of it came 
from industry. There were clearly some people in industry who were con- 
cerned that NASA was going to lead them down the road of another C-5A 
debacle and that they would end up with nothing.” 
Fletcher saw what was happening: 
He would come up with his own drawings on what it should look like. He had 
private sources that he was turning to. Contractors wanting their particular 
version. Contractors do that. And there is no reason why they shouldn’t. I 
hate to say this about Don but he really didn’t understand aerospace con- 
tractors. Tell him to design a cheaper system, he’d design a cheaper system. 
He went that far; he came up with his own design. 
Fletcher took it in stride: “We kept dealing with him. After all, you have to 
be polite, because you never know who’s going to be your boss next.” Low also 
joined in the exchanges. At one point, Rice presented a developmental cost of 
$4 billion and claimed that it came from a contractor whose name he could not 
divulge. Low asked him to disclose the contractor, so that NASA could critique 
his claim. Rice refused, but based on the questions he had asked, Low con- 
cluded that the contractor was North American Rockwell. That company had 
given far more information to NASA than to Rice, and Low determined that 
Rice’s $4 billion left out company profit and the cost of NASA program sup- 
port. Indeed, it was the equivalent of numbers that NASA itself had shown. 
9. Memos: Fletcher to Low, October 20, 1971; Donlan to Low, December 5, 1971; Low to Myers, December 
13, 1971. 
403 
THE SPACE SHUTTLE DECISION 
Every time Rice got a bright idea, he would send it over to NASA for 
assessment by its staff. The OMB’s William Niskanen, head of its Evaluation 
Division, chimed in with similar requests of his own. Within NASA, William 
Lilly was the chief budget officer and was close to the working level where 
people had to take the time to deal with these matters. 
Lilly tried to come between Rice and his staff 
It was some dirty wadare going on at that time. Our approach was to, in 
essence, to create doubt in their boss’s mind of the value of the work they 
had done. We did our studies and in many ways in order just to prove that 
they were biased, and they were wrong and they didn’t know what they were 
doing. And any way we could embarrass them, we did it. 
Lilly took care to control the flow of information from NASA to the 
OMB, for he knew that a small leak can sink a great ship: 
I reached the point, to hell with you, back of my hand to you. I mean, you 
can’t do your job $1 don’t let you in the agency [NASA]. And in essence, I 
probably went about shutting them off from information throughout the 
agency. I just told my people that, in a way that they understood, but not 
really telling them, they weren’t to respond. I wanted to see everything that 
went ovey. There was to be no answers to questions given throughout the 
agency to OMB without it coming through me personally. 
“They kept throwing road blocks on us,” Lilly continues. “Every time 
we would come up with a study and do what they wanted in terms of com- 
parative analysis. They couldn’t challenge what we had done in many ways, 
they would turn around and come with studying a new concept.” In time, 
Niskanen sent a request that went too far: “To be brutally frank about it, the 
reaction we had or my attitude on it, and what, in essence, I told them? I told 
them to go shove it up your ass. I wasn’t going to do any such thing. It didn’t 
make any goddamn sense. I wasn’t about to do such a study, and we never 
did.” 
Fletcher, by then, was using channels of his own: “We were kind of mean 
to Don in going over his head all the time. But I figured that was the only way 
we could get this thing done.” He met with Caspar Weinberger “quite fre- 
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quently,” with Peter Flanigan “almost as often,” and with George Shultz “two 
or three times.” He also arranged a meeting with John Ehrlichman.’O 
These exchanges continued through Christmas. On Monday, December 
27, having reviewed the latest contractor studies, Fletcher prepared to play his 
poker card of shuttle capacity and to make an offer that would counter the 
OMB shuttle of two weeks earlier. “We met all day to discuss the various 
options,” Low wrote. Low continued those meetings on Tuesday morning, 
talking with Myers, with Lilly, and with others as well. Following those meet- 
ings, Low and Fletcher agreed on the terms of their counteroffer. Fletcher then 
presented these terms to Weinberger in a December 29 letter: 
We have concluded that the full capability 15 x 60’ - 65,000# shuttle still rep- 
resents a “best buy”, and in ordinary times should be developed. However, in 
recognition of the extremely severe near-term budgetary problems, we are 
recommending a somewhat smaller vehicle-one with a 14 x 45’ - 45,000# 
payload capability, at a somewhat reduced overall cost. 
This is the smallest vehicle that we can still consider to be usefil for 
manned flight as well as a variety of unmanned payloads. However, it will 
not accommodate many DOLI payloads and some planetary payloads. Also, 
it will not accommodate a space tug together with a payload, and will there- 
fore not provide an effective capability to return payloads or propulsive 
stages from high “synchronous” orbits, where most applications payloads 
are placed. 
An accompanying table compared costs for five options: 
CASE 1 2 2A 3 
Payload bay (ft.) 1 0 x 3 0  1 2 x 4 0  1 4 x 4 5  1 4 x 5 0  
Payload weight (lbs.) 30,000 30,000 45,000 65,000 
Development cost 
($billions) 4.7 4.9 5.0 5.2 
Operating cost 
($millions/flight) 6.6 7.0 7.5 7.6 
Payload costs 
($/pound) 220 223 167 115 
4 
15 x 60 
65,000 
5.5 
7.7 
118 
10 John Logsdon interviews: Donald Rice, November 13, 1975, p. 2; James Fletcher, September 21, 1977, pp. 
20-21, 23, John Mauer interview, William Lilly, Washington, October 20, 1983, pp. 28-33; Roger Launius 
interview, James Fletcher, September 19, 1991, p. 14, Low, Personal Notes No. 61, January 2, 1972. 
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This table included the four cases cited by Low in his memo to Myers of 
December 13, and reviewed by Myers. Case 1 was the OMB shuttle; Case 4 was 
the shuttle NASA wanted and now apparently would not have. Following stan- 
dard custom, the option Fletcher proposed was right in the middle as Case 2A.” 
Fletcher privately knew that he could go still lower. Talking with Low, he 
decided that they could accept something as small as 14 x 40 feet with 40,000 
pounds. The two men then went to an afternoon meeting with White House 
and OMB officials: Shultz, Weinberger, Flanigan, David, Rice and Rose. 
Shultz was now the key man; he headed the OMB, he was Rice’s boss, and he 
had Nixon’s ear. 
Shultz looked at NASA’s presentation and decided that the only thing that 
made any sense, as NASA had said all along, would be the full-size version, 
Case 4. Shultz, however, did not press this point for Rice objected vigorously. 
Rice’s staff was still active; only one day earlier, his economist John Sullivan 
had sent him a memo arguing anew that the most cost-effective system was 
still the Titan 111. The meeting broke up with no decision. Fletcher and Low, 
however, came away fairly confident that they would at least get Case 2A, 
which they had recommended. Indeed, Shultz’s support, however tentative, 
allowed them to hope that they might even win the full-capability Case 4. 
Rice again prevailed, as he talked further with Weinberger. In a phone 
conversation with Fletcher, Weinberger stated that he wanted NASA to look 
at a 14 x 45-foot shuttle-with 30,000 pounds of payload, only two-thirds that 
of Case 2A. In Low’s words, “Fletcher came close to telling Weinberger to go 
to hell but restrained himself perhaps better than I could.” Fletcher then 
phoned Shultz and talked with him at length. Shultz remained unwilling to 
make a decision, but recommended that NASA should take one more look at 
Rice’s request. 
Although Rice was holding firm on a weight of 30,000 pounds, he now 
was willing to budge slightly on payload size, for Sullivan’s memo had dis- 
cussed a 12 x @-foot shuttle with twin solid boosters. Though this 
configuration would cany no more weight than a Titan 111, it could fly with 
the boosters of a Titan III: 120-inch solid motors that were in production and 
had known costs. Such a shuttle still would not match the cost-effectiveness 
of the Titan I11 itself, but it would come close. In Sullivan’s own analysis, that 
11.  Letter, Fletcher to Weinberger, December 29, 1971; Low, Personal Notes No. 61, January 2, 1972. 
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Titan would save only $100 million when compared to that shuttle. Within the 
OMB, this was as near to an endorsement as any type of shuttle was likely to 
receive. 
Low phoned Rice and asked him to put his questions in writing. Rice 
replied that he might have further questions subsequently, but he drew up a set 
of queries and sent it over to Low late on Friday evening, which was New 
Year’s Eve. Low discussed them with Fletcher and Myers over the weekend; 
on Monday, January 3, they completed their response. A sampling will illus- 
trate the exchanges: 
1. Iffiture budgets for NASA were constrained to $3.2 - $3.3 B, would you 
want to do a large shuttle? 
Answer: The answer is yes. The NASA budget is not committed to exceed 
the FY 1973 level even if the maximum credible cost overrun occurred. 
2. Why should a relatively few space station modules for the mid-1980’s 
determine the size and weight capabilities of the shuttle? What other mis- 
sions are really driving the payload size and weight requirements? 
Answer: In addition to “a few space station modules,” the payload length 
is driven above 40 feet by most NASA planetary payloads, most DOD pay- 
loads, and a few of the NASA science payloads .... The payload diameter is 
driven above 13 feet by manned payloads, some NASA science payloads, 
and some NASA planetary payloads. The payload weight is driven above 
40,000 lbs. not only by space station modules but by space station resup- 
ply logistic vehicles, as well as sortie cans;I2 a 40,000-lb. payload 
capability is also exceeded by many DODpayloads, as well as 13 different 
science, applications and planetary payloads. 
4. What capabilities and dollar benefits would be lost by going to a 12 x 40’ 
(30 - 35,000 lb.) shuttle launched by SRM’s? 
Answer: At this size and weight we lose most DOD payloads, all manned 
payloads (including resupply logistics vehicles), most planetary payloads, 
and many science and applications payloads. 
12. Small laboratories that would not fly freely in space but would remain within the payload bay and return 
with the Shuttle orbiter. 
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These exchanges with Rice would feed into a letter that Fletcher intended 
to prepare for Weinberger on Monday, January 3. On Sunday, however, with 
no resolution in sight, Low confided privately that “there is nobody in the 
White House willing to make any decisions.” 
He later wrote, 
The single most significant factor was that there was no top-level leadership 
in the White House. Nixon was unwilling to deal with his agency heads and 
dealt solely with his staff This placed a great deal of the decision-making 
responsibility with the OMB, and by definition the OMB is far more inter- 
ested in short-range budgetary problems than in the long-rangebture of the 
nation. l3 
The Hinge of Decision 
Low did not know it, but the commitment he wanted already was imminent. 
At a recent budget session held in Key Biscayne near Miami, a decision had 
been made to include funds for the Shuttle. A subsequent decision called for 
Nixon to release an announcement at the Western White House in San 
Clemente, California. He would also meet there with Fletcher, who would 
hold a press conference. Fletcher learned of this during that New Year week- 
end. He and Jonathan Rose responded by asking William Anders of the 
National Aeronautics and Space Council to prepare a draft of this presiden- 
tial statement. 
Monday dawned, with the day’s action items prominently featuring 
Fletcher’s letter to Weinberger and NASA’s responses to Rice’s question set. 
People at the Manned Spacecraft Center had been working over the weekend 
to come up with the answers, but when these responses reached Washington, 
early that afternoon, they were quite inconsistent. It quickly developed that 
some of the specialists in Houston had misread some key tables of data. With 
time pressing, NASA Headquarters gave them only one hour to come up with 
the right answers, which they did. These answers made it possible for Fletcher 
to finish his letter: 
13. Memo, Sullivan to Rice, December 28, 1971; “Space Shuttle Questions Provided by OMB on 12/31/71”; 
Low, Personal Notes No. 61, January 2, 1972; letter, Low to John Logsdon, January 23, 1979. 
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Our view that the shuttle with the 14x45 - 45,000# capability is the minimum 
acceptable option is still valid. 
The OMB proposed option of a 14x45 - 30,000# shuttle is not acceptable 
because it will not handle manned space station modules, manned sortie 
jights or manned resupply missions in a standard space station orbit: in short, 
it would not provide a manned spacejlight capability for the United States. 
Also, this shuttle would not handle 28 different science, applications and plan- 
etary payloads that could be carried with a 45,000# payload capability. 
At 6 p.m., Fletcher and Low met in George Shultz’s office with a group 
of participants that again included Shultz, Weinberger, Flanigan, Rice, and 
David. The opponents’ positions remained the same, with Rice calling for a 
smaller design and David proposing that they put off a commitment for sev- 
eral months, to give NASA time to refine its most recent estimates. Shultz 
responded differently. Unlike those critics, he had been at Key Biscayne. 
He had given Rice full opportunity to raise his objections. Now, in this 
meeting, he had seen NASA respond to Rice’s questions, with answers that 
militated strongly against the OMB shuttle. What happened next proved to be 
the hinge of decision. 
Only Low wrote of this moment soon afterward, and in a terse manner: 
“Shultz agreed with our position that the 15 x 60’ 65,000 lb. Shuttle should be 
developed.” Weinberger, Rice, and Fletcher all gave interviews during subse- 
quent years, but did not discuss the events of this meeting. Fletcher and Low, 
however, spoke of the matter with senior NASA officials, who would present 
their own  recollection^:'^ 
Lilly: Rice got a little bit confused. There was a feeling with Low and 
Fletcher that Rice got too carried away, moving toward misstatements, trying 
to exaggerate some things. George Shultz picked up the phone and called 
Morgenstern during the meeting and asked him about it. Now, NASA had pre- 
pared for this kind of thing-to be sure Morgenstern was fully 
knowledgeable. And Shultz got off the phone and made the decision-we ’11 go 
this way, and to prepare the papers for the approval. 
14. Memos: David N. Parker (White House staff), December 31, 1971; Rice to Shultz, January 3, 1972; letter, 
Fletcher to Weinberger, January 3, 1972, Low, Personal Notes No. 62, January 15, 1972. 
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Donlan: I get this directly from Dl: Fletchel: He was telling his wife the story 
of how he went over there with the information that I supplied him from our 
shuttle program studies that showed that there wasn’t all that much to be 
gained by going 45-foot length and> furthermore, it invalidated a lot of mis- 
sions that the Air Force claimed they needed for the sizing of the satellites. So 
Shultz said, “Well, what are you fooling around with that 45-foot configura- 
tion for? It doesn’t cost that much more. Why don’t you get the one you 
want-take the 60-foot one.” And Fletcher came back with that message. 
That’s how it was settled. 
Willis Shapley, NASA Associate Deputy Administrator: George Shultz-he 
had personally spent almost as many hours going through all the planning 
studies, and especially this famous economic analysis that Klaus Heiss at 
Mathematica had done. And he personally called up Oskar Morgenstern and 
other people there, and he was satisfied, finally, that it was a reasonable 
proposition. So when it was clear that all the boys made their case, Shultz 
said, ‘ I f  we’re going to do it, let’s do it right; let’s do the big shuttle and 
forget about the Bureau of the Budget shuttle.’ So that’s how we ended up 
with what it was.” 
It was Christmas in January, for whereas Fletcher and Low had come in 
hoping for approval of the downsized version that they really did not want, 
Shultz now was ready to recommend that they receive the full-size version 
that had not been in play for over a month. Similarly, the views of Rice and 
David would carry no weight. Shultz, after all, was Rice’s boss, and it was 
Shultz who would meet with Nixon. David also reported to Nixon, but he had 
little clout. He had been bypassed in favor of Magruder during the recent 
NTOP exercise. A year later, amid a post-election White House reorganiza- 
tion, Nixon would abolish his post of presidential science advisor-and 
would alsa abolish the OST in the bargain.I5 
The decision to proceed with the Shuttle became firm during the meeting 
in Shultz’s office, with Shultz confirming his assent to NASA’s request for 
$200 million as startup funds for the Shuttle within Nixon’s FY 1973 budget. 
15 John Mauer interviews: Charles Donlan, Waslungton, October 19, 1983, pp. 33-34; William Lilly, 
Wmhington, October 20, 1983, p. 39; W1lhs Shapley, October 26, 1984, p 26; Science, January 19, 1973, 
p. 233; February 2, 1973, pp. 455,458-459; February 16, 1973, p. 641; March 30, 1973, p. 131 1. 
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Nixon meetS with Fletcher and approwes the Shuttle as a at-ogranz, January 5, 1972. 
(National Archiwes) 
Flanigan now asked Low and Fletcher to prepare a draft of the presidential 
statement-which Anders was writing already. In turn, Anders’ statement 
formed the bulk of the material used in Nixon’s release. 
As recently as November, Flanigan had anticipated that any White House 
announcement would be low-key. At that time, with the $3 billion glider as 
the likely new initiative, Flanigan expected to see the main coverage limited 
to the aerospace trade press, thereby reassuring this industry of Nixon’s sup- 
port while avoiding the high visibility that would draw fire from critics. The 
Space Shuttle, however, had metamorphosed now into a $5.5 billion program. 
As early as the previous Friday, prior to the meeting in Shultz’s office, a 
White House staffer had already laid out the high-profile announcement that 
now was scheduled for Wednesday, January 5, 1972. 
Fletcher and Low flew out to California, editing two NASA statements 
along the way. Nixon greeted them at the Western White House, as did John 
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Ehrlichman. Though the President had planned to spend only 15 minutes with 
his visitors, the meeting ran well beyond a half-hour as he showed strong 
interest in the Shuttle and the space program. Fletcher had brought a model of 
a TAOS, and Ehrlichman would remember “Nixon’s fascination with the 
model. And he held it and, in fact, I wasn’t sure that Fletcher was going to be 
able to get it away from him when the thing was over.” 
Nixon stated that NASA should stress civilian applications but should not 
hesitate to note the military uses as well. He showed interest in the possibil- 
ity of routine operations and quick reaction times, for he saw that these could 
allow the Shuttle to help in disasters such as earthquakes or floods. He also 
liked the idea of using the Shuttle to dispose of nuclear waste by launching it 
into space. Fletcher mentioned that it might become possible to collect solar 
power in orbit and beam it to Earth in the form of electricity. Nixon replied 
that such developments tend to happen much more quickly than people 
expect, and that they should not hesitate to talk about them. 
He liked the fact that ordinary people, who would not be highly-trained 
astronauts, would be able to fly in the Shuttle. He asked if the Shuttle was a 
good investment, and agreed that it was indeed, for it promised a tenfold 
reduction in the cost of space flight. He added that even if it was not a good 
investment, the nation would have to do it anyway, because space flight was 
here to stay. Fletcher came away from the meeting saying, “The President 
thinks about space just like McCurdy does,” referring to a colleague within 
NASA’s upper management. 
Although his formal statement largely reflected NASA’s views, Nixon 
edited the draft in his own hand. The final version showed a f m e s s  and sense 
of direction that had been utterly lacking in his March 1970 statement on space 
policy. It also featured a grace note that might have suited John Kennedy: 
I have decided today $hut the United States should proceed at once with the 
development of an entirely new type of space transportation system designed 
to help transform the space frontier of the 1970s into familiar territoq easily 
accessible for human endeavor in the 1980s and ‘90s. 
This system will center on a space vehicle that can shuttle repeatedly 
from earth to orbit and back. It will revolutionize transportation into near 
space, bj) routinizing it. It will take the astronomical costs out of astronautics. 
In short, it will go a long way toward delivering the rich benefits of practical 
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space utilization and the valuable spinoffs from space efforts into the daily 
lives of Americans and all people.,.. 
Views of the earth from space have shown us how small and fragile our 
home planet truly is. We are learning the imperatives of universal brother- 
hood and global ecology-learning to think and act as guardians of one tiny 
blue and green island in the trackless oceans of the universe. This new pro- 
gram will give more people more access to the liberating perspectives of 
space.. .. 
“We must sail sometimes with the wind and sometimes against it,” said 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, “but we must sail, and not drijl, nor lie at anchod’ 
So with man’s epic voyage into space-a voyage the United States of America 
has led and still shall lead.lb 
It was appropriate to give a name to this new ship of space, and of state. 
Fletcher, Shapley, and Low had prepared a list that included Pegasus, Hermes, 
Astroplane, and Skylark. Flanigan passed this list to White House staffers, 
who picked the name Space Clipper. A draft of Nixon’s statement used this 
name, which resembled Lockheed’s S tar-Clipper. Nixon himself, however, 
decided that‘it would be better to refer to the vehicle in the usual fashion, as 
the “Space Shuttle.” Earlier piloted spacecraft had carried names such as 
Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo, but the new one would break with this practice. 
Criticism of Nixon’s decision came from the usual sources, with Senator 
Proxmire issuing a press release: “The President has clearly reordered our pri- 
orities. But he has reordered them the wrong way.” Senator William Fulbright 
played the same note: “I believe the shuttle simply cannot rank high on our 
list of priorities in view of the critical social and economic problems we face.” 
They, however, were merely outriders within a Democratic Party that had long 
commanded the center of American politics but now was slipping to the left, 
and whose presidential candidate, George McGovern, would shortly receive 
one of the worst electoral drubbings ever administered. Though Congress 
would perform its constitutional role by voting the funding, it would not 
become an important source of opposition. 
16. Low: Personal Notes No. 59, November 28, 1971; No. 62, January 15, 1972; letter, Fletcher to Weinberger, 
January 4, 1972; memos: David Parker, December 31, 1971; Flanigan to Nixon, January 4, 1972; Nixon, 
“Statement by the President,” January 5, 1972; John Logsdon interview, John Ehrlichman, Santa Fe, May 6, 
1983, p. 1;  Low, Memo for Record, January 12, 1972. Reprinted in NASA SP-4407, vol. I, pp. 558-559. 
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Certainly there was politics aplenty in Nixon’s decision. He wanted to 
help the aerospace industry during the upcoming election year, and the staffer 
Jonathan Rose, reporting to Flanigan, had been monitoring that industry’s 
unemployment. Fletcher, in a letter to Rose of November 22, had written that 
an early start on the Shuttle “would lead to a direct employment of 8,800 by 
the end of 1972, and 24,000 by the end of 1973.” Ehrlichman would recall 
that this was 
a very important consideration in Nixon’s mind. There are what we call bat- 
tleground states; they are the pivotal states that control big blocks of electoral 
votes. So when you look at unemployment numbers, and you key them to the 
battleground states, the space program has an importance out of proportion 
to its budget. 
The politics also reached a much higher level, touching the matter of 
presidential decisions that could stand as a legacy, with consequences that 
would reverberate through coming decades. Theodore White, a chronicler of 
presidents, had written in 1965 that “on the far edge of the plateau lie prob- 
lems which we in this decade cannot conceive of as political.” These included 
“the Moon and space. How large a part of American energy should be 
invested in this exploration with no definable certainty except the certainty 
that it will change the lives of all our children?” 
Weinberger had made an important point in his memo to Nixon of August 
12: the United States, as the world’s great reserve of strength, could do more 
than merely add bricks to the welfare state. Such policies might suit the British, 
of whom the former secretary of state Dean Acheson had said, “Great Britain 
has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role.” They would not suit America. 
One could view Nixon’s decision as a straightforward exercise in daily 
work at the White House. Nixon had a strong interest in management; he had 
set up a staff system, which included a strengthened OMB, that could weigh 
policy alternatives with considerable effectiveness and present him with well- 
researched options for his decision. As one Flax Committee staffer put it, 
“Once they decided to do it, Nixon and Ehrlichman weren’t going to argue 
with NASA whether it ought to be a 60 or a 45-foot-long bay, or 12 or 15 feet. 
If the head of NASA is telling them that it has to be this size and they want to 
go ahead with the project, they are going to say go ahead.” The demise of 
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NTOP also helped. While the Space Shuttle stood on its merits and did not 
simply replace NTOP as a backup, Nixon and Shultz had been prepared to 
include funding for NTOP initiatives in the FY 1973 budget. When no suit- 
able proposals came forth, that made it easier to shift the putative NTOP funds 
over to the Shuttle, and to approve a larger Shuttle as well. 
Yet while the Shuttle could not match the significance of Nixon’s open- 
ing to China, it drew on more than good staff work. In Ehrlichman’s words, 
“There wasn’t anybody who made those final decisions except Nixon, in this 
kind of area. Defense, space, certain kinds of domestic problems-he was the 
final arbiter.” The Shuttle carried Nixon’s personal stamp because it carried 
his personal de~ision.’~ 
Loose Ends I: A Final Configuration 
Now that Shultz had handed NASA its Space Shuttle on a silver platter, the 
agency had to decide how it would look. The question of choosing a booster 
was still up in the air, and it was far from clear that the Shuttle indeed would 
be a TAOS; liquid-fueled boosters designed as conventional first stages were 
making a strong comeback. Similarly, the agency could not simply walk away 
from Fletcher’s alternative of 14 x 45 feet and 45,000 pounds; NASA itself had 
proposed it, and it merited additional attention because it offered the potential 
advantage of being able to use existing 120-inch solid rocket motors. Further 
study of this design would also discourage the OMB from complaining that 
NASA once again was abandoning a good possibility with unseemly haste. 
Though the issue of payload size and weight was still open, the basic 
design of the orbiter was approaching a definitive form. During the fall of 
1971, when the Mark m a r k  I1 approach was still in the forefront, the con- 
tractors had worked from a Max Faget configuration known as MSC-O4OA. It 
elaborated the earlier MSC-040 by adding small liquid-fuel engines for 
orbital maneuvers, along with thrusters for attitude control that were mounted 
at the tips of the wings and tail. 
The Mark I/Mark I1 concept, however, with its phased technology, had 
never been more than an artificial stratagem to reduce peak funding by stretch- 
17 Nafional Journal, August 19, 1972, p. 1329, John Logsdon interviews: Dave Elliot, p. 4, John Ehrlichman, 
Santa Fe, May 6, 1983, pp. 9, 32-33; White, 1964, pp. 476, 478; O@ord, p 1, letter, Fletcher to Rose, 
November 22, 1971. Reprinted in NASA SP-407, vol. I, pp 555-558. 
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ing out the development, while accepting serious compromises in design. With 
Shultz’s support, NASA now was free to build an honest orbiter, one that 
would be right the first time. MSC-040A had called for four J-2s engines; a 
variant of January 1972, MSC-O4OC, replaced them with three SSMEs. 
Other decisions shaped the orbiter’s structure and thermal protection. 
Though hot structures now looked like an open invitation to a cost overrun, 
everyone knew how to build an aluminum airplane, and the orbiter indeed 
would take shape as an aircraft built largely of this metal. It then needed 
thermal protection, and NASA now placed its hope in the still-unproven tiles. 
Though recent research had increased confidence that they indeed would 
serve, what made tiles more attractive yet was that NASA could count with 
reasonable assurance on using ablative heat shields as a backup. Ongoing 
work with ablatives had cut their cost dramatically while reducing their weight 
to 15 pounds per square foot, matching the weight of the tiles. A year later, 
Eugene Love, a director at NASA Langley, would write, “Ablators are base- 
lined as a confident fall-back solution (temporary) for both leading edges and 
large surface areas, should development of the baseline approaches lag.”’* 
Though the choice of booster was still unsettled, during the early weeks 
of 1972 there was excellent reason to believe that NASA’s eventual selection 
would take good care of the Marshall Space Flight Center. The winged S-IC 
would have done splendidly, but even Boeing, which had built the basic S-IC 
and knew this concept best, had been unable to drive its development cost low 
enough to compete with alternatives such as TAOS. It fell by the wayside 
around the end of 1971, amid criticism even within the shuttle community. 
John Yardley, who headed the work at McDonnell Douglas, told Aviation 
Week, “You just could not build the world‘s largest airplane without all the 
problems that would go with a 700,000-pound craft, And it doesn’t buy you 
much flying it back if you can do the same job in a cheaper way.” 
Boeing and NASA Marshall, however, would not be denied, as they pro- 
posed a new alternative: a pump-fed booster. Though this again was to be an 
S-IC variant, it would be without wings, tail, jet engines, landing gear, or crew 
compartment. Instead it amounted to the standard S-IC, fitted out to land in 
the ocean by using parachutes. A retro-rocket was to cushion its impact in the 
18. AIM Paper 73-31; Jenkins, Spucc Shuttle, p. 115; memo, Taft to Rice, January 27, 1972; letter, Low to 
Rice, January 11, 1972. 
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sea; it then would float like a ditched airplane as it awaited rescue. After refur- 
bishment, it would fly again. 
TAOS concepts were still very much in the running, with solid motors 
receiving a share of attention. The liquid-fueled TAOS, however, with twin 
pressure-fed boosters flanking the external tank, had lost favor. A key group 
of shuttle design reviewers, at the Manned Spacecraft Center, had come 
around instead to recommending a single pressure-fed booster that would take 
the form of a conventional first stage. This, too, would provide grist for the 
mill of NASA Marshall, for that center would manage development of both 
the booster and its engines. 
Within the OMB, Daniel Taft, who worked with the NASA budget, saw 
an opportunity-and smelled a rat. The opportunity existed because NASA’s 
own estimates proposed that a suitable solid rocket motor would cost up to a 
billion dollars less to develop than a pressure-fed booster. In addition to this, 
the Air Force had already developed the 120-inch solids of the Titan 111, thus 
providing a base of experience along with confidence in the validity of the 
new cost estimates for solids. Pressure-fed versions carried no such experi- 
ence and no such confidence, for they had never been built before. 
NASA, however, wanted a pressure-fed booster, and Taft knew that to 
lead it to solids would not be easy. In a memo to Rice, late in January, he laid 
out the issues. He wrote that “NASA’s schedule for the selection of the final 
configuration ... is extremely tight (March l).” Drawing on Rice’s back-chan- 
nels to the contractors, Taft noted that one such source had recommended that 
pressure-fed designs should be studied for six to twelve months. Taft also 
asked “whether NASA can overcome its instinctive dislike” of solid rocket 
motors. He added: 
NASA has recently let contracts with the four major solid rocket contractors 
($150 K each) for quick ( 1  month) studies of development and production 
costs and technical aspects of SRMs. This is truly a hasty last minute eflort 
by NASA which can hardly be expected to make up for NASA’s failure to study 
SRMs seriously in the past. 
Of course, the requirement for Marshall’s involvement in the shuttle pro- 
gram would be quite weak if SRMs were selected. Ironically, Marshall, which 
has little understanding of SRMs and much to lose by their selection, is man- 
aging the SRM contractor effort .... 
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If le@ to their own desires, NASA would probably select the 15 x 60’ 
orbiter with the pressurezfed boostev. This is regrettable because we consider 
the pressurefed booster to be a high risk option from the standpoint of both 
investment cost and operdng cost .... 
At this time I believe that we should lay our cards on the table and 
explain frankly to NASA our concerns about the risks involved in the pres- 
surezfed boostev. . . . lg  
Meanwhile, there was the irksome matter of the budget. Nixon’s mes- 
sage to Congress included NASA’s full amount of $228 million for the 
Shuttle: $200 million for the program per se, $28 million for construction of 
facilities. NASA’s FY 1973 request totaled $3.379 billion in new obligational 
authority, $3.192 billion in outlays. In a letter to Fletcher dated February 9, 
Weinberger, however, emphasized that the second of these numbers was the 
one that counted: “For planning purposes an annual spending level of $3.2 
billion should be assumed for the foreseeable future”-that is, through FY 
1978. A week later, Shultz repeated this and added, “We also fully expect 
NASA to develop a shuttle system within the $5.5 billion estimate.” The bil- 
lion-dollar difference in development costs, pressure-fed versus solid, came 
to nearly one-fifth of this total. Choosing solids thus would give much 
needed leeway.20 
During the subsequent week, contractors presented briefings and gave 
their recommendations concerning the choice of booster. Low wrote that 
these briefings “yielded the recommendations for each contractor that were 
most predictable based on vested interests.” They also were predictable based 
on the contractors’ choices during a similar exercise six months earlier, when 
they had compared expendable boosters for interim use. On both these occa- 
sions, Boeing’s recommendations had been particularly egregious. 
Boeing was home to the S-IC and was teamed with Grumman. In their 
report of September 1, they had proposed that the standard S-IC, which 
needed no development, would give lower costs in an interim program of up 
19. Aviation Week, January 10, 1972, pp. 15-16; January 24, 1972, pp. 36-37,40-41; Low, Personal Notes No. 
61, January 2, 1972; letter, Low to Rice, January 11, 1972; memo, Taft to Rice, January 27, 1972; Report 
B35-43 RP-30 (Grumman). 
20. Avialrorz Week, January 3 I ,  1972, pp. 24-25, letters Weinberger to Fletcher, February 9, 1972; Shultz to 
Fletcher, February 16, 1972; memo, Low to Fletcher, March 22, 1972. 
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to 30 shuttle flights. (Boeing had built only 15 S-ICs for the whole of 
Apollo.) Now, in February, Boeing continued to root for the home team by 
coming out in favor of its pump-fed booster. This report also came out 
strongly against solid rockets, urging that they "should be eliminated from 
further consideration." 
By contrast, Lockheed was a major builder of solids. In September, it 
merely had weighed the merits of competing sizes and arrangements of solids, 
drawing on this in-house expertise. Now, however, it compared a range of 
alternatives that included liquid boosters-and found again that solids were 
best. The February briefing from North American Rockwell was also in char- 
acter. In September, that company had found no reason to choose between the 
alternatives of the day. Now it hedged anew, stating that one could choose 
either solids or a conventional liquid first stage, depending on what cost goals 
were most important. 
McDonnell Douglas also liked solids. It certainly had long experience 
with liquids, having built the Thor missile, the Delta launch vehicle, and the 
S-IVB, the third stage of the Saturn V. It also was familiar with solids, being 
accustomed to use them to provide the widely-used Delta with extra thrust at 
launch. It had endorsed solids in September; it now did so again. In addition 
to this, its report carried a lengthy review of their safety. 
The review covered 2,128 solid-motor firings, as Delta strap-ons, Titan 
I11 boosters, Minuteman ICBMs, and the small four-stage Scout. Thirteen 
had failed, in ways that were pertinent to the Shuttle, and McDonnell 
Douglas took care to note both the causes of the failures and the changes in 
design or in quality-control procedures that could prevent them from recur- 
ring. The report noted particularly that in the event of such recurrences, it 
would usually be possible to safely abort a Shuttle launch. However, there 
was an exception. 
This would happen if the hot, high-pressure gas within a solid motor suc- 
ceeded in burning through its casing. Large solids were built in segments, 
pinned together at their joints, and such joints posed particular hazard of a 
burnthrough. The report noted:*' 
21 Reports. B35-43 RP-21, Evaluation (quote, p. 21 1) (Grumman). LMSCA995931, -Dl57302 (Lockbed); 
Interim Reporr; Desigiz Review (briefing chart, p. 60) (McDonnell Douglas); SV 71-40, SV 72-14 (North 
Amerrcan Rockwell), Low, Personal Notes No. 65, February 27, 1972. 
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Problem Remedy 
Shuttle Abort 
Consideration 
Case burnthrough Increase case If bumthrough occurs 
adjacent to HO tank or 
orbiter, timing sensing 
may not be feasible and 
abort not possible 
insutation thickness; 
use two “0’ rings 
between segments 
Like a distant ff ash of lightning on a pleasant summer day, this briefing 
chart clearly foreshadowed the loss of the Challenger, 14 years later. 
On the whole, contractor studies found no advantage in the smaller 
orbiter, no offset to its compromise of NASA’s ability to carry DoD payloads. 
This removed the last questions as to whether NASA would get the full-size 
version that it wanted. But with the booster recommendations ranging over 
the map, NASA once again had no clear way to proceed. Six months earlier, 
a similar confusion over choice of boosters had worked to NASA’s advantage, 
by opening the door to new possibilities that included the winged S-IC. The 
situation now was different; the agency wanted to narrow its alternatives, not 
expand them. Yet within the contractors’ reports, data on costs gave an over- 
riding basis for a decision. 
Between January and March, while the development cost of a pressure- 
fed booster stayed virtually constant, the SSME escalated sharply and the 
orbiter went higher still. An internal OMB memo, from the economist 
Sullivan to Rice, summarized NASA’s own estimate of the changes, in millions 
of dollars: 
1/3/72 Current 
Estimate Estimates 
(Pressure-fed) Pressure-fed Pump-fed Solids 
Orbiter 3,058 3,660 3,660 3,750 
Main Engine 450 580 580 580 
Booster 1,390 1,400 1,080 350 
Program Support 602 570 560 470 
TotaI 5,500 6,2 10 5,880 5,150 
Costlflight 7.7 9.3 8.6 10.4 
The situation was not completely bleak; the increased cost of the orbiter, 
as much as $700 million, included $260 million for specialized solid rockets 
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that might be useful in abort. Sullivan noted that the justification for this abort 
system “seems weak,” and it soon was dropped from the design. As a result, 
these estimates could be reduced. 
But when NASA oEcials confmed these estimates, they threw in the 
towel. Both Weinberger and Shultz had insisted that NASA stay within a $5.5 
billion development cost, and it would be most unseemly if the program were 
to start with a projected cost overrun that would violate this limit. This could 
happen quite severely with the pressure-fed option; it would also happen with 
the less costly pump-fed booster, even with the abort system deleted. 
Moreover, while the projected costs for the solids drew on Air Force experi- 
ence and were both low and firm, estimates for either of the liquid-fueled 
options were dodgy and likely to increase by the next design review. 
The strong case of a solid motor also gave a strong case for choosing the 
solid motor. No one had previously tried to recover and reuse a solid booster; 
those of the Titan I11 had simply plopped into the deep, to provide homes for 
fishes. Early in January, a NASA official had said, “It is not contemplated at 
this time that a solid-rocket booster would be recoverable.” Yet the modest 
staging velocity of the solids, as low as 4000 ftlsec, meant that their heavy 
casings could easily serve as a heat sink. They also could withstand the stress 
of dropping by parachute into the ocean. NASA Marshall and its contractors 
found that reusability of these solids would cut the cost per flight to around 
$10 million, allowing the Shuttle to maintain its advantage and to capture its 
traffic from expendables.22 
NASA also had to consider the danger of the sea, for inevitably, some 
boosters would be lost. The high cost of a liquid booster meant that losing 
even one of them would be quite expensive. Moreover, although the pump-fed 
booster would save on development costs through its use of the existing F-1 
engine, its thin-walled structure would easily sustain damage while afloat. 
The casing of a solid booster would cost much less. It would be relatively 
impervious to damage, and the occasional loss of such a casing would not 
compromise the program’s overall economics. 
Low wrote that at the end of February 1972, ‘‘Dale Myers presented the 
OMSF and OMSFKenter recommendation, which was to go with ... solid 
22. Aviation Week, January 10, 1972, p. 15; March 20, 1972, pp. 14-16; memo, Sullivan to Rice, March 13, 
1972; letter, Low to Rice, January 11, 1972. 
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rocket motor boosters.” Fletcher took the news to a meeting with David, 
Anders, Flanigan, and Rose. In Fletcher’s words, “There was uniform agree- 
ment in the group that we had made the right choice.” He also met with 
Weinberger, who “seemed quite receptive” to NASA’s decision. Weinberger 
also agreed that there was no need to make a new decision on the size of the 
orbiter; that choice had already been made in early January. Low met with 
Rice and wrote that “he appeared to accept our conclusions, almost as though 
he had invented them himself.”23 
The director of NASA Marshall, Eberhard Rees, had expressed hope that 
the shuttle would use a liquid booster, because that would provide more work 
for his center. Although he had been deeply involved with liquid rockets since 
the wartime V-2 effort, he now would have to change with the times. The 
Shuttle would use two 156-inch booster~,’~ which were as large as could 
travel on American railroads. Only nine such solids had been test fired-five 
by Thiokol, four by Lockheed-and Marshall would have plenty to do in 
bringing them to a level of reliability that would allow them to cany astro- 
nauts. Marshall also would manage the development and production of the 
SSME and the external tank. This center thus would not wither on the vine. 
Budget officer William Lilly went over the estimates and came up with a 
development cost of $5.15 billion, well below the target of $5.5 billion. Myers 
objected, insisting that he could accept no lower figure than $5.34 billion, but 
Low sided with Lilly and persuaded Myers to accept his number. Naturally, 
this was the one that went to the OMB. It did, however, include the $260 mil- 
lion for the abort system that later was discarded, and thus carried a margin 
for further r ed~c t ion .~~  
With this, the Shuttle took form in the shape that NASA would build and 
that flies to this day. Ironically, though it was a NASA project from the start, 
its main design features reflected pressures from outside that agency. The Air 
Force had pushed for the large payload capacity and the high crossrange that 
called for a delta wing; while NASA later accepted these features and made 
23. Memos: Fletcher to Low, March 3, 1972; Rice to Shultz and Weinberger, March 13, 1972, Fletcher, Memo 
for Record, March 3, 1972; letters: Fletcher to Weinberger, March 6, 1972; Weinberger to Fletcher, March 
13, 1972, Shultz to Fletcher, March 17, 1972; Low: Memo for Record, March 8, 1972; Personal Notes No 
66, March 12, 1972; Donlan, Space Shuftle. 
24. A year later this specification changed to a diameter of 142 inches, due to a reduction in the design weight 
of the orbiter. Loftus et al., Evolution, p. 26  Astronautrcs & Aerorzautics, January, 1974, p. 72 
25. Aviation Week, March 20, 1972, pp. 14-16; Low, Personal Notes No. 66, March 12, 1972. 
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them its own, the initial impetus had come from the Pentagon. Similarly, the 
solid boosters came from the OMB. Left to its own devices, NASA surely 
would have picked a liquid booster such as the fully-reusable winged heat- 
sink type that flourished during the second half of 197 1. In this fashion, the 
Air Force and OMB crafted a design that NASA would construct and operate. 
Loose Ends 11: NERVA and Cape Canaveral 
NASA now was not only ready to proceed with the orbiter it wanted; it also 
could look ahead to having most of the principal elements of George 
Mueller’s integrated space program of 1969, which he had planned to culmi- 
nate in piloted missions to Mars. That program envisioned a Space Shuttle, 
approval for which was in hand. It called for a space tug, which was on the 
agenda as part of the development of the operational Shuttle. Mueller had 
looked ahead to astronaut-tended spacecraft, including a Large Space 
Telescope that would take shape as today’s orbiting Hubble instrument. 
These, too, were in prospect in 1972. Space station modules, launched by the 
Saturn V, were key elements in his scenario, with variants of these modules 
evolving into portions of Mueller’s eventual Mars ship. Though the Saturn V 
would fly no more, Fletcher had pushed successfully for a shuttle that could 
serve to build a future space station. This effort would come to the forefront 
during the 1980s. 
NASA needed one more element to make this framework complete. It 
needed the NERVA nuclear rocket, which would power the Mars mission. 
Work in Nevada with experimental nuclear engines had brought this technol- 
ogy to an advanced level that was ready for mainstream development, and 
NERVA held influential support in Congress. If this program could go for- 
ward, NASA might yet be able to set sail for the Red Planet. 
During FY 1970, NERVA moved into a phase of detailed design and 
hardware fabrication. The goal now was not further research, but rather the 
development of a flight-qualified engine with 75,000 pounds of thrust, at a 
cost of $860 million over a period of eight to nine years. The program 
received $88 million in FY 1970 and $85 million in FY 1971, with the funds 
coming jointly from NASA and the Atomic Energy Commission. 
On Capitol Hill, its political support was unassailable. The program had a 
research center at Los Alamos, New Mexico. The National Journal described 
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that state’s Senator Clinton Anderson as “NERVA’s most zealous and watchful 
guardian over the years.” Anderson was one of the most senior Democrats in 
the Senate, and chaired its space committee. The test area was in Nevada; 
hence the program also held strong support from that state’s Senator Howard 
Cannon, another influential Democrat who was also a member of the space 
committee. Indeed, support for NERVA was bipartisan. Westinghouse was 
building its reactors in Pennsylvania, home to another key supporter: the leader 
of the Senate’s Republicans, Hugh Scott. In the House, the Pennsylvania con- 
gressman James Fulton was the most senior Republican within that chamber’s 
space committee. He took a strong stand for NERVA as well. 
Nevertheless, NERVA faced opposition within the OMB. As one of its 
officials said, “Here we had a high technology. program that was expensive as 
hell, averaging $100 million a year. It had a long-term potential, but NASA 
didn’t know for a long time what they were going to do with it. It was a log- 
ical place in the budget to raise questions.” 
Late in 1970, amid preparation of the FY 1972 budget, NASA and the 
AEC requested a total of $88 million. By then, however, NASA was abandon- 
ing Mueller’s bold Mars plan. There was no need for rapid development of 
NERVA, which was likely to be ready long before any mission could use it. 
NASA decided to slow it down by lowering its priority. The OMB responded 
by treating it as a splendid opportunity to save money by canceling it outright. 
When the smoke cleared, the budget request for NERVA was down by four- 
fifths, to only $17.4 million. 
Late in January 1971, at a NASA budget briefing, George Low went out 
of his way to deny that his agency still was looking ahead to a piloted mission 
to Mars, saying, “We have in our program today no plans for a manned Mars 
landing.” He actually had plans aplenty, but he was telling the truth; they were 
not in the program. NERVA stood at their core, and NERVA by then was dying. 
Congress, exercising its power of the purse, appropriated $69 million for 
the program. Nixon, however, held the right to impound funds and refuse to 
spend them. A few years later, that power would be curtailed by the 
Impoundment Control Act, but in this fashion he released only $29 million for 
FY 1972, withholding the rest. That did it; when Fletcher sent his FY 1973 
budget request to Shultz, in September 1971, he abandoned hope of building 
a nuclear-powered engine suitabIe for Mars. 
This decision ended a longstanding NASA policy of developing advanced 
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engines well before there was need for them. The agency had contracted with 
Rocketdyne to build the F-1 as early as January 1959, over two years before 
Kennedy called for Apollo. Development of the J-2 dated to September 1960. 
The demise of NERVA meant that nobody would be flying to Mars, perhaps 
not even within our lifetimes.26 
There also was a good deal of politics in another issue: where to launch 
the Shuttle. Though NASA had an obvious interest in using the Apollo launch 
facilities at Cape Canaveral, the Shuttle was not the Saturn V and plenty of 
people in other areas of the country were ready to propose that they could offer 
sites having unique advantages. All these people demanded careful attention, 
for they had congressmen and senators as well as access to local newspapers. 
The merits of Cape Canaveral were undeniable. In addition to its Apollo 
facilities, it was on the Intracoastal Waterway; hence barges could bring over- 
size rocket stages from such locations as NASA's Michoud Assembly Facility, 
a government-owned plant near New Orleans that had built the S-IC. The 
southerly latitude of the Cape also meant that rockets launched from this site 
would benefit from the Earth's rotation, which would impart a velocity of up 
to 914 mph while a vehicle sat on its pad. 
The Cape, however, had disadvantages as well. Many military launches 
demanded a polar orbit, but Canaveral could not accommodate rocket flights 
to due north or south; they might drop spent stages on the Carolinas or Cuba. 
The Air Force had built its own separate facilities at California's Vandenberg 
Air Force Base to get around this. The Cape was subject to corrosion from 
salt air. It needed a 10,000-foot runway to land the Shuttle, and while this was 
feasible, the Cape often had cloudy or rainy weather. Lying at sea level, it 
required rockets to blast their way through the entire thickness of the atmos- 
phere. 
As early as April 1970, NASA's Tom Paine set up a 14-member Space 
Shuttle Facilities Group, which went on to evafuate both the Cape and the 
alternatives. NASA also contracted with the Ralph M. Parsons Co., a major 
heavy-construction firm, to provide independent outside advice. Some 20 
states went on to propose over a hundred possible locations, though many bid- 
ders had little idea of what NASA needed. Mill Creek, Oklahoma, invited 
26. National Journal, March 13,1971, p. 541; May 29, 1971, pp. 1156-1 165; May 6, 1972, p. 787; Data Sheets: 
F- 1 Rocket Engine; J-2 Rocket Engine (Rocketdyne). 
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NASA to use its town airfield; Brownsville, Texas put in a word for the nearby 
Cameron County Airport. Another bid came from Michigan’s upper peninsula. 
The source was an unemployed truck driver who told the New York Times, 
“Some of my friends and I were drinking it up a little at the town bar, and this 
guy came in who had just read about the space base competition ...” 
Nevertheless, there was at least one serious alternative: the Army’s White 
Sands Missile Range with its adjacent Holloman Air Force Base. Holloman 
offered existing runways along with a 4,000-foot elevation to complement its 
southerly latitude, thus giving a double boost to a shuttle. Located amid high 
desert, its weather was virtually cloudless and its flying conditions nearly 
ideal. An arid climate discouraged corrosion. The remoteness of White Sands 
also stimulated thoughts of all-azimuth launches, whereby this single facility 
would fire the Shuttle into both NASA and Air Force orbits. A community of 
missile specialists had worked here since World War 11. This location had 
another important resource: the powerful Senator Clinton Anderson of New 
Mexico, its home state, who was ready to fight vigorously for its selection. 
Anderson, however, was not the only Washington baron with eyes on this 
prize. Another was Congressman O h  Teague, chairman of the Subcommittee 
on Manned Space Flight within the House space committee. A committee 
staffer noted that early in 1970, 
NASA and industry spokesmen suddenly began pointing out that the shuttle 
potentially could be launched from almost anywhere in the United States. At 
that juncture, a number of congressmen discovered that they had phased- 
down or abandoned facilities or Air Force bases in their districts. So Teague 
and the subcommittee decided they had better make their position-and that 
of thebll  committee-clear from the outset. 
In December, he came out strongly in favor of Cape Canaveral, reacting 
with vigor against the suggestion that the Shuttle might go anywhere else. He 
warned, “Unless I am convinced that NASA is making maximum use of exist- 
ing facilities, I intend to oppose any money for the shuttle in every way, form 
or fashion.” He later added that NASA had better put the base at Canaveral, “or 
come up with a goddamned good case for its removal.” 
NASA thus had to do a lot of stroking. In October 1970, George Low 
assured Senator Anderson that White Sands would receive close scrutiny. The 
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following March, Dale Myers r e a m e d  that the competition was far from over, 
and described White Sands as the closest challenger to the Cape. But when 
NASA announced its decision, in April 1972, it stated clearly that it was not 
about to build a national shuttle site in the New Mexico desert. It awarded the 
palm to Cape Canaveral, with Vandenberg AFB to serve for military launches. 
In announcing the decision, George Low said that it would cost $150 
million to modify the existing Apollo facilities, which included the Vehicle 
Assembly Building and Pads 39-A and -B. Though Vandenberg had nothing 
resembling the VAB that it could convert, it did have a big Titan I11 launch 
facility, Space Launch Complex 6, known as Slick-Six. This site would 
require $500 million, with the Air Force paying the bill. That service had no 
intention of sharing the cost of shuttle development with NASA; NERVA 
had received its budget partly from NASA and partly from the AEC, but the 
Shuttle would be entirely a NASA project even though the Air Force was to 
receive many of its benefits. By promising to pay for its own launch facility 
at Vandenberg, this service nevertheless showed that it too would become 
actively involved. 
The rejection of both NERVA and White Sands, at nearly the same time, 
was a double defeat for Senator Anderson. However, he was 76 years old and 
in poor health. In 1972, he announced that he would retire from the Senate 
and would not run for re-election. As chairman of that chamber’s space com- 
mittee, he had done much for NASA. Even so, he wouId not be receiving any 
major base or program in New Mexico, to serve as his monument.27 
Awarding the Contracts 
The presidential campaign was in full swing in mid- 1972, and on July 3 1 Jean 
Westwood, chairing the Democratic National Committee, issued a statement:28 
Three days ago, the Nixon Administration awarded the $2.6 billion space 
shuttle contract to the North American Rockwell Corporation in California. 
I regard this decision as the latest, and perhaps most blatant, example of 
President Nixon’s calculated use of the American taxpayers’ dollars for his 
21. National Journal, April 24, 1971, pp. 869-876; April 24, 1972, pp. 706-107. 
28. Westwood, “Statement,” July 31, 1972. 
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own re-election purposes .... 
The award of this contract to North American Rockwell also raises ques- 
tions of ethics. Why is it that five of the current directors of the corporation 
happened also to be major contributors to Richard Nixon’s election in 1968? 
I ask Democratic members of Congress for a full airing of this contract 
award .... 
Westwood‘s press statement included a list of the “major contributors,” 
whose 1968 donations had mostly come to $1,000. One wealthy man, Henry 
Mudd, had given all of $2,000. Yet while stating explicitly that Nixon could 
be bought and sold for the price of a Volkswagen Beetle, she missed a poten- 
tially more significant story: Dale Myers, who had spent his career at North 
American, had put together the selection board that had picked this company 
as the winner of the contract. 
Myers was NASA’s Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight. He 
was clearly aware of the potential for conflict of interest, for in Washington, it 
is well understood that the person who picks the membership of a review board 
can often determine its decisions in advance. George Low also saw the poten- 
tial for conflict, and discussed the matter with colleagues. He later wrote that 
Myers “had fully divested himself of all his connections with North American 
and since this activity is so closely tied to all that he is going to do over the 
next several years, it was necessary that he should be involved.” 
Myers put together this board in January, while the choice of booster 
was still open. He picked its members based on their positions within NASA 
and their responsibilities within the shuttle program; the only non-NASA 
members were from the Air Force. A senior attorney provided legal counsel. 
Low wrote that he “concurred fully and formally in the selection” of the 
members. He and Myers also emphasized that the board “will conduct its 
business in strict accordance with the provisions of the Source Evaluation 
Board Manual.” 
The Request for Proposals went out on March 17, shortly after NASA 
had wrapped up the choice of the booster. Responses were due on May 12, 
and four companies replied: North American Rockwell, McDonnell Douglas, 
Lockheed, and Gmmman. Fletcher and Low-but not Myers-then reviewed 
the findings of the board during July, and met with the bidders’ corporate offi- 
cers. With them was another NASA official, Richard McCurdy. He had just 
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returned from vacation; his secretary had flown to Spain to give him docu- 
ments so he could read them on the way back. These three men then made the 
final decision. 
Lockheed ranked fourth in the competition. Though its bid was only $40 
million more than North American’s, some suspected that the proposal looked 
like another attempt at buying in. Its shuttle was heavy, and Fletcher wrote that 
its design had “unnecessary complexity.” Lockheed left a 65-second gap 
during ascent with no provision for abort. It proposed an overly high landing 
speed, a structure that could accumulate moisture, and a program management 
that would rely on subcontractors to do much of the detailed design. “We 
didn’t see how they were going to drive all those horses and keep the costs 
down,” said McCurdy. “We ended up not believing their proposal on costs.” 
Lockheed also was the only bidder with no experience in building 
piloted spacecraft. By contrast, McDonnell Douglas had been a mainstay in 
this area, for McDonnell Aircraft had built the Mercury and Gemini capsules 
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while Douglas Aircraft constructed the Skylab space station. This very 
breadth of experience, however, worked against this merged company, for 
the concepts within the proposal came partly from Douglas in Huntington 
Beach, California and partly from McDonnell in St. Louis. “Their proposal 
was almost like two company proposals,” one source confided. “They gave 
the impression of never having consummated their marriage, and we could- 
n’t live with that.” 
Moreover, the proposal projected a relatively high cost, and showed 
technical weaknesses. It divided the flight testing between Edwards Air 
Force Base and Cape Canaveral in a way that required full data-handling 
capability at both sites. Its discussion of ground operations did not reflect 
recent company experience in the Apollo program. In addition to this, 
although Douglas had designed its DC- 10 airliner for easy maintenance, the 
provisions in the proposal ‘for maintainability of the Shuttle failed to ade- 
quately make use of this background. 
The company might have strengthened its bid with a good presentation 
to Fletcher, Low, and McCurdy, but this did not go well. Low wrote that this 
briefing 
really did not answer any questions. For example, we still don’t know who the 
Chief Engineer on the Shuttle will be. Answers in general were broad, gen- 
eralized, and weak. The attitude displayed was “we are a great company and 
you had better give us the job because we will do the best job for you.” 
McDonnell Douglas came away ranked third in the competition. 
That left Grumman and North American, which together had built the 
piloted spacecraft of Apollo. “Theirs is the most recent, the most intense and 
the most demanding experience with manned space flight,” McCurdy said. 
“There’s no question it helped them formulate their proposals.” 
Grumman actually gained the highest score in the technical areas. Its con- 
figuration was not perfect, with Fletcher noting “complex designs” in 
guidance, control, navigation, and data processing. He, however, wrote that 
“Grumman’s design went to a greater depth of detail than those of the other 
companies. Its detailed weight estimates were substantiated by the design 
details.” Its structural layouts showed “a thorough understanding of potential 
problems and positive solutions,” and were simple and straightforward. 
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“Grumman did a very good job in proposing design features to enhance main- 
tainability,” he added. “The provisions it made for access throughout the 
vehicle were outstanding.” 
Grumman, however, was less outstanding in cost and management. Its 
proposed cost was higher than NASA liked. Fletcher saw why: the firm 
planned “to build up its work force rapidly to an early manpower peak. This 
poses the risk of premature hardening of the specifications and premature 
commitment of resources during the course of the program.” Grumman came 
in a strong second overall; its excellent design did not outweigh its short- 
comings in these other areas. 
North American’s concept showed weaknesses, such as a crew cabin that 
would be difficult to build. Ironically, its overall strength stemmed in part 
from a near-disaster: the flight of Apollo 13, which had an onboard explosion 
and barely survived. Fletcher wrote that this company’s “good understanding 
of all electric power subsystems reflected the very thorough studies that North 
American made following the Apollo 13 accident, which had its origin in an 
electrical subsystem.” 
This firm’s proposal “provided the lightest dry weight of any of the 
designs submitted.” It “presented an excellent analysis of maintainability 
from the standpoint of design criteria and goals to achieve optimum turn- 
around conditions and timing between flights. It designed its orbiter vehicle 
with very good overall accessibility for maintenance.” For the critical func- 
tions of guidance, control, and navigation, North American provided a 
“simple design with minimum interfaces.” 
In addition to this, the proposal was particularly strong in cost and man- 
agement. Its projected cost was the lowest of the four, and Low noted “the 
universal opinion that North American, indeed, will wind up with the lowest 
cost.” It achieved this in part by proposing a more measured approach to 
buildup of employment. “We were impressed by the way North American had 
thought through the personnel buildup,” said McCurdy. “The others attacked 
this problem a little more like a cavalry charge. North American had the 
lowest number of man-years in its shuttle proposal. Man-years is where you 
save money, nowhere else.” 
This company also gained an edge through its approach to minority 
hiring. A confrontation with black employees in 1969 had left North American 
determined to take the lead in promoting equal opportunity, and in 1972 this 
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fm had more blacks, Hispanics, and Asians than any of the three competitors. 
NASA viewed this as advantageous, for as McCurdy put it, “We’re not cru- 
saders for civil rights. But the fact that North American moved forward on this 
front tells us something about how the company is thinking ahead.” 
Fletcher, Low, and McCurdy picked this winner on the afternoon of July 
26. In Low’s words, “we very quickly determined that all three of us wanted 
to select North American Rockwell on the basis of the highest score” and “the 
lowest cost.” They then made phone calls to spread the news. When Fletcher 
phoned North American, just after lunchtime in California, he found that this 
company’s executives already had gotten the word. Their local congressman, 
Del Clawson, had received his own phone call from NASA earlier that after- 
noon, and beat Fletcher to the punch with a call of his own. 
Had Nixon’s hand steered the choice? “The lack of White House inter- 
est in this selection had been remarkable,” Low wrote. Prior to that week’s 
round of meetings, he had asked Fletcher “whether he had any commitment 
to inform the White House what was going on and whether they wanted to 
get into the act in any way whatsoever. His answer was an emphatic no to 
both ques ti 01-1s .” 
At the company briefings, Low asked the bidders to comment on the fair- 
ness of the competition. In Low’s words, three of these firms “all indicated 
that this had been the best and fairest competition they had ever participated 
in.” Sanford McDonnell, president of his firm, reserved the right to lodge a 
protest, and Low noted that “in effect, Sandy McDonnell said that the com- 
petition was a fair one if we select McDonnell Douglas, and unfair if we select 
somebody else.” However, he accepted the final decisi0n.2~ 
His conduct thus contrasted with that of Pratt & Whitney, which had 
made just this type of formal protest a year earlier, on losing the SSME com- 
petition to Rocketdyne. This complaint had the legal status of a lawsuit, 
directed not against Rocketdyne but rather against NASA, which allegedly 
had performed wrongful acts in selecting that contractor. With Pratt as the 
plaintiff and NASA as defendant, Rocketdyne held the role of a highly inter- 
ested witness whose testimony could help NASA in seeking to uphold this 
29. O’Toole and Dash, Space Shuttle; memo, Myers to Manned Spacecraft Center Duector, February 23, 1972; 
Source Evaluation Board, Report of Findings, June 23, 1972, General Summary; Low, Addendum to 
Personal Notes No. 75, July 29, 1972, Fletcher et al., “Selection of Contractor,” September 18, 1972. See 
also Reports SV 72-19, SSV 72-2 (North Amencan Rockwell). 
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award. The proceedings did not take place in federal court, but rather went 
forward under the Comptroller General, Elmer Staats. He issued his decision 
at the end of March 1972, while preparation of proposals for the complete 
Shuttle was under way. 
Pratt’s attorneys, who were highly capable, argued that NASA had “failed 
to conduct meaningful negotiations.” NASA’s discussions with ’ the bidders 
“did not include the pointing out of deficiencies or weaknesses and did not 
afford offerors an opportunity to improve their proposals.” Staats would have 
none of this: 
“It is also unfai6 we think, to help one proposer through successive rounds 
of discussions to bring his original inadequate proposal up to the level of 
other adequate proposals by pointing out those weaknesses which were the 
result of his own lack of diligence, competence, or inventiveness. 
Had NASA “erroneously and illegally accepted a nonresponsive pro- 
posal?’ Though this introduced engineering issues, Staats found “no basis to 
object to the technical judgment reached.” Was it true that “NASA’s determi- 
nation of Pratt & Whitney ’s deficiencies was arbitrary and capricious?’ Pratt 
charged that NASA had failed to respond to requests for information, had 
unfairly penalized certain technical deficiencies in its proposal while giving 
Rocketdyne something of a free ride, and had failed “to read and fully com- 
prehend” this proposal. Staats wrote, “The addnistrative report contains a 
detailed rebuttal of these contentions.” NASA’s evaluations “provided a sound 
basis for selecting the most advantageous proposal.” 
Pratt also complained that “selection of Rocketdyne wastes eleven 
years” of its experience. Though Pratt indeed had devoted much effort to its 
XLR-129 rocket engine, Staats concluded that NASA had fairly weighed 
the merits of this engine and had not overlooked its advantages in deter- 
mining that “Rocketdyne offered the superior technical approach.” NASA 
had been obliged to give due weight to the experience of Pratt, and had 
done this. 
Staats disagreed with another contention: ithat Rocketdyne’s design 
invited a cost overrun. He concluded that Rocketdyne’s cost estimates had 
been well substantiated. Similarly, he did not accept that Rocketdyne had 
“obtained an unfair competitive advantage by diversion of Saturn funds to the 
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SSME proposal effort.” He cited an audit by which “Rocketdyne determined 
the amount involved to be $2,526, and that it has made appropriate adjust- 
ments to the respective  contract^."^^ 
He concluded, “We believe the procurement was conducted in a manner 
which was consistent with applicable law and regulations and was fair to all 
proposers.” The contract award to Rocketdyne would stand; Pratt’s attempt to 
overturn it had failed. Rocketdyne indeed would design and build the SSME. 
Because this division was part of North American Rockwell, the subsequent 
award of the main Shuttle contract to this company’s Space Division gave this 
fm responsibility for the entire Shuttle orbiter, including its engine. This was 
more than North American had carried during Apollo, more than it had held 
since the days of Navaho some 20 years earlier. 
Now that Rocketdyne had the SSME, it intended to keep it. On receiving 
the initial contract award the previous July, William Bergen, president of 
North American, had approached Pratt & Whitney, inviting that company to 
share in the engine development. Pratt chose instead to pursue its appeal, and 
Low wrote in April 1972 that “there may be a lot of bad blood between the 2 
companies. Certainly it is not our intent to force a marriage at this time 
between Pratt and Whitney and Rocketdyne.” 
In building the orbiter, however, the Space Division would generously 
share the work by awarding important subcontracts to its rivals. In March 
1973, North American-now known as Rockwell International-gave 
Grumman responsibility for the orbiter’s delta wing, and granted McDonnell 
Douglas the right to build the small onboard rocket system that would be used 
for on-orbit maneuvers. NASA conducted additional contract competitions 
during 1973, choosing Martin Marietta to build the external tank and select- 
ing Thiokol for the solid rocket  booster^.^' 
The events of 1972 brought an end to NASA’s search for a post-Apollo 
future. The search had begun in 1965, when George Mueller had set up his 
Apollo Applications program office. This effort led to Skylab, but that offered 
no more than one more year of piloted missions. Characteristically, Mueller 
responded by seeking a larger space station that could fly atop a Saturn V. The 
Space Shuttle then grew out of this new pursuit, initially as a logistics vehicle 
30. Letter B-173677, Staats to Fletcher, March 3 1 ,  1972. 
31. [bid.; Low, Personal Notes No. 68,April 17, 1972; NASA SP-4012, vol. In, p. 49, 122-123. 
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but growing to take on a life of its own. 
Why, finally, did Nixon decide to build the Shuttle? One must not under- 
estimate the tendency of the federal government to look after its own; few 
major Washington programs reach an end, to vanish into the night. Nixon had 
no wish to shut down piloted space flight; he wanted to keep it alive. He also 
was concerned over aerospace employment. Yet he could have addressed such 
issues with nothing more than Big Gemini riding atop a Titan 111-M, to fly 
occasionally and show the flag. 
The key to the Shuttle was its well-founded prospect of low cost and rou- 
tine operation. This promise did not rest on the cost-benefit studies of 
Mathematica, which the Flax Committee largely refuted and the OMB 
rejected out of hand. Rather, it rested on technical developments: automated 
onboard checkout, reusable thermal protection, rocket engines with long life. 
No OMB internal memo or White House report ever denied this promise; only 
experience would do that, years later. The Space Shuttle thus could find its 
way to approval, within a nation and government that remained willing to 
embrace the new. 
During 1972, the Shuttle entered a new phase, as a mainstream aerospace 
program. The debates and arguments were finished. NASA now held its 
future in its own hands, with responsibility for executing what it had planned 
and delivering what it had promised. 
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